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Abstract 
 
At the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, Britain had only one military academy which 
taught Military History, the subject was overlooked at universities, few historians wrote on 
the topic and the government had not yet sanctioned the writing of official history. Yet, by 
the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the situation was radically different. Not only 
had Military History come to play an important role in army education, there were several 
universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, which taught the subject, while the Committee 
of Imperial Defence had created a ‘Historical Section’ dedicated to the writing of officially 
authorised histories. Despite this dramatic transformation, the development of British 
Military History during this period has hitherto not been considered by scholars as a subject 
worthy of serious investigation. The meagre research which has been conducted on the 
subject has been limited in terms of its scope and use of primary sources. This thesis will 
attempt to fill this gap in the historiography by analysing the emergence, expansion and 
diversification of British Military History between 1854 and 1914. It will examine the 
different factors which led to the expansion of Military History: the need for improved 
military education, the requirement to collate information on recent wars, commercial 
opportunism, the desire to influence public perceptions and the discovery of Military History 
as a subject worthy of historical research.  
 
1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
On 17 March 1897 Colonel Lonsdale Hale began a lecture to the Royal United Service 
Institution, entitled ‘The Professional Study of Military History’, with the words, ‘Dr 
Maguire brought before us a few nights ago the study of Military History as a factor in the 
training of the nation; today, I bring that study again before you, but this time as a factor in 
the training of the soldier’. 1  This comment, especially from an officer who had taught 
Military History for many years to officer cadets, suggests that the subject was thought to 
have a number of functions by the end of the nineteenth century.2 However, less than fifty 
years before Hale delivered his lecture, the subject had been regarded very differently in 
Britain. In 1854 the country had only one small military institution that taught Military 
History, it was not studied in any university, few historians wrote on the subject, and the 
government had not yet sanctioned the writing of official history. Given the developments 
which Hale’s comment suggests had occurred over a fifty-year period, the emergence, 
expansion and diversification of Military History in Britain between 1854 and 1914 would 
appear to be a subject worthy of closer examination.  
                                                          
1 Lonsdale Hale, ‘The Professional Study of Military History’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 
41 (March 1897), p. 690; and, T. Miller Maguire, ‘The National Study of Military History’, Journal of the Royal 
United Service Institution, 41 (May 1897), pp. 598-622. 
2 Brian Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London, 1972), p. 248.  
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Although there is no consensus as to the precise definition of ‘Military History’, the 
subject is currently understood to encompass a wide and multifaceted approach to the study 
of conflict, as well as the relationship between the armed services and society. The definition 
found in Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography, for example, 
characterises the subject as ‘the analytic review of wars, campaigns, battles, and military 
institutions, including their economic, political, and social foundations and effects, and 
relationships between military and civil authorities.3 Likewise, Stephen Morillo and Michael 
Pavkovic have adopted a similar definition, describing the subject as ‘any historical study in 
which military personnel of all sorts, warfare… military institutions, and their various 
intersections with politics, economics, society, nature, and culture form the focus or topic of 
the work’.4 Such a definition, which encompasses a wide range of considerations, is in part 
due to the influence of ‘new’ Military History which emerged during the 1960s and which 
placed an emphasis on ‘recruitment, training… the internal dynamics of military institutions 
[and] the relationship between military systems and greater society’, rather than on the 
conduct of military operations.5 As the subject is understood to encompass such a wide range 
of topics, David Gates wrote in 2001 in the preface to his Warfare in the Nineteenth Century 
that the boundaries of Military History ‘are difficult to identify, for it is hard to think of 
anything that has not influenced, or has been influenced by, war’.6 
However, such an approach to the definition of Military History has not always been 
the case, as Hale, in his lecture at the RUSI in 1897, considered Military History to be simply 
                                                          
3 Franklin D. Margiotta (ed.), Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography (Washington, 2000), 
pp. 485-6. An almost identical definition appears in Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, International Military and Defence 
Encyclopaedia, Vol. 2 (Washington, 1993), p. 1205.  
4 Stephen Morillo and Michael F. Pavkovic, What is Military History? (Cambridge, 2012), p. 3. 
5 Joanna Bourke, ‘New Military History’, in Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (eds.), Palgrave Advances 
in Modern Military History (London, 2007), p. 258.  
6 David Gates, Warfare in the Nineteenth Century (London, 2001), p. viii.  
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‘military experiences’ in the past.7 Moreover, on the eve of the outbreak of the First World 
War, John Fortescue, the Lees Knowles Lecturer in Military Science at the University of 
Cambridge, presented a further definition of the subject in which he described it as ‘the 
history of the strife of communities expressed through the conflict of organised bands of 
men’, deliberately selecting his words so as to exclude economic warfare.8 As Fortescue went 
on to explain further his conception of the subject as the history of ‘the rise and fall of 
civilisations’, or ‘the process of supplanting the inferior by the superior’, he demonstrated 
that his understanding of what constituted Military History was heavily influenced by his 
belief in Social Darwinism.9  
As such, then, definitions of what constitutes Military History seem to differ 
considerably in the twentieth century compared to the views expressed in the nineteenth 
century. Yet, as most of the more recent historical research on the nature and evolution of 
Military History as a discipline focuses on the twentieth century, there are still no studies to 
which the historian can turn to discover how Military History developed during the 
nineteenth century. This immediately raises the question as to what time-period the 
nineteenth century might cover. After E.J. Hobsbawn’s use of the term ‘the Long Nineteenth 
Century’ to refer to the period from the French Revolution in 1789 to the outbreak of the 
Great War in 1914, many historians have adopted this term.10 For the military historian, 
however, there are just as many reasons for taking the nineteenth century to refer to the 
period 1815-1914. The final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte at Waterloo in 1815 ushered in a 
new epoch in military history.11 Hence, before assessing the inadequacies, problems and gaps 
                                                          
7 Hale, ‘Professional Study of Military History’, pp. 691-2. 
8 J.W. Fortescue, Military History (Cambridge, 1914), p. 5. 
9 Ibid., p. 17.  
10 E.J. Hobsbawn, Age of Revolution 1789-1848 (London, 1962), p. i; idem, Age of Capital 1848-1875 (London, 
1975), p. i; and, idem, Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (London, 1987), p. i. 
11 Peter Burroughs, ‘An Unreformed Army? 1815-1868’, in David G. Chandler and Ian F. Beckett (eds.), Oxford 
History of the British Army (Oxford, 2003), pp. 161-3. 
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in the secondary literature, it is important to reflect on different phases in, first, the 
emergence, then both the expansion and diversification of Military History in Britain during 
the period 1815-1914. 
 
The Evolution of Military History, 1815-1914  
The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 caused an increase in the volume of Military History 
published. Particularly numerous were memoirs and autobiographies which described the 
experiences of individuals, mainly officers, during this conflict.12 Likewise a small number of 
biographical works on the military figures involved in the fighting were published prior to the 
outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, most of which were related to Wellington or 
Napoleon.13 There were comparatively few works dedicated to the narration of a campaign, 
although Sir William Napier’s six volume study, History of the War in the Peninsula, 
published between 1828 and 1840, was still considered to be the only ‘classical Military 
History’ in the English language by the military thinker Major-General Sir Patrick 
MacDougall in 1856.14 Similarly, in 1844 Major Basil Jackson wrote that even regarding the 
Waterloo campaign, ‘it cannot be said that any [British] writer has, hitherto, given us a full 
and satisfactory account of the momentous events of that period’.15 Although in this year 
William Siborne’s History of the War in France and Belgium did provide the ‘full account’ 
                                                          
12 See, for example: ‘Kincaid’, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade (London, 1847); Harry Smith, Autobiography 
(India, 1844); Robert Blakeney, A Boy in the Peninsular War (London, 1835); John Blakiston, Twelve Years of 
Military Adventure (London, 1829); H.E. Bunbury, Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France 
(London, 1854); and, George Jones, Battle of Waterloo (London, 1817). 
13 William Coxe, Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough (London, 1820); Thomas Babington Macaulay, The 
Life of Frederick the Great (London, 1842); Robert Pearce, Life of Lord Wellesley (London, 1843); William 
Napier, Conquest of the Scinde (London, 1845); Lord Ellesmere, Life and Character of the Duke of Wellington 
(London, 1853); John Gurwood, Despatches of the Duke of Wellington (London, 1852); J.G. Lockhart, A 
History of Napoleon Buonaparte (London, 1829); W. Hazlitt, Life of Napoleon, 4 vols. (London, 1828-1830); 
and, Walter Scott, Life of Napoleon Buonaparte: with a preliminary view of the French Revolution, 9 vols. 
(London, 1834-35).  
14 Jay Luvaas, Education of an Army (London, 1964), p. 102.  
15 Major Basil Jackson, ‘The Waterloo Campaign and its Historians’, Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 2 
(January 1844), p. 1.  
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that was lacking, it was still the only work in the English language that was referenced by 
Colonel Charles Chesney in his celebrated Waterloo Lectures of 1868.16 
 The lack of an intrusive European conflict between the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 prevented Military History from featuring more 
prominently in British historical writing during the first half of the nineteenth century. The 
French Emperor’s defeat in 1815 was thought to have demonstrated that the British 
constitution was, as the historian William Cruise wrote in that year, ‘quite perfect’. 17 
Consequently, a historical approach that concentrated on constitutional progress, the 
development of personal liberty, and the special nature of British Christianity came to 
dominate much of the historical writing in Britain.18 An emphasis on these factors ensured 
that despite the rapid expansion of the British Empire between 1815 and 1854, particularly in 
Asia, Military History did not feature prominently in British historical writing at this time 
beyond the few campaign narratives produced by officers who had served in these conflicts.19  
 Although chairs of History had been founded at the University of Glasgow in 1692, at 
Edinburgh in 1719, at St Andrews in 1737, and the Regius Chairs of Modern History at 
Oxford and Cambridge were established in 1724, none of these institutions had a History 
syllabus, a Faculty of History, or an examination in the subject until the 1850s. 20  The 
                                                          
16 William Siborne, History of the War in France and Belgium (London, 1844); and, Charles Cornwallis 
Chesney, Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815 (London, 1868), p. vii.  
17 William Cruise, A Chronological Abridgement of the History of England, its Constitution and Laws from the 
Norman Conquest to the Revolution in 1688 (London, 1815) p. 9.  
18 Michael Bentley, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing’, in Daniel Woolf (ed.), The Oxford History 
of Historical Writing, Volume 4: 1800-1945 (Oxford, 2011), p. 208. This approach would later become called 
the ‘Whig interpretation of history’ by Herbert Butterfield. Herbert Butterfield, Whig Interpretation of History 
(London, 1931), p. 9.  
19 The two exceptions to this are: James Mill, History of the British in India (London, 1817), and; Montgomery 
Martin, History of the British Colonies (London, 1834). For examples of campaign narratives by officers, see: 
H.H. Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War in 1824-26 (London, 1852); W.F.B. Laurice, Second Burmese War 
(London, 1853); J.J. Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War (London, 1827); and, Henry Havelock, Narrative 
of the War in Afghanistan in 1838, 1839 (London, 1840). 
20 Richard Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent (Cambridge, 2009), 
p. 59; and, Peter R.H. Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education: The Study of Modern History in the Universities 
of Oxford, Cambridge and Manchester 1800-1914 (Manchester, 1986), p. 27.  
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University of London, founded in 1836, had also created a Professorship in History, which 
between 1840 and 1860 was occupied by Edward Creasy.21 Creasy, who was educated as a 
lawyer and called to the Bar in 1837, had an interest in Military History and wrote two works 
on the subject: Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World in 1851, and Invasions and the Projected 
Invasions of England from the Saxon Times, the following year. So unusual was it for a 
university historian to write Military History at this time, Creasy felt the need to excuse the 
seeming ‘strange weakness or depravity of mind’ which he felt people would assume he had 
for selecting events in which ‘hundreds or thousands of human beings stabbed, hewed, or 
shot each other to death’ as his ‘favourite topic’. Thus, he focused on the ‘undeniable 
greatness’ of the personal qualities of many of the combatants and the place of the battle in 
history, rather than on an examination of the military means employed or on an analysis of 
the judgements made by commanders. As Military History was not examined at universities 
at this time, there was no scholarly readership for such work, so Creasy intended his writing 
for the general reading public. His Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World was particularly well 
received and it went through six editions in the three years immediately following its 
publication.22  
In keeping with its lack of prominence, Military History was not taught at any of the 
army’s academies before 1850. The Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, founded in 1741 
to train officers for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, did not teach the subject as part 
of its curriculum before 1854. Admission to Woolwich was limited to boys aged between 
fourteen and sixteen years of age who had passed an entrance exam. This assessment, which 
was set by the Professors and Masters of the Academy, reflected the ‘theoretical’ or first 
                                                          
21 Christopher Charle, ‘Patterns’, in Walter Ruegg (ed.), History of the University in Europe, Vol. 3, p. 62; 
Edward Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo (London, 1851), p. iii.  
22 Edward Creasy, Invasions and the Projected Invasions of England from the Saxon Times (London, 1852); 
Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, pp. iii, v; Leslie Howsam, Past into Print: The Publishing of 
History in Britain 1850-1950 (London 2009), p. 53; Edward Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World 
(London, 6th edn., 1854).  
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phase of education a cadet would undertake. As a result, it focused on English, Maths, 
French, German, Geography, History and Drawing. The study of History at Woolwich paid 
no special attention to military events, was limited to the period before 1815, and expected 
the pupil to exhibit factual knowledge only. Once a cadet had passed through the ‘theoretical’ 
part of his study at Woolwich, he advanced to the ‘practical’ phase of instruction which did 
not include any historical study.23  
Similarly, the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, formed for the education of young 
officers in 1812, did not teach Military History before 1854, either. This institution admitted 
boys between thirteen and fifteen years of age, so its curriculum was dedicated to providing 
them with a basic ‘liberal education’ as opposed to specialist military instruction. Passing out 
of Sandhurst was not obligatory for an officer, since between 1815 and 1871 around two-
thirds of all commissions in the army were obtained by purchase, while the other third were 
‘inherited’ through regimental seniority. 24  Therefore, on successfully completing the 
Sandhurst course a cadet merely received a ‘recommendation’ for a commission in the 
army.25 For much of the period prior before 1854 the purchase of a commission in the 
Infantry or Cavalry did not entail any form of written exam to demonstrate the candidate’s 
suitability. When promotional exams were introduced, beginning in July 1849, they did not 
include Military History until 1904. 26  The Royal Military College did have a ‘Senior 
Department’ intended to train serving officers for a staff appointment, a role which entailed 
assisting a commanding officer with the administrative, operational and logistical 
requirements of his force, although attendance was not compulsory for such a position. The 
                                                          
23 Anon., Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Consider the Best Mode of Re-organising the System for 
Training Officers From the Scientific Corps, 1857 (0.52), pp. 62-63. 
24 G.A. Shepperd, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and its Predecessors (London, 2008), pp. 51, 78; and, 
Richard Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London, 2001), p. 157.  
25 John Smyth, Sandhurst (London, 1961), p. 58.  
26 Anon., ‘Military Education, Notes by the Editor’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 55 (April 
1911), p. 483. 
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‘Senior Department’ did not teach Military History and the entire teaching staff consisted of 
only one professor.27 
From 1850, the cadets who had graduated from the Royal Military Academy at 
Woolwich, and were destined for a commission in the Royal Artillery, underwent the army’s 
only Military History course that was instituted prior to 1856.28 For six months they were 
placed under the command of a ‘Director of Studies’ at the Royal Artillery Institution and 
were taught, among other subjects, ‘Military History, British and Foreign’, as well as the 
‘application of the three arms, strategy, battles… sieges [and] military biography’.29 Given 
the few British volumes on these subjects, teaching was largely conducted from works 
published in French and German, so not only were students given the ‘opportunity… to keep 
up the knowledge of these languages already acquired at the Royal Military Academy’, but 
specialist language instructors were appointed to assist them.30  
In the development of Military History in Britain after 1815, it was the Crimean War 
which represented the major turning point. After this conflict, the army began to expand 
dramatically the teaching of the subject in its educational curricula. From 1858 the subject 
was taught at the newly created Staff College which assumed the role of training staff officers 
from the ‘Senior Department’ of the Royal Military College. By 1870, Military History was 
included in the syllabuses at Woolwich, Sandhurst, and the Royal Engineers Establishment at 
Chatham, where those officers destined for the Royal Engineers were trained after they had 
graduated from the Royal Military Academy.31 There was also a dramatic increase in the 
publication of books which utilised Military History for officer education, the most notable of 
                                                          
27 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 53.  
28 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860 (London, 1860), pp. 3, 13, 56. 
29 Anon., Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Consider the Best Mode of Re-organising the System for 
Training Officers From the Scientific Corps (0.52) (London, 1857), pp. 45, 320 429. (This report will be 
referred to hereafter as the Yolland Commission.)  
30 Ibid., pp. 452, 343.  
31 Edward Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902 (Manchester, 1992), p. 101.  
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these being Edward Hamley’s Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained, first published 
in 1866, which had gone through seven editions by 1914, although other similar books were 
produced by Patrick MacDougall in 1856 and J.J. Graham in 1858.32 
Similarly, from the 1890s, works which utilised Military History for officer education 
began to diversify in terms of the topics which they were compiled to illustrate. In 1896 
Charles Callwell used examples from Military History in his work on irregular warfare, Small 
Wars: Their Principles and Practice, and also in his books on maritime operations.33 Equally, 
Julian Corbett used Military History heavily in his celebrated work Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy.34 In the decade before the outbreak of the Great War there was a dramatic 
expansion in the volume of Military History which was published with the intention of 
serving a didactic function for officers; in fact several publishers, such as Constable and 
Swan and Sonnenschein, began to produce series of such works.35  
Official history emerged, too, after the Crimean War when Lord Panmure, the 
Secretary of State for War, authorised the writing of two accounts of this conflict, the first to 
document the activities of the Royal Engineers during the siege of Sebastopol and the second 
the experience of the Royal Artillery.36 Thus, from then on to be classed as ‘official history’, 
a work, even if it did not contain the term in its title, needed to have been produced using 
public funds and to have been authorised by the Secretary of State for War.37 Although 
                                                          
32 Edward Hamley, Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained (London, 1866); P.L. MacDougall, The 
Theory of War (London, 1856); and, J.J. Graham, Progress of the Art of War (London, 1858). 
33 Charles Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London, 1896); idem., Military Operations and 
Maritime Preponderance (London, 1905); and, idem, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaign 
Since Waterloo (London, 1897).  
34 Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London, 1911).   
35 Swan and Sonneschien started the ‘Special Campaign Series’ with S.C. Pratt, Saarbruck to Paris: The 
Franco-German War (London, 1904), p. i. Constable started the ‘Campaigns and their Lessons’ with Charles 
Callwell, Campaigns and Their Lessons: Tirah 1897 (London, 1911). 
36 H.C. Elphinstone, Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by the Corps of Royal 
Engineers (London, 1856); H.D. Jones, Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by 
the Corps of Royal Engineers (London, 1856); and, Frederick Maurice (ed.) History of the War in South Africa, 
4 vols. (London, 1906-1912). 
37 TNA, CAB 103/434, Report of Sub-Committee, January 1907, p. 2. 
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official history continued to be produced in Britain throughout the period between the 
Crimean War and the outbreak of the First World War, the practice of producing authorised 
accounts spread to India: from 1874 the British authorities there began to produce historical 
work which narrated the expeditions undertaken by the Indian Army.38 Although for many 
years Britain possessed no permanent body dedicated to the production of authorised history, 
in 1906 the Committee of Imperial Defence, an advisory body responsible to the Prime 
Minister, formed a ‘Historical Section’ dedicated to the production of official history 
intended to be of use to the Committee and the armed services.39 Under the guidance of the 
Historical Section, two Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese War were produced with the 
intention that they would supersede the accounts of this conflict begun by both the Navy and 
the General Staff.40 Consequently, under the guidance of the Historical Section a ‘Combined 
History’, which included equal reference to operations on land and sea, was produced for the 
first time.41  
Another development was the unprecedented number of works produced in the wake 
of the Crimean War which were written with the intention of being accessible to the reading 
public. They were written in a readable style, did not include complex arguments and were 
often based on a limited amount of information.42 The publication of this type of material, 
which was occasionally referred to as ‘popular’ history, expanded greatly between 1854 and 
1914. The Second Boer War, in particular, fought between 1899 and 1902, was the subject of 
a vast numbers of such works, which included first-hand accounts of the fighting written by 
                                                          
38 W.H. Paget, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes (Simla, 1874); and, W.H. Paget 
and A.H, Mason, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to 
Date by Lt. A.H. Mason (Simla, 1884).  
39 TNA, CAB 103/434, Committee of Imperial Defence Historical Section Memorandum, 28 January 1914.  
40 TNA, CAB 103/434, Note by the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1914, p. 3.  
41 Neill Malcolm and Ernest Swinton, Official History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War, 3 vols. 
(London, 1910-1920).  
42 For two examples, see: ‘Daily News Correspondent’ [J.F. Maurice], The Ashantee War: A Popular Narrative 
(London, 1874); and, Spenser Wilkinson, Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff 
(London, 1890). 
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officers and journalists, as well as biographical volumes on British military leaders, 
particularly Colonel Robert Baden-Powell, who had commanded the besieged garrison of 
Mafeking.43 Similarly, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 generated a large of quantity of 
publications, including several serialised histories, such as Cassell’s History of the Russo-
Japanese War, the first instalment of which appeared barely four weeks after the outbreak of 
hostilities.44  
In short, any cursory survey of the publication of works of Military History in Britain 
during the course of the nineteenth century, taken to be the period from 1815 to 1914, reveals 
that there was limited publishing activity from the end of the Napoleonic Wars up until the 
outbreak of the Crimean War. Thereafter, however, Military History underwent a dramatic 
period of expansion and diversification, emerging for the first time as an identifiable 
discipline. Not only did the instruction of Military History at army educational institutions 
expand, there was a rise in publishing activity, in terms of works produced both for officers 
and for the reading public. Military History even began to arouse the interest of scholars at 
universities. In other words, the period 1854 to 1914 would seem to represent the crucial 
early phase in the development of the subject. But before considering in more detail what 
issues face the historian in considering this phenomenon, it is important to examine the views 
and comments of those few historians who have passed judgment on the emergence of 
Military History during the nineteenth century. 
 
Historiography  
The standard historical works which exist on the British Army in the nineteenth century have 
concentrated on the classic areas of military reform, in particular organisational change, the 
                                                          
43 Lawrence James, Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London, 1995), p. 212. 
44 Anon., Cassell’s History of the Russo-Japanese War, 3 vols. (London, 1904-5). 
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development of recruiting systems, and the improvement of training methods.45 There has 
been much less attention paid to the development of fields of intellectual activity at this time. 
The scholarly works which have discussed British military thought and history in the 
nineteenth century have viewed the subject predominantly within the context of the Great 
War rather than in its own right.46 Even more problematic is that, since the 1920s, the limited 
scholarly work which has commented on how Military History was studied by the army in 
Britain prior to 1914 has been strongly influenced by the thoughts of J.F.C. Fuller and Basil 
Liddell Hart. As the ideas of these men have been so influential, and have been often repeated 
verbatim in subsequent historical work, it is important to outline their views on the way the 
subject was studied by the army.  
In the inter-war period Fuller sought to reform the way in which the British Army 
thought about warfare.47 He maintained that British generalship in the Great War had been 
seriously undermined because the training officers received did not enable or encourage them 
to think about future developments in the conduct of war.48 To demonstrate his view, Fuller 
pointed to his experience of studying Military History at the Staff College in 1913.49 He 
claimed that the study of the subject there had been centred on only one campaign, fought in 
the Shenandoah Valley during the American Civil War, and had been restricted to the 
compilation of factual information. To Fuller, this approach undermined the point of studying 
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47 J.F.C. Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War (London, 1926), p. 328, and; Brian Holden Reid, J.F.C. 
Fuller: Military Thinker (London, 1987), p. 67.  
48 Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, p. 29; and, J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure. 
A Study of the Personal Factor in Command (London 1932), pp. 72, 77. 
49 J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London, 1936), p. 29.  
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the subject as it did not question ‘why’ and ‘how’ success or failure in a campaign had 
occurred. Much of Fuller’s strident criticism of the study of Military History in Britain 
appeared in his 1926 book The Foundations of the Science of War. Here he outlined his view 
that war could be treated as a science with principles and laws which could be revealed, 
studied, and applied to the study of Military History.50 
Liddell Hart agreed with Fuller’s interpretation of the study of Military History in 
Britain. He too thought that war should be studied as a science, with the role of Military 
History to ‘throw the film of the past through the material projector of the present onto the 
screen of the future’.51 In the same fashion as Fuller, even using the same example, Liddell 
Hart pointed to the study of the subject at the Staff College to demonstrate how he thought 
the army had misused the subject before 1914. He wrote, ‘to be able to enumerate the blades 
of grass in the Shenandoah Valley… is not an adequate foundation for leadership in a future 
war where conditions and armament have radically changed’.52 Moreover, both Liddell Hart 
and Fuller thought that the flawed approach they had identified in the British approach to 
studying Military History had caused the army to overlook the importance of the American 
Civil War. They argued that the army had either drawn the wrong lessons from the conflict or 
had ignored its significance altogether.53 This led Liddell Hart to consider the American Civil 
War as ‘The Signpost That Was Missed’, as he believed that this oversight had, in part, 
caused the army to be unprepared for the style of fighting which took place during First 
World War.54 
                                                          
50 Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, p. 328. 
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52 Liddell Hart, Remaking Modern Armies, p. 170. 
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54 Brian Holden Reid, ‘“A Signpost That Was Missed?” Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil 
War’, Journal of Military History, 70/2 (2006), p. 385. 
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However, there is reason to question the interpretation put forward by both Fuller and 
Liddell Hart concerning the study of Military History in the army prior to 1914. The only 
evidence provided by both men is anecdotal. They did not provide any verifiable evidence, 
such as exam papers, essays, or even a description of the Military History syllabus taught by 
the army at its training establishments to substantiate their claims about the study of the 
subject. Moreover, as both men were seeking to promote their own ideas concerning the 
reformation of the army after the First World War, they had a vested interest in presenting the 
army in the worst possible light. Furthermore, when the historical writing of Liddell Hart 
came under scrutiny from John J. Mearsheimer, it was revealed that on numerous occasions 
Liddell Hart had ‘twist[ed] the historical record’ in order that his own ideas would appear 
correct.55 
Nevertheless, the limited historical scholarship concerning the study of Military 
History in Britain before 1914 has drawn heavily on the views of Fuller and Liddell Hart. 
One example is the American historian Jay Luvaas, who wrote several works which 
examined aspects of British military thought between 1815 and 1940, which included 
Military History. 56  In his book, Education of an Army, Luvaas adopted a biographical 
approach, and each chapter focused on the life and work of one military writer, so that 
Military History was not examined in any other than a cursory fashion in relation to the 
writings of Generals E.B. Hamley and J.F. Maurice, Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, Spenser 
Wilkinson and Lieutenant-Colonel C. à Court Repington. When he referred to the study of 
the subject at the Staff College, Luvaas heavily relied on the interpretation provided by 
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Liddell Hart and Fuller, quoting Liddell Hart’s remark about ‘the blades of grass in the 
Shenandoah Valley’ to characterise his own interpretation.57  
Although Luvaas did not closely examine the teaching of Military History at the Staff 
College, Brian Bond’s work, Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914, came closer to 
doing this. Bond’s volume was a great improvement on the only other general study of the 
Staff College, authored by A.R. Godwin Austen in 1927. Austen focused on articulating the 
social activities undertaken by the students of the college and adopted an irreverent tone in 
which he attacked the appearance of officers instead of providing an analysis of the course of 
study. Bond’s work did discuss the teaching of Military History at the college, but it too 
relied on Liddell Hart’s interpretation of the study of the subject, also quoting his statement 
on the ‘blades of grass in the Shenandoah’.58 Moreover, Bond did not examine the Military 
History exam papers or essays produced by students at the institution. Likewise, Holden 
Reid’s working paper ‘War Studies at the Staff College, 1890-1930’ presented the 
interpretation put forward by Fuller and Liddell Hart on the study of Military History without 
recourse to primary evidence to substantiate his claims; here, too, Liddell Hart’s phrase on 
the ‘blades of grass in the Shenandoah’ was repeated.59  
The development of the writing of official history in Britain before 1914 has also been 
largely overlooked. In the wake of the historiographical controversies over the British 
Official History of the First World War, there has been some interest among historians in the 
writing of official histories. This has seen three books edited by Robin Higham on official 
histories published around the world; and, there have been other studies on the writing of the 
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British and German Official Histories of the First World War.60 Following Liddell Hart’s 
famous claim that the British official account of the First World War was ‘official, but not 
history’, as he thought that it was intended to protect the reputations of British commanders 
rather than be an accurate record, scholarly work which has looked at the writing of official 
history has largely fixated on the extent to which ‘official history can be honest history’.61 
This close attention paid to individual histories, and the extent to which they may or may not 
have been manipulated, has deflected attention away from any analysis of improvements in 
official historical writing during the nineteenth century.  
Of the four edited volumes on the writing of official Military History edited by 
Higham, only the work Official Histories: Essays and Bibliographies from Around the World 
contained a chapter concerning official histories produced in Britain before the Great War.62 
Although this short eight-page chapter, entitled ‘The First British Official Historians’, looked 
briefly at the official histories produced as a result of the Crimean War and the British 
invasion of Egypt in 1882, it did not engage in any depth with the official histories produced 
before 1906. In fact, Luvaas described the Official Histories of the Abyssinian campaign, the 
Zulu War, and the Nile Expedition as ‘nondescript’, only briefly referring to them, with half 
the chapter devoted to a discussion of the accuracy of the Great War Official History.63 
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Some historical work has appeared on individual official histories written at this time, 
but these have failed to integrate their findings into a broader picture of official history 
writing before the Great War and have suffered from limited archival research. Following a 
reprint of the British Official History of the Zulu War, John Laband published a pamphlet 
Companion to accompany the new edition. The fifteen-page pamphlet focused on the 
biography of the author of the Official History, and the material used to write it, so it did not 
discuss the development of official historical writing at this time. Likewise, Brian Robson’s 
article on the Official History of the Second Afghan War neither provided accurate comment 
on the development of official history writing, nor did it make full use of all the primary 
material available.64  
The Official History of the Second Boer War has been analysed by Ian F.W. Beckett 
in greater depth than the official histories of the Zulu or Second Afghan War. But, again, the 
scope of the work did not allow for much consideration of the development of official 
historical writing.65 Similarly, Jonathan B.A. Bailey and Gary P. Cox in their writing on the 
British Official History of the Russo-Japanese War did not attempt to place their findings 
within the broader context of official historical writing in Britain before 1904.66 Moreover, all 
three of these studies did not include important primary material. Beckett’s work did not 
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analyse the original drafts of the Official History which survive, nor did he make full use of 
the files concerning the compilation of the Official History at the National Archives at Kew. 
Bailey’s work, together with that of Cox, suffered because although they referred to the 
Official History that was compiled jointly between the Army and Navy on the Russo-
Japanese War, neither referred to the Official History which the army produced itself, and 
which sold a greater number of copies.67  
The only work to attempt to give a complete overview of the Military History 
produced during the long nineteenth century is a book chapter by Tim Travers.68 However, he 
only devoted four pages to the period between 1854 and 1914, ignored official military 
history and, because he failed to consider how an understanding of what constituted the 
subject developed over time, came to the conclusion that popular Military History only began 
to appear after the Second World War. 69  In fact, besides John MacKenzie’s Popular 
Imperialism and the Military, which used the term ‘“instant” histories’ to refer to historical 
accounts of a campaign written by journalists using their despatches, which often appeared 
soon after the end of the fighting, only one scholarly article has considered popular Military 
History published before 1914.70 Like his discussion of official history, Beckett’s article 
‘Early Historians and the South African War’ makes no attempt to place the analysis within 
the broader context of other Military History produced in this period.71 
Hence, it can be seen that the historical literature concerning the writing of Military 
History in Britain during the nineteenth century is both problematic and incomplete. In the 
case of the historical work looking at Military History studied by the army, there is an 
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overreliance on the interpretation provided by Liddell Hart and Fuller which is based only on 
anecdotal evidence. The scholarly work considering the writing of official history before 
1914 consists of one brief overview which disregards much of the subject, or work that 
focuses on only one official account published before 1914. Likewise, Military History that 
was not official and was not intended for officer education has barely been considered in the 
academic literature, reflecting a narrow approach to the research into Military History, one 
which eschews including popular culture. Given the dramatic expansion in the scale and 
scope of Military History between 1854 and 1914, the lack of serious historical work on the 
subject is a major omission. This study will therefore be dedicated to answering the following 
question: How and why did British Military History emerge, expand and diversify between 
1854 and 1914? 
 
Research Issues  
In seeking to answer the question above, this study will attempt to fill a gap in the military 
historical literature. In order to answer the central research question, however, it is important 
that concepts and categories which are commonly used by historians of the twentieth century 
are not applied without reflection to the nineteenth century. So, before addressing the 
methodological approach which is to be adopted, it needs to be established what is 
understood by Military History, what geographical restrictions have been used in the 
selection of the texts under investigation, what is understood by the term ‘military’, and the 
relationship between military theory and history.  
When it came to characterising their work as History, writers in the nineteenth century 
were not constrained by the lack of any lapse of time between an event and their study of it. 
Consequently, the 1889 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica simply defined the subject 
as ‘the prose narrative of past events’ and gave no explanation regarding the distinction 
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between the past and the present.72 This was also a common feature in the Military History 
written during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Spenser Wilkinson, for example, in his 
inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor in Military History at Oxford, declared that as 
‘Military History is the effort to understand war’, it could include ‘either wars that have 
happened and are over, or a war that is taking place’.73 Such an understanding of the scope of 
the subject could be seen in works intended for officer education.74 But the same applied to 
‘popular’ work, such as the first volume of G.B. Malleson’s Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An 
Historical Narrative which appeared in 1857 while the conflict was still raging; similarly, the 
initial instalment of H.M. Hozier’s Franco-Prussian War appeared in 1870, and was 
advertised by the publisher as ‘a History of the present’.75 
As the length of time which had elapsed between an event and the publication of an 
account did not affect whether it was considered historical writing, this presents a 
methodological problem in distinguishing between ‘history’ and journalism. In the period 
examined by this study journalism was understood in very narrow terms closely associated 
with the appearance of work in a newspaper. Thus, the 1910 edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica described it as the ‘intellectual work comprised in the production of a newspaper’ 
and, similarly, ‘reporting’ was the reproduction in a newspaper of a description ‘in narrative 
form [of] the events, in contemporary history’, from the ‘notes made by persons generally 
known as reporters’.76  
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Moving to the term ‘military’, in the twentieth century it came to refer to the armed 
services generally, so now encompasses the army, navy and air force.77 In the nineteenth 
century, however, it referred exclusively to the army; in 1913 when the International 
Congress of Historical Studies included a section for work on the armed services, it 
distinguished between ‘naval’ and ‘military’ histories.78 However, this is not to say that there 
was not some overlap between Naval and Military History, and, most famously, Julian 
Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy of 1911 looked at how the navy and the army 
should cooperate.79 In keeping with the way in which Military History was understood during 
the nineteenth century, this study will focus on the approaches which were adopted to the 
history of land warfare. In referring to the subject as a discipline, capitalisation will be used, 
whereas lower case will be employed when the military past is referred to.80 
As this study is intended to examine British Military History it will naturally focus 
predominantly on work produced in the British Isles. Given the close connections between 
the Indian and British armies during the period 1854-1914, particularly as India was under 
the control of the Crown from 1858 following the Indian Mutiny, it will though also examine 
how the subject was approached by British historians resident there.81 However, as other 
parts of the Empire published less Military History, and eventually gained independence – 
Canada by 1867, Australia and New Zealand by 1900, and South Africa in 1910 – they were 
no longer under British rule, and so have been excluded from this study.82  
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While this study focuses on British Military History, the extent to which the way it 
was written was influenced by the works of Antoine-Henri de Jomini and Carl von 
Clausewitz is, nonetheless, an important consideration. Jomini used military history to 
identify ‘principles of war’ which he claimed could be used to understand warfare in any 
period. 83  As a result, his theoretical writing was based around the articulation of these 
principles using examples drawn from military history. It was this way of using the subject 
which was adopted by Yates in Elementary Treatise on Strategy and so was the pre-existing 
method of approaching the subject in Britain in 1854.84 By contrast, Clausewitz laid out a 
much more complex system by which Military History could be approached to make it of use 
to the military student. He observed that following historical research, in which the student 
ascertained what had occurred in the past, there were two types of criticism which could be 
used: first, the tracing of effects back to their causes; and second, the testing of the means 
employed by a commander. This latter method involved appraising the decisions made by 
historical figures based on the information that was available to them at the time, and was 
intended to develop the judgement of the student.85 It is important to identify whether the 
theoretical views which underpinned the way in which the subject was used to serve a 
didactic function for officers changed as this might provide an indicator of diversification in 
the approach to Military History during the period 1854-1914.  
The Military History which will be considered in this study was not always published 
with the same aim in mind, since it contained different types of analysis, utilising different 
types of source material. Moreover, the early development of the subject prior to 1854 meant 
that some genres of Military History, such as campaign narratives written privately by 
officers, had already been established, while other genres had yet to emerge. It would then 
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not be possible to judge accurately the emergence, expansion and diversification of Military 
History written between 1854 and 1914 without separating the work produced into several 
categories: it was used in officer education through examinations; it appeared in instructional 
works published for officers; it appeared in the new form of ‘official history’; it was written 
for a popular market; and, it started to take the form of serious historical research. Considered 
from another angle, Military History was written by different authors – military officers, 
civilians and journalists. The new emerging forms of Military History require, then, separate 
research questions which address different issues related to the transformation of Military 
History in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
First, this study intends to analyse what caused the army to expand the use of Military 
History in its exam syllabuses. To do this it is necessary to ascertain not only why the army 
studied Military History, and the extent to which this changed, but also how this affected the 
way in which the subject was taught. Together these factors will allow the dominant view in 
the historiography, that the study of the subject was based on the compilation of mere factual 
information, to be considered through reference to hitherto under-utilised army teaching 
materials.86 Moreover, this will shed light on the extent to which the subject played a role in 
the attempts to professionalise the army during this time, particularly in response to its 
occasional poor performance, as well as the influence of any theoretical writing which may 
have underpinned the approach to the subject.87  
Second, and closely connected to the first issue, is the need to establish why there was 
an increase in the writing of Military History intended to serve a didactic purpose for army 
officers. It is of particular importance to ascertain the motivations behind the publication of 
this work as this will determine the extent to which this type of Military History either 
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influenced or reflected the exam syllabuses used by the army. Consequently, this may reveal 
the advances in British military thought, particularly as regards the extent to which these 
works were written to create a better understanding of warfare, improve professionalism or 
were simply written to take advantage of the demand created for material which enabled 
students to prepare for examinations.  
Third, this study will investigate what caused the emergence and diversification of 
official history. The historians who wrote official history had access to numerous documents 
when compiling their accounts which were unavailable to other military officers. Access to 
this information came at a price, however, as it was expected that both high-ranking military 
and political figures would review the work to ensure that confidential material would not be 
included, and that the history was, in their view, accurate, and that it reflected the views of 
the government.88 The role of these influences later led Liddell Hart to cast doubt on the 
accuracy of the Official History of the Great War.89 Thus, to help answer this question it is 
important to establish why official history first came to be written after the Crimean War, 
whether it was to serve an educational or intelligence purpose for the military and the extent 
to which it was influenced by the desire to protect the reputation of the army. Moreover, as 
the Prussian General Staff produced official accounts of their victories in both the Seven 
Weeks War and Franco-Prussian War, the degree to which these works exerted an influence 
on the production of British official history is also an issue of some significance. 
Fourth, it is necessary to establish what factors contributed to the expansion and 
diversification of popular Military History. As this type of work was intended for a large 
readership, it is necessary to examine the extent to which its writing was influenced by 
commercial opportunism. This consideration is even more important as, throughout the 
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period 1854-1914, especially after the educational reforms of the 1870s, public literacy began 
to increase in Britain, so the size of the potential market for popular Military History was 
continually expanding.90 Correspondingly, as between 1867 and 1885 the government passed 
electoral reform legislation which dramatically increased the number of men eligible to vote, 
it is important to determine the extent to which this type of Military History was intended to 
influence voters, especially as regards their perceptions of the army and the Empire.91 
Fifth, the study will analyse what factors contributed to the emergence of Military 
History as a university and research discipline? As popular Military History was intended to 
be accessible, it did not engage in a thorough examination of the past or utilise many sources, 
so it is important to consider, finally, the more intellectually rigorous approaches to the 
subject which drew on primary source material and conducted a higher level of analysis. To 
be able to provide a response to this question, it is necessary to examine how the writing of 
intellectually rigorous Military History developed, prior to the subject’s appearance as a 
university subject. In this regard, it is also important to ascertain the extent to which the 
emergence of Modern History as a university discipline stimulated the development of 
Military History based on primary research into documents. Equally, the way in which 
Military History was taught once it became a university discipline is of fundamental 
importance in arriving at an answer to this sub-question.  
By addressing these issues, this study will aim to provide a comprehensive assessment 
of how and why Military History emerged, expanded and diversified in Britain between 1854 
and 1914. The five main subjects which will be analysed will provide the structure to the 
thesis; they will also provide the basis for an answer to the principal research question. But to 
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Reform Act of 1867, and the ‘Representation of the People Act’ of 1884, the majority of men could vote. This 
tripled the size of the electorate.  
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answer this question effectively, five specific sub-questions will be posed in order that the 
development of Military History in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century can be 
investigated in a more systematic fashion. These sub-questions are as follows:  
 
 
 What caused the army to expand the use of Military History in its exam 
syllabuses?  
 Why was there an increase in the writing of Military History intended to serve a 
didactic purpose for army officers?  
 What caused the emergence and diversification of official history? 
 What factors contributed to the expansion and diversification of popular Military 
History?  
 What factors contributed to the emergence of Military History as a university and 
research discipline? 
 
By considering these five sub-questions this thesis will aim to contribute to a greater 
understanding of the factors which caused the emergence, expansion and diversification of 
British Military History in the period between 1854 and 1914.  
 
Source Material 
The source material for this study consists of both published historical works and 
unpublished archival sources. Published Military History will necessarily be the principal 
form of source material used in this thesis. The published material examined will include 
books published during the period, as well as articles which appeared in military and civilian 
journals, illustrated weeklies and the ‘high-brow’ quarterlies. There are, of course, a number 
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of limitations in the employment of such source material. The use of articles from periodicals 
can be problematic as on occasion they were published anonymously. Although this problem 
has been alleviated in the case of civilian periodicals produced in the Victorian period due to 
the publication of the Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals which has identified 
previously anonymous authors, it remains a challenge in the case of military journals and 
articles written in the Edwardian period.92  
Correspondence between publishers and authors is another important source for this 
study. The papers of Blackwood’s publishing house are held at the National Library of 
Scotland in Edinburgh; they contain the letters sent to the publisher, William Blackwood, in 
addition to financial accounts extending over a period of years. This collection is of particular 
importance as Blackwood maintained a ‘military staff’ of officers who regularly published 
Military History through the company, writing also articles for Blackwood’s Magazine.93 
Furthermore, the Publishers Archive at Reading University holds further material which 
relates to the publication of Military History, particularly the company papers of Longmans 
Publishers, and Swan and Sonnenschein. 
The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, holds the 
papers of several military historians which are of particular relevance to this study. The most 
notable collection of private papers held at this archive are those of Sir John Frederick 
Maurice who taught Military History at the Staff College, published several works on the 
subject, and acted as the official historian of the British invasion of Egypt and the Second 
Boer War. However, there are limitations to this material. 94  As is the case with the 
                                                          
92 Walter E. Houghton (ed.), Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900 (Toronto, 1966).   
93 David Finkelstein, House of Blackwood: Author Publisher Relations in the Victorian Era (Pennsylvania, 
2002), p. 26.   
94 For wider discussion of the broader issues raised by the use of private papers as historical source material, 
see: Brian Brivati, ‘Using Contemporary Written Sources: Three Case Studies’, in Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton & 
Anthony Seldon (eds.), Contemporary History Handbook (Manchester, 1996), pp. 289-97, and; Arthur 
Marwick, New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language (Houndmills, 2001), pp. 152-85.  
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Blackwood papers, the material held often reflects one side of the correspondence, as only the 
letters received are to be found. Moreover, as with all private papers, the quality of the 
information is variable, and depends on the intended recipient of the letter. Thus, a 
description of the progress made on an author’s work may differ considerably if the message 
was sent to the publisher, a personal friend or a spouse.  
The material used in the teaching of Military History at the army’s academies has 
remained virtually unused by historians; this is a reflection, itself, of the lack of scholarly 
interest in the subject.95 This material includes the coursework and exam papers set as part of 
the Military History syllabus at the Staff College, Sandhurst and Woolwich. In fact, the exam 
papers set by these institutions survive for the period 1854-1914. The Staff College exam 
papers were published several months after each exam, although exam answers have not 
survived to the same degree. Nonetheless, the Liddell Hart Centre holds the papers of several 
figures who either studied Military History at the Staff College or taught the subject.96 The 
private papers of officers who held high rank during the First World War have been donated 
to archives more frequently than those who served in the army before the 1890s. As a result, 
the coursework and essays produced by students which still survives predominantly relates to 
the two decades preceding the outbreak of the Great War. Nevertheless, despite these 
drawbacks, the collective wealth of information contained in some papers provides an 
unparalleled insight into how the subject was understood and utilised by the army during the 
second half of the long nineteenth century. The library of the Joint Service Command and 
Staff College at Shrivenham also holds the majority of the teaching material which was used 
                                                          
95 The only historian to refer to them is Beckett, but he provides no analysis of the exam papers. Beckett, ‘Early 
Historians and the South African War’, p. 28. 
96 The LHCMA holds papers related to instruction conducted at the Staff Colleges by the following officers: 
Major-General Thompson Capper, Major-General John Frederick Maurice, Colonel Archibald Montgomery-
Massingberd and Major-General William Robertson. This archive also holds papers related to the studies 
conducted at the Staff Colleges by the following officers: Captain William Robertson, Captain Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd and Captain Archibald Wavell.  
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between 1902 and 1914 at Camberley in a bound collection known as the ‘Camberley Reds’. 
The Military History exams which were set as part of officer promotion between 1904 and 
1914 have also been overlooked by the scholarly literature on officer education. As these 
exam papers were published with an examiner’s report and the marks awarded to those who 
sat these exams, they are an invaluable source.  
The official histories written between 1854 and 1914, together with the unpublished 
reports, drafts, and memoranda associated with them, are also important sources, although 
they are rare and, in some cases, they remained unpublished. Nonetheless, the British Library 
either holds the only remaining copy or retains re-issued versions of all of the official 
histories which were printed in Britain. The archival material relating to these official 
histories is varied: the scope of this material varies according to the era during which it was 
written or the extent to which it was considered controversial. Very little archival material 
exists on the official histories produced before 1901. The Topographical and Statistical 
section of the War Office, and its successors, were responsible for the writing of official 
history. However, this section was notoriously badly organised and the histories were 
produced in an improvised fashion.97 In fact, many of the official historians did not keep 
private papers, or as in the case of one of the British official historians of the Russo-Japanese 
war, Ernest Swinton, ‘used to indulge in orgies of tearing up’ their private papers.98  
The first Official History of the Second Boer War which was undertaken, written 
between 1901 and 1903 under the supervision of G.F.R. Henderson, created a great deal of 
controversy and was suppressed by the government. Consequently, a large quantity of 
archival material associated with this History survives in the National Archives at Kew and 
has been utilised in this study. Moreover, the only surviving drafts of Henderson’s original 
                                                          
97 TNA, WO32/6054, Memoranda on the Disorganisation of the Intelligence Branch Library, 23 January 1894.  
98 Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History (London, 2004), pp. 30-1.  
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History, which have never been considered by historians, and are held in the Cullen Library 
of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, can be used to shed more light on 
why this work was suppressed.  
Taken as a whole, then, this body of source material – both published and unpublished 
– is more than adequate to provide a sound empirical foundation on which an analysis of the 
emergence, expansion and diversification of Military History between 1854 and 1914 can be 
based.  
 
Research Design  
The analytical approach adopted in this thesis will be thematic, based around five chapters, 
which considers the subject according to the different genres of Military History outlined 
above. Each genre evolved during the second half of the nineteenth century, so it is necessary 
that the process of evolution be traced. A thematic approach has been preferred over a more 
chronological method, which might have allowed certain interactions between authors to 
become more visible but which would have been largely unmanageable and provided more 
limited possibilities for the investigation. Each chapter will aim to provide a response to the 
specific research sub-questions posed above. 
The first two chapters will assess the way in which Military History was employed in 
army education. Chapter 1 examines how the army taught the subject at its military 
academies and the way in which entrance and promotion exams played a part in the 
emergence of Military History as a discipline. The desire to improve officers’ professional 
abilities led Military History to play an increasingly important role in army education; during 
the three decades before the outbreak of the Great War, the way in which it was taught 
underwent a major transformation which was strongly influenced by approaches prevalent in 
Germany. Chapter 2 will then consider the Military History which was written predominantly 
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for a military audience, usually by officers and civilians close to the army. While much of the 
work produced for officer education closely mirrored the exam syllabuses created by the 
army, yet, at the same time, there were still several important volumes authored by British 
writers which had a considerable impact on how the army taught the subject. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of the development of the genre of official history, 
usually produced under the auspices of the War Office. In the early phase in the development 
of this genre, these histories were intended as sources of information for specialists, in many 
cases as a source of intelligence information. As the number of histories increased, they 
became directed towards wider sections of the army, before they began to be written for a 
new purpose: to protect the army’s reputation or refute criticism of it. As the popular press 
expanded its reach and influence over the British reading public, military disasters became a 
‘new front’ which the army leadership had to consider. Later accounts were conceived, in 
fact, as intended primarily for the general public and not a professional military readership. 
Nonetheless, immediately before the outbreak of the Great War some histories came to be 
directed towards the education of regimental officers, partly due to the role played by the 
Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence which was founded in 1906. 
What is important to note about this period, however, is that military history was not 
only directed towards officer education or an official defence of senior commanders’ 
behaviour. Chapter 4 will reflect on the nature of popular Military History and why it grew in 
popularity. One the one hand, commercial opportunities contributed to its rapid growth, but at 
the same time these publications offered an opportunity to influence the public’s perception 
of a particular campaign or the chance to condition their perceptions of the abilities of the 
army and its commander. Finally, Chapter 5 will investigate the development of intellectually 
rigorous approaches to Military History which culminated in the subject starting to be taught 
at universities. The emergence in the 1880s of Modern History as a discipline based on the 
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analysis of source material legitimised for the first time the academic study of Military 
History.  
The different genres of Military History which emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century appear to suggest, even on the basis of a relatively cursory glance, that the 
complexity and variation in the discipline has been largely ignored by historians, who have 
been content to adopt the Fuller-Liddell Hart thesis of learning facts by rote. A closer 
examination of the subject, however, may topple some of the long-standing and 
unsubstantiated beliefs surrounding the formative period in the development of British 
Military History. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Military History and Army Education:  
Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff Colleges, 1856-1914 
 
 
 
 
At the start of Britain’s involvement in the Crimean War in 1854, Military History was not 
taught at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, the Senior Department of this institution 
which trained staff officers, or the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. At this time 
Sandhurst and Woolwich taught boys who were less than sixteen years of age, and so the 
majority of the syllabus at these institutions was tailored toward providing a general ‘liberal 
education’ rather than specialist military instruction. The study of Military History was not 
required either to obtain a commission, the majority of which were still attained by purchase, 
or to secure promotion.1 The only group to study Military History were those cadets who 
graduated from Woolwich, destined for the Royal Artillery, who between 1850 and 1858 
underwent instruction in the subject at the Royal Artillery Institution.2  
By the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, however, the focus on the teaching of 
Military History in the British Army had increased significantly. Not only was the subject 
studied at Sandhurst and Woolwich as well as at the Staff College, which had replaced the 
Senior Department of the Royal Military College, but a significant proportion of marks were 
                                                          
1 Yolland Commission, pp. 48, 44-5, 21, 62. The only exception to this was that between 1850 and 1858 the 
handful of cadets who graduated from Woolwich and were destined for a commission in the Royal Artillery 
underwent a course of study which included Military History.  
2 Ibid., pp. 45, 429, 320.  
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assigned to it at each establishment, reflecting the importance placed on its study.3 Moreover, 
the subject was studied by officers as part of the process of promotion and by those officers 
in the Militia and Territorial Force who wished to convert their commission into one in the 
Regular Army.4 Despite this dramatic expansion in the study of Military History in the army, 
no scholarly work has examined either the reasons for this development or the way in which 
the subject was taught. The standard works on the Victorian and Edwardian Army contain 
little on the role played by Military History in army education as they have focused 
predominantly on other areas of military reform.5  
It is most surprising, though, that the few works which have examined military 
education between 1854 and 1914 have overlooked important primary source material; at the 
same time, they have been too narrow in scope to investigate the subject. As Jay Luvaas’ 
Education of an Army adopted a biographical approach, it focused on the writing of several 
military historians, rather than on how the subject was taught at the army’s educational 
establishments. 6  While there has been no research which has examined the syllabus of 
Sandhurst or Woolwich, there have been several studies which have examined the teaching 
conducted at the Staff College.7 However, this material, written by A.R. Godwin-Austen, 
Brian Bond and Brian Holden Reid, has overlooked important primary source material 
relating to the way in which Military History was studied there, including exam scripts, 
model answers written by the examiner and material produced by students. Moreover, the 
writing of Bond, Holden Reid and Luvaas all deferred to the opinion put forward by J.F.C. 
                                                          
3 Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp. 51-7. 
4 Anon., Report on the result of the Examination in November 1904 for officers of the Regular Forces, Militia, 
Yeomanry and Volunteers, for Promotion (London, 1905). 
5 Spiers, Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902, pp. 1-24; and, Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 119-22, 
132-3. 
6 Luvaas, Education of an Army, pp. vii-xi. 
7 Only popular histories of Sandhurst and Woolwich exist, for example see: Smyth, Sandhurst; and, G.A. 
Shepperd, Sandhurst (London, 1980).   
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Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart that the study of the Military History at the Staff College 
constituted little more than a recital of factual material.8 
In order to answer the first research question posed in the introduction – namely, what 
caused the army to expand the use of Military History in its exam syllabuses – this chapter 
intends to address three issues. Why did the army study Military History? To what extent did 
the rationale for studying Military History undergo modification? To what extent did the 
methods used to teach the subject change? In order to shed light on these questions, this 
chapter will consider: first, how and why Military History was taught at Sandhurst and 
Woolwich prior to the outbreak of the Second Boer War in 1899; second, how the subject 
was used in the training of staff officers between 1856 and 1885, a period when the education 
of these officers began to undergo a major transformation; third, how the subject was used in 
the education of staff officers between 1885 and 1914; and, fourth, the role of Military 
History in exam syllabuses, 1899-1914, especially at Woolwich and Sandhurst. The 
emergence of Military History as a subject tested in examinations was without doubt an 
important element in the expansion of interest in the discipline. 
 
I. Sandhurst and Woolwich, 1856-99 
The Crimean War put a spotlight on the training of officers, particularly those in the Royal 
Artillery and Royal Engineers.9 This caused the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, to 
appoint a Commission in January 1856 under Lieutenant-Colonel W. Yolland to investigate 
the training that these officers received and to suggest how the British approach could be 
improved.10 The committee looked to the systems of military education on the continent, 
                                                          
8 Liddell Hart, Remaking Modern Armies, p. 170; Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 157; Holden 
Reid, ‘War Studies at the Staff College 1890-1930’, p. 4; and, Luvaas, Education of an Army, pp. 243, 369. 
9 Smyth, Sandhurst, p. 74.  
10 Yolland Commission, p. 20.  
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particularly those in France and Prussia. They discovered that the French Military College at 
St. Cyr taught ‘Military Administration, Military Art and Military History’, with the lectures 
on ‘Military Literature, Military History, Military Geography and Statistics’ constituting 
nearly half those a cadet received each year. Similarly, they found that to gain entry to the 
French Staff College an officer sat an admission exam which included Military History. Once 
in the establishment the student received one lecture a week in ‘Military Art and Tactics’ 
which was illustrated by historical case studies. It was also found that in Prussia the subject 
was intended to communicate military theory and it was studied at divisional level schools, at 
the school of Artillery and Engineering as well as at the Kriegs-Schule in Berlin.11  
The commissioners noted with concern that while Military History and the study of 
military theory had been largely overlooked in Britain, ‘great attention [was] paid in every 
important school abroad to the lectures on Military Art and History, Tactics, Military 
Geography and Statistics, and what is termed Military Literature’. In an attempt to redress 
this they proposed that both Sandhurst and Woolwich should teach Military History, as it 
appeared to the commissioners that, ‘if there is such a thing as an Art of War… a military 
college must be the proper place for studying it’.12 Likewise, the committee felt that the 
French and Prussian systems had demonstrated that Military History was ‘a most important 
branch’ of ‘scientific’ training for the staff officer, and so recommended that the subject 
should be taught at a newly formed Staff College.13  
The commissioners also looked to the continent, especially the Prussian approach, 
when it suggested that a single body should oversee all military education and the 
appointment of specialist examiners.14 This idea was accepted by the Secretary of State for 
                                                          
11 Ibid., pp., 14, 27, 31, 40, 68, 168, 176,  214, 246, 220, 233.  
12 Ibid., pp. 43, 48, 52; Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 17. 
13 Yolland Commission, p. xxix; and, Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, pp. 3, 13, 56. 
14 Ibid., pp. 60, 262.  
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War and, so, on 1 June 1857, the ‘Council of Military Education’ sat for the first time.15 This 
council found it difficult to find men who were qualified to both teach and examine Military 
History and so officers who had served in continental armies, where the subject had been 
studied, were therefore often the most eligible. Thus, Major Charles Adams, who had served 
in the Austrian Army for thirteen years, was appointed as Instructor of Military History at 
Sandhurst in 1860, before going on to hold the Professorship in the subject at the Staff 
College between 1868 and 1874. Likewise, when it came to selecting men to act as the 
examiner for Military History, a role that entailed setting the admission and final exams in the 
subject at the Cadet and Staff Colleges, the council encountered the same shortage of suitable 
applicants. Hence, Captain E.M. Jones, who had spent his early career in the Prussian Army, 
was appointed to this role in 1862, and eventually succeeded Adams as Professor of Military 
History at Sandhurst in 1868.16 
As proposed by the Yolland committee, Military History was included on the course 
of instruction at Sandhurst in 1858, a change which was made possible by an alteration in the 
role of this institution. While it was still not compulsory to attend this institution to receive a 
commission, from this time the college was no longer intended to provide a basic education 
to young boys, but to provide ‘military training and knowledge’ to cadets aged over sixteen.17 
The inclusion of Military History was primarily intended to teach the cadets ‘the generally 
received principles of tactics and strategy’. To this end, cadets were first ‘put through a short 
course of military theory… [and then received] a series of lectures… given upon some short 
                                                          
15 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 3; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4261, ff. 99, 
Hamley to Blackwood, 23 March 1870; Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 4; and, 
Anon, Report of the Council of Military Education, 1865, p. 4. 
16 Anon., Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Present State of 
Military Education and into the Training of Candidates for Commissions in the Army (C.25) (London, 1870) 
(hereafter, Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence), pp. 362, 7, 367. 
17 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 17; and, Royal Commission, Military Education, 
1870, Evidence. From this time Sandhurst cadets were given priority of appointment over those who had not 
attended the institution and instead sought to purchase a commission directly.  
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campaign with the object… of illustrating strategy’.18 The study of military theory was only 
intended to teach the students ‘the mere elements’ of the subject and explain ‘some of the 
ordinary technical terms’ which would be expounded with historical examples in the later 
Military History lectures.19 Towards the end of the cadet’s time at the college, the emphasis 
of the course shifted to the study of tactics by ‘going more fully into particular portions’ of 
the campaigns under study, although at this time the course did ‘not go very far’ into the 
subject. The course relied heavily on the ninety-minute lecture given each week in which the 
cadets were expected to take notes.20 The instructors were able to choose which books to use 
when compiling lectures, so, while Captain C.W. Robinson stated that ‘Hamley’s Operations 
of War was freely consulted’ as he wrote his, other instructors felt that they would ‘rather 
take Colonel MacDougall’s book [The Theory of War]’ since the work was considered ‘more 
elementary than Colonel Hamley’s’.21  
Strategy was presented to the cadets as being governed by several principles, or 
‘maxims of the art of war’, which had been identified by Jomini and were outlined by 
Hamley and MacDougall.22 As such, the cadets were taught that the definition and object of 
strategy was ‘moving troops to advantage when not in the immediate presence of an enemy’, 
a definition which closely corresponded with that used by Hamley in Operations of War.23 
The campaigns used on the course to illustrate Jomini’s ‘principles of war’ had all taken 
place later than 1756, and from 1865 the instructors were ‘prohibited’ from using examples 
                                                          
18 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, pp. 427, 102.  
19 C.W. Robinson, Lectures upon the British Campaigns in the Peninsula, 1808-1814 (London, 1871), p. iv; 
and, Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 104.   
20 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, pp. 102, 105, 25.   
21 Robinson, Lectures upon the British Campaigns in the Peninsula, p. v; and, Royal Commission, Military 
Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 104. 
22 Robinson, Lectures upon the British Campaigns in the Peninsula, p. 235.  
23 Ibid.; and, Edward Hamley, Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained (London, 1st edn., 1866), p. 55. 
Here Hamley defined the object of strategy as: ‘so to direct the movement of an army, that when decisive 
collisions occur it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage’. 
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from the Seven Years War, so campaigns fought during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic period remained the mainstay of the course.24  
The notes which the students took in each lecture were used to answer a question set 
for the second study period that week.25 These questions took various forms, asking the 
cadets either simply to provide a concise account of the campaign covered in the lecture, or 
be more analytical, and the students were asked to ‘remark on the strategy and tactics of the 
campaign’.26 As the cadets were given no access to a textbook, their answers were based 
entirely on the notes taken in the preceding lecture.27 Even as late as 1904 the Sandhurst 
library had no copy of Jomini’s theoretical writing or of MacDougall’s work, although it held 
one copy of Operations of War.28 The cadet’s answers were marked by the instructors and 
made up half of the final mark he received in the subject, the other half coming from the 
exams sat at the end of each year.29  The subject commanded a high number of marks, 
reflecting how important its study was thought to be; in fact, from 1868 only the study of 
‘Fortification’ and ‘Military Drawing’ were awarded more marks.30  
Although it was hoped that the Military History course would give the young officer 
‘an intelligent interest in the study of their profession’, the cadets did not take a great interest 
in their studies. The atmosphere at Sandhurst at this time was anything but studious and ‘two-
thirds’ of the cadets were thought to be ‘idlers’ by the instructors.31 The library at Sandhurst 
also reflected this general lack of intellectual interest and its collection of books was 
                                                          
24 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 104.  
25 Ibid., p. 194.  
26 NAM, Henry Cooper Papers, 6112-595-26, Royal Military College Sandhurst, Military History memoir on 
the Waterloo Campaign, Junior Division, 1865. 
27 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 102.  
28 Sandhurst, Gentleman Cadet’s Library Catalogue, 1904, p. 17.  
29 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 105; and, Anon, Report of the Council of Military 
Education, 1865, p. 203.  
30 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, pp. 427, 428; and, Anon., Report of the Council of 
Military Education, 1865, p. 35.  
31 Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, pp. 25, 178. A view reinforced by the fact that Sir 
Ian Hamilton recalled his time at Sandhurst in 1870 as ‘my year of idleness at the Royal Military College’. Ian 
Hamilton, Listening for the Drums (London, 1944), p. 13.   
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predominantly given over to novels and works irrelevant to the military subjects taught at the 
college.32 As a result, the marks the cadets achieved in Military History were often very low; 
in 1864, for instance, of the 125 cadets who took the final exam, only twenty-eight achieved 
above half-marks in this subject.33  
While Military History played an important part of the course of instruction at 
Sandhurst, the subject was not introduced to the curriculum at Woolwich until 1867. The 
Council of Military Education finally decided to include the subject as ‘superior officers’ in 
the Artillery and Engineers felt that ‘the absence of all knowledge of Military History was a 
defect in the course of study at the Academy’, one which placed ‘the establishment in this 
respect at a disadvantage when compared to the Royal Military College’.34 Initially Colonel J. 
Miller, V.C., was appointed to teach the subject and was asked to devise the course of 
instruction himself.35 Unfortunately, he decided on an ambitious syllabus which stretched 
back into ancient times, meaning that he had only reached the early Roman period by the end 
of the first half-term. 36  When the authorities insisted that he abandon his extensive 
programme and devote the rest of the course to campaigns ‘of a date not earlier than 
Frederick the Great’, Miller promptly resigned.37 Thanks to the ‘Miller fiasco’, Woolwich 
was left at short notice with a difficult position to fill.38 Luckily, Captain Henry Brackenbury, 
who had been appointed as Assistant-Instructor of Practical Artillery at the Academy in 1864, 
had a keen interest in Military History and had studied the Waterloo campaign ‘so closely… 
that [he] was prepared to lecture upon it at once’. The Governor of the academy supported his 
                                                          
32 Sandhurst, Gentleman Cadet’s Library Catalogue, 1904, p. 2. 
33 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1865, p. 213.  
34 Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1868, p. 15. 
35 Sandhurst, List and Dates of the Appointments of Officers, Professors, and Maters to the Royal Military 
Academy from its Formation; and, H.D. Buchanan-Dunlop (ed.), Records of the Royal Military Academy 
(Woolwich, 1895), p. 129.  
36 Henry Brackenbury, Some Memoires of My Spare Time (Edinburgh, 1909), p. 66.  
37 Buchanan-Dunlop (ed.), Records of the Royal Military Academy, p. 129 
38 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4234, ff. 7, Hamley to Blackwood, 16 January 1868.  
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application and, after the Council of Military Education had attended one of his lectures, 
Brackenbury was appointed to replace Miller.39 
Despite several important differences, Military History was taught at Woolwich in 
largely the same manner as at Sandhurst: at both institutions the course revolved around one 
lecture a week in which the cadets took notes.40 However, at Woolwich, only the two senior 
classes were taught the subject, so a cadet only received instruction during the second part of 
his time at the institution.41 To be promoted up the classes in order to finally graduate, a 
student had to pass an exam, which for those passing into the final class, and those passing 
out of the institution, included two Military History papers, both of which were set by the 
council’s examiner in the subject. The weighting of marks given to Military History at 
Woolwich was significantly lower than at Sandhurst and in the final exam the subject was 
assigned fewer marks than Mathematics, Artillery Studies, Military Drawing, Chemistry, 
Physics and French.42 
Just as at Sandhurst, the study of Military History at Woolwich was based around 
campaigns thought to illustrate ‘the principles of strategy and tactics’ which had been 
articulated by Jomini. However, unlike at Sandhurst, the Woolwich course employed 
Hamley’s Operations of War as a textbook.43 Getting the work approved for use was made 
considerably more difficult as the author sat on the Council of Military Education.44 In 1867 
the ‘academy authorities’ contacted Hamley regarding the use of the work, but the other 
members of the Council of Military Education rejected it on two grounds.45 First, they felt 
that it was ‘inexpedient’ for Hamley to recommend his own book and, secondly, they stated 
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that ‘they considered the work of too high a class for the cadets’ to understand. In response to 
the first point, Hamley argued that ‘the only question for consideration in such cases is, not 
who the writer may be, but the fitness of the book for the purpose’.46 Hamley not only 
insisted that his work could be comprehended by the Woolwich cadets, but that ‘it was 
calculated greatly to injure the work if the statement went forth on the council’s authority that 
it was beyond the capacity of highly educated intelligent young professional students’ to 
understand it.47 Hamley was adamant that his book should be used on the course and even 
considered asking his friend, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, the Duke of Cambridge, 
who had authority over the council, to ‘waive’ their objection to the use of the book.48 
Indeed, when the authorities at Woolwich reapplied to use the work the council backed down 
and, by 1888, the library at Woolwich held sixteen copies of various editions.49  
The use of Operations of War had a large impact on the content of the course and its 
influence can be seen not only in the questions set for the cadets, but also in their answers. 
For instance, on the exam paper set in July 1874 a question asked the cadets to ‘give a 
description… of the frontier between France and Germany as it existed in 1870, and [to] 
point out the strategical advantages or disadvantages which its configuration and physical 
features presented to either power’.50  Operations of War went into detail describing the 
influence which the shape of a frontier could have on military operations. In the narrative of 
the Franco-Prussian War contained in the work, Hamley pointed out that German forces 
massed in the ‘Rhenish provinces’ were ‘on the side of the angle [of the frontier] which was 
parallel to the French communications, [and were,] as explained in the chapter on 
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Configuration of Frontiers, in the most favourable position for offence’.51 The French Prince 
Imperial, a cadet at Woolwich at this time, answered this question using the same point as 
was put forward in Operations of War, writing that due to the shape of the frontier, German 
forces in these provinces could ‘descend the valley of Alsace cutting the French troops… 
from their base of operations’.52  
The campaigns studied at Woolwich were much more varied than those employed at 
Sandhurst. Although the American Civil War was not studied at this time, a variety of 
campaigns from the Franco-Prussian War, the Second Afghan War, the Russo-Turkish War 
and the Crimean War were used.53 However, after 1871 the course increasingly focused on 
the Franco-Prussian War and so the library of this institution came to hold a large number of 
works on this conflict.54 The focus on a war which had been fought with newly developed 
breech-loading rifled weapons caused the study of Military History at Woolwich to focus 
increasingly on the influence which technological developments had exerted on tactics. For 
instance, in July 1883 the cadets were asked ‘what modifications have been caused in the 
proportion of [field] guns to other arms, and in the tactics of Field Artillery by the 
introduction of (1) rifled small arms, (2) rifled field guns?’55 The examiners also expected the 
cadets to be able to analyse the tactics under development on the continent in relation to 
British methods. In 1875, for instance, the Prince Imperial chose to answer a question which 
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asked him to ‘institute a comparison between the German and English methods of attack, as 
laid down by the recent orders on the subject’.56  
Military History was also taught at the Royal Engineers Establishment at Chatham 
during the 1870s and 1880s to those officers who had passed out of Woolwich and were 
destined for the Royal Engineers.57 The summary of the syllabus written in 1887 by H. 
Tovey, Instructor in Military History, Strategy and Tactics at Chatham, reflected that 
Jomini’s work dominated the approach to the subject there.58 Therefore, not only was strategy 
defined as the art of ‘properly directing masses of troops upon the theatre of war’ so they had 
material superiority at the decisive point, but also great emphasis was placed on an 
explanation of the role played by bases and lines of operation. Moreover, Military History 
was simply used to illustrate each principle taught to the students, so Tovey’s work listed 
campaigns by the Jominian idea they were thought to demonstrate.59  
As most officers purchased their commission between 1858 and 1870 they did not 
attend Sandhurst or Woolwich, and hence were not required to study Military History. Once 
in the army there was little incentive for officers to study the subject as it did not appear on 
the exams set for promotion until 1904, none of the Army’s ‘Garrison Instructors’ taught the 
subject; and, according to John Frederick Maurice, Instructor of Military History at Sandhurst 
between 1871-3, the officer ‘hated literary work… [and had] hardly the energy to undertake 
it’.60 Even though the reforms instituted by Secretary of State for War Edward Cardwell in 
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1870-1 made completion of the Sandhurst course obligatory for those seeking a commission 
in the Infantry and Cavalry, this did little to increase the study of Military History in the army 
as the subject was removed from the syllabus of Sandhurst in 1873, replaced by the study of 
‘Tactics’.61 The reason for this was that a Military Commission which sat in 1870 to consider 
army education felt that the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars had underscored the 
importance of a junior officer’s tactical understanding and the commissioners proposed that 
more time should be devoted to the study of tactics.62  
The study of tactics at Sandhurst was centred on the historical development of the 
‘elements’ thought to govern the topic.63 The textbook selected for the course was F. Clery’s 
Minor Tactics and the historical examples which it used to illustrate these ‘elements’ were the 
ones used on the course.64 Cadets were allowed to purchase additional books to assist them in 
their studies, and Winston Churchill, who attended the College in 1894, recalled that he had 
ordered ‘Hamley’s Operations of War... together with a number of histories dealing the 
American Civil, Franco-German and Russo-Turkish wars [since these] were then our latest 
and best specimens’.65 However, the study of Tactics at Sandhurst had a serious flaw. As the 
course was entirely based on the textbook, the instructors felt that they could not spend long 
on the most recent developments in tactics caused by technological change as these did not 
appear in Clery’s work and the examiner would only set questions based on this book.66  
Even though Tactics already played an important part in the study of Military History 
at Woolwich, a committee under Lord Mortley, appointed to revise the syllabus in 1886, put 
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forward new regulations based ‘very much on what had already been adopted for Sandhurst’. 
The committee concluded that although ‘Military History is obviously a useful study for 
every officer’, the study of Tactics was ‘essential’.67 Since it was felt that there was not 
sufficient time available to teach both topics, a specialised study of tactics replaced Military 
History in 1887.68 At first, the way in which Tactics was taught mirrored the approach used to 
teach Military History with historical examples used to illustrate the ‘tactical principles’ 
under consideration. However, by 1892 the number of questions that appeared on exam 
scripts that required historical knowledge declined dramatically. Most questions set after this 
time either placed the cadet in an imaginary contemporary situation which tested their 
decision-making, or merely asked abstract questions regarding the ‘special duties’ of various 
units.69 Although it was not necessary for an officer to have studied Military History in order 
to gain a commission, from 1857 it had been, in theory if not in practice, compulsory for an 
officer to have studied the subject to be eligible for a staff position. Consequently, Military 
History formed an important part of the syllabus at the Staff College from its formation 
following the recommendation by the Yolland committee.70  
 
II. The Staff College, Camberley, 1858-85  
Following the report of the Yolland Commission, which had found that Military History 
formed an important part of officer education on the continent, the Duke of Cambridge issued 
a General Army Order on 9 April 1857 which made it a requirement that those holding staff 
positions should be ‘thoroughly acquainted’ with ‘the principles of strategy’ through a 
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knowledge of ‘military history, especially as relates to the campaigns of the ancient and 
modern commanders’.71 This requirement was later extended and from 5 March 1859 men 
promoted to the rank of Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General were 
expected to ‘give proof’ that they had ‘carefully studied at least four of the most memorable 
modern campaigns’, and could ‘explain the apparent objects of the movements, and the 
reasons which he suppose[d had] led to their adoption’.72  
Therefore, when the ‘Senior Department’ of the Royal Military College was 
converted and expanded to create the Staff College in 1858, the Council of Military 
Education included Military History as part of its syllabus.73 The study of this subject was 
intended to give the student ‘an opportunity of studying deeply and thoroughly the accounts 
of the campaigns of great commanders, and through them the principles of military art’.74 To 
gain entry to the college an officer had to pass an admission exam intended to demonstrate he 
had some knowledge of Military History. At first, candidates were only expected to give a 
factual, ‘detailed account’ of a campaign which they had studied, but from 1862 campaigns 
were specially selected for this exam and notification was published in the army’s General 
Orders as well as in military periodicals. 75  From this time candidates were expected to 
express an opinion on how effectively these operations had been waged and the exam became 
‘principally directed to elicit this knowledge rather than a mere narrative of facts’.76 Since the 
entrance exam was competitive, and so only the highest scoring candidates could be admitted 
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to the college, great importance was placed on the study of Military History as it was 
allocated the second highest number of marks, with only Mathematics worth more.77 
Just as at Sandhurst and Woolwich, the Staff College syllabus relied heavily on 
Jomini’s writing and campaigns were analysed in relation to his ‘principles of war’. 78 
Consequently, MacDougall’s The Theory of War, which embodied Jomini’s ideas, was used 
as the set-text for the admission exam between 1864 and 1869. 79  The main method of 
instruction was through the weekly lecture which was given on ‘the general principles which 
govern strategy and tactics’, with ‘the operations of one campaign described with a view to 
illustrate a particular branch of the general subject’. 80  Until 1869 a variety of mainly 
European campaigns, which had been fought between 1757 and 1866 were selected for study 
at the college.81 Battlefield tours were also conducted on the continent, although at this time it 
would appear that the work was not all that intellectually rigorous as Hamley, the first 
Professor of Military History, reported to Blackwood in 1861, that while they had seen the 
‘battlefields to perfection’, the ‘fly fishing was spoilt by the unremitting glare of the sun’.82 
Since wars fought against native peoples did not conform to Jomini’s model, this type of 
conflict was seen as below a staff officer, and Hamley was even opposed to sending Staff 
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College graduates on the Ashanti expedition in 1873, commenting that ‘it is cutting bricks 
with a razor to send highly instructed officers into the bush to fight naked savages’.83 
The notes which the students took from lectures, together with their wider reading, 
were used to answer questions set by the professor which, ‘at his own discretion’, he felt 
deserved greater analysis.84 The answers the students gave were ‘judged [by] the power 
shewn to grasp and arrange the subject’ as well as ‘the judgement and acuteness shewn in 
commenting on the parts which admit of discussion… and the style of writing, which ought 
to be such as would render a detailed report from a staff officer valuable and reliable’.85 The 
marks assigned for these ‘memoirs’ made up half of those assigned to the subject, with the 
other half coming from the exams sat at the end of the year.86 Military History, along with 
Mathematics, Fortification and Artillery were assigned the highest marks at the institution.87 
As such, Military History held a high importance for the students, and those who achieved 
the highest grades were found to have ‘devoted most of [their] attention’ to the subject.88 To 
assist the students with their work, the college library had a ‘large collection’ of military 
historical works, and even had an arrangement with the publisher Longmans, Green, and Co., 
so the clerk who purchased the books ‘always [got] them through Longmans’.89  
At this time, strategy was understood at the Staff College in almost exclusively 
military terms, as Jomini had presented it, thus concerned with the manoeuvres of armies in a 
theatre of war. This view was not revised when the ideas of Clausewitz began to play an 
important part in the study of Military History at the college alongside those of Jomini, 
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between 1866 and 1873. In fact, Clausewitz was thought to describe strategy in the same way 
as Jomini. Evelyn Baring, in an essay written during his time at the college in 1868, stated 
that ‘if any definition [of strategy and tactics] be required, that of Clausewitz seems as good 
as any: ‘Tactics are employed on the battlefield; strategy is the conduct of troops up to the 
moment of collision’.90 Since Clausewitz was understood in these terms, his ideas on the 
manoeuvres of an army in a theatre of war were those which received the most attention. 
Thus, when Major Charles Adams, Professor of Military History between 1868 and 1874, 
described Clausewitz’s contribution to the study of warfare, he focused on his work regarding 
‘military system, the preparation of the theatre of war, the advantage of the initiative, the 
moral influence of early success, the values of true selection of the objective, secrecy of 
purpose and extreme vigour of execution’.91  
Colonel Charles Chesney, Adams’ predecessor at the college, also thought of 
Clausewitz’s work in the same terms and focused on the Prussian theorist’s discussion of the 
movement of military forces during a campaign. In October 1868, Chesney published his 
Waterloo Lectures which consisted of ‘some of [his Staff] College lectures [put] together in 
proper fashion’ which ‘embod[ied] the results of a study… carried on’ at the Staff College.92 
The footnotes in this work demonstrate that he had read On War in a French translation, 
published in 1851, and had used it in his analysis of the campaign at the college.93 In an 
attempt to defend Wellington from Napoleon’s assertion that the British position at Waterloo 
was ‘badly chosen’, as the forest of Soignies could have prevented an orderly retreat, 
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Chesney was particularly interested in Clausewitz’s thoughts regarding the influence 
woodland could have on a defensive position, and he noted that: 
 
Clausewitz… has made the attempt in his ‘Art of War’, to treat systematically the 
subject of the use of forests by armies. He describes at the opening of his chapter 
a partially traversable wood (such as is and was that of Soignies) as the first case 
to be considered, and thus, after some considerations lays down his theory… 
[that] wooded districts cannot in any manner be used advantageously for 
defensive actions, except when they lie to the rear. In this case they conceal from 
the enemy all that passes in the defender’s rear and at the same time serve to cover 
and facilitate his retreat.94  
 
 
While Chesney used Clausewitz’s writing to vindicate the position selected by Wellington, he 
also noted that the recent ‘American experience’ during the Civil War would ‘no doubt have 
caused [the Prussian to] greatly to modify’ his view on the role of woodland in warfare, as he 
felt that it had demonstrated its utility during defensive action.95  
Chesney’s use of Clausewitz’s ideas influenced the final exam set by the external 
examiner, Major George Colley, in 1868. The Staff College students, who had evidently 
studied Clausewitz’s writing, were asked to ‘apply the theory of Clausewitz on the use of 
forests easily traversed to an army on the defensive, to the subject of Waterloo and the 
English position there’.96  Likewise, Clausewitz’s views regarding the defensive value of 
forests were used by Baring in his 1869 Staff College essay on Napoleon’s operations in 
Poland during December 1806 in which he too quoted from the 1851 translation of 
Clausewitz.97 
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Clausewitz’s views of the influence of other obstacles on the conduct of a campaign 
were also studied at the Staff College during this time. In the final exam set by the external 
examiners Colonel Lumley Graham and Captain A. Clarke in 1873, the opinion expressed in 
On War regarding the role of fortresses in defensive operations formed a central part of one 
question.98 The students were told that, ‘Clausewitz says, “Les places fortes sont les premiers 
et les plus important points d’appui de la defense”’, and were then asked in relation to the 
recent Franco-Prussian war to ‘consider how far the French Frontier fortresses fulfilled this 
attribute during the early part of the campaign’.99 The views of the Prussian regarding the 
influence of rivers were also studied; in fact, Baring referred many times to his view on this 
topic as it had been covered in On War in his Staff College essays.100 Similarly, Clausewitz’s 
writing on the relationship between attack and defence was discussed at this time. Baring’s 
essay on the operations in Poland in 1806 used his concept of ‘le point limite de la victoire’ to 
explain why Napoleon abandoned his offensive operations after the Battle of Pultusk.101 
Moreover, it was Clausewitz’s notion that defensive campaigns should consist largely of 
offensive action which formed the basis of Baring’s analysis of this campaign.102 So often 
had Baring deferred to Clausewitz’s writing in this essay that he felt the need to provide an 
‘apology for quoting him so often’, even though ‘his great reputation as a military critic… 
gives considerable weight to all he says’.103  
The critical approach to Military History outlined by Clausewitz also influenced how 
Chesney approached the subject. The Prussian had observed that following historical research 
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there were two types of criticism which could be employed, the tracing of effects back to 
their causes, and the testing of the means a commander employed. 104  Chesney directly 
borrowed from Clausewitz’s ideas on critical analysis. In the introduction to his Waterloo 
Lectures he outlined ‘the two chief classes of critical remarks which writers employ’.105 The 
first which he described corresponded with Clausewitz’s conception of critical analysis, 
which Chesney saw as the ‘sort of criticism… which… dissects events to find the rules which 
govern them [so that] an event may be traced in all its leading features, [and] its influence on 
the course of the campaign may be noted’. The second type of criticism which he outlined 
mirrored the way suggested by Clausewitz to analyse the means employed by a commander. 
Chesney described this as ‘deal[ing] with the characters and conduct of the men concerned…  
[as] the task of the historian still remains unfulfilled if he fail[s] to assign in some degree at 
least, the relation to the whole of the chief actors and their parts’.106  
This approach to the critical analysis of Military History, particularly the testing of the 
means employed by a commander, directly influenced how the subject was taught and 
examined at the college from the late 1860s. Baring in his essay on Napoleon’s operations in 
Poland made sure that his criticism of the decisions made by commanders was limited to an 
analysis of how they acted given the information available to them at the time, as he noted: 
‘Clausewitz says… Lorsque la critique veut prononcer un eloge ou un blame concernant un 
acte, elle ne reussira jamais qu’imparfaitement a se metre a la place de celui qui a accompli 
cet acte’.107 Similarly, in April 1872, Adams set a question which placed the students in the 
position encountered by Marshal Bazaine in August 1870 and asked them to ‘propose any 
course of operations which may suggest [themselves] to you as more conducive to the 
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interests of the country invaded… the suggestions [should be based] upon such information… 
as may be reasonably supposed to have been in Bazaine’s hands during the given period’.108 
This style of question also appeared on both the admission and final exams. For instance, 
those graduating in 1870 were asked to ‘draw up a memorandum on the military situation and 
scheme of offensive operations, such as might have been laid before a council of war held at 
the Austrian Head Quarters about the 20 April [1859], assuming the general position of the 
Allies to be known, and [that] the Austrian army [was] ready to cross the Ticino’. 109 
Likewise, in the 1867 admission exam, applicants were asked to ‘discuss the courses open to 
Napoleon after the fall of Moscow’.110    
As the understanding of Clausewitz’s writing on strategy was limited to that relating 
to the operations of armies moving in a theatre of war, his ideas regarding the role which 
politics played in warfare were only imperfectly comprehended. Although there was some 
realisation that political considerations may impact strategy, this notion received little 
attention and was even directly criticised at the college. Despite his frequent use of 
Clausewitz’s writing, Baring in his Staff College essays was adamant that Jomini’s 
‘principles of strategy’ presented ‘a strategical standard which never changes under any 
circumstances’.111 Thus, Baring argued that, although ‘many non-military matters’ such as 
‘the moral and political part of war’ had ‘a very direct bearing and influence on… operations 
in the field’ during a campaign, any consideration which caused a general to conduct his 
operations in a manner which was not strictly in accordance with the principles of war also 
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led him to violate the ‘strategical standard’ and so had caused him to conduct a faulty strategy 
which an ‘active and skilful enemy’ could exploit.112  
The Jominian conception of strategy in use at this time prevented much emphasis 
being placed on the character of a general and the influence of an army’s morale on the 
conduct of a campaign. Although there was the occasional reference to these factors, these 
were rare.113 While Baring in his essay on the operations in Poland noted that Clausewitz had 
written ‘the moral effect of the arrival of fresh troops on a battlefield even though few in 
number, must always be very great’, he did not regard the influence of morale a major 
consideration in his analysis. Baring even rejected the consideration of a commander’s 
personality when studying a campaign on similar grounds to that which had led him to 
condemn anything which interfered with the ‘strategical standard’ presented by Jomini’s 
principles.114  
In 1870, when Hamley was appointed commandant of the Staff College, his 
Operations of War and Jomini’s L’art de la Guerre were made the only text books set for the 
admission exam, a position they retained until 1894.115 As a result, these exams increasingly 
began to reflect the approach to Military History contained in these works and so campaigns 
were used simply to ‘illustrate’ the ‘principles of strategy explained and illustrated in the 
Operations of War’.116 Often the questions were directly taken from Hamley’s work, and in 
1890, 1892 and 1894 candidates were simply asked to state ‘Hamley’s comments’ on a 
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particular topic.117 Unsurprisingly, when preparing to take this exam candidates focused their 
attention on learning this work by heart. In 1889 the Military History examiner commented 
that, while the relevant Army Order had stated that ‘the military history... required [for the 
exam was] that embraced by Parts 1 to 5 of the Operations of War’, he felt that for several 
years the candidates ‘appear to have unanimously interpreted this as simply ‘the military 
history and geography recorded in Parts 1 to 5 of the Operations of War, for, with a few 
exceptions, no candidate has in his answers, ventured to give a fact, to offer an opinion, or to 
make a statement, which is not to be found within the cover of [this work]’.118 Since answers 
now consisted of ‘a parrot-like repetition’ of the Operations of War, ‘the candidates, as a rule, 
show[ed] a very correct knowledge of the historical facts of the campaign [but] the weakness 
of the papers [lay] in the deductions drawn from correctly stated facts’.119  
As the Operations of War came to dominate the admission exam, the work had an 
increasing influence on how the subject was taught at the Staff College. Hamley used his 
authority as commandant to develop the Military History course largely in line with how the 
subject was approached in his work. This dramatically reduced the use of Clausewitz’s 
writing at the Staff College; indeed, after 1873, reference to him on the exam scripts 
ceased.120 Similarly, the final exams came to focus on the memorisation of judgements in the 
Operations of War as well as knowledge of the events of a campaign. In 1876, for the first 
time in this exam, students were simply asked to ‘describe the method suggested in the 
Operations of War’ to answer a question.121 In the same way, a question in 1880 asked 
students to ‘follow the course of the [Franco-Prussian War] by mentioning in succession all 
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the rivers crossed or in any way utilized by the armies on either side’.122 Although this 
question went on to require students to ‘deduce from this study a general consideration of the 
influence of rivers in war’, this topic had been covered in part five of Hamley’s work, 
particularly in chapter seven, which provided an analysis of this campaign.123 As the third 
edition of the Operations of War, published in 1872, included a new chapter on the 
conventional phase of the Franco-Prussian War, culminating in the defeat of the French 
armies at Sedan and Metz, this campaign was frequently studied at the Staff College.124 From 
1873 to 1881 it came to dominate the Military History course, so that the Franco-Prussian 
War became the only conflict studied in relation to strategy during this period.125   
 Just as the Seven Weeks War and Franco-Prussian War had stimulated the study of 
tactics at Sandhurst and Woolwich, tactics received increased attention at the Staff College 
from 1871. Instead of questions on this topic being interwoven with questions on strategy, as 
had been done since 1858, an additional paper which looked exclusively at tactics was added 
to the final exam in Military History.126 Even though before 1866 the study of Tactics on the 
Military History course had revolved around developments in weapons technology, in 1870 
the syllabus was formally amended so that its study in the second year included special 
reference to the ‘recent modifications dependent on improved arms’.127 Thus, the increase in 
firepower created by ‘breech loading arms of precision’ took on a particular significance. In 
1872, for example, E.H.H. Collen won a prize for his essay on the Battle of Wörth which 
stressed the ‘enormous sacrifice of life’ and failure of the attack which he felt would have 
resulted if the current British tactics, dependent on a frontal attack using the line formation, 
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and closing to engage in a hand-to-hand fight, had been used by the Germans during the 
battle. 128  Instead, Collen suggested that due to the increase in firepower which modern 
weapons generated British troops should adopt a much more open formation, as he felt this 
move away from current British methods was ‘inevitable’.129  
The works of continental writers, especially Prussians, were used to study Tactics at 
the Staff College. In 1871, Bronsart von Schellendorf’s work was directly referenced on the 
final exam when the students were asked ‘what general principles [regarding the] alteration 
of infantry tactics did the author of the Tactical Retrospect of the Campaign of 1866 
advocate’.130  In 1876 students were asked for the ‘opinion of Continental writers, from 
experience of late wars, on volley and independent firing… and the reasons for the course 
you advocate’.131 In fact, the Operations of War also had a considerable impact on the study 
of tactics; and, Hamley’s approach, based on historical precedent, was the one adopted in the 
final exam.132 Given that a close acquaintance with the Operations of War was now essential 
for all aspects of the Military History course at the Staff College, as well as at Woolwich, 
Hamley noted in 1874 to his publisher that ‘Operations is selling well… we should have got 
through more than a thousand in the year… this is by far the best year… it has yet seen’.133 
This domination continued after Hamley had vacated the Commandant’s position in 1877 and 
only began to be challenged in the late 1880s.134 
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III. The Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, 1885-1914  
The first move away from the reliance on learning factual information and judgements 
contained in the Operations of War at the Staff College occurred when John Frederick 
Maurice was appointed as Professor of Military History in 1885.135 Maurice had previously 
been trained there, passing out fourth in his class in 1872, while Clausewitz’s writing was 
still in use.136 When he arrived to take up this position, he found that there had taken root ‘an 
idea of Military History which was certainly very different from [that] held by the very able 
men who had been those from whom I had myself learnt in the past’. He discovered that the 
students, in reaction to the emphasis which had been placed on the reproduction of facts, had 
focused their attention on learning the details of a campaign. He even discovered that ‘a 
zealous student had actually elaborated a memoria technical’ enabling him, ‘for the purpose 
of an examination, to place the troops in full detail just as they were on every day of any 
importance… in the campaign which he was studying’, which given ‘the nature of the 
examination enabled him to take a very high place’.137 
 By contrast, Maurice’s view of the role Military History should play in military 
training, and how it should be studied, was shaped by the Clausewitzian approach to the 
subject. Maurice stated, mirroring the Prussian’s writing on critical analysis, that in ‘the study 
of Military History it is necessary in each separate case first to ascertain accurately what the 
facts really are; secondly, to endeavour to ascertain what the causes were that led to the facts, 
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and thirdly, to endeavour to draw sound conclusions for the future’. 138  Again reflecting 
Clausewitz’s view, he felt that ‘it must be emphatically asserted that there does not exist… 
“an art of war” which was something other than the resultant of accumulated military 
experience’. As such, he thought that ‘it is essential for a soldier… to keep before him the 
fact that the object is not merely to acquire information concerning operations, battles, 
skirmishes, and charges, or indeed, any mere information at all’, but to improve his 
judgement as ‘knowledge [is] only of practical value in so far as it acquaints us with what we 
have to expect in war, and in so far as this acquaintance makes it easier for us to act in 
war’.139  
 To this end, Maurice set about modifying the Military History course at the Staff 
College to reflect this aim. However, he could do little about the content of the admission 
exam, since ‘out of sheer idleness’ the external examiner made a ‘fetish’ out of Operations of 
War and, until 1895, had continued the ‘habit of exacting verbal accuracy of quotation from 
the unfortunate candidates’.140 Maurice reduced the time given to the study of strategy, as he 
felt ‘it does not seem… possible at the Staff College to do more in that matter than to 
introduce men to the method of studying campaigns’. On the assumption that ‘a man is likely 
to acquire a much better knowledge of [how to approach the study of Military History] by a 
close and intimate study of one particular section of it’, he directed his students towards an 
in-depth analysis of one campaign in each year they spent at the college.141 Thus, the way in 
which Maurice taught the subject was underpinned by the notion that it should guide the 
student in his own self-education by providing him with the necessary tools for further study. 
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By 1890, Maurice’s reform of the subject had begun to come into effect and questions which 
focused on the development of a student’s judgement had returned to the course.142   
 Maurice, however, who retired from his position in 1892, realised that the reform of 
the Military History was still not complete. Although the external examiner in 1890 found a 
‘marked improvement’ in the study of the subject, as the students showed the ‘unmistakeable 
signs of intelligent reading’ with many going ‘well beyond “chessboard” strategy, [showing] 
that they appreciate[d] how much campaigns depend on… moral influences’, it was still 
noted that ‘it was not very difficult to trace the sources from which the information 
supplementary to that given in the Operations of War was derived [as they] were not 
numerous’. 143  In the year of his retirement, Maurice wrote to his successor, G.F.R. 
Henderson, that ‘I am deeply conscious that at present the Staff College produces a 
monstrous deal of bread for very little sack… from the ruck we have turned out, I fear… 
some cranks and not a few pedants. I am sure that under the new regime you will succeed 
where I have often failed’.144  
 Henderson shared Maurice’s view about the role which Military History should play 
in military training. In a lecture given in 1894, he pointed out that Operations of War had 
only provided the ‘elementary’ and ‘mechanical’ building blocks of the military art, but had 
‘scarcely mentioned’ the ‘higher art of generalship’ by which ‘the great commanders bound 
victory to their colours’.145 Henderson thought of a campaign not simply in terms of the lines 
of advance, or bases of operation, but as ‘a struggle between two human intelligences’.146 
Thus, like Clausewitz, Henderson placed great emphasis on the use of Military History to 
develop an officers’ judgement, and noted that ‘by far the most useful way of studying 
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Military History’ was to ‘find out from your books… what the situation was at any given 
time’ and ‘decide for yourself what you would have done had you been in the place of one of 
the commanding generals, and write your orders. [By doing this] you are training your 
judgement’.147  
This understanding of the role Military History could play in army education directly 
influenced how Henderson taught the subject at the Staff College. He taught his students that 
as ‘strategical questions cannot be solved on the spur of the moment but require close 
thinking and deep reflection… a rusty intellect is of no use, but a trained mind is required to 
decided rapidly’, since ‘in war a general is involved in darkness… which he can only 
penetrate by his own genius’.148 James Edmonds, who entered the Staff College in 1896, 
recalled that Henderson used Military History as ‘a framework for instruction’.149 A good 
example of this came from Edmonds time at Camberley: Douglas Haig was set a question by 
Henderson which asked him to ‘give the reasons’ behind the orders of the Confederate 
General Lee from June 13 to June 26 1862. To answer this question, Haig compared the 
characters of the commanders involved as well as the various methods for ‘solving’ the 
‘strategical situation’ at hand, for which Henderson congratulated him on his analysis.150   
In 1893 the final exam was abolished, so students were ranked only according to their 
work undertaken while on the course.151 Since the students were no longer required to sit a 
test set by an external examiner, Henderson was given greater freedom to develop the 
Military History syllabus along the lines he saw fit. Thus, he produced a list of twenty-one 
‘strategical principles’ which replaced Jomini’s ‘principles of war’ as the standard against 
which a campaign was analysed at the college. These were:  
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1) Strategy and Policy must be in harmony. 2) Good Organisation. 3) Sound 
Training. 4) Good Intelligence. 5) Concentration. 6) Preparation of the theatre 
of War. 7) Objectives must be carefully chosen, the main objective is the 
enemy’s main army. The secondary objectives are strategical points. 8) 
Direction. 9) Concentration of superior force at the decisive point at the 
decisive time. 10) The moral is to the physical as three to one. 11) Time is 
counted in war by minutes not by hours. 12) Compel the enemy to make 
mistakes. 13) [The importance of] natural features. 14) Victory brings a new 
strategical situation. 15) The strategic pursuit. 16) The strategic counter stroke 
is the best weapon for the defence. 17) War is not a matter of precedent. 18) 
Manoeuver is the antidote to entrenchments. 19) The best is the enemy of the 
good. 20) Cavalry… is strategically the most important arm. 21) Command of 
the Sea.152 
 
 
When Henderson left the Staff College in 1900 to serve on Lord Roberts’ staff in 
South Africa during the Second Boer War, his ‘strategical principles’ remained the standard 
against which a campaign was analysed until 1913.153 For example, in 1905 students in the 
Junior Division were asked to answer, in relation to Henderson’s principles, the question 
‘how far are the strategical and tactical lessons drawn from the campaigns of 1815, 1862, 
1866 and 1870 confirmed, or modified, by the experiences of the recent war in 
Manchuria’.154 Lieutenant-Colonel G. Morris, the member of the Directing Staff who taught 
Military History in 1909, also frequently referred to Henderson’s principles in the ‘schemes’ 
he set for students. He expected these principles to be used not only to provide a ‘summary of 
the lessons’ thought to have been demonstrated by the American Civil War, but to analyse 
Napoleon’s conduct in the ‘campaign of 1814’.155 Similarly, the papers of W.R. Robertson, 
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commandant of the Staff College between 1910 and 1913, contained a copy of Henderson’s 
principles, too, dated March 1912.156 
A key consideration which separated Henderson’s ‘principles’ from those devised by 
Jomini was the importance placed on psychological factors, which Henderson referred to 
using Napoleon’s maxim that ‘the moral is to the physical as three to one’.157 Consequently, 
the consideration of ‘moral factors’ began to play a larger role in the study of Military 
History at the Staff College; Haig’s notes taken in 1896 demonstrate, in fact, the emphasis 
which was placed on them. He wrote that ‘the psychological element [of] human nature with 
its infinite versatility play the chief part in war’ and, under the title ‘moral means’, he noted 
that ‘there is very little difference between the victor and the vanquished. But the difference 
is… owing to opinion!’ 158  Similarly, later that year, when he recorded the main four 
‘elements [which] are of importance in leading to decisive action’, he placed ‘morale’ and 
‘character’ as the most important.159 After Henderson had left the Staff College, the influence 
of ‘moral’ considerations on the conduct of a campaign remained an important part of the 
Military History syllabus and so students continued to be set questions in which the influence 
of psychological factors was central.160   
 In terms of the object of strategy and the role which political considerations should 
play, Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’ borrowed heavily from Jomini’s writing. Since the 
new principles stated that ‘the main objective is the enemy’s main army’, the study of 
strategy continued to be viewed primarily in military terms, as political factors were excluded 
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from setting the objective which an army pursued.161 Like Jomini, Henderson’s principles 
included the statement that ‘strategy and politics must be in harmony’; thus political 
considerations were held to have an influence on how a commander went about the 
destruction of the opposing army.162 Haig wrote in his Staff College notebook, that ‘political 
considerations may modify strategical principles often deemed inviolate… since strategy is 
dependent on [the] interior political conditions of a country’.163 Moreover, the admission 
exams began to refer to how political considerations should shape the conduct of a campaign: 
candidates were asked in 1899, ‘assuming that from the military point of view a particular 
series of strategical operations promises the best results, state what non-military 
considerations may affect the question of its adoption’.164   
As Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’ referred to the influence which ‘Command of 
the Sea’ could have on military operations, the role which this factor exerted on strategy 
began to be studied on the Military History course at the Staff College. It is likely that 
Henderson’s reading of Alfred T. Mahan’s work on the influence of sea-power on history led 
him to include this factor. Henderson had first referred to the American writer’s work in 1894 
in a lecture to the RUSI. In his article on ‘War’, which appeared in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica in 1902, he praised his ‘brilliant analysis of the nature of naval warfare and his 
masterly elucidation of the great principles of success and failure [in war]’.165 Reference to 
the influence of sea-power on land campaigns first appeared on the Staff College admission 
exam in 1898 when candidates were asked how ‘the conditions of modern war affected the 
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offensive strategy of Great Britain in conflicts with powers beyond the sea’. 166  Since 
Henderson’s principles were used as a framework around which students constructed their 
answers to questions posed by the teaching staff, the influence of maritime considerations on 
land operations often appeared in their work. For example, W.R. Robertson, answered a 
question set by Henderson in October 1898 on recent ‘Russian acquisitions’ in the ‘Far East’, 
by arguing that in any future conflict Britain should fall back on its ‘historical strategy’ by 
using the navy to both blockade the enemy’s ports and to conduct amphibious operations 
against the enemy’s colonies, so as to find new markets for British merchants, while denying 
them to the enemy.167  
After Henderson had left the Staff College the course of studies there began to place 
an increasing emphasis on a close co-operation between the army and navy. From 1906 
several places were reserved for naval officers and in 1909 the first ‘Combined Naval and 
Military Staff Tour’ took place, in which students from both services jointly planned 
operations.168 This emphasis on close co-operation influenced the way in which Military 
History was taught. Not only did reference to the importance of maritime considerations 
remain on the Military History syllabus, but students received lectures on ‘Amphibious 
Strategy’ which drew on examples gleaned from recent operations conducted during the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Spanish American War of 1898, and the Chilean Civil 
War of 1891.169 The Staff College library also held a selection of works on this topic. As part 
of the Military History course, students in 1913 were expected to read, among other material: 
                                                          
166 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1898 (London, 1899), p. 30. 
167 LHCMA, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/1, essay entitled ‘What changes in the Strategical relations between 
Russia and England have been produced by the advance and recent acquisitions of Russia in the Far East?’ p. 8. 
168 Godwin-Austin, The Staff and the Staff College, p. 242; Frederick Maurice, Life of Lord Rawlinson of Trent 
(London, 1928), p. 85; and, JSCSC, Shrivenham, Senior Division, 1910, ff. 27, ‘First Combined Naval and 
Military Staff Tour, 1909’, n.d.  
169 JSCSC, Shrivenham, Junior Division, 1909, ‘Syllabus for Examination in Military History and Geography’, 
December, 1909, Senior Division, 1907, ff. 94, ‘Military History Lectures’, 13 November 1907; and, Senior 
Division, 1907, ff. 97, ‘Amphibious Strategy’, 19 November 1907. 
67 
 
G.A. Furse’s Military Expeditions Beyond the Sea, Major C.E. Callwell’s Effect of Maritime 
Command on Land Campaigns and his Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, as 
well as G. Aston’s Letters on Amphibious Strategy.170 Noticeable by its absence, however, 
was the work of Julian Corbett, especially his Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 
(1911). 171  The inclusion of maritime considerations in the syllabus influenced which 
campaigns were selected for study and in the decade before the outbreak of the Great War, 
the campaign fought in the Richmond peninsula in 1862 during the American Civil War, in 
which an amphibious landing took place, was regularly studied.172 
Just as the use of Henderson’s strategical principles continued after his tenure at the 
Staff College had ended, the use of the subject to develop an officer’s judgement remained 
central to the teaching in the years before the outbreak of the Great War. Consequently, those 
taking the admission exam were reminded that ‘unless each important situation [during a 
campaign] is dealt with as a problem, of which the student thinks out his own solution, the 
study of Military History is of no great value’.173 Likewise, on the course of study itself, 
students continued to be set questions regularly which placed them in the position of a 
commander and charged them with deciding the best course of action. In 1910, for example, 
students of the Senior Division were placed in the position of the Russian General 
Mishchenko, who commanded several cavalry units during the Battle of the Yalu during the 
Russo-Japanese War. They were required to write an ‘appreciation of the situation, winding 
up with a detail of the distribution you propose for your troops [with] copies of any orders 
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you will issue’.174 This style of question not only allowed students to practise writing orders, 
but also required detailed information regarding the specifics of the campaign so, to answer 
the next question, in which the students were placed in the position of ‘General Staff Officers 
of the Headquarters Staff of the Russian Army’, they were required to use the newly 
published ‘advanced portion’ of the British Official History of the war.175  
 Despite these areas of continuity between the approach to the study of Military 
History introduced by Henderson and that used in the decade prior to the outbreak of the 
Great War, in 1899 the study of ‘Small Wars’ and warfare against ‘savage’ peoples was 
introduced to the subject’s syllabus, with Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and 
Practice acting as the textbook.176 From 1902, the admission exam included a new voluntary 
paper which was entirely devoted to this subject, which utilised Callwell’s work as its sole 
textbook.177 Many of the questions set both on this paper and on the Military History course 
were directly lifted from the work, and Callwell’s central argument, that conventional 
military forces should always seek to compel the enemy to fight, often acted as their 
premise.178 Initially, students were simply asked to provide historical examples to illustrate 
the principles described in Callwell’s work. However, from 1908 a more Clausewitzian 
approach was adopted and questions began to appear which placed the candidate in a 
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historical situation from a ‘small war’ and asked them to decide the best course of action.179 
In 1909 the topic was removed from the Military History syllabus, although there continued 
to be a voluntary ‘small wars’ paper on the admission exam, and it became its own subject at 
the Staff College, known as ‘Warfare in Uncivilised Countries’.180 This new subject was also 
based on Callwell’s writing; it drew on the same examples from Military History, while the 
notion that ‘strategy favours the enemy’ continued to underpin many questions.181 
  The number of officers from the Indian Army admitted to Camberley was strictly 
limited following their first admittance to the institution in 1877. In 1889, and again in 1890, 
the Indian authorities put pressure on the War Office to allow more of its officers to attend 
the Staff College, but on both occasions their proposals were rejected. 182  When Lord 
Kitchener became Commander-in-Chief in India in November 1902 he began to reconstitute 
and modernise the Indian Army and so demanded a far greater number of trained staff 
officers than the existing arrangement could provide. A committee was organised under 
Major-General E.H.H. Collen in 1904 to consider the formation of a Staff College in India.183 
The main concern of this committee was that the formation of a second Staff College would 
‘certainly result in the gradual growth of two schools of thought, and in a divergence of views 
on Staff Duties between the officers of the British and Indian Armies’.184 Hence, when on the 
committee’s recommendation, a second institution was opened, first temporarily at Deolali in 
1905, and then permanently at Quetta in 1907, the syllabus adopted was modelled on the one 
used at the ‘mother college at Camberley’. At first, only graduates from Camberley were 
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selected as teaching staff so as to ensure the ‘fundamental principle’ of ‘uniformity and 
similarity of thought between the two colleges’.185   
As a result of this, the way in which Military History was taught at Quetta closely 
mirrored the Clausewitzian approach in use at Camberley. The first Military History lecture 
given each year to students at Quetta, which looked in part at the ‘object and best method of 
studying’ the subject, presented Clausewitz’s three types of historical criticism as the ‘strictly 
critical parts of historical study’. The script used for this lecture by Major A. Montgomery-
Massingberd in 1913 quoted from the J.J. Graham translation of On War to illustrate the 
importance of ‘tracing of effects to causes’ and ‘the testing of the means [a commander] 
employed’. Likewise, students were told to avoid committing ‘to memory too many 
unimportant facts that are really of little value [such as] the names of generals, places, and the 
exact details regarding the forces engaged’. Just as at Camberley, the central reason for 
studying Military History was the development of an officer’s judgement by drawing ‘lessons 
as how to, or how not to act under certain circumstances’ so that the staff officer ‘may know 
instinctively the soundest line of action to adopt and what mistakes to avoid’ in the future.186 
 Henderson’s ‘Strategical Principles’ which had been ‘issued to successive [classes] at 
Camberley’ were also used in the study of Military History at Quetta.187 As a result, those 
factors thought by Henderson to influence the conduct of a campaign were studied, with the 
consideration of ‘moral’ factors deemed to be the ‘most important’.188 As at Camberley, 
emphasis was placed the importance of the ‘Command of the Sea’, since ‘all strategy must 
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embrace the combined forces of the army and navy’.189 The campaign most frequently used 
to illustrate this principle was that fought in the Richmond peninsula during the American 
Civil War in 1862, as at Camberley.190 The one area of difference between the Military 
History syllabuses at Camberley and Quetta was due to geography. Due to their relative 
proximity, students at Quetta were able to visit the regions fought over during the Russo-
Japanese War, whereas at Camberley the annual tour visited the battlefields of the Franco-
Prussian War instead.191  
At both Camberley and Quetta in the years immediately before the outbreak of the 
Great War much more emphasis was placed on Clausewitz’s discussion of the influence 
which political considerations had on strategy than had been the case previously. This change 
followed a discussion held during a Staff Officers Conference in January 1908 on the 
‘necessity for the soldier to study politics in relation to strategy’. Here Brigadier-General 
Launcelot Kiggell, former Deputy Assistant Adjutant General at Camberley, later to be made 
Commandant in 1913, commented that the more he had both studied and taught Military 
History, the more he had become convinced that ‘politics were at the back of all strategical 
problems’. He continued, ‘it was not possible to separate strategy and politics, and indeed 
Clausewitz based his whole theory of war on the fundamental principle that strategy must be 
based on policy’.192  
The courses of instruction at both Staff Colleges reflected this greater emphasis 
placed on the Clausewitzian understanding of war, especially the way in which the political 
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end a nation sought should influence its military objective sought by the army.193 In 1909 the 
Camberley admission exam defined strategy as ‘the use of combats for the object of the war’ 
as Clausewitz had done. In 1911, the same exam asked candidates to illustrate how successful 
commanders conducted their operations, bearing in mind that ‘strategy must consider itself 
entirely dependent upon and subservient to the national policy’.194 At Camberley in 1913 the 
Junior Division were asked to prepare a memorandum on the best way to defend Richmond, 
the Confederate capital during the American Civil War, as if they were a ‘military advisor to 
President Jefferson Davis’ on the 20 February 1862. The model answer prepared by the 
examiner expected the students to realise that the military objective sought by the 
Confederates was determined by their political objective. Therefore, although ‘purely 
defensive’ military measures were thought to put the Southern armies at a serious military 
disadvantage, this was advocated as ‘the Federal[s would] be compelled to take the offensive 
as the only means of achieving their [political] aim’, and this would make them appear to be 
the ‘aggressors’, increasing the likelihood of England and France intervening on the 
Confederate side. Moreover, if the political situation allowed the Confederates to go on the 
offensive, the examiner expected pupils to identify Washington, not the Federal Army, as the 
military objective as ‘its fall and the flight of the Federal Government might conceivably 
expedite the recognition’ of Southern independence internationally.195 Similarly, at Quetta, in 
the first Military History lecture given to the Junior Division in 1913, Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd explained that when studying and analysing a campaign it should 
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be remembered that ‘policy is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must exercise a 
continuous influence over it’.196  
Although the study of Military History at Camberley underwent significant changes 
between 1858 and 1914, the subject was taught continuously at this institution during this 
period. In contrast, the subject had ceased to be taught at Sandhurst and Woolwich by 1887. 
However, by 1904, both institutions were teaching the subject again and Military History had 
also been added to the syllabus of the exams set as part of officer promotion. 
 
IV. Sandhurst, Woolwich and Army Exams, 1899-1914  
In an attempt to correct the problems in officer education highlighted by the Second Boer 
War, in April 1901 the Secretary of State for War, St John Broderick, appointed a committee 
under A. Askers-Douglas to investigate how the army trained its officers and to propose 
changes to the existing system. A central concern of the committee was to foster a greater 
sense of professionalism in the officer corps, and so an emphasis was placed on balancing 
‘the acquisition of knowledge likely to be useful to the officer’ with ‘that which is of still 
greater importance, the right training of the mind:… the development of the power of 
acquiring knowledge and of using it when acquired’. 197  The committee was told by 
Henderson that since Military History was not taught outside the Staff Colleges the British 
officer was not sufficiently educated for ‘modern war’.198 The solutions which were proposed 
and introduced had, however, mixed results; but they were nonetheless significant. 
In an attempt to rectify this perceived problem, and in the interests of promoting 
professionalism, the Askers-Douglas committee suggested that Military History should play 
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an important part in the course of instruction at both Woolwich and Sandhurst so that a young 
officer would learn ‘sufficient Military History [as] to stimulate his interest in this important 
subject’ and so inspire him to take up the study of the subject voluntarily after he had left the 
institution. To ensure that officers remained committed to their professional development and 
continued to study Military History throughout their career, the committee also proposed that 
an annual exam for all regimental officers under the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel should be set 
‘on the Military History of a selected campaign’ and that those found ‘conspicuously ignorant 
on two or more consecutive occasions… should be warned that they will not be promoted’.199  
As a consequence of these proposals not only was Military History returned to the 
Woolwich curriculum in 1903, but the course at Sandhurst underwent modification. Since 
1899, Military History had been taught in a limited form at Sandhurst. Students had received 
three lectures a term in the subject as part of the course of instruction in Tactics. But as only 
300 of the 5750 marks available to a cadet during his time at the college were assigned to 
Military History, it was considered ‘an impossible way of teaching’ the subject.200 Despite an 
increase in the time spent on the subject in 1901, so that a cadet received twelve lectures and 
thirty hours of class instruction during his time at the institution, the number of marks 
assigned remained the same; an arrangement the Assistant Military Secretary of the Army, 
Colonel A.M. Delavoye, called a ‘farce’.201  
Following the implementation of the proposals put forward by the Askers-Douglas 
committee, the number of marks allocated to the study of Military History at Sandhurst was 
raised, and an additional ‘voluntary’ paper in the subject was added to the course. This 
allowed a cadet who had received more than eighty per cent of the marks available in the 
obligatory exam to receive up to forty-eight additional marks in the subject, in theory 
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rewarding their interest and further study of the subject. Although these changes meant a 
cadet could now receive up to 400 marks in Military History, on a par with those allotted to 
the study of ‘Drill’ and ‘Musketry’, the subject was still poorly represented when compared 
to the 1200 marks available in both ‘Military Engineering’ and ‘Military Topography’. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the voluntary paper proved to be a failure, as only six of the 
seventy-four cadets on the course in 1904 received the required marks in the obligatory exam 
to count towards their grade.202 In light of this, in December 1905 the voluntary paper was 
discontinued and the marks assigned to Military History were raised to 1200 to reflect the 
importance which the Askers-Douglas committee had placed on its study.203   
In line with the proposals put forward by the Askers-Douglas committee designed to 
stimulate interest in the study of Military History, measures were adopted at both Sandhurst 
and Woolwich to encourage the students to read the subject. At Sandhurst from 1903 a 
textbook was set for each campaign examined: the work used for the Peninsular campaign 
was the first volume of Major-General C.W. Robinson’s Wellington’s Campaigns (1905), for 
the Waterloo campaign, Major-General H.D. Hutchinson’s Story of Waterloo: A Popular 
Account of the Campaign of 1815 (1890), while, in 1904, Henderson’s Campaign of 
Fredericksburg (1885) was set as ‘the book’ for the study of this campaign.204 However, the 
use of textbooks did have one important drawback, even though the students were expected 
to read other works, as it led to some of the ‘weaker’ students ‘cramming’ the textbook and 
merely repeating its conclusions. In June 1907 the examiners found that this practice had 
taken place more than usual, since ‘apparently the candidates had learnt it all by heart and felt 
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that they must bring it out at all-risks’.205 The examiners were highly critical of this approach 
to the subject, and later commented that although the exam papers were ‘specially prepared to 
defeat [methods] such as these’, it was apparent that ‘the subject [was still] got up in a parrot-
like manner by a large proportion of the candidates’.206  
At Woolwich a much greater emphasis was placed on ensuring that the cadet read as 
widely as possible. Students were expected to read works related to the campaign under study 
and also those on recent and on-going campaigns. In 1905, ‘with a view to testing further 
whether the cadets have grasped the importance of the study of Military History’, the 
examiner set a question on the Russo-Japanese War, even though the conflict was still raging 
and was ‘not included in the synopsis of the term’s studies’. Naturally, to answer this 
question ‘the cadets were… dependent to a great extent as regards facts on their own private 
reading, and as regards the appreciation of facts, on their own criticism’.207 The examiner 
found that ‘the results of this test [were] noteworthy’, as the work of ten cadets out of the 
forty examined, ‘were of so high a quality as to earn full marks [and] in only one case was it 
found necessary to award less than half marks’. As a result of this experiment, the examiner 
felt that Military History had ‘been so taught and studied’ that ‘the cadets now… obtaining 
commissions [from Woolwich] have a very good foundation for their future work in the 
subject’.208   
At both Sandhurst and Woolwich, an understanding of Jomini’s ‘principles of war’ 
remained integral to the course, with students expected to define terms such as ‘double lines’ 
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of advance and ‘interior lines’ of communication in the final exams set. 209  Likewise, 
Hamley’s Operations of War continued to influence both courses, with questions such as that 
set at Sandhurst in June 1905 regarding, ‘mountains [as] military obstacles’, based on 
examples directly taken from this work.210 Moreover, Robinson’s Wellington’s Campaigns, 
used as a textbook at Sandhurst, consisted of lectures which he had written using Hamley’s 
work while teaching there between 1868 and 1870.211  
However, following the changes implemented as a result of the Askers-Douglas 
committee, at both Sandhurst and Woolwich a greater emphasis was placed on the use of 
Military History to develop an officer’s judgement, thus implementing the Clausewitzian 
approach to the subject, as had already been achieved at the Staff College. From 1904 
questions which placed the cadet in the position of a commander making a judgement were 
employed. In 1908, for example, an exam paper set at Woolwich included questions which 
asked the cadet to ‘write a short appreciation of the situation as it presented itself’ to General 
Lee when he assumed command of Confederate troops in Virginia in April 1862, and to 
‘discuss the various courses which were open’ to ‘Stonewall’ Jackson on 7 June 1862 at Port 
Republic.212 More emphasis was also placed on developing the cadet’s ability to deduce 
practical ‘lessons’ from the campaigns studied. 213 In the final exam set at Sandhurst in June 
1906, in a question on the Peninsular Campaign of 1808-10, the cadets were asked ‘what 
have you learnt as regards the utility of delivering counterstrokes from your study of this 
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campaign, and is it more difficult to deliver a counterstroke now than it was in those days, if 
so, why?’ The examiner praised the cadet’s work, noting that ‘they show a considerable 
knowledge of the facts of the campaign, and, what is still more important, they have grasped 
the lessons which can be learnt… and which can be applied in future wars’.214   
After 1905 the influence exerted by sea-power on land campaigns also became a 
feature of the study of Military History at Woolwich and Sandhurst. This further brought 
their curriculum into line with that of the Staff College.215 Since Woolwich placed such a 
high regard on private study, the library there acquired several books on the subject, 
including Callwell’s Maritime Command and Effect on Land Campaigns Since Waterloo, his 
Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, as well as Julian Corbett’s Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy.216 The campaign which was the most regularly used to study 
maritime operations was also that fought during the American Civil War in the Richmond 
peninsula in 1862.217 For example, in July 1912 the cadets were asked to ‘discuss the various 
ways in which “Command of the Sea” influenced the course of the campaign up to the end of 
June 1862’ and ‘although McClellan’s strategy was based on a full use of sea-power held by 
the Federals, to what extent do you consider the methods by which this advantage was 
applied actually furthered the plans of his opponents?’218 At Sandhurst, many of Alfred T. 
Mahan’s books was purchased for the library, and by 1904 it held Life of Nelson: the 
Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (1897), Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
1660-1783 (1890), and Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 
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1793-1812 (1892). 219  Consideration of the influence of maritime considerations on land 
campaigns directly influenced the course at this institution, the influence of British sea-power 
on the campaigns in the Spanish Peninsula during the Napoleonic wars appeared on the final 
exams set at Sandhurst every year between 1905 and 1914.220  
While the proposals made by the Askers-Douglas committee regarding the study of 
Military History at Woolwich and Sandhurst were accepted, their suggestion that an annual 
Military History exam be set for all officers under the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel was 
rejected, although the matter continued to be discussed at Staff Conferences in the years 
before the outbreak of the Great War.221 Instead, in November 1904, Military History was 
added to the syllabus of the promotional exams sat by Lieutenants for promotion to Captain, 
and Captains for promotion to Major.222 The number of marks assigned to Military History 
was reasonably high, as out of the total of 1,600 marks available on the syllabus, it was 
allotted 500.223 As this was the second highest weighting of marks, only behind the subject 
known as ‘Military Engineering, Tactics and Topography’, which accounted for 600 marks, it 
ensured that officers would need to devote a considerable amount of time to the study of 
Military History to ensure that they were promoted.224 The Military History papers focused 
on a specially selected campaign which changed every year, notice of which was placed in 
the April edition of the Army Orders.225 Both the Lieutenants and Captains taking the exam 
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sat the same two papers, the first of which focused on the ‘strategy and grand tactics’ of the 
selected campaign, while the second paper concentrated on a ‘special period’ so that the 
‘details of the minor tactics’ could be examined’.226  
The justification for the inclusion of Military History in this exam, just as the Askers-
Douglas committee had hoped to exact at Sandhurst and Woolwich, was to stimulate 
professionalism by encouraging ‘officers who have perhaps never read a Military History 
book before in their lives to acquire a taste for this study’, so that they would then read 
military literature ‘of their own free will’.227 Since it was felt that a ‘direct incentive’ was 
needed to start officers reading more than just the books prescribed by an exam syllabus, no 
textbook was deliberately set for these exams, ensuring that officers would be forced to read 
widely in preparation for them.228 In order to place more books ‘within reach of officers’, 
small libraries consisting of ‘instructive and interesting publications’ were organised in their 
messes so that they could read in their spare time, as it was thought they ‘would read Military 
History much more freely if they could feel they were not going to be examined on every 
book they took up’.229 To further assist officers taking these exams, a series of classes of 
instruction were organised by the General Staff in order to prevent officers attending an 
institution intended to ‘cram’ men for the exam.230 At Aldershot, although these classes were 
conducted differently elsewhere, all officers, not just those up for promotion, were expected 
to study the campaign selected for the promotional exam by reading the books recommended 
by the officer in charge of the district, and by attending the lectures on the campaign put on 
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over the winter months.231 Likewise, the RUSI organised series of lectures on the campaigns 
selected for the upcoming exams.232  
Just as at Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff Colleges, the promotional exams used 
Military History to develop an officer’s judgement, so the questions employed either placed 
the candidate in the position of a commander making a decision, or asked them to deduce 
‘lessons’ from the period under study. 233  While knowledge of Jomini’s ideas, as they 
appeared in Operations of War, was still required, there were far fewer references to them.  
Likewise, the examiners made it plain in the reports published after every exam that they 
were not interested in candidates demonstrating a comprehensive knowledge of the events of 
a campaign. Instead, they expected them to exhibit ‘the training derived from thinking out the 
difficulties’ presented to a commander, as weighing ‘the advantages and disadvantages of [a] 
possible course of action’. In short developing judgement was thought to be ‘one of the most 
important assets derived’ from the study of the subject.234  
The proposals of the Askers-Douglas committee also influenced the exam sat by 
officers in the Militia and Territorial Force to convert their commission into one in the 
Regular Army, and by university graduates seeking a commission, which were collectively 
referred to as the ‘competitive exams’. In 1899, the ‘Military Law and Tactics’ paper of these 
exams was replaced by one on Military History, and a new syllabus set ‘parts I, II, III of 
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Hamley’s Operations of War’ as the only text.235 The flaws in this approach to testing the 
candidate’s knowledge of ‘the art of war’ was soon made apparent as the candidates merely 
learnt ‘by heart’ summaries which gave ‘a good cram in the first three parts of Hamley’ 
allowing them to ‘get a good many marks without knowing anything about the subject’.236 
The changes brought in as a result of the Askers-Douglas Committee led to the removal of 
the textbook, with the intention of requiring wider reading from the candidates, and raised the 
level of difficulty of the exam, so that although it remained of a lower standard than the 
promotional exams, it would ensure that the candidate’s knowledge of Military History was 
‘approximate, as nearly as possible, to that of the Sandhurst Cadet’.237 To this end the number 
of marks assigned to Military History on the syllabus remained the same. Thus, out of the 
5000 marks available, 1000 continued to come from the subject.238  
However, initially, this exam preserved the influence of Operations of War and one of 
its two papers, entitled ‘the principles of strategy’, consisted largely of questions based on the 
Jominian ‘principles of war’ and terminology found in Hamley’s work. For example, papers 
set in September 1904, March 1909, and October 1910 all referred to the importance of 
forcing the enemy to ‘form a front to a flank’ as Hamley had done, and on every paper the 
candidates were asked to provide examples from military history to illustrate each principle 
covered in the exam.239 The other paper set for this exam focused on the strategy employed in 
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a ‘special campaign’, which, like that selected for the promotional exam, changed each year. 
Tactics were examined separately in two additional papers, the first of which focused on their 
historical development from 1740 to contemporary times, while the other consisted of 
abstract questions which placed the candidate in fictional combat situations to examine the 
action they took.240  
Even though the promotional exams demanded a higher standard of work and placed 
much less emphasis on the knowledge of Jominian principles than the competitive exams, 
both syllabuses expected candidates to analyse the campaigns under study through a set of 
criteria similar to that used at Sandhurst and Woolwich. Thus, in both exams candidates were 
expected to comment on the ‘relations between politics and strategy’, the ‘influence… of sea-
power’ on land campaigns, and the role played by ‘moral factors, especially personality and 
[the] characteristics of an opponent’.241 The reference to the ‘relations between politics and 
strategy’ received no further explanation on the syllabus, so it appears to have been left 
deliberately vague so that the candidates were forced to interpret it themselves. Just as at 
Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff Colleges, the inclusion of maritime considerations on the 
syllabus affected which campaigns were selected for study. However, while these institutions 
consistently revisited the same campaign to study this factor, possibly to make less work for 
the instructors, the promotional and competitive exams drew on a variety of operations 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in October 1910 (London, 
1911), p. 15. 
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conducted during the Russo-Japanese War, the American Civil War, the Peninsular War and 
the Russo-Turkish War.242 
In the latter part of 1911 an effort was made to standardise the professional exams 
undertaken by officers in the British Empire. In 1905, following the precedent set in Britain, 
the Indian Army had included Military History as part of the promotional exams set for those 
applying for promotion to Captain and Major. The authorities in India appointed W.H. James’ 
Modern Strategy (1904) as the textbook for this exam, a work which was based on the 
syllabus of the British competitive and promotional exams.243 However, in August 1911, the 
authorities in India scrapped this system and began to use the Military History papers that 
were set in Britain and which were used in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.244  
Similarly, at this time the competitive exams increasingly mirrored the promotional 
exams, and the ‘principles of strategy’ paper was dropped so that both papers could be set on 
the ‘special campaign’, the first examining the strategy employed, the second the tactics 
used.245 This change also marked a reduction in the emphasis placed on Jominian principles, 
and more questions were devoted to developing the judgement of the candidate. Moreover, 
by this time, the second paper on both the promotional and competitive exams was altered so 
that candidates were now expected to demonstrate their ‘knowledge of tactical principles’ and 
their ability to apply them to the guidance laid down in the first volume of Field Service 
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Regulations.246 Although it had taken the chastening experience of the Second Boer War, 
these changes to army education not only reflect that by 1911 a new emphasis had been 
placed on raising the professional attainments of the officer corps as a whole, but also that the 
study of Military History had been assigned an important role in this endeavour.   
 
*    *   * 
 
In considering why the army expanded its use of Military History in its examination syllabus, 
broadly speaking, the justification remained the same from the end of the Crimean War to the 
outbreak of war in 1914. Military History was always intended to increase the professional 
capacity of the officer corps, at least in part because it was used to convey a common 
understanding of war. Despite this, how the subject was thought to contribute toward this end 
did undergo significant modification, particularly after 1885.247  The long process of this 
modification is, ultimately, what is significant because an analysis of why Military History 
continued to feature in officer education provides important insights into the development of 
British military thought as the syllabuses necessarily reflected the way in which the army 
expected officers to think about warfare.  
The modifications to the teaching of Military History ran through several phases, the 
first of which was ushered in by the Yolland Commission of 1857. As the decision to begin 
the study of Military History had resulted from the Commission’s visit to continental military 
academies, the method which was initially adopted to study the subject in Britain also 
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reflected how it was taught abroad.248 Subsequently, it was foreign wars which provided 
further stimulus to the teaching of Military History: the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian 
Wars led to an increased emphasis on the study of tactics during the 1870s. Military History 
was drawn on to provide historical examples for the study of the ‘tactical principles’ 
contained in F. Clery’s Minor Tactics.249 But as it was impossible to find examples which 
provided an illustration of the effect of the most up-to-date weaponry, and so the most recent 
developments in tactical thought, the study of tactics became increasingly based on fictional 
case studies.250 As such, the teaching of tactics differed considerably from that of strategy. 
When Edward Hamley’s Operations of War came to dominate the study of the subject 
during the 1870s and early 1880s, this led to an unfortunate emphasis – up to a point 
unintended – to be placed on rote learning from this instructional work.251 The approach to 
the subject was centred on the study of an individual campaign so that Jomini’s principles 
could be illustrated. However, the John Frederick Maurice and G.F.R. Henderson era at the 
Staff College (1885-1900) had a major effect on the justifications for the teaching of Military 
History in the army. Both were influenced by Clausewitz and they utilised the method of 
studying the subject which he had proposed. They not only placed an emphasis on the use of 
Military History to develop the military judgement of the student, but taught the subject in a 
way which would enable their pupils to be able to use it as a guide to their own education in 
the future. To this end, a certain focus remained on the communication of the ‘principles’ 
thought to dictate the conduct of operations. 252  While these preserved the influence of 
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Jomini’s writing, Henderson instructed his students to employ some of the ideas contained 
within Clausewitz’s writing as criteria through which to analyse a campaign.253 
The notion that Military History could play a role in the self-education of officers and 
could be used to develop their military judgement influenced the proposals of the Askers-
Douglas Committee of 1902.254  As this committee emphasised the need to improve the 
professionalism of the officer corps, it recommended that Military History should be included 
on the syllabuses of Sandhurst and Woolwich as well as in the army’s professional exams in 
an effort to create an interest in military literature amongst officers.255 Besides its use to 
develop military judgement, Military History continued to be used to communicate a 
standardised way of thinking. The syllabuses of Sandhurst and Woolwich, as well as the 
promotional and competitive exams, employed the criteria used at the Staff College to 
analyse campaigns, including moral and maritime considerations.256 
There were, nonetheless, clear limits to the degree to which the Staff College could 
contribute to the courses at Sandhurst and Woolwich, as illustrated by the study of irregular 
and colonial warfare. While the teaching of this subject began after a change in the Military 
History syllabus at the Staff College in 1899, prior to the publication of Charles Callwell’s 
Small Wars in 1896 there had been no theoretical work on this type of conflict.257 That the 
study of ‘Small Wars’ was not undertaken at Sandhurst and Woolwich, and that it did not 
become part of the promotional and competitive exams, was due to several causes. As small 
wars were ‘often campaigns rather against nature than against hostile armies’, the main 
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obstacles to their conduct were seen to be logistical, thus the domain of staff officers.258 
Moreover, there was little literature available, such as campaign narratives, on which study 
could be based. Finally, the Field Service Regulations of 1909, which began to influence the 
way in which Military History was taught, placed an emphasis on the similarities between 
different types of conflict, noting that in ‘warfare against an uncivilised enemy’, the 
‘principles of regular warfare’ need only ‘be somewhat modified’. 259  It is therefore not 
surprising that the army prioritised the study of conventional campaigns to ensure that an 
officer had an understanding of ‘regular warfare’ before he studied the factors thought to 
modify its conduct.  
If the justification for the study of Military History, and the way in which it was 
examined, had advanced rather slowly, these advances were still significant. In the wake of 
the reforms brought in as a result of the Second Boer War, Military History came to be 
employed by the army in four different ways as part of an effort to increase the 
professionalism of the officer corps.260 First, the Clausewitzian approach to Military History 
was introduced to the syllabus for the promotional and competitive exams in 1904, as well as 
at Sandhurst and Woolwich. 261  Second, the study of the subject was used as a way to 
encourage officers to develop an interest in military literature, which it was hoped would lead 
them to read such material of their own free will.262 To this end, no textbooks were set at 
Woolwich or for the promotional and competitive exams so that students were forced to read 
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around the subject, rather than just ‘cramming’ a single work. 263  Third, given the 
contemporary emphasis on ‘learning the lessons’ of the Second Boer War, those sitting 
Military History exams began to be asked to derive ‘lessons’ from the campaign under 
study.264 Finally, the subject was used as a way to instil the directives contained in the Field 
Service Regulations as Military History papers included reference to this manual and it was 
expected that candidates would analyse campaigns in relation to its precepts.265 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Strategy, Tactics and Campaigns: 
Military History for Officers 
 
 
 
 
During the period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the outbreak of the 
Crimean War in 1854 British historians produced a small quantity of Military History 
intended for a military audience. As was noted at the time, the reason for this could be traced 
to lack of demand for this sort of literature, created in part because the British Army did not 
have any major continental commitment during these years, or a training establishment which 
could stimulate interest in the subject.1 Moreover, the typical regimental officer spent the 
majority of his career stationed throughout the Empire, where his ability to manage the troops 
entrusted to him was of greater practical use than the study of Military History.2 In other 
words, before the Crimean War there was no recognisable body of literature which could be 
described as Military History.  
The few works which were published between the Napoleonic Wars and the end of 
the Crimean War, most notably William Napier’s History of the Peninsular War (1828-
1840), focused mainly on campaigns fought in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, so were 
not only of little direct practical relevance to officers but obscured the Military History which 
had been written by Britain’s only outstanding military thinker, Major-General Henry Lloyd, 
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who had died before the outbreak of the Peninsular War.3 In the period before 1850, the few 
British officers who did study Military History were forced to rely on works written by 
continental writers, usually reading them in the original language. This only changed in 1851 
when Edward Yates produced a work which articulated Jomini’s principles of war with the 
intention ‘to prepare the way for, and render advantageous’ the study of Military History.4 
There was also little regiment history produced prior to the 1870s. The need for such histories 
was thought to have been obviated following the publication of a history of each regiment in 
the army by Richard Cannon between 1837 and 1854.5  However, the majority of these 
volumes consisted of ‘nothing more than copious extracts from Napier, eked out with reprints 
of the formal reports taken from the London Gazette’.6  
By contrast, however, during the period between 1854 and 1914 Military History 
published for a military audience underwent a period of dramatic expansion. Not only were 
many volumes produced to assist those taking army exams, such as Edward Hamley’s 
Operations of War, which went through seven editions during this time, but also works such 
as Charles Callwell’s Small Wars which drew on Military History to discuss ways of 
understanding conflict which did not appear on the army’s exam syllabuses. 7  Similarly, 
periodicals aimed at a military readership featured increasing numbers of articles intended 
both to educate and entertain this audience.8 This was a development of major significance. 
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Nonetheless, the existing scholarly literature has largely overlooked the development 
of Military History written for a military readership between 1854 and 1914. For the most 
part, the writing of Basil Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller regarding Military History in Britain 
before 1914 dealt with how the subject was taught by the army, rather than on an analysis of 
the work which had been published for military readers.9 One exception to this was that they 
both referred to G.F.R. Henderson in their writing on the American Civil War, if only to 
observe that the conflict had been essentially neglected by British historians prior to the 
publication of his Stonewall Jackson.10 Although Liddell Hart claimed that it was this work 
that had first kindled his interest in this war, he argued that its focus on the operations in the 
Shenandoah Valley had obscured the role sea-power had played in the outcome of the 
conflict, and so had prevented thought on an aspect he felt was a crucial to the ‘British way in 
war’.11 
Henderson’s writing on the American Civil War was also examined by Jay Luvaas in 
his Military Legacy of the Civil War, although his analysis was necessarily limited to an 
appraisal of the work which had appeared on the conflict. No consideration was given to 
other wars, or the development of Henderson’s ideas regarding the study of military history. 
In Education of an Army, Luvaas engaged in an analysis of the work of several British 
military thinkers, including Hamley and Henderson.12 While there was some discussion of the 
Military History produced by each writer, there was no attempt to place this within a wider 
context or to investigate the development of this type of writing, particularly as several 
notable military historians who produced work prior to the Great War were not examined by 
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Luvaas.13 Moreover, Luvaas failed to undertake a detailed analysis of the multiple editions of 
Hamley’s Operations of War which – given that the work had a major influence on how the 
army studied Military History – was a major oversight.14  
In order to offer a solution to the second research sub-question posed in the 
introduction, which asked why between 1854 and 1914 there was an increase in the writing of 
Military History intended to serve a didactic purpose for army officers, this chapter intends to 
examine what actually stimulated the writing of this type of work. To this end, it will pay 
particular attention to the extent to which material was produced to assist those taking army 
exams, the use of the subject to introduce new ideas into British military thought and the role 
of this type of work in fostering professionalism. This chapter will follow a chronological 
approach based around four sections: first, it will consider how Military History was written 
for a military audience between 1854 and 1866; second, the material written between 1866 
and 1890 will be examined, particularly in relation to the later editions of Hamley’s 
Operations of War; third, the impact of new approaches to the writing of Military History 
(1885-99) will be assessed; and, fourth, the influence which the changes to army education 
caused by the Second Boer War exerted on the writing of Military History will be considered.  
 
I. Hamley’s Operations of War and the Creation of a Market, 1854-66 
The writing of Military History for the purpose of military education received an impetus in 
Britain following the recommendations of the Yolland commission, first published in July 
1856.15 Besides advocating that Military History should be taught in the army’s educational 
establishments, the commissioners realised that the study of the subject on the continent was 
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Organising the System for Training Officers for the Scientific Corps (406) (London, 1856). This was an 
advanced portion of the Yolland Commission’s report.  
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‘much assisted by the good text-books’ which existed ‘in great numbers in Germany and 
France, but are scarcely found at all amongst ourselves’. This, they reasoned, created ‘a great 
preliminary obstacle to the extension of [military] education’ in Britain as ‘foreign works, or 
translations of them, can never suit our purposes so well as our own productions, not to speak 
of its being discreditable to us to rely solely or mainly upon them’. Consequently, they hoped 
that their proposals regarding the study of Military History by the army would lead British 
writers to ‘create a literature of this kind’.16  
In this regard, the commissioners appear to have been successful as, by August 1856, 
P.L. MacDougall, Superintendent of Studies at Sandhurst, had begun work on The Theory of 
War: Illustrated by Numerous Examples from Military History, which was ultimately 
published by Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts that year. MacDougall admitted in the 
preface that the first half of his book had been entirely compiled ‘from the writings of 
Napoleon, Frederick [the Great], the Archduke Charles, and Jomini’, and the method of 
arrangement used ‘was partly suggested by Yates’s… Treatise on Strategy’. It was Jomini’s 
writing which provided the real basis for the work as MacDougall presented Jomini’s 
‘principles of war’ and illustrated each in turn with several historical examples. 17 
MacDougall’s work proved to be popular; the review which appeared in Colburn’s United 
Service Magazine praised the work highly, proclaiming that it ‘ought to find a place amongst 
the limited number of books which an officer may permit himself to possess’, a second 
edition of the work was printed in 1858, followed by a third in 1862.18  
                                                          
16 Yolland Commission, p. 43.  
17 MacDougall, The Theory of War, pp. ix, 116-126, 207-226. 
18 Quote taken from an advert found in Longmans catalogue published in P.L. MacDougall, Campaigns of 
Hannibal: Arranged and Critically Considered, Expressly for the use of Students of Military History (London, 
1858), n.p.   
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Given the success of MacDougall’s book it was added to in 1858 by J.J. Graham’s 
Progress of the Art of War. 19  This work was initially offered to the publisher John 
Blackwood, as Graham’s cousin, James Frederick Ferrier, a professor at St Andrew’s 
University, had published several articles in Blackwood’s Magazine. However, since ‘it did 
not suit’ Blackwood to publish the work, Graham’s book was published by Richard 
Bentley.20 The work, mirroring the approach to the study of Military History adopted by 
Yates, MacDougall, and which was currently in use by the army, sought to communicate the 
‘immutable… principles of war’ derived from Jomini, so that the reader could then 
‘exercise… with advantage [the study of] the actual operations of war as detailed in history, 
the great school, rich in instruction… for those who aspire to distinction in the military 
profession’.21 This work was also well received and, by November 1861, Graham felt able to 
say that it had met ‘with a fair success’.22  
Part of the reason for this success was that six chapters of Graham’s work utilised 
examples from classical campaigns and so reflected the Duke of Cambridge’s General Army 
Order of 9 April 1857 that military operations from this time were to be studied by those 
officers seeking a staff position.23 Since classical campaigns did not feature in The Theory of 
War, MacDougall, now Commandant of the Staff College, wrote a short book entitled 
Campaigns of Hannibal: Arranged and Critically Considered, Expressly for the use of 
Students of Military History, which was published in 1858 also by Longmans, to compensate. 
Although this work did not mention Jomini’s writing directly, the reader was referred to The 
Theory of War to supplement the analysis of the campaigns which appeared.24 
                                                          
19 J.J. Graham, Progress of the Art of War (London, 1858).  
20 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4160, ff. 261, J.J. Graham to Blackwood, 28 November 1861. 
21 Graham, Progress of the Art of War, pp. 5, 23, 6.  
22 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4160, ff. 261, J.J. Graham to Blackwood, 28 November 1861. 
23 Graham, Progress of the Art of War, pp. 30-87.  
24 MacDougall, Campaigns of Hannibal, pp. 83, 192, 195. However, Campaigns of Hannibal did not stay 
relevant for those studying military history for a staff appointment for very long, as, on 5 March 1859, the Duke 
96 
 
Following the educational reforms introduced in 1856, ensuring that an officer had 
access to military literature, particularly Military History, became a matter of concern for the 
military authorities. Although in 1853 there were 150 libraries run by the army throughout 
the Empire, all of these were either recreational or specialist technical establishments, so did 
not contain general works for military education. To rectify this, Albert, the Prince Consort, 
who had a history of privately funding libraries and promoting officer education, began 
systematically to purchase military books in early 1857, with a view to personally creating 
such an institution. When this library opened in 1860 at Aldershot, in a new building paid for 
by the Prince Consort, it was free of charge for officers to use, and it contained 619 titles, of 
which 335 were Military History and biography. Given that few works of military literature 
existed in English at this time, knowledge of foreign languages, especially French and 
German, was deemed essential for the librarian. This was a stumbling block for most 
candidates, and it was only a few months before the library opened that a suitable candidate 
was found.25  
Naturally, given the lack of Military History written in English at this time, besides 
Henry Lloyd’s History of the Late War in Germany, MacDougall’s The Theory of War, and 
William Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula, few works were held by the library in 
this language and majority of the collection was in French and German.26 Both the historical 
and theoretical work of Jomini and Clausewitz was held by the library. 27  Besides Vom 
Kriege, which was held in German as well as in a French translation, the latter undertaken by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Cambridge changed the requirements, so that only ‘the most memorable modern campaigns’ needed to be 
studied. Anon., Report of the Council of Military Education, 1860, p. 41. 
25 P.H. Vickers, ‘A Gift So Graciously Bestowed’: The History of the Prince Consort’s Library (Aldershot, 
2010), pp. 1, 15, 17-18, 30, 33, 56. The library was maintained by the monarch’s Privy Purse until Queen 
Victoria died in 1901, when funding was taken over by the War Office. 
26 Lloyd, History of the Late War in Germany; MacDougall, The Theory of War; Napier, History of the War in 
the Peninsular; and, Anon., Prince Consort’s Library Catalogue, 1860, pp. 5, 36, 59.  
27 Baron de Jomini, Politique et Militaire de la Campaigne de 1815 (Paris, 1839); idem., Histoire des Guerres 
de la Revolution (Paris, 1806); idem., Precis de l’art de la Guerre; and, idem., Traité des Grandes Operations 
Militaries ou history critique des Guerres de Frederic le Grand (Paris, 1851); and, Anon., Prince Consort’s 
Library Catalogue, 1860 (Aldershot, 1860), pp. 4, 54, 65.   
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Major Neuens, Clausewitz’s historical writing also featured prominently in the library’s 
catalogue from its opening, with his Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien, and Der Feldzug von 
1799 in Italien und der Schweiz held in German language versions, along with his Campaign 
of 1812 in Russia, which was held in an English translation.28 However, the library failed to 
attract officers in the numbers which the Prince Consort had hoped: on average only six 
people a day visited in the year after it opened. 29  Despite this, the library continued to 
purchase new works, including Clausewitz’s Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich, which was 
bought in 1862 for the collection.30  
From 1855 there was a conscious effort to draw on the ‘military spirit in the country’ 
and to promote officer education. To this end, the United Service Institution became ‘Royal’ 
in 1857 and began to publish a quarterly journal. 31  Despite this change, Hamley, now 
Professor of Military History at the Staff College, still felt that when called on to write an 
article or present a paper at the Institution he did so ‘very much against [his] will’ because he 
‘never felt certain that [he] may be technical [in his treatment of Military History] without 
becoming tedious’ to the audience.32 However, the newly created journal did contain Military 
History intended for officer education and, in its first issue, a paper ‘On the Armies of 
Ancient Greece’ was given by G.R. Gleig, in which he sought to illustrate that the ‘principles 
of the art of war never vary'.33 Despite his reservations, a lecture written by Hamley for use at 
the Staff College on the campaign of Marengo did appear in the journal in 1860.34 This 
journal was not alone in communicating Military History for educational purposes to a 
                                                          
28 Carl von Clausewitz, Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien (Berlin, 1847); idem, Der Feldzug von 1799 in Italien 
und der Schweiz (Berlin, 1837); idem, Vom Krieg (Berlin, 1852); idem, Campaign of 1812 in Russia (London, 
1843); and, Anon., Prince Consort’s Library Catalogue, 1860, pp. 4, 56, 58, 62. 
29 Vickers, ‘A Gift So Graciously Bestowed’, p. 56. 
30 Carl von Clausewitz, Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich (Berlin, 1835); and, Anon., Prince Consort’s 
Library Catalogue, 1860, p. 65. 
31 M.D. Welch, ‘Science and the British Officer (1829-1869)’, Whitehall Paper Series, 44 (July 1998), p. 39. 
32 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4149, ff. 113, Hamley to Blackwood, 13 February 1860. 
33 G.R. Gleig, ‘On the Armies of Ancient Greece’, Journal of the United Service Institution, 1 (Jan. 1858), p. 30.  
34 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4161, ff. 49, Hamley to Blackwood, 12 May 1861; and, E.B. Hamley, ‘The 
Campaign of Marengo’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 4 (Oct. 1860), pp. 25-35. 
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military audience: Colburn’s United Service Magazine published campaign narratives for 
those studying the subject.35  
At this time, the only periodical which included Military History intended for a joint 
military and civilian audience was Blackwood’s Magazine, produced by the publisher John 
Blackwood. This periodical had been started in 1817 as an ideological response to the 
Edinburgh Review, which reflected the liberalism of its ‘Whig’ editor, Francis Jeffery.36 The 
‘high Tory’ editorial position of Blackwood’s Magazine, which supported the interests of 
rural landowners, attracted the readership of officers as many came from this class. 37 
Likewise, the policy of anonymous articles attracted officers with a literary inclination, which 
allowed Garnet Wolseley, writing as ‘an English Officer’, to publish an account of his time 
spent with the Confederate Army during the American Civil War in 1863.38 Hamley was a 
frequent contributor and, among other work, he produced an article on the career of the Duke 
of Wellington which he intended for ‘a general reader’ as well as the ‘military student’.39 In 
1860 this was published by Blackwood as a separate volume to serve as ‘a good feeler’ to 
discover whether a book on military science would be ‘acceptable’ to a military audience as 
well as the general reading public.40 
Hamley’s position at the Staff College caused him to come into contact with the few 
officers who did write Military History at this time, thus allowing him to recommend these 
                                                          
35 Anon., ‘Notices of Books’, Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 4 (Oct. 1860), pp. 18, 100; and, Anon., 
‘Notices of Books’, Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 5 (Jan. 1861), p. 1.  
36 W.E. Houghton and J.L. Altholz (eds.), Wellesley Index to Victorian Index, 1824-1900, Vol. 1 (London, 
1966), pp. 7, 417.  
37 Ibid., p. 7; and, Spiers, Late Victorian Army, p. 94.  
38 Garnet Wolseley, ‘A Month’s Visit to the Confederate Headquarters’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 93 (Jan. 1863), 
pp. 1-29. For biographical information on Wolseley, see Appendix 1.  
39 E.B. Hamley, ‘Story of the Campaign Written in a Tent in the Crimea’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 76 (Jul.-Dec. 
1854), pp.617-631; E.B. Hamley, ‘Wellington’s Career’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 87 (Apr. 1860), pp. 397-417; 
Hamley ‘Review: Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 98 (July-Dec. 1865), pp. 38-48; NLS, 
Blackwood Papers, MS4149, ff. 113-114, Hamley to Blackwood, 13 February 1860; MS4149, ff. 143, Hamley 
to Blackwood, 14 February 1860; MS4170, ff. 80, Hamley to Blackwood, 18 October 1862; and, E.B. Hamley, 
Wellington’s Career (Edinburgh, 1860), p. iii. 
40 Hamley, Wellington’s Career; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4149, ff. 121, Hamley to Blackwood, 20 
April 1860. 
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men to Blackwood, his close friend.41 Hamley introduced him to Charles Chesney in March 
1862 because of his ‘very good account of the war in Virginia’, and also to Henry Hozier, 
whom he had met as he passed through the Staff College in 1864.42 Hamley was also close 
friends with MacDougall; the pair regularly arranged fishing trips together, and they 
discovered that they had a ‘mutual friend’ in Blackwood.43 Similarly, when John Frederick 
Maurice won the ‘Wellington Essay Prize’ in 1872, which was subsequently published by 
Blackwood, he became associated with this group, and both he and his wife came to be 
acquainted with Hamley, with whom they dined.44 So, by 1866, Blackwood’s publishing 
house had formed a network which consisted of the major British military historians which 
Blackwood referred to as his ‘military staff’.45  
As Hamley was satisfied by the sales of his volume on Wellington’s career, in late 
April 1862 he began reading ‘some military works’ in the Staff College library with a view 
producing ‘an elementary essay on military science’. 46  Despite his friendship with 
MacDougall, privately Hamley dismissed his The Theory of War in a letter to Blackwood as 
‘desultory and superficial… scrappy and flashy’. But since he noted that it had ‘paid him 
well’, he planned to supersede MacDougall’s work with a ‘useful and popular book’ of his 
own which would make the subject ‘clear to the general reader’ as well as to ‘military men’.47 
As such, the working title of this book between December 1862 and February 1865 was ‘The 
Common Sense of Military Art’; however, several months before its publication Hamley 
                                                          
41 Gerald Porter, Annals of a Publishing House: Blackwood’s, Volume 3 (London, 1897), p. 277; and, NLS, 
Blackwood Papers, MS4265, ff. 9, MacDougall to Blackwood, 10 August 1870.  
42 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4170, ff. 23, Hamley to Blackwood, 3 March 1862, and MS4190, ff. 50, Hamley 
to Blackwood, 19 February 1864. For the article Hamley was referring to, see below.  
43 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4318, ff. 100, Hamley to Blackwood, 3 April 1874, MS4318, ff. 108, Hamley to 
Blackwood, 1 August 1874, and, MS4265, ff. 9, MacDougall to Blackwood, 10 August 1870. 
44 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4304, ff. 128, Hamley to Blackwood, 26 November 1873. 
45 Porter, Annals of a Publishing House: Blackwood’s, Volume 3, p. 268. 
46 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4170, ff. 43-44, Hamley to Blackwood, 29 April 1862, and MS4161, ff. 49, 
Hamley to Blackwood, 12 May 1861.  
47 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MSS30690, Book Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865, 
MS4161, ff. 49, Hamley to Blackwood, 12 May 1861, and MS4209, ff. 215, Hamley to Blackwood, 6 April 
1866.  
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decided that ‘Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained’ would ‘do’.48 Likewise, when 
conspiring with Blackwood to decide, in advance, the findings of the review of the work 
which would appear in Blackwood’s Magazine, Hamley hoped that ‘some intelligent non-
professional, who having a taste for the subject and some knowledge of a general sort, might 
find that I had cleaned up his ideas… [such as] a lawyer [or] a University man… [as he] 
would be more likely to see the logical aspect of the book than a soldier’.49  
Hamley signed a publication agreement with Blackwood on 10 April 1865, in which 
the publisher made the ‘most friendly and liberal offer’ to not only bare all of the risk of 
production, but to award Hamley 66% of any profit the work made, providing that he kept the 
book ‘up to date’.50 Since Hamley insisted on ‘a good many maps [as] without them a book 
of this sort is of little use’, the cost of production was high, so even if the book was sold at 
16/- it was expected to only ‘clear about £140 for every 1000 copies’ sold.51 Since Hamley 
felt that ‘it could not pay anybody to write books at that rate’, he advocated ‘at least… a 
Guinea as the price… [since] I doubt fewer would be sold than at 16/-’; due to these 
objections when the book did go on sale in 1866 it was priced at 28/-. Even at this inflated 
price Hamley ‘fully [expected] a good steady sale’ and stood to make 9/9 for every work 
sold, meaning that for every 1000 copies purchased he would earn £488.8.0, which was 
£406.0.0 more than he would have earned if the same number had sold at 16/-.52    
In the book, Hamley argued that military history contained ‘representative operations, 
each involving and illustrating a principle or fact, which, when elicited and fully recognised, 
[would] serve for future guidance’, thus allowing the student to ‘read Military History, and to 
                                                          
48 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4170, ff. 104, Hamley to Blackwood, 15 December 1862, and MS4199, ff. 17, 
Hamley to Blackwood, 22 February 1865’. 
49 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood, 22 February 1865, and MS4209, ff. 215, 
Hamley to Blackwood, 6 April 1866. 
50 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MSS30690, Book Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865, 
and MS30613, Blackwood to Ernle, 9 April 1923. 
51 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood, 22 February 1865. 
52 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MSS30690, Book Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865. 
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investigate military problems, with the confidence of one who does not grope and guess by 
surveys and judges’. While Hamley used these ‘representative operations’ occasionally to 
refer to the observations of Archduke Charles, he mainly used them to illustrate Jomini’s 
‘principles of war’.53  
Hamley also used some examples from the American Civil War to illustrate Jominian 
principles in Operations of War. Most notably ‘Stonewall’ Jackson’s campaign of 1862 in 
Virginia was presented as an example of the ‘advantage’ of operating from a central strategic 
position against an opponent on a double line of advance’, and Sherman’s operations against 
Johnson on the Chattanooga were shown as an illustration of how threatening an enemy’s 
flank would cause them to fall back to protect their line of communication. 54  Privately 
Hamley was very critical of the Union forces, declaring to Blackwood that their defeat and 
panicked retreat after the first battle of Bull Run was ‘the greatest joke in the world’, and he 
had hoped that ‘the cracks and flaws of the rotten old Union’ would lead to their defeat by the 
Confederacy.55 Despite this, in Operations of War he limited his criticism of the Union to a 
mild censure of Sherman, claiming that he had moved too slowly against Johnson’s flanks, 
because as the war progressed it became clear to Hamley that the North would ultimately 
win, and so he decided it would be a ‘pity [to] say anything unpleasant [about] the Yankees’ 
which would harm his book’s sales in the United States.56 
The only other work written at this time on the American Civil War intended for 
officer education was by Charles Chesney. His Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, 
published by Smith, Elder and Company in 1863, underscored that the ‘inquiring reader of 
military history’ would find ‘profit in studying campaigns and battles’ as in them he may 
                                                          
53 Hamley, Operations of War (1st edn., 1866), pp. viii, 6, 33, 73-6, 139, 159-162.  
54 Ibid., pp. 170-3, 195-8.  
55 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4131, ff. 193, Hamley to Blackwood, 16 March [1861], and, MS4170, ff. 61, 
Hamley to Blackwood, 9 September 1862.  
56 Hamley, Operations of War, p. 198; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 41, Hamley to Blackwood, 4 July 
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‘trace not only the great principles of the art itself, but also see how wonderfully natural 
genius and matured judgement have varied their application under different circumstances’. 
Thus, he too used the war to illustrate Jomini’s principles of war, particularly how the 
‘central position of Richmond’ gave the Confederates ‘the advantage of interior lines’ of 
communication.57 Similarly, in his articles on these campaigns and those of Sherman in 
Georgia, which appeared the JRUSI in 1864, Chesney again used the war to provide an 
illustration of Jominian principles which ‘were, or ought to have been, the same which 
animated Caesar, Hannibal, or Napoleon’.58  
As the educational reforms brought in by Lord Panmure after the Crimean War made 
Military History play a greater role in army training, a limited demand was created for work 
which reflected the syllabus, which in turn generated a financial incentive for both publishers 
and authors to produce such material. Since this work reflected that Jomini’s writing had 
been adopted almost wholesale as the basis for the study of Military History by the army, it 
stressed continuity in war, rather than change. Thus, initially both ancient and recent 
campaigns were selected to underscore the ‘timeless’ principles of war. However, as the 
army’s Military History syllabus underwent significant change between 1866 and 1890, 
reflecting both concerns regarding the utility of the subject and the increasing prominence of 
Operations of War, the idea of continuity in war came to be questioned.      
 
II. Hamley, Operations of War, and the Growth of Tactical Study, 1866-90 
As the study of Military History at the Staff College between 1866 and 1874 required 
students to read widely, besides Hamley’s Operations of War, several books were produced 
by men connected with the college to meet this demand. Chesney’s Waterloo Lectures was 
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based on his teaching there and was published in 1868 by Longmans, Green & Co.59 In 1870 
Longmans also brought out Evelyn Baring’s Staff College Essays, which was marketed to 
those studying to take the admission exam.60 Similarly, in 1877 Blackwood’s published a 
collection of lectures given by Major Charles Adams at Camberley between 1868 and 1874 
under the title Great Campaigns.61  The work was edited by Charles Cooper-King, then 
Professor of Tactics, Administration and Law at Sandhurst, and was also intended for ‘those 
going up for the Staff College’.62 Given the nature of these works, they all reflected the way 
in which Military History was studied at the Staff College prior to 1874, and so they all 
referred to Clausewitz’s historical and theoretical writing, as well as that produced by 
Jomini.63 As the publication of these works was closely associated with demand for material 
which reflected the Staff College syllabus, when Operations of War came to dominate the 
way in which Military History was taught there, following Hamley’s appointment as 
Commandant in 1870, this undermined the demand for them, so this type of work ceased to 
appear.64  
Besides the influence of Operations of War on the Sandhurst and Woolwich syllabus, 
one of the main reasons why it was able to dominate the way the army studied Military 
History was because the author was obliged in his publication agreement to ‘keep the book 
up to date’ and to amend the work in relation to the most recent conflicts.65 Although the 
Austro-Prussian War had created a need for a new revised edition of Operations of War a few 
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Chesney to Blackwood, 1 April 1868. 
60 Baring, Staff College Essays, p. vi.  
61 Charles Adams, Great Campaigns, ed. C.C. King (London, 1877).  
62 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4347, ff. 13, King to Blackwood, 18 April 1876, MS4361 ff. 25, Cooper-King to 
Blackwood, 7 June 1877, and MS4361, ff. 32, King to Blackwood, 16 September 1877.  
63 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4230, ff. 122, Chesney to Blackwood, 1 April 1868; Adams, Great Campaigns, 
pp. 548, 450, 10; Baring, Staff College Essays, pp. 9, 22, 213, 13, 18. 
64 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1870, p. 7; Anon., General Orders by his 
Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief (1 October 1874), p. 1; NLS, Blackwood Papers, 
MS4261, ff. 26, Hamley to Blackwood, 3 March 1870; and, Lonsdale Hale, ‘Professional Study of Military 
History’, p. 709. 
65 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30613, Blackwood to Barbra Ernle, 9 April 1923.  
104 
 
months after the original was published, following an agreement between Blackwood and 
Hamley, the second edition was not produced until 1,000 copies had been sold from the 1,500 
printed during the first impression.66 Thus, it was not until October 1868, when Blackwood 
was able to report to Hamley that the original edition was ‘nearly out of print’, that work 
began on producing a second edition to incorporate Hamley’s amendments.67 In the second 
edition, published in May 1869, Hamley added reference to the effect of railways and the 
electric telegraph on strategy, but largely played down the effect of both. He thought that 
railways ‘need be regarded only as roads giving increased facilities of movement’, and he 
pointed to the French operations in Italy in 1859, and the Manassas Campaign fought during 
the American Civil War in July 1861, to illustrate this point. Likewise, he merely stated that 
the telegraph had the potential to allow a commander to combine his forces more effectively, 
but that there had been no historical example of this. Consequently, Hamley felt that these 
technological developments had not altered the Jominian principles on which he based the 
work and he had ‘the satisfaction of finding much that he had written illustrated by the 
events’ of recent campaigns.68 
In the section of the work on tactics, Hamley argued that a ‘new phase’ in their 
development had been caused by ‘the changes of the infantry weapon [which added] rapidity 
of fire… to that of precision’. As a result of this, Hamley found that his chapter on the 
‘changes in contemporary tactics’ needed to be ‘in great part rewritten’.69 Since he felt that 
these new weapons had made ‘the manoeuvres of [the] former era… in great measure 
obsolete’, he advocated a move away from formations practised on ‘drill-fields’ and, instead, 
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the use of those which reflected the fact that the war of 1866 had demonstrated ‘light infantry 
duties’ to be ‘more than ever important’. He also added a passage on the importance of 
entrenchments as he felt that the American Civil War had demonstrated ‘the value of these 
[had] increased; for as the fire of the line [became] more formidable, so does shelter from it 
become of proportionate importance’.70  
Hamley’s work became recognised internationally in May 1870 when General 
William F. Barry accepted Operations of War as a textbook at the U.S. Artillery School.71 
Hamley believed that the reason for its acceptance was down to the intervention of ‘General 
Sherman with whom I have had some pleasant correspondence about it, and to whom I sent a 
copy of the second edition’.72 Moreover, he was approached several times regarding the 
possibility of a French translation of the work. However, the translation does not appear to 
have been undertaken, at least partly because Hamley was not impressed by his 
correspondence with the proposed translator, who he hoped ‘understands French better than 
he does English’.73  
The third edition of Operations of War, which was published in the final months of 
1872 to incorporate the changes the author felt necessary after the Franco-Prussian War, also 
presented strategy as little changed.74 Thus, the new chapter added on the ‘Campaign of Metz 
and Sedan Considered with Reference to the Forgoing Chapters’ provided a brief history of 
the campaign which was used to confirm and further illustrate Hamley’s ‘principles’. 75 
Again, it was in relation to tactics that the biggest changes to the work were made. 76 
Hamley’s approach in this chapter remained based on historical precedent and consisted of a 
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discussion of the tactics employed in 1870, in which he argued that the increase in infantry 
firepower had made a frontal attack of a position ‘costly and doubtful’. By way of a solution 
to this problem, Hamley drew on the tactics employed in 1870, and wrote that a ‘flank attack’ 
was now ‘essential’ and that the battles of ‘Wissenburg, Spicheren, Wöerth and Gravelotte’ 
had all continued to be indecisive until they were ‘decided by the turning of a flank’.77  
The Franco-Prussian War led to an increased focus in British military education on 
the study of Tactics, so, in 1873, the study of this subject replaced Military History at 
Sandhurst, as well as at Woolwich from 1887; and, in 1876 a paper on the subject was set for 
officers promoted to the rank of Captain.78 Since Operations of War was not set as the 
textbook for the study of Tactics, a need was created for tactical works, hence a large number 
of German books were translated.79 Similarly, two works by British authors were quickly 
published: Précis of Modern Tactics by Robert Home, and the work selected as the official 
textbook, C. Clery’s Minor Tactics. Both of these works based their treatment of the subject 
on historical precedent, especially drawing on the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian 
wars.80 Although Clery, like Hamley, recognised that ‘modern improvements in fire-arms’ 
had made necessary major ‘alterations in the fighting formations of infantry’, he too based his 
writing on the same set of ‘principles’ which had underpinned British tactics since the 
Napoleonic Wars.81 Hence, although he wrote that ‘the ultimate success of [an] attack [now] 
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practically depends on the effect produced by the fire of the skirmishing line’, he remained 
wedded to the idea of the main ‘line of infantry’ covered by skirmishers.82  
Despite this, in 1872 a reaction began against the use of historical precedent as the 
foundation of British tactical methods. Some officers, like Lonsdale Hale, instructor of 
Military History at Chatham, felt that only the most recent wars could be studied with a view 
to ascertaining effective tactics.83 While others, such as E.E.H. Collen in his Staff College 
essay ‘The Battle of Wörth’, which appeared in the JRUSI in 1873, argued that if the British 
Army did not cease to ‘cling to the line formation’, simply because it had been that ‘in which 
British soldiers have fought and conquered’, it risked defeat at the hands of a more free-
thinking continental opponent. 84  Similarly, Colonel W.W. Knollys argued in Colburn’s 
United Service Magazine that while British tactics remained linked to ‘those taught by 
Wellington and his army’, a platform which ‘should have served us as a scaffold on which to 
mount higher’, would in fact have ‘been employed as a weight to keep us stationary’.85 It was 
during this period, in which British writers struggled to find an approach to the study of 
Tactics, and in which large numbers of Prussian works were read, that a new approach to the 
use of Military History for tactical study came into use in Britain.86  
The final revisions made by Hamley to the Operations of War were begun in October 
1877 and appeared in the fourth edition of the work which was published in early 1878.87 
Unlike previous revisions, Hamley’s discussion of tactical matters remained largely 
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unchanged; instead, he felt recent operations conducted during the Russo-Turkish War (1877) 
had demonstrated that modern technological developments had modified one of Jomini’s 
principles. 88  Hamley argued that the electric telegraph had now ‘diminished’ the 
‘disadvantage’ connected with a double line of advance in relation to ‘concentrated forces’ in 
a central strategic position, as the war had provided examples of how the telegraph had 
allowed the commander of divided forces to keep in contact with them so that they could 
rapidly concentrate when necessary. The operation which caused him to come to this 
conclusion, and which he gave as an example, was undertaken by General Ivan Lazarev 
against Mukhtar Pasha as the latter covered Kars from a Russian advance in October 1877. 
Lazarev’s telegraph allowed him to coordinate the movement of a fraction of his force that 
was forty miles behind Mukhtar’s position so that he could successfully conduct an attack on 
the Turkish formation from two directions simultaneously.89        
Although a fifth edition of Operations of War appeared in 1886, in which corrections 
were made to small typographical errors, there were no further revisions to the substance of 
the work until 1907.90 The reason for this was that between 1882 and his death in 1893 
Hamley was engaged in a public feud with Wolseley over his role in the British invasion of 
Egypt. This caused him to lose interest in military affairs and so he devoted more time to his 
literary writing in the hope that he would ‘break out into a “latter spring” of poesy’.91 
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Furthermore, Hamley insisted to Blackwood that ‘there had been no wars illustrative of 
principles since that of 1870’, so the work was not in need of any further changes.92  
In terms of sales, the success of the work was closely associated with its use at 
military training establishments and the appearance of new editions. Thus, as Operations of 
War dominated the way in which the British Army taught Military History during the 1870s, 
and was used by the U.S. Army during this time, the third edition of the work sold around 
1000 copies in the twelve months ending in February 1874 alone.93 However, following the 
cancellation of the U.S. Artillery School’s annual order in 1882 and the lack of a new edition 
which had made major changes to the work, between July 1882 and July 1885 only 401 
copies were sold.94  
As Operations of War dominated how the army approached the study of Military 
History between 1874 and the mid-1880s, the few other works which were produced for 
professional study were either based on Hamley’s work, or were intended to assist the student 
in the study of it. In 1870, for instance, F.J. Soady wrote Lessons of War with the intention of 
assisting the military student in his study of the ‘authorities and writers’ of Military History. 
The work adopted a format which closely mirrored Operations of War, and quoted long 
passages from the work.95 At first, Hamley attempted legal proceedings against ‘the piratical 
book of Soady’, but was foiled as he ‘should have had to show the damage [he] had 
individually sustained as grounds for claiming indemnification’.96 Hamley, exasperated by 
‘the state of the law which professes to protect authors’, took matters into his own hands and 
used his connection with Henry Brackenbury, Professor of Military History at Woolwich, 
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whom he knew through Blackwood’s ‘military staff’, to cause the ‘suppression’ of the book 
at this institution.97 Similarly, when Macmillan approached Maurice in 1889 for his opinion 
regarding the possibility of publishing in England Elements of the Art of War, written by 
James Mercur the Professor of Civil and Military Engineering at West Point, Maurice 
explained that while Operations of War ‘gets a large sale because all those who are going up 
for examinations get it’, the sale of other ‘more valuable’ works was ‘very limited’. 98 
Consequently, Macmillan did not publish this work in Britain.  
Although the example Hamley made of Soady was likely to have deterred others from 
producing similar works, books continued to be produced to assist in the study of Operations 
of War. In 1885, Mitchell & Co. published O.R. Middleton’s Outlines of Military History, 
which consisted of campaign narratives intended to supplement those given in Hamley’s 
work for those who did not have the time or ‘the inclination’ to read more widely. 99 
Moreover, the material produced by those lecturers who taught Military History at the army’s 
training facilities reflected the influence of Hamley’s work. C.W. Robinson’s Lectures upon 
the British Campaigns in the Peninsula, published in 1871, which consisted of lectures given 
while he was Instructor of Military History at Sandhurst, was based on Hamley’s work and 
often quoted him.100 Similarly, H. Tovey’s Elements of Strategy, which was ‘printed in order 
to form the basis’ of the instruction in Military History at Chatham, was also largely based on 
Operations of War.101  
Besides the limited role Military History played in the study of tactics, there was no 
inducement for regimental officers to read the subject for their professional development at 
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this time. Many senior officers even actively discouraged the study of military literature, 
fearing that their men would become ‘bookworms’ rather than ‘practical soldiers’.102 As a 
result, few officers took to studying during the 1870’s, and, at this time, the Prince Consort’s 
Library only had on average seven visitors a day, which, in some years, fell to as low as 
four. 103  Charles à Court Repington recalled that once an officer had left Sandhurst his 
‘education in the art of war practically lapsed’; and, because this anti-intellectual attitude 
further limited the incentive for British publishers to produce Military History, he was forced 
to buy ‘French and German books on war’.104  
To make matters worse for publishers who considered publishing Military History, 
officers came from ‘classes very much dependent for their reading on local circulating 
libraries’, and so ‘as a rule they did not know where to get’ books on the subject even if they 
wanted them. In 1872, Maurice recommended to Blackwood that to overcome ‘the great 
difficulty in getting a sale of books in the army’, the ‘best course of advertisement’ was not to 
place notices in newspapers, since officers did not read these, but instead to place the advert 
with booksellers at railway stations, along with a note stating that these works could ‘be 
ordered at this bookstall’. Maurice hoped that this would create more demand for Military 
History, not only because officers would ‘gaily read anything during a railway journey’, but it 
was also likely to lead officers to purchase these books for themselves, rather than forming, 
as they did currently, small reading groups which left the purchase of the volumes circulated 
‘to the one or two men who make it their business’.105 Similarly, since these reading groups 
further cut down the limited demand for Military History, Maurice was ‘quite convinced’ that 
‘the best sale’ for Military History was to be found ‘among the Volunteers and Militia’ since 
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when not on manoeuvres ‘they have little or nothing to do’ and, because they were often out 
of contact with other officers, ‘they borrow[ed books] less’.106    
Given the low demand for Military History intended for military education, publishers 
produced very few books of campaign history written by British authors expressly for this 
purpose. Between 1866 and 1890, no histories of this type appeared on the Crimean War, and 
only one history of the War of 1859 in Italy was published. 107  Besides Henderson’s 
Campaign of Fredericksburg, there were no histories, official or otherwise, intended for 
officer education on the American Civil War, and those who wished to study this conflict 
were obliged to use works published in the United States. 108  Likewise, the only books 
produced on the Austro-Prussian War thought to be of use for military study by Maurice were 
Henry Hozier’s Seven Weeks War, and A. Malet’s Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation 
which, like the only book on the Franco-Prussian War he considered of use, George Hooper’s 
Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, had not been expressly written for officer 
education but principally for a civilian market.109  
Although there was a limited demand for Military History books written for 
educational purposes, after the Cardwell army reforms of 1870-1 there was an increase in the 
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number of regimental histories written. The reforms had amalgamated many regiments which 
consisted of only one battalion and so began a wave of regimental histories in an attempt to 
record the exploits and traditions of the units which had lost their individual identity.110 This 
type of work appeared frequently in military periodicals, particularly Colburn’s United 
Service Magazine.111 
As Operations of War dominated the way in which the army studied Military History 
during the 1870s and 1880s and, because beyond examinations, there was no professional 
readership for military books, there was little financial incentive for either authors or 
publishers to publish. Even though Hamley’s work remained the pre-eminent book on the 
subject, he continued to produce new editions which reflected a realisation that technological 
developments challenged the idea of continuity in warfare.112 Beyond Operations of War, the 
technological advancement of weapons also stimulated a desire to find a new approach to the 
study of tactics in the late 1880s and 1890s.113 This ultimately caused the re-emergence of 
Clausewitz’s ideas in the study of Military History. 
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III. New Approaches to Military History, 1885-99  
Sir Garnet Wolseley, as a proponent of officer education, promoted and associated with men 
who thought in a similar fashion as he rose to prominence in the late Victorian Army.114 One 
such man, who came to Wolseley’s attention after winning the ‘Wellington Essay’ prize in 
1872, was Maurice.115 Likewise, it was Henderson’s first book, Campaign of Fredericksburg, 
published by Kegan Paul in 1885, which brought him to Wolseley’s attention.116 In this work, 
Henderson emphasised the importance of the study of Military History for an officer, as the 
‘great commanders’ had all had ‘their minds fully prepared by the study’ of the subject.117 He 
intended the book for Volunteer officers, partly because he realised that their training was 
inadequate, but also because he was short of money.118 While Henderson admitted that the 
work was an ‘amplification’ of a chapter in Chesney’s Campaigns in Virginia, the level of his 
analysis surpassed this work, as although he did not overtly utilise ideas put forward by 
Jomini or Clausewitz, he paid particular attention to decisions made by commanders and 
analysed their judgements in detail.119 On the strength of this work, Wolseley appointed 
Henderson as an Instructor of Tactics at Sandhurst in September 1889, where he became 
friends with Maurice, then a Professor at the Staff College; and, he became a ‘frequent 
visitor’ to Maurice’s house in Camberley where they would discuss Military History ‘until 
well after midnight’.120   
To further the cause of officer education, Maurice purchased Colburn’s United 
Service Magazine from Hurst and Blackett, and restarted the periodical as the United Service 
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Magazine with the publisher William Clowes & Sons in April 1890.121 Maurice hoped that 
the magazine, with its new editor, Charles Cooper-King, would become popular with both the 
military and general reading public, rivalling the Nineteenth Century and other monthly 
reviews.122 Maurice spared ‘neither expense nor trouble’ in securing ‘the ablest and most 
eminent writers’, so alongside his own writing, articles by Wolseley, Sir Charles Dilke, 
Rudyard Kipling, Spenser Wilkinson, F.N. Maude and Henderson appeared in the 
periodical.123 Unsurprisingly, given the new proprietor, the magazine emphasised the study of 
Military History as a crucial element in the professional development of an officer. Wolseley, 
aware of the prestige his name would lend to this cause, wrote several articles for the 
publication which discussed how he felt Military History ‘should be studied’.124 He wrote 
that he had ‘never been engaged in any campaign’ where he had not felt the benefit of his 
‘earnest study of Jomini and Clausewitz’, emphasising that Military History must be read 
‘critically to be of any use’. He hoped that officers would see the subject as providing ‘the 
data from which… to solve military problems’, and, in so doing, enable them to ‘deduce 
principles’ upon which they could act so as to make ‘rapid decisions under fire, and at critical 
moments in action’.125  
The magazine published a large number of military historical articles intended both 
for military education, and for the general readership. Cooper-King asked T. Miller Maguire, 
a ‘crammer’ well-known for preparing officers for the Staff College, to ‘contribute some 
illustrations of the principles of strategy… to encourage the study of Military History’. 
Maguire used British campaigns for these narratives, and based his writing on ‘the works of 
                                                          
121 Maurice, Work and Opinions, p. 75; and, ‘Editorial Notice’, United Service Magazine, 1 (Apr. 1890), p. 1. 
122 Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years, pp. 25-6.  
123 Anon [C.C. King], ‘Editorial Notice’, United Service Magazine, 1 (Apr. 1890), p. 1.  
124 NAM, Cooper-King Papers, 8501-70, Wolseley to Cooper-King, 11 November 1891, pp. 16-18; Garnet 
Wolseley, ‘Study of War’, United Service Magazine, 2 (Mar. 1891), p. 490; and, Garnet Wolseley, ‘Field 
Marshal von Moltke’, United Service Magazine, 4 (Nov. 1891), p. 92.  
125 Wolseley, ‘Study of War’, p. 490; and, Wolseley, ‘Field Marshal von Moltke’, p. 92.  
116 
 
General Hamley, General Clery, and Colonel Home… because there [were] none better in the 
English Language, either as originals or translations’. 126  For recreational reading, also 
intended to create an interest in Military History, the magazine included popular accounts of 
British campaigns, which dispensed with military analysis, and included regimental history, 
as well as recollections from veterans.127 This combination of Military History written for 
education and recreation proved to be popular with the military readership, and although it 
was felt that the title discouraged the general reading public, in early 1891 Wolseley wrote to 
Cooper-King that ‘I rejoice beyond measure to think that the magazine is doing so well’.128  
The JRUSI also increased the number of articles it published on Military History, 
which were intended to increase the professionalism of the officer corps. For example, in 
1897, it published Lonsdale Hale’s paper on ‘The Professional Study of Military History’ in 
which he argued that officers could increase their ‘personal professional capacity’ through the 
use of the subject to learn the Jominian principles of war.129 The institution also created the 
‘Chesney Medal’ in 1899 to award an ‘author of original literary work treating naval or 
military science and literature which has a bearing on the welfare of the British Empire’ with 
a view to encourage the production of this work in Britain. 130  This award was created 
following a proposal by the ‘George Chesney Memorial Committee’, which was formed on 
24 April 1896, and consisted of, among others, the Marquess of Lansdowne, Lord Roberts, 
George White, Sir G.S. Clarke, Sir Lintorn Simmons, and the publisher John Blackwood.131  
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Likewise, the ‘Aldershot Military Society’ was created by General Archibald Alison 
in February 1888 with a view to stimulating the professional interest of the officers posted to 
this station through lectures held on military topics at the Prince Consort’s Library. 132 
Military History was a mainstay of the lecture series, and Maguire and Henderson regularly 
presented papers to the society which analysed campaigns, particularly those fought during 
the American Civil War.133 The series also included papers for the general interest of the 
members and, on 22 November 1898, the journalist G.W. Steevens gave a lecture on the 
‘Downfall of Mahdism’ in the Sudan.134 Just as had been the case with the United Service 
Magazine, this mix of Military History for education and recreation proved to be popular, and 
by October 1888 the society had 530 members.135  
Military periodicals intended mainly for recreational reading, such as the Army and 
Navy Illustrated Magazine, also began to carry Military History articles during this period. 
From the first issue, a series on Regimental History was included, entitled ‘Glories and 
Traditions of the British Army’, as well as one on ‘Old Battlefields’.136 The magazine also 
included narratives of the most recent British Imperial campaigns, and produced a series of 
profusely illustrated books on British military history, the first of which was written by Major 
Arthur Griffith, entitled Wellington and Waterloo, published in January 1898. 137  From 
December 1897, the magazine featured a regular section entitled, ‘On the Military Book 
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134 G.W. Steevens, Downfall of Mahdism (Aldershot, 22 November 1898).  
135 Vickers, ‘Gift So Graciously Bestowed’, p. 72.  
136 See for example: A.C. Lovett, ‘History of the 16th Lancers’, Army and Navy Illustrated Magazine, 5 (29 Oct. 
1897), p. 21; Anon., ‘Glories and Traditions of the British Army: History of the Rifle Brigade’, Army and Navy 
Illustrated Magazine, 5 (17 Mar. 1898), pp. 322-30; and, Anon., ‘Glories and Traditions of the British Army: 
Black Watch’, Army and Navy Illustrated Magazine, 5 (17 Mar. 1898), p. 360.   
137 See, for example, in the Army and Navy Illustrated Magazine: Anon., ‘Afridi War’, 5 (18 Feb. 1898), pp. 
273-4; Anon., ‘Soudan Campaign’, 5 (4 Mar. 1898), p. 319; Anon., ‘Notes: Wellington and Waterloo’, 5 (21 
Jan. 1898), p. 213; and, Arthur Griffith, Wellington and Waterloo (London, 1898).  
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Shelf’, in which military literature, including Military History, was reviewed by an 
anonymous writer.138   
Prior to becoming a contributor to the United Service Magazine, Wilkinson’s interest 
in the study of tactics had led him to form the ‘Kriegspiel Club’ at Oxford University in 1874, 
and, following his commission in the 2nd Manchester Volunteers in 1878, to contribute to the 
founding of the ‘Manchester Tactical Society’ in February 1881. This society had initially 
adopted W. Shaw’s Elements of Tactics as its ‘textbook’ and, in 1883 it began to use 
Operations of War.139 These works, along with the Volunteers other training arrangements, 
dismayed Wilkinson and the other members of the society as they felt they were based on the 
historic ‘drill’ used by the British Army which ‘had been swept off the battlefield by the 
needle gun’.140 As a result, the society turned to German works, with Wilkinson and H.L. 
Rocca translating several books in the late 1880s by Ernst Wilhelm Hugo von Gizycki, 
Commander of the 18th (2nd Brandenburg) Field Artillery Regiment.141 This German tactical 
literature convinced the society that British works, which were based on the communication 
of ‘principles’ both derived and illustrated by historical precedent, did not articulate ‘the 
proper method’ of studying the subject, which the society now claimed was based on the 
development of ‘the power… to decide rightly how to act under given circumstances’.142  
                                                          
138 For example, also in the Army and Navy Illustrated Magazine: Anon., ‘On the Military Book Shelf’, 5 (21 
Dec. 1897), p. 142; Anon., ‘On the Military Book Shelf’, 5 (7 Jan. 1898), p. 166; and, Anon., ‘On the Military 
Book Shelf’, 5 (4 Feb. 1898), p. 228.  
139 Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years, pp. 5, 7, 18, 24; and, Spenser Wilkinson, Exercises in Strategy and Tactics: 
Translated from the German (Manchester, 1887), p. iii. 
140 NAM, Lord Roberts Papers, 7101-23-82 to 90, Wilkinson to Roberts, 28 Aug, 1892; and, Wilkinson, Thirty-
Five Years, p. 19. 
141 Hugo von Gizycki, Exercises in Strategy and Tactics: [taken from Strategischtaktische Aufgaben nebst 
Lösungen], trans. Spenser Wilkinson (Manchester, 1887); and, Hugo von Gizycki, Exercises in Strategy and 
Tactics: [taken from Strategischtaktische Aufgaben nebst Lösungen], trans. H.L. Rocca (Manchester, 1889).  
142 Gizycki, Exercises in Strategy and Tactics, p. iii. Quote from preface by T.M. Brown, President of the 
Manchester Tactical Society. Wilkinson had also read On War by 1890 as his pamphlet, Brain of an Army, first 
published in this year, laid out the Prussian theorist’s views of the role of Military History should play in 
military education. Spenser Wilkinson, Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the General Staff (2nd edn., 
London, 1895), pp. 178, 149-86. 
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The translation of Gizycki’s work came to the attention of Maurice while he was 
teaching at the Staff College, and he wrote in 1889 that he did ‘not think a more valuable 
series of papers [had] for some time been issued from our military press’. 143  Although 
Maurice had read On War in both German and English by 1891, when in this year he wrote 
an essay on how an officer should use Military History to ‘improve his judgement’ which 
embodied Clausewitz’s views on the subject, he attributed these ideas to Gizycki’s On the 
Study of Military History as a Means of Increasing the Military Capacity of an Officer.144 As 
Maurice was attempting to promote this new approach to the study of the subject in Britain 
and, even by 1905, Graham’s translation of On War was ‘little known’, it is probable that he 
felt officers were more likely to read ‘the few pages’ of Gizycki’s ‘little pamphlet’ rather than 
the lengthy, complex, and rather turgid, On War.145  
Henderson, possibly through his connection with Maurice, also took up Clausewitz’s 
ideas regarding the role Military History should play in officer education, but he too 
attributed them to contemporary German tactical writers, including Gizycki. In his second 
book, Battle of Spicheren, published by Gale and Polden in 1891, Henderson pointed out that 
Gizycki had written that Military History allowed the reader to learn from the experience of 
others. Henderson argued, mirroring Clausewitz’s ideas, ‘if we would make this alien 
experience our own’, it was necessary to ‘examine… operations so closely as to have a clear 
picture of the whole scene in our mind’s eye’, so one could ‘assume… the responsibilities of 
the leaders who were called upon to meet those situations [so as] to come to a definite 
                                                          
143 Gizycki, Exercises in Strategy and Tactics. Maurice quoted from an advert at the back of the work, p. 34.  
144 Maurice commented in this year that Graham had ‘very badly’ translated Clausewitz’s On War. Maurice, 
War, pp. 94, 136. The original title of Gizycki’s work, which was published in Berlin in 1881, was ‘Über 
kriegsgeschichtliche Studien als Mittel zur Förderung der Kriegstüchtigkeit des Offiziers’. The translation given 
above is that given by Maurice. Wilkinson and Rocca did not translate this work into English, and it seems that 
Maurice read it in German. This work was also held by the Library of the British Museum: G.K. Fortescue, 
Subject Index of the Modern Works Added to the Library of the British Museum in the Years 1881-1900 
(London, 1902), p. 904. 
145 Maurice, War, p. 94; and, Bassford, Clausewitz in English, pp. 57, 70. Between 1885 and 1900 Graham’s 
translation of On War only sold between ten and twenty copies a year.  
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decision and to test the soundness of that decision by the actual event’. This affected the style 
in which Henderson wrote the book. He not only described each phase of the action in great 
detail and in strict chronological order, so the reader could place themselves in each 
‘situation’ as it arose, but also included an appendix which directly posed questions asking 
the reader how they would have acted at crucial stages of the battle.146  
Similarly, the ‘main object’ of Henderson’s subsequent book, which was a translation 
of General von Verdy du Vernois’ Tactical Study Based on the Battle of Custozza, published 
in 1894 by Gale and Polden, was ‘to show how Military History may be most profitably 
studied’. Here Henderson pointed to Vernois’ articulation of Clausewitz’s ideas to argue that 
the subject, if studied correctly, could develop an officer’s ‘capacity for judgement, 
forethought and resolution’. Thus, again, Clausewitz’s ideas regarding the study of Military 
History were attributed to a contemporary German tactical writer.147  
Henderson’s next work, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, first 
published with Longmans, Green & Co. in August 1898, was on a much greater scale than his 
previous books, as not only was it a two-volume study, but as he now taught Military History 
at the Staff College, it went into detail on strategic matters.148 This work also reflected the 
influence of Clausewitz’s writing as it too emphasised the role which Military History could 
play in the development of an officer’s professional judgement; Henderson explained that 
Jackson’s ability as a general had been honed by his study of the subject.149  Moreover, 
Henderson described Jackson as a ‘military genius’, using the same term as Clausewitz; he 
                                                          
146 G.F.R. Henderson, Battle of Spricheren (London, 1891), pp. 27, 260-1.  
147 G.F.R. Henderson, Battle of Custozza (London, 1894), pp. v, viii, xi.  
148 G.F.R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, 2 vols. (London, 1898).  
149 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 25, 96, 72, 518.  
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not only pointed to his martial skill but also aspects of his personality, such as his ability to 
remain ‘cool and composed’ in action.150 
Other concepts which Clausewitz used in his writing also appeared prominently in 
this work and influenced how Henderson described Jackson’s operations. Just as Henderson 
had paid great attention to Jackson’s personality, he also referred to how he had correctly 
judged the character and temperament of the commanders opposing him; this allowed him an 
insight into their decisions, and to ‘upset’ their ‘mental equilibrium’ by acting as they would 
least want. Similarly, Henderson further emphasised the importance of psychological factors 
by describing them, using the term moral as ‘a power in war more potent than mere 
numbers’. Reference to their influence on commanders, and on men under fire, formed an 
important part of Henderson’s description of warfare. 151  Henderson also described the 
‘mighty power’ of ‘uncertainty in war’, and presented the counter-offensive as ‘the soul of 
the defence’.152  
Despite the addition of these Clausewitzian concepts, Henderson described the 
fundamental nature of strategy in Jominian terms. Therefore, while Henderson had noted that 
policy should influence strategy, this was limited to an acceptance that military means should 
be tailored to the political context of the war and did not extend to the Clausewitzian notion 
that the object of strategy was achieving political ends though military means. Therefore, 
while Henderson continued to describe the ‘proper objective’ as always the ‘main army of the 
enemy’, he considered Lincoln ‘quite justified’ in February 1862 to retain a large force in 
Washington to prevent the Confederacy gaining legitimacy in the eyes of other nations 
through the capture of his capital, as this would have increased the chance of foreign 
                                                          
150 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 23, 177, 142, 511, 223, 510, and, Volume 2, pp. 480, 486; and, Clausewitz, On War, ed. 
Howard & Paret, pp. 100-1, taken from Book I, Ch. 3. Here Clausewitz had presented a combination of physical 
and psychological courage, with a trained intellect, which gave its owner an insight into the likely outcome of 
military operations, as constituting ‘military genius’.  
151 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, Vol. 1, pp. 250, 281, 331, 339, 375-7, 424, 427. 
152 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 432, 434, 212, and, Vol. 2, p. 201. 
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intervention.153 This understanding of strategy also meant that Henderson did not enter into 
an analysis of how Jackson’s operations were intended to contribute to the ends of policy, but 
instead he focused on how they were intended to defeat the Federal armed forces arrayed 
against him.154 Likewise, the operations which Jackson conducted in the Shenandoah Valley 
in 1862, in which his 16,000 men ‘absolutely paralysed’ several Federal armies consisting of 
175,000 men, was used as an illustration of the Jominian ‘first principle of war… to compel 
[the enemy] to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction 
in turn’.155  
Henderson had intended the book for the civilian reading public as well as a military 
readership, commenting in the introduction that he hoped civilians would not find his in-
depth discussion of military matters ‘dull’.156 Henderson was vindicated as the book, no 
doubt assisted by the fact that it covered several campaigns regularly used for exam purposes 
after 1904, was re-printed ten times between August 1898 and July 1913; in fact, by 1927 he 
had become ‘one of the few British soldier-historians whose writings [had] been widely read 
by civilians’.157 Henderson was compensated for his efforts financially, as in the publication 
agreement of 17 May 1897, Longmans agreed to publish the book, referred to by its original 
working title as ‘A Life of Stonewall Jackson’, at their own risk and expense, and to pay him 
                                                          
153 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 288, Vol. 2, p. 391.  
154 For example in Vol. 1, pp. 227-8, there is no real explanation given as to how sending Jackson to operate in 
the Shenandoah Valley would help achieve the ends of policy. Instead, there is a description of the military 
means he is to employ, but no analysis as to how this is linked to policy. Similarly, in Volume 2, pp. 200-1, 
Lee’s aim in invading the North in September 1862 is presented simply and only briefly as shocking the North 
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point to the in-depth analysis provided on the means employed by Jackson to defeat the Federal Armies in the 
Shenandoah Valley.  
155 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 515, Vol. 2, p. 392. These figures are those given by Henderson. Interestingly, Hamley used 
this campaign to illustrate the same principle. Hamley, Operations of War (1st edn., 1866), pp. 170-3, 195-8. 
156 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, Vol. 1, p. xi. 
157 Ibid., p. i. ‘Bibliographical Note’ in 11th edn., 1913, Vol. 2. The work was reprinted by Longmans in April 
1900, October 1902, March 1903, March 1904, January 1905, September 1906, August 1909, July 1911, and 
July 1913. G. Aston, Study of War (London, 1927), p. 4.  
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a royalty of 12.5% of the retail price of 16/- for the first 500 copies sold in the Britain or the 
Empire, then 16.6% on all additional copies sold.158  
Although the method of analysing Military History advocated by Henderson drew on 
a combination of ideas found in the writing of Jomini, Clausewitz and Mahan, and so cannot 
be considered truly original, from the mid-1880s Callwell, a Staff College graduate who 
served in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, began to use the subject to explore new 
approaches to the study of war.159 In 1884 and 1885 Callwell wrote two articles for the 
Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution on the strategy and tactics which had been 
employed in what he referred to as Britain’s ‘Small Wars’, or campaigns conducted by 
regular troops against non-regulars.160 These articles, together with his essay on ‘Lessons to 
be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces have been Employed since the Year 
1865’, which won the Royal United Service Institution’s ‘Gold Medal’ in 1887, formed the 
basis of his book on the subject, entitled, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 
published for the Intelligence Division by the Stationery Office in 1896.161 Although in this 
work Callwell presented several ‘principles’ deduced from the past to act as a guide for a 
commander, as Jomini had done in relation to regular warfare, Callwell’s principles were 
more conceptual, reflecting his realisation that ‘the conditions of small wars are so 
                                                          
158 RPL, Longmans, Green and Co., Papers, MS1393: 3/2342, Publication Agreement for ‘Life of Stonewall 
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160 Charles Callwell, ‘Notes on the Tactics of our Small Wars’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution 
(1884); idem, ‘Notes on the Strategy of our Small Wars’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution (1885); 
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‘Warrior-scholarship in the age of Colonial War: C.E. Callwell and Small Wars’, in Andrew Mumford and 
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diversified’ that they did not lend themselves to a strictly positive system, and that the 
political objective of the war should shape the military objective.162 
Despite Callwell’s insistence that Small Wars was ‘a treatise and not a textbook to be 
accepted as gospel’, the work was selected as a textbook at the Staff College in early 1899 
and became ‘the standard work on its particular subject’, leading to its translation into French 
and Italian.163  The inclusion of the work on the Staff College Military History syllabus 
appears to have assisted its sale, as it took until the end of 1899 for the initial print run of 
1000 copies to sell out, at which time a new edition of the work was prepared which included 
historical examples from the Tirah expedition of 1898.164 In early 1900, 1,250 copies of this 
edition were published, although they took until 1903 to sell out. After this, 750 copies of a 
third edition of the work, which included a new chapter on Guerrilla Warfare, reflecting the 
British experience during the final two years of the Second Boer War, were printed and by 
June 1905 only 100 copies had been left unsold.165   
The publication of Mahan’s Influence of Sea-Power on History (1890) and its sequel, 
Influence of Sea-Power on the French Revolution (1892), preceded the production of several 
volumes by British writers on the effect which naval power could have on land campaigns. In 
November 1895, following Callwell’s realisation that ‘Captain Mahan’s great works’ did not 
continue their analysis beyond 1815, he contacted Blackwood regarding the possibility of 
producing a volume which examined the ‘effect of sea-power upon land campaigns’ from this 
                                                          
162 Callwell, Small Wars, pp. 4, 14, 63. For example, in Chapter 7 the ‘principle’ illustrated is that, ‘boldness and 
vigour [are] the essence of effectively conducting… operations’ and in Chapter 8 the reader was informed that 
‘tactics favour the regular army while strategy favours the enemy’. Interestingly, Callwell was taught during his 
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Charles Callwell, Stray Recollections, Vol. 1 (London, 1923), p. 278.  
163 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905; and, MS30102, Callwell to 
Blackwood, 18 August 1904.  
164 Callwell, Small Wars, p. i.; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905.  
165 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30111, Callwell to Blackwood, 30 June 1905. 
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time.166 Blackwood agreed, and in 1897 published Callwell’s Effect of Maritime Command 
on Land Campaigns since Waterloo. 167  As the work noted, in a possible reference to 
Henderson’s inclusion of the subject at the Staff College, ‘the theory is gaining ground that 
maritime command is a paramount consideration upon which the employment of the land 
forces in time of war depends’.168 In order to further underscore the importance of this factor, 
Callwell described several conflicts, including the Crimean War and the American Civil War, 
to demonstrate the important role maritime considerations had played in them.169 However, 
even though the work was recommended reading at the Staff College, it sold just 662 copies 
between 1897 and June 1907.170  
Despite this, Callwell’s book was not the only volume published at this time to draw 
on Military History to emphasise the importance of maritime considerations for the British 
Army. In 1897 William Clowes and Son published G.A. Furse’s Military Expeditions Beyond 
the Seas. The first volume of this work examined the factors which the author considered 
essential for the success of an amphibious operation and the second volume provided a series 
of historical case studies to illustrate them.171 Similarly, the following year Julian Corbett’s 
Drake and the Tudor Navy was published by Longman.172 In this work the author argued that 
as Sir Francis Drake had successfully used maritime operations against the militarily superior 
Spanish, he had demonstrated that he was the ‘unsurpassed master of that amphibious warfare 
which has built up the British Empire’.173 The increased emphasis on maritime operations 
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also led to the production of an abridged single volume, or ‘student’s edition’, of A.W. 
Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea, which had been published by Blackwood between 1863 
and 1880 in eight volumes.174 The major task of editing down this work was undertaken by 
G.S. Clarke as he felt that officers ‘study 1870-71 over-much’ and that ‘profound strategists’ 
who knew nothing of maritime considerations were ‘not the national need’.175 
Despite the use of Clausewitzian concepts in Henderson’s writing, at this time no 
work written by a British author principally for officer education was based on Clausewitz’s 
concept that war was a form of political interaction, which used military means to achieve its 
ends. The only writer to base his work on this premise was Spenser Wilkinson. But this had 
caused him to direct the majority of his writing at civilians, since this group influenced the 
policy Britain sought to pursue in war, either directly as political figures, or indirectly as the 
electorate.176 The reason why the Clausewitzian understanding of war was overlooked was 
partly because the ideas of Jomini and Clausewitz were held to be complementary at this 
time.177  Thus, in the United Service Magazine in September 1891 Wilkinson wrote that 
Clausewitz ‘differ[ed] from Jomini, not in disagreeing with his theorems, but by laying the 
chief stress on matters which in Jomini’s work appear to be secondary… the two writers thus 
supplement one another’.178 However, Wilkinson felt that the lack of a professional military 
readership was the main reason why Military History was not based on the Clausewitzian 
understanding of the nature of war. Wilkinson pointed out that even when Maurice defined 
‘War’ in his article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1890, he failed to ‘set out [war] as a 
form of social relation or as a branch of political action’ and, instead, described it as the 
                                                          
174 A.W. Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea, 8 vols. (London, 1863-1880); and, A.W. Kinglake and G.S. Clarke 
(eds.), Invasion of the Crimea: Student’s Edition (London, 1899).  
175 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4686, ff. 77, G.S. Clarke to Blackwood, 16 November 1899; and, Clarke and 
Kinglake (eds.), Invasion of the Crimea: Student’s Edition, p. v.  
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177 For example, Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, Vol. 1, p. 288, and, Vol. 2, p. 391.  
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realm of strategy and tactics.179 Wilkinson realised that Maurice had been ‘obliged to write an 
elementary’ treatment of the subject, rather than a more complex one which utilised the 
Clausewitzian understanding of the subject, because of the ‘want of a professional public to 
address’ who could comprehend such an approach.180  
The lack of this type of readership, despite the attempts by Wolseley, Maurice, 
Henderson, Callwell and others to create it, was caused by the fact that there was still no 
direct incentive or compulsion for the majority of officers to study the subject. Even by 1902, 
most officers were considered by the Asker-Douglas Committee to be ‘lamentably wanting 
[in] the desire to acquire knowledge and in the zeal for the military art’. As a result, in the 
same year, Maguire noted that ‘an officer, however rich, who spent £20 a year on military 
literature would be laughed at by his friends, several generals included’. Therefore, because it 
was realised that ‘a book that will sell by the tens in England would sell by hundreds in 
Germany and France’, ‘few publishers will issue a military treatise at their own cost [in 
Britain since] there is no reading public for them’.181 This, in turn, formed a vicious cycle 
which kept the price of the few works of Military History which were produced artificially 
high, meaning that they were ‘so costly only a relatively small [number]… can afford to 
purchase them’, which further dissuaded officers from studying the subject.182 The Askers-
Douglas Committee listened to these concerns, and their proposals, which came into effect in 
1904, had a major impact on the writing of Military History for officers.   
 
 
                                                          
179 The same criticism could also have been extended to Henderson’s ‘definition’ of the term which he wrote for 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1902. Henderson, Science of War, pp. 1-38; and, Wilkinson, ‘Military 
Literature’, United Service Magazine, 3 (Sept. 1891), p. 507. 
180 Wilkinson, ‘Military Literature’, United Service Magazine, 1 (Sept. 1891), p. 142. 
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IV. The New Market for Military History, 1899-1914  
The changes in army education brought in by the Askers-Douglas Committee created a new 
large readership for Military History, as besides the cadets passing through Sandhurst and 
Woolwich, each year more than 300 officers sat the promotional exams, with 536 taking them 
in May 1905, and around 100 officers taking the competitive exams every year, with 184 
taking them in March 1904.183 Moreover, as no textbook was set publishers were given scope 
to produce a variety of works for those taking these exams.  
Since both papers of the promotional exam, as well as the second paper of the 
competitive exam, were focused on a ‘Special Campaign’ which was selected each year, the 
opportunity was created for publishers to produce a range of campaign narratives for those 
taking these exams.184 Swan and Sonnenschein started the ‘Special Campaign Series’ in 1904 
when they published S.C. Pratt’s Saarbruck to Paris: The Franco-German War.185 The series 
was intended ‘not only [to] be useful for examination purposes but [as] the nucleus of an 
interesting library for the military student’; and, by August 1914, it had grown to consist of 
nineteen uniform volumes.186 Each volume focused on a single campaign and aimed to give 
‘a précis of [its] main events’ with some analytical comments, as in the new exams ‘the study 
of Military History [was] not all about details, but the deductions from them’.187 To ensure 
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that these works were accessible to its intended audience S.C. Pratt, who became the editor of 
the series, kept production costs as low as possible by purchasing the rights to use pre-
existing maps, rather than incur the large expense of producing new ones, enabling each 
volume to be sold for only 5/-.188 This series returned a good profit and its works were 
considered among the most profitable books produced by the company.189 
The second book in this series, entitled Russo-Turkish War 1877: A Strategical 
Sketch, was written by Maurice’s son, Frederick Barton Maurice, and was published in 
1905.190 Pratt invited him in December 1904 to contribute to the series and Maurice agreed to 
a royalty of 20% after 1,500 volumes had been sold, which would rise to 25% after the sale of 
2,500 volumes.191 Pratt emphasized the importance of publishing the book quickly so it could 
be marketed to those sitting the promotional exam set in December 1905; thus, he insisted 
that the book be ready for sale by the beginning of November.192 This approach paid off and 
Pratt reported that the book’s sales had made a ‘good start’ by January 1906, and by late 1907 
the work had earned Maurice £8.7.9 in royalties, suggesting that the work was likely to have 
sold around 1,660 copies by this point.193  
Maurice analysed the campaign along the lines set by the syllabuses of the 
promotional and competitive exams. While he noted that ‘policy always influences strategy 
and the major operations of war... [and] the policy of the Russian government had the most 
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direct influence upon the scope of the operations’, he did not make the employment of 
military means to achieve the ends of policy the basis of his analysis. Instead, he argued that 
‘the objective of sound strategy’ was always ‘the defeat of the enemy’s army’, so his account 
was centred on the lines of advance adopted by each side in relation to the other. He noted 
that, as Hamley had done in the fourth edition of Operations of War, while ‘Napoleon’s 
dictum that a double line of operations is unsound is still true... Telegraphy [had]… made it 
possible to keep forces which are separated still under the control of one man; and they are 
then working on a single line of operations in the sense in which Napoleon understood the 
phrase’. The work also reflected the syllabus as Maurice discussed the maritime element of 
the war and the role of ‘moral’ considerations. He also analysed the tactics employed, as 
knowledge of them was required for the second paper of the promotional exam. He argued 
that the Russian Army had ‘misunderstood or altogether neglected’ the ‘tactical lessons’ of 
the Franco-Prussian War because they employed infantry tactics which were based on the 
maxim that ‘the bullet is a hag, the bayonet is a queen’.194 
The publisher Constable and Co. also began to produce campaign narratives when 
they began the ‘Campaigns and their Lessons’ series in 1911, edited by Callwell. 195 
Unusually, the first work in the series written by Callwell analysed a British colonial 
campaign fought on the North-West frontier of India against the Afridi tribe. It is likely that 
Callwell selected this topic for those sitting his ‘Small Wars’ paper on the Staff College 
admission exam, as this campaign had featured in the 1905 and 1906 exam papers.196 By 
August 1914 this series consisted of another three works which focused on campaigns which 
regularly featured on the syllabus of Woolwich and Sandhurst, as well as on the promotional 
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Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1906, pp. 98-9. 
131 
 
and competitive exams. The next work to appear was L.H.R. Pope-Hennessy’s Campaign of 
1870-71: After Sedan, followed by Neil Malcolm’s Bohemia, 1866.197  
Forster, Groom & Co., too, began to publish campaign narratives for those taking 
Military History exams, producing seven books of this type by H.M.E. Brunker between 
1905 and 1912.198 To distinguish this material from that produced by other publishers the 
company intended the work to have two unique selling points: it was not only cheaper than 
those produced by their competitors, it was also intended to be directly relevant to the topic 
of the upcoming exam.199 Given this emphasis on keeping the price of these works as low as 
possible, they only cost 3/6 to purchase; and, the six complementary volumes which the 
company published each consisted of past exam papers edited by Brunker, including the 
examiner’s comments, were sold for 1/-.200 As it was the Army Orders issued in April which 
usually pronounced the campaign selected for the exams sat in November or December, 
Brunker only had a short period of time to produce each work.201 Since he realised that he 
could only treat his topic superficially, he included a list of additional works which ‘should 
be carefully perused’ once ‘the outline [of the operations] as given in this account is 
grasped’.202 However, the emphasis placed on producing the works quickly and cheaply told 
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in the quality of the final product as they were full of spelling mistakes and inaccurate 
information.203      
Besides producing cheap campaign narratives, several publishers responded to the 
changes in army education by publishing several works which presented the criteria through 
which campaigns were analysed at Sandhurst, Woolwich and on the promotional and 
competitive exams. Thus, Gale and Polden published three cheap works, H.T. Russell’s Notes 
on Strategy and Military History, G.P.A. Phillips’ Guide to Military History for Military 
Examinations and F.F. Boyd’s Strategy in a Nutshell, between 1904 and 1910.204 Similarly, 
in 1904, Blackwoods published Modern Strategy by W.H. James, and in the same year 
Cassell produced C.E.K. MacQuoid’s Strategy Illustrated by British Campaigns.205 As these 
works reflecting the syllabuses used by the army, they all used examples from history to 
illustrate the importance of ‘moral’ and maritime factors, ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ lines of 
manoeuvre, and to present the true objective of strategy as the enemy army.206 James’ work 
proved to be especially popular as it was adopted by the Indian Army as the textbook for its 
promotional exam between 1905 and 1911.207 This added to its ‘rapidity of sale’ and, as 
between July 1905 and June 1908 alone it sold around 1,250 copies, Blackwood needed to 
produce a second edition of the work within a few months of its first appearance.208  
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As the first five parts of Operations of War were made central to the Military History 
section of the competitive exams taken between December 1899 and November 1904, the 
sales of the work dramatically increased, and Blackwood sold 2,304 copies during this 
time.209 However, when in 1904 the work was removed as the textbook and the syllabus was 
altered to include factors which were not covered, such as ‘moral’ and maritime 
considerations, its sales collapsed, and only 435 copies were sold between July 1904 and June 
1907.210 As a result, Blackwood asked his ‘military staff’ to suggest how the work ‘might be 
brought up to date, before the expiry of the copyright’ so that it would once again reflect the 
army’s exam syllabuses.211 In April 1906, Launcelot Kiggell agreed to edit the book, and 
sought the help of Major Robert Home, Captain A.H. Marindin of the Black Watch, Colonel 
Richard Haking, an officer on the General Staff, Callwell and G.S. Clarke, to evaluate the 
work, although he made all of the changes to the text himself.212 Kiggell was paid £50 by 
Blackwood to revise the text; when he was appointed as Assistant of Staff Duties on the 
General Staff on 1 January 1907 he took a ‘months “Hamley” leave’ to complete his revision 
of the work.213  
Kiggell was keen to retain the book’s original character and felt that ‘the principles of 
strategy are so constant’ that only relatively minor revisions were needed in its first five 
parts.214 Thus, he rejected G.S. Clarke’s proposal for ‘a chapter on Imperial Strategy’ because 
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‘the book purports to deal with war in general’ and not Britain’s ‘particular case’.215 The 
largest break with Hamley’s approach appeared in the sixth part of the work, where his 
chapters on tactics were removed and replaced with an analysis of the Russo-Japanese War. 
This conflict was used to demonstrate ‘command of the sea’ as ‘a vital factor’ in warfare, and 
Kiggell discussed amphibious landings in great detail.216 Kiggell also broke with Hamley’s 
purely illustrative use of military history here: as he narrated the campaign, he not only 
described and evaluated the ‘courses open’ to commanders, but also posed questions directly 
to the reader, asking them to consider the best course of action available to the commander on 
either side.217 As Kiggell’s revision caused the work to once again reflect the criteria through 
which the army’s exam syllabuses expected students to analyse campaigns, the sales of the 
work were partly restored, and between July 1907 and June 1914 Blackwood sold 2,134 
copies.218  
To reach the new market for Military History which the changes in army education 
had created, Longmans, Green and Co., published a collection of Henderson’s lectures and 
articles under the title Science of War in 1905.219 Henderson’s literary agent, W.M. Colles, 
now acting on behalf of Henderson’s wife, originally offered the work to Blackwood on 19 
August 1903, stressing that it was of the ‘highest intrinsic merit’, and noted that Major 
Gretton, one of Henderson’s ‘most intimate friends’ would ‘write a memoir of about 10,000 
words in length’ to accompany the introduction to which ‘Lord Roberts [had] consented to 
                                                          
215 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30122, Kiggell to Blackwood, 15 April 1906, and MS30128, Kiggell to 
Blackwood, 19 April 1907.  
216 Hamley, Operations of War, ed. Kiggell, pp. 349-391, 350-353. 
217 For examples, see ibid., pp. 360-2, 366-7, 372. On p. 367, Kiggell asked the reader, ‘what is a general placed 
in such a predicament to do?’ He then noted that ‘it is easy to find fault, but very hard to show a remedy, and the 
student of strategy will find it a valuable exercise to determine what he would have done under such conditions. 
The following points are suggested for consideration…’ he then went on to suggest the options available and his 
solution to the problem.  
218 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30809, Stock Books, 1904-1907, n.p., and MS30810, Stock Books, 1908-1916, 
n.p. 
219 Henderson, Science of War (London, 1905).  
135 
 
write’.220 However, as Longman offered good terms, agreeing to produce the work at their 
own expense and risk, as well as to pay a royalty of 15% of the published price of 14/- on the 
first two thousand copies sold, and 25% thereafter, Henderson’s widow agreed they could 
produce the work.221 The collection was edited by Neill Malcolm, and under the agreement 
with Longmans he received a fee of £25, paid on the day of publication.222  
Hugh Rees Ltd also looked to reproduce the teaching material of those who had 
taught Military History at the army’s training establishments; and, in 1904, they added a new 
edition of Tovey’s Elements of Strategy to its ‘Pall Mall Military Series’, updated by T. 
Miller Maguire to reflect the new exam syllabus.223 In 1907 the company also published 
Wellington’s Campaigns by C.W. Robinson, which consisted of ‘lectures delivered some 
years ago’ at ‘Sandhurst… and subsequently revised’ to meet the new syllabus.224 Both of 
these works heavily reflected the fact that Operations of War had been used to write the 
original version as little attention was paid to political influences on the Jominian ‘principles’ 
illustrated by the historical examples in the work. 
 However, W.D. Bird’s Précis of Strategy was added to the series in 1910, also to 
assist those taking Military History exams, and it reflected the influence of ‘the works of 
Clausewitz’.225 Bird’s work was based on his teaching at Quetta which broke away from 
Henderson and Hamley’s contention that the military objective should always be the 
destruction of the opposing army. He wrote that whether the conflict was a ‘war of conquest, 
                                                          
220 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30091, W.M. Colles to Blackwood, 19 August 1903. In the end, this memoir 
was written by Lord Roberts.  
221 Henderson died on 5 March 1903 following an illness. See Chapter 3 for more information.  
222 RPL, Longman Papers, MS13933, Science of War publication agreement made between Miss Henderson and 
Longman, 4 January 1905, pp. 1-2. 
223 Hamilton Tovey, Elements of Strategy, ed. T. Miller Maguire (London, 1904), p. i. Chapter on maritime 
considerations added: pp. 155-65, and new chapters by Maguire on ‘Operations in Virginia’ during American 
Civil War, pp. 165-88, and the Franco-Prussian War, pp. 189-212. 
224 Robinson, Wellington’s Campaigns, p. 7.  
225 W.D. Bird, Précis of Strategy (London, 1910), p. v. The work covered all the elements required by the 
promotional and competitive exam syllabus, for example, maritime considerations, p. 52, and moral 
considerations, p. 75. 
136 
 
or whether the object is limited to forcing the enemy to agree to our demands’, this was only 
a ‘general rule’ to follow. Instead, Bird argued, illustrating the point with a historical 
example, that the military objective should be directly set by the political object of the 
conflict. He wrote that it ‘may in certain cases be the capital, [such as] Paris in 1814’, or ‘the 
objective may be the person of the leader, such as Napoleon, when resistance depends on his 
presence in the field’.226 Similarly, Hugh Rees published two works by Bird which consisted 
of lectures he had given at Quetta on the Russo-Japanese War and the Franco-Prussian 
War.227 These also reflected the syllabus there, so the objective sought by an army was 
presented as being influenced by the political end the war was fought to achieve, rather than 
simply the opposing army. 228  Therefore, with regards to the Russo-Japanese War, even 
though the occupation of Korea resulted in Japan splitting its forces and risking ‘defeat in 
detail’, this was held to be the correct course ‘by the political necessity’ of this action, since 
holding the region gave Japan ‘a strong diplomatic card’.229 
Military journals also published material of use to those taking Military History 
exams at this time. The JRUSI, for instance, published the syllabus of the Competitive Exams 
in 1911.230 Likewise, the Journal of the Royal Artillery Institution also produced articles on 
campaigns likely to feature in upcoming exams, such as J.C. Dalton’s ‘Campaign of 1866 in 
Bohemia’, in which his analysis deferred to that of ‘Hamley’ in ‘his famous Operations of 
War’.231 This publication also featured numerous articles on Military History and military 
                                                          
226 Ibid., p. 23.  
227 W.D. Bird, Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1909); and, idem, Lectures on the 
Strategy of the Franco-German War (London, 1909), p. i.  
228 Bird, Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 11-12, 64; and, idem, Lectures on the Strategy 
of the Franco-German War, p. 8.  
229 Bird, Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 19, 22. 
230 Anon., ‘Notes by the Editor, Military Education’, p. 924. 
231 J.C. Dalton, ‘Campaign of 1866 in Bohemia’, Journal of the Royal Artillery, 32 (Apr. 1905), pp. 49-64.  
137 
 
theory which had not been selected for exam purposes.232 Similarly, the Army Review, which 
had been created in 1911 by the Army Council for, in part, ‘placing at [the army’s] disposal 
the results of the most recent research into military history’, lived up to this responsibility.233  
The periodical which contained the most Military History for officer education was 
Maurice’s United Service Magazine. Besides the usual articles on the military history 
selected for army exams, and those which dealt with the subject for general interest, the new 
editor, A.W.A. Pollock, included several features which were based on the Clausewitzian 
approach to the subject, such as A.F. Becke’s Waterloo Campaign: An Appreciation of the 
Situation from the Point of View of a French Staff Officer on 1st June 1815.234 The influence 
of Clausewitz’s writing on the journal was particularly noticeable as, in 1907, its publisher, 
William Clowes, acquired the rights to translate the new German edition of On War which 
had appeared in 1905; from September 1907 the periodical carried a serialised translation, 
supplemented with comments by Maguire. 235  However, when this prematurely ended in 
March 1909, due to the re-publication of Graham’s translation of the work by Maude, it had 
only covered part of Clausewitz’s writing on the use of historical examples.236 Other articles 
by Maguire which appeared in the periodical, intended to assist those taking Military History 
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exams, were subsequently published separately in volume form by William Clowes to 
complement the series of books the author had already published with the company.237   
Although during this time the army’s exam syllabuses placed an emphasis on the 
influence which maritime considerations existed on land campaigns, several works were 
produced with the intention of exploring this topic to encourage officers to take up its study, 
rather than simply preparing men for a Military History exam. In 1905 Blackwood published 
Callwell’s Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance, which drew on examples from 
military history to examine the most effective way to conduct amphibious operations.238 As 
General Lyttleton, then CGS, felt that a work of this type was ‘sorely needed in both 
services’, he granted Callwell a period of leave so that he could write it. 239  Unlike his 
previous work on this topic, Callwell was critical of Mahan’s writing as he felt that it 
overestimated the effect which sea-power alone could have on the course of a war and so had 
downplayed the important role which land forces could play during maritime operations. To 
illustrate this, he pointed to the Peninsular War and American Civil War, as in these cases the 
almost total ‘command of the sea’ by one side had not translated swiftly into victory, and 
ultimately both conflicts had been decided by land forces.240 The work enjoyed good sales 
between 1905 and 1911, when it sold around 900 copies, reflecting both the growing 
professional readership for such work and the emphasis placed on maritime considerations at 
this time. However, following the publication of Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime 
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Strategy in 1911, the sales of Callwell’s work fell dramatically, and it only sold seventy-five 
copies between 1911 and 1914.241  
Between 1898 and 1914 Corbett produced several works which placed an emphasis 
on the influence which maritime factors could have on land campaigns.242 From 1904, his 
work drew on the writing of Clausewitz to argue that naval strategy should not be seen in 
isolation, but as only one of the means by which a government tried to achieve the political 
end it had gone to war to attain.243 Thus, for example, in his 1907 study, England in the Seven 
Years’ War, he argued that as the close co-operation between the British Army and Navy was 
instrumental in the successful conduct of the war, the ‘practice of amphibious warfare’ during 
the conflict was ‘as luminously informing as… [the] campaigns of Frederick the Great’.244 In 
his most famous work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett again drew on 
Clausewitz’s writing to argue that limited war was only possible when it was fought between 
two nations separated by the sea. For Corbett, this was the ‘true meaning’ and ‘highest 
military value of command of the sea’ as it had historically allowed England to successfully 
compete with more militarily powerful nations.245  
Besides the production of Military History for the purpose of military education, the 
Second Boer War directly led to an increase in the quantity of regimental history published. 
The role played by volunteer units in this conflict, particularly by the City Imperial 
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Volunteers, caused the production of work which described the history of this type of unit, 
even those which had not taken part in the war.246 The conflict also caused the publication of 
several volumes which dealt exclusively with the activities of regular regiments during the 
war.247 Similarly, complete histories of individual units were produced with sections on the 
Boer War, partly because publishers could be reasonably sure of a limited but guaranteed sale 
of the work as officers in the regiment could be expected to purchase it.248 Moreover, at this 
time there was also an increase in the production of regimental histories associated with 
Indian army units following the decision by the Government of Central India to publish A 
Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army to the Year 1895 (1905) in the hope that this 
would fill ‘up gaps in the Military History of Northern India’.249 
 
*  *  * 
 
In considering the role of officer education as a catalyst for the expansion in the publication 
of Military History after 1854, there was an obvious inter-relationship between the 
examination syllabuses used by the army and many of the published works. In essence, there 
was a financial incentive which existed for both authors and publishers: when Military 
                                                          
246 For example: W.H. Mackinnon, Journal of the CIV in South Africa (London, 1901), p. vii; A. Sebag-
Montefiore, History of the Volunteer Forces (London, 1908); J.M. Grierson, Records of the Scottish Volunteer 
Forces, 1859-1908 (London, 1909); D. Sinclair, History of Aberdeen Volunteers (London, 1907); B.E. 
Sargeaunt, Royal Monmountshire Militia (London, 1910); E.C. Broughton, Historical Record of 1st Regiment of 
Militia (London, 1906); W. Corner, 34th Company (Middlesex) (London, 1902); and, J.R. Harvey, Record of the 
Norfolk Yeomanry (London, 1909). 
247 M. Jacson, Record of the Regiment of the Line, Being a Regimental History of 1st Battalion Devonshire 
Regiment During the Boer War (London, 1906); J.L.C. Gilson, History of the 1st Battalion, Sherwood Foresters 
in the Boer War (London, 1908); and, B. William and E. Childers, H.A.C. in South Africa (London, 1903).  
248 See for example: H.R. Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs (London, 1905); C. Hart, History of the 1st 
Volunteer Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment (London, 1906); M.L. Ferrar, Historical Howards of the 
Green Howards (London, 1911); P.H. Dalbiac, History of the 45th Battalion. 1st Nottinghamshire Regiment 
(London, 1902); and, RPL, Swan and Sonneschein Papers, MS7631, Directors Meetings Minutes, 1904-1909, 2 
February 1909. 
249 F.G. Cardew, Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army to the Year 1895 (Calcutta, 1905), p. i; R.G. 
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History first began to be taught by the army there was a need for textbooks. Although this gap 
was filled very quickly by works such as P.L. MacDougall’s The Theory of War and Edward 
Hamley’s Operations of War, which illustrated the Jominian principles which lay at the heart 
of military education for much of the nineteenth century, the stranglehold maintained by 
Hamley’s book acted as a hindrance to the diversification of Military History. 
However, the reformation of the way in which Military History was taught by the 
army after the Second Boer War created a much larger readership, particularly as outside 
Sandhurst there were no textbooks as officers were expected to read around the subject.250 
This created an even greater financial incentive for publishers and authors to produce 
Military History. As a result, more material appeared which reflected the syllabuses of 
Sandhurst and Woolwich, as well as the promotional and competitive exams.251 Although the 
campaign narratives which were published appeared to provide mostly factual information, 
officers were now required to answer analytical questions.252 Equally, the textbooks which 
dealt with modern strategy presented the criteria through which students were expected to 
analyse the campaigns selected for examination; these works, however, were tailored to the 
syllabus intended for officers below the rank of Major.253 Thus, by 1913, Sandhurst and 
Woolwich did not reflect the most recent advances in military thought on the relationship 
between politics and strategy, as they perpetuated Henderson’s view that, while the political 
context of a campaign should influence operations, the military objective was always the 
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enemy army.254 Such an understanding of strategy was increasingly at odds with the Military 
History syllabus at the Staff College in the years before the outbreak of war.255  
Financial considerations, and the opportunity to support the army examination system, 
were not, of course, the only factors which influenced the emergence of Military History 
directed towards officer education. Although the Military History written prior to the late-
1880s and early 1890s displayed little attempt to foster professionalism in the officer corps, 
thereafter this became an increasingly important consideration. Following the success of the 
Prussian Army during the Seven Weeks and Franco-Prussian Wars, there was mounting 
pressure to use Military History to increase the professional abilities of British officers.256 
The absence of a professional readership for complex military literature, though, in part 
caused by the level of anti-intellectualism in the army at this time, meant that much of the 
material was simply intended to encourage officers to read Military History rather than make 
any great demands on their intellect.257  
The army’s attempt to stimulate greater professionalism in the officer corps after the 
Second Boer War by forcing officers to read around the subject was, up to a point, 
successful.258 This change assisted in the formation of a professional readership able to digest 
more complex work which dealt with Military History and military thought. In the years 
before the outbreak of the Great War, two translations of On War were published; a version 
edited by F.N. Maude sold 573 copies in the first year alone, which stood in sharp contrast to 
the handful of copies J.J. Graham’s translation had sold between 1873 and 1899.259 Similarly, 
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there were translations of several other German and French works, including studies by 
Rudolf von Caemmerer, F. von Bernhardi and J. Colin.260 The change also created scope for 
British writers to address this new professional readership with their own more complex work 
on military thought and military history. Not only did S.L. Murray’s Reality of War: An 
Introduction to ‘Clausewitz’ appear in 1909, but F.N. Maude was able to be ‘dependent on 
his pen’ for a living. Maude not only wrote works to assist those sitting exams, but also 
volumes in which he expressed his own ideas regarding military thought, most notably in 
Evolution of Modern Strategy and War and the World’s Life.261  
What does seem to emerge from the increasing inter-action between the writing of 
Military History and Military Theory was the continuing role played by foreign authors. The 
gradual move away from the Jominian approach to Military History had been instigated in the 
1870s through the dissatisfaction with the British approach to the study of tactics.262 This led 
to the increasing interest in Britain in contemporary German tactical writers, such as Ernst 
Wilhelm Hugo von Gizycki, who utilised the Clausewitzian approach to Military History. 
Thus, possibly through his connection with Maurice, when Henderson expounded upon the 
Clausewitzian approach he attributed it to German tactical writers, such as Gizycki and Verdy 
du Vernois.263 By the late 1890s, Henderson was also including other Clausewitzian ideas, 
such as the role of psychological factors in warfare.264 This influenced his teaching at the 
Staff College, particularly the ‘strategical principles’ through which students were taught to 
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analyse campaigns.265 However, the use of Clausewitz’s writing was not an entirely new 
contribution to British military thought as his work had influenced the material produced for 
those attending the Staff College in the early 1870s, as well as Charles Chesney’s Waterloo 
Lectures.266  
Nonetheless, original ideas were introduced by Charles Callwell, even if Small Wars 
was published by the Crown’s Stationery Office which bore the cost of publication. 267 
Although Callwell’s next work, Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since 
Waterloo, was arguably not as original as Small Wars, since it drew on A.T. Mahan’s writing, 
it was still intended to introduce new ideas into British military thought.268 These works sold 
reasonably well, further demonstrating the growth of a professional reading public in the 
period between the late 1890s and the outbreak of the Great War.269 While Callwell’s writing 
on amphibious operations was subsequently overshadowed by Julian Corbett’s, it is likely 
that this was because Callwell focused on offering practical insights to those conducting this 
type of operation and so his work not only had a more limited potential readership, but its 
reputation may have suffered due to the author’s connection to the disastrous Gallipoli 
landings in 1915.270 Still, the gradual emergence of a ‘British School’ in writing on military 
theory demonstrated that Military History had begun to diversify beyond merely serving the 
requirements of officer education. Military History had also started to break the chains of 
commercial viability as the sole criterion as to whether a book could be published or not.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Emergence of Official History, 
1856-1914 
 
 
 
 
The term ‘official history’ was not formally defined in Britain before 1914, and prior to the 
establishment of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1907, there 
was no organisation dedicated to the writing of History authorised by the government.1 The 
first British work to have the term ‘official history’ included in its title appeared in 1889 
when the Official History of the Sudan Campaign was published, although this phrase had 
already appeared during the 1870’s in the English translation of the Prussian Official 
Histories of the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War.2 In other words, once 
again, it appeared as if continental writers had produced the decisive impetus towards the 
development of another genre of Military History. 
Nonetheless, History authorised by the government had often been produced by the 
War Office before 1889. In a report into the creation of official history submitted to the 
Committee of Imperial Defence in January 1907, the work entitled Siege of Sebastopol 1854-
5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by the Corps of Royal Engineers, compiled in 1857, 
was listed as the first official history written in Britain since it had been produced using 
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public funds and had been authorised by the Secretary of State for War.3 The report went on 
to provide a list of the authorised historical works produced by the War Office, and stated 
that the Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia, which was produced in 1870, was ‘the first 
detailed official history’ that had been compiled.4 Following its emergence, British official 
history underwent a period of diversification prior to 1914, as not only did work appear on 
almost all of the major wars fought by the British Army during this time, but authorised 
accounts began to be written in India, as well as on conflicts in which British forces had not 
participated.5  
Despite the emergence of British official history, and the number of authorised 
accounts produced between 1856 and 1914, very little scholarly work has appeared on the 
development of this type of writing. Following Basil Liddell Hart’s claim that the British 
Official History of the First World War was ‘official but not History’, as he believed it was 
intended to protect the reputation of British commanders, the attention of historians has 
focused on this controversy.6 In fact, the only work to examine how British Official History 
was written before 1914 – Jay Luvaas’ chapter in Higham’s Official Histories: Essays and 
Bibliographies from Around the World – only briefly discussed material produced before the 
Great War, and focused on the accuracy of the Official History of the First World War.7  
Beyond this, some scholarly work has appeared which considers individual authorised 
Histories written before 1914, but these have not attempted to examine the development of 
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this genre of military historical literature and, at the same time, lack any serious engagement 
with the available primary material. The articles written by Brian Robson and Ian F.W. 
Beckett on the Official Histories of the Second Afghan War and the Second Boer War 
respectively have both overlooked important archival sources. 8  Similarly, Jonathan B.A. 
Bailey and Gary P. Cox, in their work on the British Official History of the Russo-Japanese 
War, failed to refer to the authorised account of this conflict produced by the army, which 
sold more copies than the History written by the Historical Section of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence.9 
The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to examine the causes of the emergence and 
diversification of British official history between 1854 and 1914. As official history began to 
be pursued more seriously, a number of factors conditioned its development. At one level, 
official histories were seen as possessing an educational value for officers, providing 
information as an aid to study. At another level, these histories provided an opportunity to 
defend the reputations of commanders, wherever they had taken a battering at the hands of 
the press. At the same time, the inherent challenge of official histories emerged quite clearly: 
the problem of providing a critical account while defending the reputation of both the army 
and government. Finally, the issue of the extent to which Prussian official histories 
influenced the British histories needs to be borne in mind.  
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In order to provide a full account of the development of official history, the following 
four themes will be considered: first, Official Histories written for a specifically military 
audience and with little concern for generating a profit; second, the Official Histories 
produced in the period 1880-96 intended for a military audience, but which were written to 
protect the army and its commanders from criticism; third, the development between 1882 
and 1903 which saw authorised accounts written specifically for a civilian readership; and, 
fourth, the British Official Histories produced between 1903 and 1914 which included for the 
first time didactic information on operational and tactical methods thought to be of use to 
regimental officers. If the story of the emergence of official history as a specific form of 
Military History contains some themes which proved even more controversial in the 
twentieth century, a close examination of the struggle to write worthwhile official histories is 
closely related to some of the questions dealt with in other chapters. 
 
I. Official History for a Specialist Professional Readership, 1856-1914 
In July 1856 the commission appointed by the Secretary of State of War, Lord Panmure, to 
investigate army education released an early draft of its report which concluded that one of 
the major barriers to the study of Military History for officer education in Britain was the lack 
of works in English. 10  Besides the hope that the inclusion of Military History on the 
Woolwich curriculum would lead private individuals to produce educational volumes on the 
subject, the commissioners suggested that ‘the Government might advantageously [order the 
production] at once [of] some works of this kind’ with ‘great care being taken to place 
preparation of them in the ablest hands’.11 Consequently, on 30 September 1856 Panmure 
                                                          
10 Anon., Foreign Military Education: Report of the Commissioners to Consider the Best Mode of Re-
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directed that ‘while the incidents of the Siege of Sebastopol are still recent… an official 
record should be compiled’.12  
The official history, entitled Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations 
Conducted by the Corps of Royal Engineers, Published by Order of the Secretary of State for 
War was intended purely for professional study by officers from the Royal Engineers. As the 
preface to the first volume stated; ‘the strictly professional character of this work has 
constantly been kept in view, and nothing has been inserted that was not required to elucidate 
the engineering operations’. As a result, the work did not provide a complete narrative of 
British operations in the Crimea and ‘several of the more important events of the campaign 
[were] but casually alluded to, whereas others, solely of professional interest, but of little 
importance to a general reader… [were] dwelt upon at considerable length’. Thus, besides the 
largest section of the history, which was a ‘Trench Journal’ that listed on a day by day basis 
the duties the unit had performed, the work contained reports from senior Royal Engineers 
which were often highly critical of the army and the conduct of the campaign. A reoccurring 
criticism was the way in which the British and French forces had besieged Sebastopol, since 
‘the north side [of the city was left] entirely open throughout the whole period that the 
operations were in progress, thereby enabling the garrison to receive reliefs of men and 
supplies of every kind’. Likewise, the account emphasised the inability of the Royal Artillery 
to bombard the city. It stated that ‘a great mistake was made by designating the several 
periods of attack as bombardments… it was only toward the end of July that anything of that 
kind could be considered as having been ordered’ due to the lack of howitzers available to the 
army.13  
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The task of compiling this work was given to the newly-created Topographical and 
Statistical Department, which had been set up as part of the War Office in 1855.14 As the 
name suggests, the role of this department was to produce any maps that the army might 
require, and so it was staffed accordingly with two officers, one military clerk and twenty-six 
civilian lithographers. 15  Even though the department was not set up to write historical 
accounts, no official historian was specially appointed, and so the compilation of the first part 
of the work, which consisted of a journal recounting the Engineer’s activities in the Crimea 
up until February 1855, fell to the head of the section, Captain H.C. Elphinstone.16 The 
second volume, which covered the period between February and September 1855, was 
written by Major-General Sir Harry D. Jones, who had commanded the Royal Engineer 
department in the Crimea during this time, and so the ‘duty of arranging the journal from that 
period necessarily devolved upon him’.17  
Once work had begun on the Journal of the Operations, an official account of the 
activities of the Royal Artillery during the siege was also produced. This work, entitled An 
Account of the Artillery Operations Conducted by the Royal Artillery and Royal Naval 
Brigade Before Sebastopol, was compiled by W.E.M. Reilly, the commander of the ‘siege 
train’ employed against Sebastopol, and written under the direction of Major-General Sir 
Richard Dacres, who had commanded the Royal Artillery in the Crimea for most of the 
siege.18 This official history was also intended to provide specialist didactic information on 
siege warfare, albeit this time for artillery officers, rather than provide a detailed narrative of 
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all British operations during the siege; it included detailed lists of artillery ammunition 
expenditure throughout the siege, yet provided little information about the Infantry assaults 
on Sebastopol. 19  The work was heavily reliant on the account of the Royal Engineers’ 
activities during the war. There were no maps included in Artillery Operations, but the reader 
was told that ‘the Royal Engineer Journal is copiously illustrated with elaborate Maps and 
Plans, to which reference may be made for the elucidation of this volume’. 20  Important 
information, such as the intended objective of attacks launched against Sebastopol, was not 
included in the work and, once again, the reader was told that this information ‘must be 
sought for in the Royal Engineer Journal of the Siege’.21 Despite this reliance on the official 
account, Artillery Operations differed from it in terms of the main lessons regarding siege 
warfare to emerge from the war. It considered that the siege had demonstrated that 
earthworks, however strongly they had been constructed, could not ‘withstand heavy and 
continuous artillery fire’.22 On the other hand, the Journal of the Siege of Sebastopol stated 
that earthworks had been shown to be quite effective during the siege.23  
The only other official history produced about a single unit prior to 1914 was the draft 
History of the operations of the Royal Engineers during the Second Boer War.24 This work 
was never completed and only exists in rough galley proof form with pencil corrections. This 
official history closely resembled the previous account written about the Royal Engineers as 
it too focused on technical didactic information intended for officers of this regiment. For 
example, the first chapter of the work described in detail the defences of Ladysmith, which 
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was besieged during the conflict, and paid particular attention to the searchlights constructed 
by the Engineers and the water supply of the town. By comparison, the battle of Colenso, a 
major operation to relieve the besieged garrison, only received a cursory description as no 
Royal Engineer personnel had been involved.25 
Following the completion of Artillery Operations in 1859, the next official history to 
be produced concerned the Abyssinian expedition of 1867-8. The work, published in 1870 
under the title Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia, was compiled in the Topographical and 
Statistical Department of the War Office by Major T.J. Holland and Captain Henry Hozier as 
both officers had first-hand experience of the staff arrangements of the expedition. Holland, 
as Assistant Quarter-General of the Bombay Army, had overseen the embarkation of the 
Indian Army units used in the campaign, while Hozier had been on the expedition’s staff. The 
work was intended as a compilation of the intelligence information gathered on the area and 
its people as well as a collection of reports which provided instructive information regarding 
the administration of an expedition in this region. Thus, the climatic readings taken by the 
expedition were included along with a history of the British relations with the area, including 
a description of the language, customs, and religion of the natives. The Official History also 
contained detailed information about the supplies used by the expedition and the 
administrative techniques employed by the force. For example, it listed how much food was 
taken by each soldier in so much detail that even the daily turmeric ration issued to each man 
was recorded. The arrangement of a water supply was a particular concern of the work, and 
the methods employed to secure the daily ration of this resource was also considered in great 
detail. By contrast, the actual fighting which took place only received a cursory mention, and 
no didactic information was provided regarding it. The decisive action of the campaign, the 
                                                          
25 TNA, WO108/283-298, ‘Royal Engineers in the Second Boer War’, Chs. 1-18, n.d [1903?], pp. 9-13, 12.  
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Battle of Arogie, was covered in only six pages, whereas the arrangements to acquire mules 
for the expedition took up thirty pages and two chapters.26 
The success of the Prussian Army and staff system in the Seven Weeks War of 1866 
and the Franco-German War of 1870-1 spurred the re-organisation of the Topographical and 
Statistical department. In 1870, a memorandum which highlighted the unsatisfactory nature 
of the organisation was sent by Captain Charles Wilson, the Executive Officer of the 
Topographical department, to Edward Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War. Cardwell 
authorised the Northbrooke Committee to examine the department in an attempt to improve 
it. The committee reported on 30 April 1870, and its findings had important implications for 
the production and distribution of official history. The committee suggested that the 
Statistical Section should be divided into three sub-sections each with its own geographical 
area of responsibility. These sections were charged, among other tasks, with the translation of 
‘such foreign works as may be deemed advisable... [and to produce] a series of pamphlets 
descriptive of foreign armies similar to those prepared by the Prussian Topographical 
Department, and [these should be sold] to officers of the Army for a small fixed sum’.27  
As a result of this new role, work began on the translation of the Official Histories 
produced by the Department of Military History of the Prussian Staff. The first work 
translated was Campaign of 1866 in Germany, and was carried out by Captain Henry Hozier 
and Colonel von Wright, Chief of the Staff of the Prussian VIII Corps, who completed the 
task in 1872.28  The work consisted of a single volume which was a direct copy of the 
Prussian original, with no additional commentary added. The work, together with a portfolio 
of maps and plans, was printed by several private publishers under the supervision of the 
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Government Stationery Office. The next translation undertaken by the department was the 
Prussian official account of the war against France, entitled, Franco-German War 1870-
1871.29 This work was supervised by Captain F.C.H. Clarke, who completed the translation, 
and the British military attaché in Berlin, Major-General Charles P.B. Walker, who checked 
the translated proof sheets.30 The translation, due to the sheer scale of the original, was 
serialised into twenty sections which could be purchased individually or as a set of five large 
volumes consisting of the sections bound together. This translation was a major undertaking 
and it took between 1873 and 1884 to produce the 2,711 pages of the finished work. The time 
it took to complete was prolonged as Clarke was also expected to continue his other duties 
within the department; as chief of ‘D’ section, which was responsible for gathering 
information on Russia, he had much of his time taken up by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, 
including by several intelligence-gathering trips to Russia.31   
This Official History provided detailed information regarding both the operational and 
tactical dispositions of the Prussian Army and did not focus on one unit, or pay close 
attention to logistical matters as the British official history did. Instead, it provided a detailed 
campaign narrative which followed the major fighting formations, providing information 
regarding the location and actions of individual units in battle. This focus on the fighting 
formations and the success of the German Army in the war caused the work to be the first 
official account to be used in the study of Military History by the British Army, as in 1870 
the Staff College first included this war in its syllabus on the subject.32 This conflict was 
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regularly studied at the Staff College and the Prussian Official History became part of the 
required reading.33 
On 1 April 1873, Cardwell further reorganised the War Office with the establishment 
of an Intelligence Branch within the Topographical Department.34 This change meant that the 
collection and dissemination of information on campaigns fought by both British and foreign 
powers became an even more important part of the department’s remit.35 Hence, between 
1884 and 1897 it produced a series of short critical accounts of several of these campaigns to 
‘place before the reader in a handy shape the experience gained by former generations’.36 For 
instance, the first one to be produced, a 91-page pamphlet entitled British Minor Expeditions: 
1746 to 1814, was often damning in its criticism of the conduct of operations.37 While most 
of these accounts, such as the handwritten ‘British Operations in China, 1840, 1841 and 
1842’, written by John Sutton Rothwell between 1884 and 1891, and W.S. Cooke’s French 
Operations in Madagascar 1882-1886, printed in 1886, gave only short narratives of the 
operations, R.N.R. Reade’s Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6 provided details 
regarding the expedition’s logistics.38  
In 1866 the Government of India ordered that a ‘record should be composed of the 
expeditions made from time to time against the North-West Frontier Tribes’, which would 
contain ‘information as might render the work a valuable guide to those who might have 
future dealings with these turbulent neighbours’.39 As a result, W.H. Paget wrote Record of 
Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes for the Indian Intelligence Department in 
                                                          
33 NAM, David Stephen Robertson Papers, 9405-10-11-6, Staff College Reading List, 1910. 
34 Fergusson, British Military Intelligence 1870-1914, p. 15. 
35 Charles Callwell, Stray Recollections (London, 1923), p. 312. 
36 Anon., British Minor Expeditions, 1746 to 1814 (London, 1884), p. i.  
37 Ibid., pp. i, 10.  
38 TNA, WO273/1, ‘British Operations in China, 1840, 1841, 1842’ by John Sutton Rothwell, 1884-1891; 
Cooke, French Operations in Madagascar; and, R.N.R. Reade, Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6 
(London, 1897), pp. 22, 35.  
39 Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. 1 (Simla, 1907), p. i; W.H. Paget, Record of 
Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes (Simla, 1874); and, W.H. Paget, Record of Expeditions 
against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to Date by Lt. A.H. Mason (Simla, 1884).    
156 
 
1874, which was later revised in 1884 by A.H. Mason.40 The authorities in India looked 
towards the system of writing official history then currently in use in England. So, not only 
was the work primarily intended to communicate intelligence regarding the region traversed 
by the expedition, as well as the way in which it had been conducted, but the historian was 
also paid an extra 10/- a day on top of his regimental pay, the same rate as his counterparts in 
Britain.41 However, the form taken by the work was radically different, as instead of adopting 
a chronological approach, each tribe was dealt with individually. Thus, following a 
description of the ‘people and their customs’ the expeditions against them were narrated.42 
Even though it came in for criticism, as ‘the mass of minute detail of little military 
importance [swelled] the size of the book to such an extent as [to] frighten all but the most 
determined’ reader, the Indian Intelligence Branch continued to produce similar narratives for 
intelligence purposes.43  
As the frontier of British influence in the region advanced, most notably as a result of 
the Durand Agreement in 1893, there was a need to revise and extend the scope of Paget’s 
and Mason’s work to include ‘all the frontier tribes... [as well as] Afghanistan from the Kilik 
Pass in the north to the border of Persia in the west’.44 As a result, the Indian Intelligence 
Branch produced a seven volume work, entitled ‘Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from 
India’ between 1907 and 1912, access to which was closely controlled; it was not released to 
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the general public.45 The style adopted mirrored that used by Paget; thus one region was dealt 
with per volume and each chapter in these works was devoted to describing a group of native 
people and the expeditions which had been conducted against them.46 The customs of the 
natives were thought to be of particular importance, so the reader was told, for example, that 
‘the Baloch [are] less turbulent, less treacherous, less bloodthirsty, and less fanatical than the 
Pathan’, as ‘he has become most honest under the civilising influences of our rule’. The work 
also provided advice for those planning future military expeditions in the regions described, 
although it was warned that such action often had no pacifying effect as it ‘often leaves 
behind it bitter memories in the destruction of property and loss of life’.47 Subsequently, this 
work was supplemented by both accounts of recent operations, such as the Abor expedition 
of 1912, and ‘histories’ of older campaigns, including the Sikh Wars and Wellington’s 
campaigns in India.48  
Although the Intelligence Branches in Britain and India continued to write official 
history for the use of specialist groups in the military, from 1880 this no longer became the 
only intended function of this work. From this time, the desire to influence the reader’s 
perception of British conduct during a conflict began to play an increasingly important role in 
the production of some authorised accounts. While this trend may have helped to increase the 
readership of the histories, it raised on the other hand new challenges and problems. The 
issue at stake was whether the armed forces could be entrusted with writing the histories of 
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the wars and campaigns in which they had participated in, given the pressure which 
commanders might exert on the official historians.  
 
II. Official History and the Reputation of the Army, 1880-89 
The British Army between 1879 and 1885 suffered several major defeats. In 1879, a British 
column was destroyed by the Zulu Army at Isandlwana in Zululand, the next year two British 
and Indian Brigades were defeated at the battle of Maiwand in Afghanistan, in 1881 the 
Boers defeated a British force at the Battle of Majuba, effectively ending the First Boer War, 
and in 1885 General Charles Gordon was killed in Khartoum causing the failure of the 
expedition sent to rescue him. The way in which official accounts of these incidents were put 
together, although they were written primarily for a professional audience, demonstrate that 
from 1880 official history was also intended to protect the reputation of the army and senior 
British commanders. This marked an important development in the writing of authorised 
accounts. 
In May 1878, Sir Archibald Alison took over the command of the Intelligence Branch 
of the War Office, under his supervision the Official History of the Zulu War entitled, 
Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879, was begun by Major 
John Sutton Rothwell in 1880 and was published in 1881.49 This work was the first British 
official account to devote the majority of the work to the deployment and operations of the 
fighting forces, rather than logistical considerations, and so it was the first British authorised 
account to adopt an approach that mirrored that used by Prussian official history. The work 
was predominantly compiled with the use of private letters sent by sixteen officers who held 
command positions during the war, and the minutes taken at courts of inquiry set up to 
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investigate incidents of the conflict. The private letters that were used were initially sent to 
Alison for intelligence purposes, but were passed onto Rothwell to enable him to compile the 
History. 50  This work was also the first British official account to include information 
provided by the enemy. Information given by several Zulus was included, but only one 
warrior, Methlagazulu, commander of one wing of a Zulu regiment at Isandlwana, was 
specially named as providing information.51 His account of the battle appeared in an extended 
footnote to supplement the scarce information that the British had about the battle. The 
Official History retained some highly detailed information concerning the organisation of the 
expedition for professional use, but this was considerably less than had been contained in 
previous British official accounts. For example, the appendix contained a section on transport 
arrangements which provided a description of the ox-wagons used in the campaign, and the 
daily ration assigned to the animals which pulled them. 52  Likewise, as with previous 
accounts, there was very little discussion of the causes of the war and only sixteen pages, out 
of a total of 174, were devoted to this.53  
The battle of Isandlwana, fought on the 22 January 1879, in which a Zulu army 
consisting of around 13,700 men wiped out a British column, killing fifty-two officers and 
806 other ranks, together with approximately 300 native troops who fought alongside them, 
was a serious disaster which significantly set back the campaign to invade Zululand.54 The 
court of enquiry which was convened after the battle established that the commander of the 
camp at Isandlwana, Lieutenant-Colonel H.B. Pulleine, had been given strict orders to defend 
his position.55 On the orders of Lord Chelmsford, the Commander of the British forces, a 
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detachment of 468 men under Anthony Durnford arrived to reinforce Isandlwana, and as one 
of Durnford’s own staff officers recalled at the court of enquiry, ‘Colonel Pulleine gave over 
to Colonel Durnford… the orders he had received… “to defend the camp”: these words were 
repeated two or three times in the conversation’.56  Crucially, as Lieutenant-Colonel J.N. 
Crealock, a senior staff officer with the expedition, pointed out to the court, these orders ‘as a 
matter of course [were] binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command’ of the 
camp.57 However, the court ascertained that soon after Durnford arrived he heard reports that 
enemy forces were close by and were in retreat. Despite Pulleine’s protestations that this was 
against his orders, Durnford led this group of men, which constituted a third of the defenders 
of the camp, out to attack the enemy.58 The court was able to ascertain from interviewing the 
few survivors of the battle that Durnford marched his force over four miles out of the camp. 
Here he encountered the main body of the Zulu army and began to retreat rapidly to 
Isandlwana.59 The Zulus caught up with them close to the camp but beyond the effective 
range of Pulleine’s defenders.60 In an attempt to rectify this, Pulleine was forced to extend his 
semi-circular defensive line away from the camp toward Durnford’s force in an effort to 
support it. As a result, the court concluded, that British line had become over-extended and 
the Zulus were able both to out flank the British force and to break through the centre of the 
line.61 As Lord Chelmsford later privately wrote to the Secretary of State for War, ‘had the 
force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself [as he had ordered]… I 
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feel absolutely confident that the whole Zulu army would not have been able to dislodge 
them’.62   
Rothwell is highly likely to have had access to the report of the Court of Enquiry as 
some of the wording used to describe the battle in the Official History closely mirrored it.63 
However, although the Official History stated that Durnford had taken command of the camp 
when he arrived, it did not state that Durnford had inherited the orders to defend the position 
as had been established in the court of enquiry. In fact, the official account suggested that 
Durnford was not bound by the instructions to defend the camp, only that it prevented him 
from removing units under Pulleine’s command.64 Thus, the Official History did not include, 
as had been established at the court of inquiry, that it was the disobedience of a British 
commander who ignored an order that was, at least in part, to blame for the defeat at 
Isandlwana. Instead, the Official History played down Durnford’s role in the overextension of 
the British line and instead placed the emphasis on factors outside British control for the 
defeat. Thus, although the Official History made a reference to the British line being over 
2,000 yards in length, it did not explain the reason why it had become so extended. The 
actions of Durnford’s detachment were not narrated in connection with the Zulu assault on 
the main camp, and so Pulleine’s decision to detach units in an attempt to support him was 
not explained or made clear. The Official History focused on the ‘enormous force’ of Zulus 
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which ‘pressed forward from all sides, regardless of the heaviest losses’ and outnumbered the 
British forces by ‘six to one’. Likewise, it was the gap in the British line created when the 
Natal Native Contingent turned and fled when the Zulus got within 200 yards of them which 
received much of the blame for the defeat.65  
Similarly, the official account did not include evidence which pointed to a serious 
breach in the security of the camp at Isandlwana which had allowed Zulu spies to freely 
examine the British dispositions before the battle. Lieutenant W.H. James had produced a 
report for the Intelligence Branch in March 1879 which attempted, with the limited 
information available, to ascertain the main events of the battle and to investigate the cause of 
the defeat.66 James discovered that before the battle, several Zulus, led by a man called 
Gamdana, were invited into the British position and had ‘a good opportunity… of seeing the 
nature and composition of the force, and whether the camp was defended or not’. As the 
report concluded, the Zulus ‘turned out to be spies and went back to the enemy’.67 It is highly 
likely that Rothwell had access to this report, as it was compiled in the same department as 
the Official History, and both works were overseen by Alison as commander of the 
Intelligence Branch. The official account barely referred to this major breach in camp 
security and only mentioned Lord Chelmsford having an ‘interview’ with Gamdana outside 
his tent.68  
Although the creation of official accounts had become standard practice in Britain 
since 1855, there does not appear to have been an official account written regarding the First 
Boer War. It is likely that both the highly controversial nature of the series of British military 
defeats at Laing’s Nek, Schuinshoogte, and Majuba, which led to the decision by the Liberal 
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government under W.E. Gladstone to sign a peace treaty with the Boers, made the publication 
of a history too controversial. 69  Consequently, there is no evidence that a history was 
compiled or even proposed by the Intelligence Branches in either Britain or India. 
The desire to protect the army’s reputation also influenced the production of the 
Official History of the Second Afghan War. The problems associated with the compilation 
and belated publication of this official account stemmed from the Anglo-Indian defeat during 
the Battle of Maiwand. The work was initially compiled under the orders of Major-General 
Sir Charles MacGregor, who had served as Chief of Staff to the commander of the campaign, 
Frederick Roberts. MacGregor collected the documents needed to write this history; and, 
when on leave in England in 1881, he passed the material to Captain Pasfield Oliver who 
began to write the work.70 By 1885 the duty of compiling the account had passed to the 
Intelligence Branch in India, where the work was treated as confidential and so was not 
published.71 In fact, Lord Roberts thought that although ‘the portion of the war which came 
under Sir Charles’ personal observation is fully and, as a rule, accurately described, the 
account of the operations which took place elsewhere is neither complete nor invariably 
correct’.72 As a result, it was ordered that the Official History ‘should not be issued without 
the sanction of the Government of India and that all but fifty copies of the same should be 
destroyed’.73 Only one known copy of this version of the Official History survives, as the 
volume belonged to Lord Roberts.74   
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In 1888 Oliver requested that an edited version of the confidential history should be 
released to the public.75 Lord Roberts, who had become Commander-in-Chief of India in 
1885, agreed with this proposal as ‘the work would prove a valuable record, and would 
enable officers to study intelligently the military operations of the war’.76 Work progressed 
slowly, and in 1891 Roberts put the project on hold so ‘the work [could] be entrusted to 
someone noted for his literary skill, who would be able to devote the whole of his time to 
it’.77 To this end, on 19 April 1893, Lieutenant F.G. Cardew began work on a version of the 
Official History which could be read by both officers and the civilian reading public. 
However, this was suppressed in 1896 because the British military authorities in India 
deemed its narration of the Battle of Maiwand to be too controversial and to reflect badly on 
both British commanders and the army.78  
During this battle, British and Indian forces, under General George Burrows, had 
broken and fled in the face of a determined attack by Afghan tribesmen.79 Initially, Cardew 
included a full account of the battle along with Burrows’ censure of his subordinate 
commanders in the draft of the History which he submitted for review to the Indian Foreign 
Department and to the Quarter-Master-General of the Indian Army, Major-General 
Alexander Robert Badcock. Although the Foreign Department approved the work, Badcock 
‘invited attention to the account of the battle of Maiwand… which contains controversial 
matter’. The straightforward removal of Burrows’ criticism of the other officers, which 
Badcock ordered, did not satisfy Lord Roberts. He pointed out that as ‘time has somewhat 
dulled the edges of the antagonism that statement and counter-statement [about the battle has] 
caused… it is too early… to sharpen those edges by the publication of an official account’. 
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Moreover, Roberts pointed out that in 1896 there was ‘no public demand or necessity for 
publication’ of the official account. Thus he ordered that Cardew’s work should be ‘treated as 
confidential for the next ten years at least’.80 Consequently, Cardew’s Official History was 
suppressed until 1908 when his version, published by John Murray, went on sale in Britain, 
twenty-eight years after the battle of Maiwand had taken place.81 
While the Official History of the Second Afghan War continued to cause controversy, 
work began on an authorised account of the Sudan Campaign which was compiled in the 
Intelligence Branch of the War Office. In January 1886, Major-General Henry Brackenbury 
took over as the new director of this department and oversaw the writing of both the Official 
History of the invasion of Egypt and the official account of the Sudan campaign. 82 The 
branch was seriously underfunded, and had barely enough staff to undertake its ordinary 
intelligence duties, let alone prepare official history. When Colonel Charles Callwell was 
appointed to the Intelligence Department in 1887 he found that his section, which consisted 
of himself and one other officer, was responsible for gathering, compiling, and cross-
referencing all intelligence material collected on Austria-Hungry, the Balkans, Egypt, and 
most parts of Africa.83 Likewise, between 1896 and 1899, the same being true of previous 
years, this department was given a budget of only £20,000, even though its topographical 
section alone estimated that it needed at least £17,000 a year to perform its duties 
adequately.84 As Brackenbury and his staff were unable to devote time to compile the official 
account of the British operations in Sudan, an official historian was appointed to write the 
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history of the campaign.85 This job was given to Colonel H.E. Colville, the Deputy Assistant 
Adjutant General in charge of intelligence-gathering during the expedition. He was not 
considered part of the Intelligence Branch, but merely ‘occupied one of the rooms in the 
place as a matter of convenience’ while he worked on the history.86 Colville had finished the 
preliminary proofs of the work by March 1887 when he was taken ill and the project was 
given over to Callwell.87 So, as a member of the Intelligence Branch had to devote much of 
his time to producing the Official History, ‘Brackenbury was a little inclined to grumble at… 
his staff being taken up by such a job, when heavy arrears of compiling work remained to be 
disposed in his department’.88 The publication of the account became seriously delayed as the 
controversial nature of the expedition caused many objections to be raised when it was 
circulated to political and military figures who had been involved in the campaign. Due to 
these delays the Official History was only ready for publication in July of 1889 and was not 
published until the November of that year.89 
The initial stages of the Sudan Campaign were politically sensitive for the 
government. Without direct orders, the British General Charles Gordon had remained in the 
Sudanese capital, Khartoum, as an Islamic uprising swept the country. Gordon, a devout 
Christian and opponent of the slave trade in the region, felt that if he defended the city the 
British government would be forced to rescue him, and in so doing defeat the uprising. 
However, the British cabinet could not reach a decision and remained inactive as the siege of 
the capital progressed. 90 The Official History encountered opposition from political figures 
for its narrative of these events as soon as the first draft had been circulated for comment. 
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Evelyn Baring, the British pro-consul in Egypt during the campaign, and Lord Salisbury, the 
Prime Minister, both ‘concurred’ that ‘steps should be taken… to cancel all the political 
portions of the work and to prevent them from remaining on official record at the War 
Office’, as a ‘consequence… some forty pages or so of the book were cut out bodily’.91 
Callwell felt that ‘whether Colville’s version was misleading or not, it did seem to me that 
plunging into these preliminary political events before starting an account of the actual 
military operations, was to ask for trouble, the more so when, as everybody knew, those 
preliminary political events had excited much controversy’.92  
The Official History attempted to refute the direct criticism of the army that had 
appeared in the press and had been made by officials opposed to the handling of the 
expedition. There had been much discussion in the press about the correct route the 
expedition sent to relieve the siege should take.93 Firstly, a shorter route that went from the 
port of Suakin, on the Red Sea, directly across the desert to the Nile, reaching it at Berber, 
was considered. However, the commander of the expedition, Sir Garnet Wolseley, decided to 
use a longer ‘river route’ that followed the Nile from Egypt to Khartoum. The choice of this 
route entailed the construction of specially designed boats, which the Official History 
referred to as ‘whalers’, which further delayed the departure of the force. 94  Once the 
expedition reached the town of Korti on the Nile a small contingent on camels proceeded 
over the desert to Metemmeh cutting out a large meander of the Nile.95 When this small 
contingent, commanded by Colonel Charles Wilson, eventually reached Khartoum after many 
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setbacks, it found that the city had fallen only ‘a couple of days’ before it had arrived.96 
Consequently, the army, but principally Wolseley and Wilson, received a great deal of 
criticism in the press for what was considered to be the unnecessary delays in the advance.97  
Consequently, while the army had a vested interest in explaining why the longer route 
had been selected, as the government had put off the decision to send the expedition, any 
discussion which alluded to this could be potentially embarrassing to politicians. 98  Not 
surprisingly, when Baring was given a draft of the history he felt that it was not ‘prudent’ to 
go into detail concerning the selection of the route and argued the account should only state 
that ‘[Wolseley], after taking... military advice decided to send the expedition by the Nile’.99 
Despite this, the published version of the Official History included extended quotations from 
the memorandum that Wolseley had sent to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Hartington, 
who had opposed the ‘Nile route’. Therefore, the Official History, despite opposition from 
politicians, contained Wolseley’s detailed justification as to why he had selected the longer 
route and so allowed him to respond directly to his critics.100 
The delay entailed by the decision to have boats specially made for the campaign was 
a contentious issue which the army felt the need to justify. While the campaign was being 
planned, Commander Hammill, an officer from the Royal Navy, submitted a report which 
was highly critical of the design of the whalers. Although the Official History acknowledged 
Hammill’s criticism, it devoted much space to refuting it through the inclusion of two reports 
by officers experienced in the use of such craft during the Red River Expedition of 1870; 
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these reports concluded that the use of these boats in the advance down the Nile was ‘a matter 
of detail well within the power’ of the force. Moreover, the Official History emphasised the 
contribution of the whalers to the campaign and, for example, explained that once the 
expedition had reached Wadi Halfa ‘the river... became impractical for native craft, and but 
for the whalers the transport arrangements must have broken down’.101  
The history also defended Wilson against the charge which had appeared in the press 
that it was his ‘indecision and total inexperience of warfare’ that caused the delays which had 
occurred as the expedition neared Khartoum.102 When the Official History came to discuss 
the fall of the city, it quoted extensively from Wilson’s own book and explained in his own 
words that there was ‘nothing to show [him that]... a delay of a couple of days would make 
much difference’ to the state of the siege.103 Moreover, not only did the appendix of the 
official account contain Wilson’s report to Wolseley which explained his delay, but it also 
contained a report written by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Kitchener on the fall of the city which 
concluded that the news of the advancing British ‘led the Mahdi to decide to make at once a 
desperate attack on Khartoum, before reinforcements could arrive in the town’, so 
exonerating Wilson.104  
Therefore, although Official History intended purely for the education of a specialist 
military audience continued to be written between 1880 and 1889, following a series of 
British defeats a greater emphasis came to be placed on the protection of Britain’s 
commanders’ reputations in the writing of some official histories. While these works retained 
detailed information for a military audience, some authorised histories dispensed with this 
altogether and were, in fact, aimed principally at the civilian reading public. In other words, 
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by the 1880s, official histories had already started to perform more than one historical 
function.  
 
III. Official History for the Reading Public, 1882-1903 
The first authorised account that was written principally for the reading public concerned the 
British invasion of Egypt and was entitled Military History of The Campaign of 1882 in 
Egypt.105 The author, John Frederick Maurice, who had served during this campaign on the 
staff of the commander of the expedition, Wolseley, was the first individual official historian 
to be specially appointed for such a task.106 Although Maurice had first been given the task of 
writing the Official History in 1882, it took him five years to complete the work.107 The main 
reason for this delay was due to his selection to take part in the Sudan Campaign in 1884, as 
this meant he could not work on the account until he returned to the Intelligence Department 
in early 1886.108 Moreover, Maurice did not give the work priority over his own private 
literary projects, nor did he remain in the Intelligence Branch while he wrote the account. He 
began teaching Military History at the Staff College in 1885, took over the writing of an 
article on ‘War’ from Hamley in 1886, intended for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, was 
engaged in writing a study entitled Hostilities without the Declaration of War, and was also 
working on a biography of his father.109 Brackenbury, the commander of the Intelligence 
Branch, became exasperated by the delay in the compilation of the account as it was being 
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compiled in his department. He wrote to Wolseley in July 1886 to point out that he had been 
waiting for more than six months but had ‘not yet seen a proof’ of the work.110 Following 
Wolseley’s intervention, Maurice sped up and it was finally published in 1887.111  
When Maurice began compiling the history he received no official instructions; thus, 
instead of providing details for an officer studying the campaign, he produced an account 
aimed specifically at the reading public with the intention of directly refuting the criticism of 
the army and Wolseley which had appeared in the press.112  Maurice believed that as Britain 
was a constitutional monarchy, and so had an electorate which could influence national 
policy, the duty of a British official historian was different to that of his counterpart in a 
monarchy such as Prussia. As he later put it, ‘the King is on the field of battle in Prussia so 
there is no danger of the politics getting damaged by journalists misunderstanding and thus 
having an impact on public opinion’.113  As Wolseley’s plan of campaign in Egypt had 
involved several feint attacks and the spread of disinformation to confuse the enemy, the 
press, as well as the Egyptians, were duped and the former ‘proclaimed to the four corners of 
the earth’ that his moves were real attacks that had ended in ‘hopeless failure’.114  
Maurice made it a central concern of his work to point out to a civilian readership that 
‘ruses de guerre’ were an important part of the art of war, so should not lead ‘immediately to 
reports sent to every capital of Europe’ regarding ‘futile enterprises undertaken’.115 Similarly, 
he thought that the press had misrepresented the interval between Wolseley’s landing at 
                                                          
110 LHCMA, John Frederick Maurice Papers, 2.2.10, Lord Wolseley to Maurice, July 1886.    
111 Maurice, Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. i.  
112 Maurice, Work and Opinions, p. 55. For examples of critical press coverage concerning the way the 
campaign was conducted see: Anon., ‘War in Egypt’, London Daily News, 1 August 1882, p. 5; Anon., 
‘Campaign in Egypt’, London Daily News’, 7 August 1882, p. 5; Anon., ‘Epitome of Opinion’, Pall Mall 
Gazette, 30 August 1882, pp. 11-12; Anon., ‘The War’, Morning Post, 30 August 1882, p. 7; Anon., ‘From our 
London Correspondent’, Manchester Evening News, 31 August 1882, p. 2; Anon., ‘The War’, London Standard 
4 September 1882, pp. 4-5; Anon., ‘Campaign in Egypt’, London Daily News, 8 September 1882, p. 5; Anon., 
‘Delay of the Army’, Huddersfield Chronicle, 11 September 1882, p. 3; Anon., ‘Egypt’, Manchester Courier 
and Lancashire General Advertiser, 13 September 1882, p. 5; and, Maurice, Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. i. 
113 J.F. Maurice, ‘Critics and Campaigns’, Fortnightly Review, 44 (July 1888), p. 12. 
114 Maurice, Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, p. 16-17, 38. 
115 Maurice, ‘Critics and Campaigns’, pp. 12-13. 
172 
 
Ismailia and the start of his advance against the Egyptian Army as it had been characterised 
as a ‘delay’ attributable to ‘sloth which attended the military movements’. By way of 
response, Maurice noted that when the army was engaged unloading stores, ‘nothing could be 
recorded of a kind likely to tickle the ears of the readers at home’ and so the press began to 
criticise the army in order that it could report on something during the interruption in the 
action.116  
As Maurice had aimed this history at the popular market, the idea of commemorating 
British actions during this campaign became an important part of the official account. The 
Campaign of 1882 devoted eighty-two of its pages to appendices that provided a 
comprehensive list of all of the officers who had taken part in the expedition. 117  The 
increasing role of commemoration, especially the focus placed on those thought to have 
distinguished themselves, caused a problem for Maurice as Hamley, commander of the 
Second Division during the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, felt that both he and his men had not 
received the credit they were owed for their role in the campaign. Hamley was outraged to 
hear that Wolseley had not mentioned his division in the official despatch on the battle that he 
had sent back to England and which had been published in the London Gazette.118 As Hamley 
wrote to his close friend, the publisher William Blackwood, ‘it is actually a fact that owing to 
my not being mentioned in the despatch as commanding the division hardly anybody seems 
to know I was in the battle at all, even my relations fancied I must have been elsewhere’.119  
Hamley felt that he and his division had played the decisive role in the battle, and that 
Wolseley was deliberately hiding his contribution as it had overshadowed his own. Moreover, 
as the army forced men to retire if they had not received promotion before they reached a 
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certain age, Hamley had a vested interest in his conduct during the campaign appearing in the 
best possible light as this could lead to promotion and prevent his compulsory retirement.120 
He was disappointed by the way the campaign had been covered by the newspapers, as ‘the 
press correspondents in Egypt were the worst I have ever heard of’; he felt this had also 
contributed to his division being overlooked.121 Hamley sought to set the record straight with 
an article which described the battle from his point of view in the Nineteenth Century in 
December 1882. Here, in his attempt to present himself as a great leader, he wrote that his 
division had attacked the strongest part of the enemy position and had broken the Egyptian 
defences, causing the enemy to retreat, before the rest of the British force, under Wolseley, 
had arrived.122  
When Maurice circulated the first draft of the Official History in late 1885, he found 
that for the most part it was considered to be accurate by those who had fought in Egypt. 
Archibald Alison, who had served in Hamley’s brigade during the battle of El-Tel-Kabir, was 
especially pleased with the accuracy of the account of that battle; although he suggested 
altering ‘trifling matters of detail’, he considered it to be ‘clear and concise’.123 Hamley, on 
the other hand, was deeply unhappy with the account as he again felt that his role in the battle 
had been downplayed. On the same morning in which he read Maurice’s draft, he called on 
him in person demanding to know ‘whether you are responsible for this thing’.124  
Maurice agreed to consider the changes to the account that Hamley had put forward; 
he had after all circulated this draft so that he could get feedback on it.  However, instead of 
proposing alterations to the account, Hamley ordered the historian to write what he told him 
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and Maurice recalled the meeting as ‘rather that of a slave driver to a slave than even of a 
General Officer using his military authority to dictate to a junior’, as Hamley ‘held out the 
most magniloquent threats of his influence and of what he would do if justice were not done 
him’.125 Hamley also insisted that he should review each draft of the History as Maurice 
produced it to ensure that no changes were made to the version of events that he had dictated. 
This high-handed approach taken by Hamley is apparent in the letters that he sent to Maurice 
while the Official History was being written. On one occasion, for example, he informed 
Maurice that he should ‘call at [his] chambers at 10.30 on Thursday and bring the proof and 
notes [so] that we might finish and revise them there… by that time you will have read what I 
have to say’.126 
The changes that Hamley insisted were made to the Official History were designed to 
make the official account closely mirror his article in the Nineteenth Century, so to add 
apparent authority to his interpretation of the battle. He directly manipulated the Official 
History to reflect his claim that the attack of his division caused the Egyptians to retreat 
before the other parts of the British force arrived. He told Maurice to write that he had 
observed ‘numbers of Egyptians, who were… flying from the works southwards toward the 
canal’ as his division made their attack.127 In his article he had written that, ‘the immediate 
result of the advance was to split the centre of the Egyptian line… which now crumbled… 
into… crowds of fugitives, making for the canal’.128 Likewise, Hamley insisted that Maurice 
include a passage in which he personally stopped several of his men from falling back 
without orders by calling out ‘rightabout turn’ to them, thus preventing the spread of panic.129 
This, too, was intended to tally with his article as here he had claimed he had prevented some 
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troops from retreating and had ‘sent [them] all on together’ to continue the attack. 130 
Furthermore, as Hamley’s force had suffered the heaviest British casualties during the battle 
he claimed in his article that ‘anyone… by referring to the list of casualties, and comparing 
these with the losses of other bodies of troops, [can] ascertain by that simple test on whom 
bore the brunt of the fighting’.131 As the early drafts of the Official History did not include 
casualty figures, Hamley rebuked Maurice for this, insisting that ‘I never heard of a narrative 
of a battle without a statement of the losses’; he insisted that they should be listed by 
regiment, enabling the reader to see that his force had endured the greatest loss.132 
Maurice soon discovered that although Hamley’s division had suffered the heaviest 
casualties in the battle, he could not corroborate his claim that Egyptian forces fled as he 
pressed his attack, or that he ordered retreating soldiers back into the fight. When Maurice 
asked Alison about these claims he pointed out that the main part of the battle had been 
fought in darkness, so there was no way Hamley could have seen the Egyptians falling back 
to the canal. When asked if Hamley had issued the command to the retreating soldiers, Alison 
replied ‘that they could have received from him a word of command and acted on it is 
absolutely impossible’ as although he ‘was not far from Sir Edward at the time… there was 
so much noise that I could not make the soldier out in front of me hear one word’. This meant 
that the ‘statement Sir Edward shouted across the ditch a word of command to barely-visible 
men, and that they obeyed him, is a product of imagination only’. Maurice also discovered 
that while Hamley had been dictating the content of the official work, he had been boasting 
that ‘the Official History would do him justice’ regarding his part in the battle.133  
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As Maurice could find no corroborating evidence to substantiate the claims Hamley 
had ordered him to include in the Official History, he resolved to include a footnote which 
made it plain to the reader that the information came from Hamley alone. Maurice later wrote 
that, ‘I could not, with honour, have done otherwise than insert that note… unless I was to 
allow Sir Edward to dictate to me the form which the History was to assume, [which would] 
then [let him] appeal to it as an independent and official judgement on the case’.134 Maurice’s 
footnote stated that, ‘I am here and in other parts of the narrative indebted to the personal 
evidence of Sir E. Hamley. It is more necessary to make this remark because… it is often 
difficult to get corroborative evidence of parts of the story’.135 Although Maurice did not 
change the information that Hamley had ordered him to include, Hamley still never forgave 
him for including the footnote as it seriously undermined the authority of the passages he had 
instructed Maurice to write. In fact, Hamley was so angry over the addition of the footnote 
that when he next met Maurice after the publication of the work, ‘he put his hand behind his 
back and refused to shake hands’ with him.136 
The way in which the initial Official History of the Second Boer War was compiled 
marked a significant change in how authorised accounts were produced. This work was not 
compiled in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, or under its supervision. Instead, 
when G.F.R. Henderson was appointed as the official historian in the autumn of 1900 by 
Lord Roberts, he found that he had not been assigned office space to write the work and as 
obtaining suitable rooms proved harder than anticipated, he was unable to start work until 
January 1901. Henderson immediately began compiling large quantities of information as the 
war in South Africa continued; by early 1903 he and his staff had collected over 850 
envelopes containing staff diaries and official correspondence produced during the war. In 
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addition, eighteen large cases of Lord Roberts’ papers and seven cases of Lord Kitchener’s 
correspondence had been collected and catalogued.137  
As was the case with the other official histories produced in this period, the official 
historian received very little guidance as to the scope and content of the project until a first 
draft of the work had been circulated to the officials involved in the conflict.  As a result of 
this, Henderson, like Maurice, designed the project as he saw fit. He wanted the work to be 
more than just a ‘dull record of facts’ and instead to be a ‘picturesque’ History modelled on 
Napier’s History of the Peninsular War and Alexander W. Kinglake’s history of the Crimean 
War.138 Moreover, he did not intend to limit the scope of his work to the events in the 
conflict. Instead, he undertook a major study of British relations with the Boers from 1796 to 
1902 which he estimated would run into seven volumes of at least 450 pages each.139 Due to 
the intended scope, and the scale of the war, this Official History was the first to have a staff 
of officers working on the account. Between 1901 and 1903, including Henderson, there were 
seven officers working on the Official History.140 Once Henderson had secured office space, 
Major Gretton was detailed to assist him. Next, in June 1901, Lieutenant Beaty-Pownall 
joined as a volunteer without pay, although from March 1902 he was allowed to draw 10/- a 
day. To accompany Henderson on research trips to South Africa and to assist with writing, 
Captain M.H. Grant and Lieutenant Cockcraft were seconded in November 1902.141 On 1 
January 1903, Captain Bowers from the Army Service Corps was appointed to the project, 
and, finally, in February 1903, Captain Ross arrived. Henderson’s account was also the first 
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to include a civilian in a literary role, as he employed Miss Reade, ‘a literary woman with a 
remarkable knowledge of South African modern history to help him produce the first 
volume’; and she assisted with the verification of quotations which appeared in the chapters 
which concerned political matters.142 
In an attempt to make the official account as appealing as possible to the public, on 
his own authority Henderson appointed a literary agent to sell the work to a commercial 
publisher.143 On 8 June 1901, Henderson signed a contract with the publisher Hurst and 
Blackett which gave them the rights to publish the official account of the Second Boer 
War.144 Although the contract named Henderson personally as the recipient of the royalty 
payments, the agreement was signed on the understanding that he was only acting as the 
representative of the War Office.145 The literary agent, Mr W.M. Colles, induced several 
publishers to compete against each other for the right to purchase the work. In this way, he 
managed to induce Hurst and Blackett to agree to pay royalties of 30% of the sale price to 
Henderson, with a £300 advance for each volume he was able to produce.146 Furthermore, 
Henderson, again on his own authority, sent Colles to the United States in 1903 to look into 
the possibility of publishing the Official History in that country.147 
By February 1902, the ill health that had forced Henderson to be invalided out of 
active service in South Africa returned; and, although he went to Egypt in the autumn of that 
year to avoid the British winter, he died at Assouan on 5 March 1903.148 The lack of official 
oversight of Henderson’s project meant that it was only after his death that the government 
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and the Treasury became fully aware that he had been producing more than just a short 
narrative history of the war, intended mainly for a military readership.149 The controller of the 
government Stationery Office was also highly critical of the agreement that Henderson had 
signed with Hurst and Blackett, as it was so badly worded that not only did a loophole exist 
so the publisher could refuse to pay royalties if he so chose, but it did not even specify the 
quality of paper that the publisher ought to use. Furthermore, he pointed out that the 
Stationery Office already had agreements with several companies entitling them to sell 
official publications, so the contract with Hurst and Blackett would land them ‘in serious 
[legal] difficulties’.150  
The first volume of Henderson’s work was devoted to a political history of the 
relations between the Boers and British, but since the work was written with the general 
reading public in mind the discussion of such a subject was particularly contentious and, as 
one report to the Secretary of State pointed out, it ‘bristle[d] with controversial matter’.151 
Two re-occurring themes ran through Henderson’s history. Firstly, he was highly critical of 
Boer political thought in an attempt to undermine any sympathy for their cause, writing that 
‘Great Britain was backed up by the forces of enlightenment and progress [whereas] the Boer 
was the champion of political anarchy’.152 He argued that the Boers had always been opposed 
to any system of government that they currently had and suggested that the Dutch settlers in 
the Cape in 1795 had been only too eager, ‘like their kinsfolk in Europe’ to accept French 
rule as the existing constitution had been ‘not exactly to their liking’.153 Similarly, Henderson 
went out of his way to undermine the significance of the ‘Great Trek’, in which the Boer 
people left the British Cape colony to start their own republic, by suggesting that this had ‘no 
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effect whatever on their status as British subjects’ and so they had not ‘divested themselves 
of their allegiance to the British Crown’.154 Moreover, the History suggested that if the ‘Great 
Trek’ had any real significance it was that it demonstrated the ‘goodwill’ of the British 
‘abstinent lion’, which let the Boers have their ‘political protest’.155 
Henderson intended to undermine further sympathy for the Boer cause by 
emphasising the way the Boers had treated the natives badly. Henderson argued that ‘to the 
Boer the man of colour was little more than an animal’, and he maintained that they had 
consciously adapted their religious beliefs to allow themselves to hold slaves. He stated, ‘a 
constant supply of submissive blacks was undoubtedly essential… and the student of human 
nature will note with interest that, according to the creed of the Afrikander [sic], the least 
troublesome means of supplying this need received divine sanction in the old testament’. By 
way of contrast, the history presented the British Empire as holding an enlightened attitude 
toward the natives. It pointed out: ‘the slave trade was done away with in 1806; and from that 
time forward a broad and unselfish humanitarianism [took over the Empire], of which the 
most helpless and despised races were the peculiar care’.156 It was particularly apparent that 
Henderson was using the Boer attitude toward slavery as a way to alienate support for them 
as, despite his criticism of this institution in the drafts of the Official History, in Stonewall 
Jackson he had in fact championed it. Here he had claimed that the abolition of slavery 
‘meant ruin to the negro’ as ‘under the system of the plantations, honesty and morality were 
being gradually instilled into the coloured race’ and that without it they ‘would relapse into 
the barbaric vices of their original condition’.157  
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The second theme which ran through Henderson’s draft chapters was an attempt to 
place blame for British military defeats in South Africa on political figures, rather than the 
army, and, in so doing, the work demonstrated partisan opposition toward the Liberal and 
Radical parties. The history of South Africa was portrayed as a series of crises which ‘for 
more than ninety years not one of [Britain’s] ministers proved competent to deal’. 158 
Gladstone’s administration, which had ordered British forces to surrender to the Boers during 
the First Anglo-Boer War in 1881, was a particular target for Henderson. The History 
described Gladstone’s Midlothian speeches, in which he criticised British policy in South 
Africa, as a ‘terrible indiscretion... condemning the annexation before he had acquainted 
himself with the facts’. The history also accused Gladstone of placing personal motives above 
the best interests of the Empire as, for him, ‘there was a worse calamity than an inglorious 
surrender, and that was the return of the Conservatives to power... because it relegated Mr 
Gladstone to the cold shades of the opposition’.159  
 Likewise, Henderson blamed government underfunding of the military for the poor 
showing of the British officer corps during the Second Boer War as ‘few… statesmen appear 
to have had more than a faint inkling of their predominant influence upon the affairs of 
nations; and not one had the good sense to endeavour to apply them to the military needs of 
the United Kingdom’.160 Thus, ‘military education had few friends outside of the army’, and 
so ‘the economists, pursuing a reckless path up the line of least resistance’ were permitted ‘to 
deprive the British officer of the such facilities for acquiring professional knowledge as he 
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already enjoyed’.161 Henderson pointed to the education of staff officers as a particular case 
in point, as government ‘economy again intervened’ and so only thirty-two officers per year 
passed out of Camberley which was ‘even in time of peace… not enough for the needs of the 
army’.162 
As a result of the large quantity of controversial material which appeared in the 
proposed Official History it encountered opposition when the first drafts were sent to the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices. Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, took 
particular exception to it. He was so worried by its divisive nature that he took the first 
chapters before the Cabinet in late September 1903, arguing that the ‘points of historical 
summary will be taken exception to in an official publication and will give offence’.163 Other 
ministers agreed with him. One pointed out that passages such as the one found in chapter 
three which stated that, ‘the Cabinet that then sat in Westminster overlooked practical politics 
in the quest of unattainable ideals’, would ‘fitly grace the pages of the National Review but 
[was] surely out of place in an Official History of a campaign’. Furthermore, the cabinet was 
worried that, as the funds for the Official History had come from the army’s budget, the ‘tax 
payers may object to public money voted for… the history of the war being expended on a 
political history of South Africa’. It was, after all, ‘an era of Royal Commissions and one 
may be appointed at any moment to consider how army funds are being expended’.164  
So, when Maurice took over the Official History in March 1903, he inherited a project 
which had raised strong opposition within the government. 165  Although Maurice was a 
supporter of the idea that official history should influence public opinion, the proposed 
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history was so vehemently critical of the British government and the Boers, that as he wrote 
on 28 September 1903 to the secretary of the War Office, ‘I should not myself have 
attempted to propose or submit anything of the kind; but I find this volume left behind by 
Col. Henderson’.166 In an attempt to secure funding for Henderson’s original project, Maurice 
argued that it was the Official History’s ability to change the way the public thought about 
the campaign which was its greatest selling point. Even though it was escalating in cost, 
Maurice argued that if the work could give the public the impression that the war had not 
gone badly for Britain, it would prevent expensive calls for the reform of the army. As The 
Times had begun its own history of the war in 1900, Maurice thought that if this became ‘the 
one authoritative History in England’ it would have an ‘influence on the electorate… and the 
House of Commons’ which would ‘make it very hard [for the government] not to adopt a 
view of [conscription]… embodied in the plan of army reform… set forth by that newspaper’, 
and ‘it would be difficult to devise anything more costly’ for the nation. Similarly, Maurice 
saw the Official History as a way to combat the Prussian General Staff’s historical section’s 
own account of the campaign. Maurice drew a direct comparison with how he thought The 
Times history would dictate popular understanding of the war in Britain. He argued that if the 
German official account were to become the ‘authoritative History for Europe… written as it 
will be by men all pro-Boers at heart… [it would lead to] the formulation of an alliance 
against us of all the nations effected by their statement’. He left it to ‘competent statesmen to 
judge of the financial cost of meeting the consequences’.167  
Although Maurice proposed that the offending political chapters should be removed 
from this history and privately published, so as not to lose such an ‘able and laborious study’, 
on 17 November 1903 the Secretary of State, H.O. Arnold-Forster, ordered that ‘Volume 1 as 
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written by Col. Henderson is not suitable for publication... [and] this whole portion of the 
work will be discarded’. He also instructed that ‘Maurice will be informed that it is not 
considered desirable to publish a book on the lines suggested by him, viz., a book for general 
circulation written in a manner to interest ordinary readers’. Instead, Maurice was 
commanded to write a history ‘as near as circumstances will allow upon the lines of the 
German official history of the War of 1870’. This revised project was not to exceed four 
volumes in length, and ‘two or three introductory chapters’ were to be substituted for the 
volume that had been discarded. 168  Furthermore, the publication of any of Henderson’s 
account was prohibited and so the government also sent out letters to those who may have 
had a copy of the original manuscript, including Henderson’s wife who had moved to Ceylon 
following her husband’s death, instructing that it should be returned as soon as possible.169 
Thus, by early February 1904 the Secretary of State for War was told that he could ‘safely 
assume’ that all of Henderson’s original manuscript had ‘been destroyed’.170  
The controversy surrounding Henderson’s History ensured that henceforth much 
greater oversight was exerted over historical projects at the outset of the research. The work 
undertaken by Maurice and Henderson had demonstrated that official history, while viewed 
by many government officials as a valuable undertaking, would always be fraught with 
political difficulties. Due to both political and budgetary pressures, the intention was now that 
they would be written exclusively for the purposes of military education. The first account to 
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be written under these new ‘restrictions’ was Maurice’s history of the Second Boer War; with 
this project, British official history entered a new developmental phase.  
 
IV. Official History as Source for Officers’ Studies, 1903-1914  
The work on the new Official History of the Second Boer War, which was begun following 
the abandonment of the original project under Henderson, was taken up in April 1903.171 
Hurst and Blackett, despite the major changes to the project that had been ordered by Forster 
and the realisation that they were likely to make a loss, agreed to publish the work under the 
original terms of the contract.172 The inclusion of political matter remained problematic; so, 
in late 1905 drafts of the new first volume, in which Henderson’s controversial work had 
been condensed into the first few chapters, were circulated for feedback among politicians. 
Maurice received agreement from the Prime Minister for this volume to be published on 12 
October 1905. However, once the drafts had gone to the printers, the Colonial Office issued a 
memorandum regarding the discussion of political matter in the History, ‘strongly 
depreciating any such reference to past [political] events as injurious in the present situation 
in South Africa’. Maurice was forced to recall the drafts he had sent to the publishers and to 
remove all of the political comment which appeared in the Official History.173 It was not until 
12 December 1905 that Maurice was able to obtain approval for the latest revision and was 
finally able to resubmit the work for publication. 174  This was a clear indication of the 
continuing political sensitivity surrounding official histories. 
The first volume of the new history, which covered the opening months of the war, 
was finally published in early 1906. The second volume did not appear until 1907, as given 
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the problems which had plagued the project, only eight of its thirty-two chapters were in 
preliminary draft form by the beginning of 1906.175 During the course of the writing of this 
volume, the Committee of Imperial Defence set up the ‘Historical Section’ to oversee the 
production of all official history in Britain, so the compilation of the two remaining volumes, 
which appeared in 1908 and 1912 respectively, was carried out under the supervision of this 
body.176 As work progressed, Maurice was taken ill as the third volume was in an early stage, 
and Captain M.H. Grant took over as the official historian.177  
This Official History was similar to the other accounts produced in Britain after 1880 
in that it mirrored the Prussian approach in which a narrative of the fighting was the central 
focus. However, it was the first British account to include didactic information regarding the 
general conduct of military operations in the text. Previously, British official histories had 
provided information for military specialists, such as staff officers, engineers, and those in the 
artillery, but had never provided information regarding the best way to conduct a campaign, 
or the most effective way infantry fire could be employed. The Official History described 
Lord Roberts’ advance against the Boer General Cronje as an example of how to out 
manoeuvre an opponent. It paid particular attention to the psychological aspect of command 
and described ‘all war… so far of the two opposing commanders are concerned’ as ‘the play 
of mind upon mind’ and provided the reader with a list of ways in which a general could 
misdirect his opponent. The history stated ‘it will be found that in practice Lord Roberts took 
advantage of every one [of these techniques]’. 178  Once it had described Lord Roberts’ 
misdirection in this campaign, the history concluded that ‘the interest of the whole scheme 
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for modern soldiers lies in the fact that it was an application of very ancient principles of war 
to the times of railways and telegraphs’.179 Furthermore, the history included the ‘Notes for 
Guidance in South African Warfare’ which Lord Roberts had circulated during the campaign. 
These notes were based on the experience of fighting against the well-armed and highly 
mobile Boers; as such, it placed the emphasis on overcoming the firepower created by 
modern rifles and artillery. The reader was told that ‘any attempt to take a position by direct 
attack will assuredly fail… the only hope of success lies in the being able to turn one or both 
flanks’.180  
However, there is no evidence to suggest the Official History was used to teach 
Military History at the army’s academies, even though copies were retained for official use. It 
is highly likely that the decision to remove all reference to political matters caused the history 
to be considered unsuitable for this purpose as knowledge of the motivating political factors 
behind a conflict had been deemed important by the army in the study of Military History 
since at least 1889.181 It was Lord Lansdowne as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and 
Alfred Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in 1905 requested that all 
political matter should be finally removed from the Official History. Lansdowne argued that 
the history should ‘be [of] a purely military nature, compiled for the benefit of military 
students’; he was opposed to it possessing a ‘political complexion’ as he felt that this would 
mean that it would ‘contain matter which has no direct connection with the operations in the 
field’.182 Lyttleton, went even further; he felt that even though most of the political comment 
had been removed, the Official History should be reduced to a ‘colourless narrative’ that did 
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not refer to any political matters.183 Maurice responded, mirroring Clausewitz, that ‘Military 
History… is absolutely useless and worthless except in so far as it places the man who reads 
it in the position of those whose actions he is studying, and therefore enables him to profit by 
their experience’.184 Since he thought ‘all the military operations [of a war] are inextricably 
interwoven with… ‘political considerations’, he realised that the government were forcing 
him to ‘produce [a history] that would be absolutely useless and valueless’.185  
Although Maurice thought that the work had a limited utility for officer education, he 
still hoped that it could be an accurate record of the events of the wars. Hence, he renewed 
Henderson’s appeal for officers to submit information for the Official History and sent out a 
circular letter to this end which stated, ‘we cannot make bricks without straw; and though the 
mass of material to be dealt with is very great, it often fails us at important points’.186 The 
circulation of draft chapters to principal military figures for correction did, though, run into 
problems. Sir Ian Hamilton, for example, who had commanded the British Infantry during the 
battle of Elandslaagte early in the war, served as a military attaché with the Japanese Army 
during the Russo-Japanese War and so was unable to comment on the proofs of the Official 
History that had been sent to him. As Hamilton recalled, ‘Elandslaagte is told all wrong in the 
Official History… the various times of the movements are muddled up’. But by the time he 
had returned to England, the volume which contained the account of Elandslaagte had already 
gone to print. Hamilton later wrote that when he ‘pointed out to [Maurice] the mistakes… he 
became so angry that I left the matter alone and never explained that I had not received [his] 
letter [concerning the draft chapter]’.187       
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Moreover, General Redvers Buller was particularly unhappy with the way his defeat 
at the Battle of Colenso had been described in the draft circulated to him by its author, Major 
Arthur Griffith. Buller wrote to Maurice proclaiming, ‘I thought it the poorest piece of 
writing I had ever [seen]… not only were there in it several statements which [were] 
incorrect… only a parody of the truth’; as a result, he offered to write the account of the 
battle for Griffith.188 Buller also met with Major Ferryman from Maurice’s staff to discuss 
further the alteration of the account.189 It is likely that Buller hoped to respond to the criticism 
which had been directed at him in the press, and in the Times History of the War in South 
Africa, which had centred on a message he had sent to George White, commander of the 
besieged Ladysmith garrison, following the Battle of Colenso, in which he apparently called 
on him to surrender.190 However, the restrictions placed on the Official History, as it was now 
intended principally for officer education, prevented a response to such criticism. Thus, 
although the history printed a complete transcript of the messages sent between Buller and 
White, no attempt was made to explain or justify them.191  
In any case, the disappointing sales of the Official History would have prevented it 
providing an effective rebuttal to the Times History. By 1914, only 4,500 copies of the 
official account had been sold to the public, while 1,050 copies had been retained for ‘official 
use’.192 The scrapping of Henderson’s original volume, the restarting of the project, and the 
employment of a writing staff had pushed up the costs. The Committee of Imperial Defence 
found that the expenditure had been ‘extravagant to the last degree’.193 The Treasury was 
unable to provide accurate figures as to the final cost as it had not been aware of Henderson’s 
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activities, so had no accurate information about his expenses. They estimated in 1905 that the 
Official History would cost the government at least £26,000 to produce, even though 
originally only £4,000 had been budgeted for it. To make matters worse, the Treasury 
concluded that ‘allowing for waning public interest [in the war] and rival publications, it is 
evidently improbable that anything like a quarter of the cost will ever be recovered’. The 
Historical Section, in a report submitted in December 1913, admitted that the production of 
the Official History had ‘not proved satisfactory’, and that the official account had ‘not been 
widely read either by the general public or by the two services’.194  
Despite Maurice’s concern regarding the value of the Official History of the Second 
Boer War as a didactic work, the next two British authorised accounts were intended for the 
education of regimental officers as well as military specialists. In 1907, Section Two of the 
General Staff’s Directorate of Military Operations, which had been assigned the job of 
producing official history by the War Office reconstitution committee, released an account of 
the British operations in Somaliland between 1901 and 1904.195 The work was written by 
John Adye and Aylmer Haldane, who had begun compiling information even before the 
campaign had begun.196 The work was intended to be ‘an interesting and instructive study for 
all ranks of all the important work undertaken by units, services and departments’, so, besides 
logistical and administrative details, a chapter was included which dealt with the ‘strategy 
and tactics’ employed by both sides.197 In August 1906 this department also published the 
first volume of an official account of the Russo-Japanese War, intended to provide 
information for those taking Military History exams set by the army in 1905 on this 
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conflict.198 The work was begun by Haldane and was later transferred to Adye, who was 
assisted by Major Dowding, a retired officer, along with a military clerk.199 In the work itself, 
‘criticism [was] excluded, as it is necessarily of doubtful value when based upon imperfect 
knowledge’; and, the discussion of the naval aspects of the war were only included where 
they directly influenced the operations on land.200  
On 6 September 1906, Lord Esher, spurred on by fact that the navy had also begun to 
produce a separate Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, called on the Committee of 
Imperial Defence to create a ‘Historical Section’ to supervise the production of all official 
history in Britain. Esher argued that as British military campaigns were often matters of close 
coordination between the army and navy the production of official history should be 
conducted jointly by both services. Esher warned that ‘it is most unlikely that the lessons of 
the operations will be adequately appreciated unless they are treated as a whole’ by an 
official account which included both the military and naval aspects of the conflict. Moreover, 
he reasoned that the Committee of Imperial Defence was the best body to conduct this task as 
‘no Military History… is complete unless the political considerations which influenced the 
campaign are included, and neither the Admiralty nor the War Office is specially qualified to 
deal with history in this aspect’. The production of one official account, rather that several, 
was also expected to save the treasury money, as this body had described the current 
arrangement as having led to ‘confusion and extravagance’.201 Both the army and the navy 
supported this move largely because it enabled the cost of producing official history to be 
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borne by the Committee of Imperial Defence’s budget rather than their own. 202  On the 
strength of Esher’s request, a special subcommittee was set up under Sir George Clarke to 
investigate the current method of producing official history and to prepare a proposal for the 
creation of a Historical Section.203 Clarke’s sub-committee presented its report on 10 January 
1907, and on the 21 February the creation of the Historical Section was officially 
sanctioned.204 The Historical Section was finally set up in April 1908, although work was 
commenced in August 1907 on a ‘Combined Official History’ of the Russo-Japanese War 
which recounted both the naval and military aspects of the conflict.205  
However, the project to produce only the Combined Official History ran into 
difficulties as it was realised that to get an accurate History which could comment on the 
events of the war, large amounts of information would need to be analysed. This would mean 
that the Combined History would not appear for several years, and so would be of no use to 
those sitting Military History exams in the short term. Thus, the Historical Section decided to 
continue the Official History begun by the General Staff in 1906 in an effort to provide an 
official account for exam purposes which could be used before the Combined History 
appeared.206 So, between 1908 and 1910, when the first volume of the Combined History 
appeared, four parts of this original series, produced by Haldane, were published. The second 
part of this series, which followed the General Staff publication, was described in the preface 
as ‘an advanced portion’ of the Combined History, covering the period from the end of the 
battle of Ya-lu to the battle of Liao-Lang. The third and fourth parts appeared in 1909 and 
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covered the siege of Port Arthur, and the Battle of Liao-Yang respectively. The final part 
appeared in 1910 and covered the battle of Sha-Ho.207 
The Treasury originally assigned £1,500 for these works, but by early 1907 £1,100 
had already been spent on the project, although only one volume had appeared.208 Even 
though these parts refrained from any analytical comment, the system of producing official 
accounts in advance of the main Official History was found to have ‘grave drawbacks’. In the 
case of parts three, four and five, ‘so much fresh information became available’ during their 
production that they had to be heavily revised and time devoted to ‘re-write them to a great 
extent’ before they could be published.209 Moreover, a disclaimer was added to the preface of 
these accounts, stating that they made ‘no claim to be complete and accurate in every respect, 
but all available information, with the exception of [confidential material], has been 
utilized’.210  
The cause of this problem was the source material available. Initially, the only sources 
of information came from British officers who had accompanied the Japanese Army during 
the war, or from official Japanese sources. These, of course, contained little information 
about the intentions of the Russian Army and, at best, gave a fragmentary narrative of the 
battle on which the official account could be based. A good example of this can be seen in the 
British narrative of the actions undertaken by the Japanese Guards and 12th Division during 
the second phase of the Battle of Yalu on the 1 May 1904. The information which appeared 
in the second ‘advanced portion’ of the Combined History came from a lecture given by 
Major Fukuda, the Chief of the Operations Section of the First Japanese Army, to the foreign 
military attachés. Fukuda explained that the ‘Guards and the 12th Division were very tired and 
                                                          
207 Anon., Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, 5 Parts (London, 1906-1912). 
208 TNA, CAB 103/434, Report of Sub-Committee, January 1907, p. 3. 
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hungry’ and so waited for ‘the reserves [which] on the contrary, had been eagerly waiting the 
order to advance, and came on quickly to Conical Hill’. Lieutenant Colonel C.V. Hume, the 
British military attaché, ordered that ‘this narrative is the official account for the present’.211 
Consequently, the first British official account of the battle, which appeared in 1909, relied 
on this information and explained that ‘instead of immediately pressing forward… [the 
Guards and 12th Division] appear to have halted for some hours’, as ‘the men were tired and 
hungry and General Kuroki was unwilling to attempt to force the second Russian position 
until they had had some food and rest’.212 However, by 1910 information had come to light 
from the Russian side, so that the Combined History was able to ascertain that the reason for 
the delay in the advance was in fact down to the Japanese assault being ‘stubbornly opposed’ 
by Russian forces under General Kashtalinski and not the tiredness or hunger of the Japanese 
troops.213   
When Russian information became available, this too was often found lacking and 
further delayed the advanced portions of the Official History. The publication of the fifth 
part, which provided a narrative of the battle of Sha-Ho, was held back to ‘enable reference to 
be made to the account given in the Russian Official (Military) History’.214 However, this 
Russian account was found to be so long and inaccurate, due to the fact it had been produced 
by several writers who worked without coordination and with the use of ‘no maps [which] 
agree exactly’, that it proved to be of limited use.215 As a result, no alterations were made to 
this British account before it was published, although the second volume of the Combined 
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History was edited with reference to the information provided in the Russian Official 
History.216   
The Combined Official History ran to three volumes, the first volume appearing in 
1910, the second in 1912, and the third, which was completed in 1914, was only published in 
1920, as it was ‘unavoidably delayed owing to the late war’. 217  The first volume was 
compiled by Major Neill Malcolm, while Major Ernest D. Swinton was responsible for the 
compilation of the other two volumes. To assist these principal writers, a permanent staff of 
one military and one naval assistant secretary were assigned to them. Moreover, as some 
sections of the Official History were handed over to those who had special expertise on the 
subject, Commander J. Luce of the Royal Navy was entrusted with the production of the first 
drafts of the naval portions of the History, while Major Bannerman, who had been attached to 
the Japanese Army during the siege of Port Arthur, wrote the account of this operation.218   
The Combined History contained analysis and didactic information for military 
readers and devoted two chapters of each volume to an analysis of the strategic and tactical 
elements of the military and naval operations. Not only were the strengths of the Japanese 
joint naval and military plan analysed in relation to the weaknesses of the Russian plan, but 
the Official History posed questions to the reader asking them to consider how they would 
have acted if they had been in command. For instance, following a discussion of the siege of 
Port Arthur, the reader was directly asked: ‘were the Japanese well advised in attacking Port 
Arthur, or should they have concentrated every available man against General Kuropatkin, 
merely masking the fortress?’ Similarly, the History was intended to inform readers how best 
to conduct military operations in the future. For example, the battle of Yalu was described as 
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providing ‘one more example of the difficulty of guarding a river crossing against an 
enterprising enemy’. The history went on to describe how it felt the river should have been 
defended using ‘a comparatively weak force’, which would have enabled the Russians to 
‘strike a vigorous blow, with superior numbers if possible, at some point’ against the 
Japanese forces crossing the river.219  
Despite the analysis it provided, the Combined History did not sell well. By 1914, 
only 1,095 individual volumes had been sold, on top of the 589 which had been distributed 
officially. By contrast, the advanced sections of the Official History had sold 9,998 copies by 
the same time and 3,657 had been issued for official use. The production of both histories 
was considered ‘financially a dead loss’, with at least £16,000 spend on the production of 
both official accounts between August 1907 and March 1914, but with only £1,702 received 
from the copies sold.220  
However, the Combined History was well regarded and Swinton was awarded the 
Chesney Medal by the Royal United Service Institution in 1919 for his contribution to 
‘military knowledge and science’. As Swinton later wrote to Liddell Hart, he considered the 
compilation of the Official History ‘the dullest work on earth, except the [analysis and] 
comments’, but he admitted that ‘all the labour was done by my assistants and I got the 
Chesney medal… which I let them smell over a meal to celebrate my honour’.221 Despite all 
the hurdles which work of this nature presented, the Combined History demonstrated that 
there was a place for official history and it could make a serious contribution to Military 
History as a whole. 
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*  *  * 
 
In summary, in this formative period in the commissioning and writing of British official 
histories, the origins of the official history as a form of military historical writing can be seen 
in their function as a means of serving the educational and professional needs of military 
officers. If this represented the origins of official history, as the popular press began 
increasingly to influence public opinion during the course of campaigns abroad, official 
histories offered the opportunity for the army to provide explanations in those cases where 
commanders appeared to have failed. The official history became a means of defending 
reputations. Yet, the scope of the official histories became subject to increasing controversy 
due to G.F.R. Henderson’s desire to include the political background to the South African 
War. The battle over official history saw it pulled in several directions. 
The first British official histories, written on the Crimean War, were produced with 
the intention that they would enable officers in the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery to 
learn from the experience of the siege of Sebastopol.222 However, as the majority of British 
campaigns fought between 1857 and 1914 consisted of expeditions conducted in hostile 
environments against culturally diverse groups of native people, after 1870 many authorised 
Histories were intended to provide information for staff officers as they planned future 
colonial campaigns in these regions. These works contained extensive material on the area 
traversed, the natives encountered, as well as the logistical organisation and administration of 
the expedition, rather than information on tactics.223 A version of this approach also appeared 
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in India, as the Intelligence Branch compiled accounts of the expeditions conducted by the 
Indian Army.224 
Although many official accounts were produced principally for military education, 
and so were less concerned with the reputation of the army, defending reputations did play an 
important part in the writing of several works, particularly those published between 1879 and 
1903. As the army encountered a series of military setbacks between, which were well 
publicised following the growing coverage of colonial campaigns in the cheap daily press, the 
production of authorised accounts during this time began to be affected by the army’s desire 
to protect its reputation. Therefore, although they were also intended to serve a didactic 
function, the Official History of the Zulu War obscured British errors which had contributed 
to the disaster at Isandlwana and the authorised account of the Sudan campaign included 
passages which responded to the criticism which had appeared in the press or had been made 
by officials.225 As it was deemed by Lord Frederick Roberts that the narrative of the defeat at 
Maiwand would cause too much controversy, the Official History of the Second Afghan War 
was suppressed, only eventually appearing in 1908. 226  Indeed, it is probable that the 
controversy surrounding the British defeat during the First Boer War led to the failure to 
produce an official account of this conflict.  
In the evolution of the compilation of official histories, a development of some 
significance was the growing control in the writing of the accounts. Prior to 1903 there had 
been little government oversight of the writing of official accounts before the circulation of 
the first drafts of the work. This meant that John Frederick Maurice had been able to produce 
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the account of the Official History of the invasion of Egypt along the lines he saw fit.227 As a 
result, he wrote the work principally for the reading public not only with the intention of 
directly responding to the criticism of the army and Sir Garnet Wolseley which had appeared 
in the press, but also to inform readers of the difficulties facing the commander as he 
conducted the campaign. As Maurice later wrote, the Official History gave him the 
opportunity of ‘pressing certain considerations upon my countrymen which are of permanent 
interest… which ought to be present in their minds during the course of every future 
campaign’. 228  However, as the history was intended for the reading public, Maurice 
encountered difficulties as Sir Edward Hamley attempted to shape the work’s account of the 
Battle of Tel-el-Kebir to support his contention that he had played a major part in the 
engagement.229 Despite Maurice’s argument that a work aimed at the general public would 
help revive Britain’s reputation on the continent and provide a response to the criticism 
directed at the army in the Times History of the War in South Africa, subsequent British 
Official Histories were produced only to provide didactic information for officers.230 
While many of the arguments over the limits and intentions of official histories were 
specifically British, just as was the case in other genres of Military History, foreign 
influences did act as a catalyst. Following the translation of the Prussian official accounts of 
the Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian War during the 1870s, many British accounts 
adopted a similar style and became centred on a narrative of the campaign and the fighting 
which had taken place.231 The term ‘official history’ may, in fact, also have been derived 
from the Prussian works since it was only after their translation that the term came into use in 
Britain. The Prussian approach was seen as the ‘gold standard’ for the subject by H.O. 
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Arnold-Forster when he set the guidelines for Maurice’s account of the Second Boer War, as 
he told him to model his work on the Prussian Official History of the Franco-Prussian War.232  
However, British official history did not mirror the Prussian approach that closely due 
to several unique British requirements. Given the nature of many British campaigns fought 
between 1857 and 1914, many Histories were dedicated to providing information for staff 
officers planning future operations in the same regions, so contained logistical information 
and intelligence on the native population.233 This requirement was particularly apparent in the 
authorised accounts produced in India: the style they adopted was largely dictated by the need 
to provide description of the relations between the government of India and the tribes who 
inhabited the North-West frontier of the country.234 Given the growing emphasis on maritime 
operations in British military thought at this time, the Combined History of the Russo-
Japanese War placed a great emphasis on this element of the conflict.235 It was, in fact, 
Maurice’s contention that the role of a British official historian was different to that of his 
counterpart working in a monarchy, such as Prussia: due to the influence of public opinion on 
national policy, he had produced an authorised account specifically intended for this 
readership.236  So, again, while foreign influence played a part, in this genre of Military 
History, a specifically British path was trod.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
‘Popular’ Military History, 
1854-1914 
 
 
 
 
While for the most part official history was written specifically for those in the military, other 
forms of Military History appeared between 1854 and 1914 that were intended for a much 
broader audience. During this period the term ‘popular’ was applied to the Military History 
which was intended for a wide readership and which was, as a result, written in an accessible 
style, drawing on a limited range of source material.1 Just as in the case of Military History 
exams set by the army, where no significant period of time needed to elapse between the 
conclusion of a campaign and the appearance of questions related to it, popular Military 
History often appeared likewise very soon after the event which it described.2  
Although the use of the term ‘popular’ to describe accessible Military History does 
not appear to have come into common use until the 1850s, examples of this style of work 
were published after the Napoleonic Wars, particularly in the form of memoirs and 
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biographies.3 Even with the level of public literacy, which was around sixty-per cent for men 
in 1851, volumes which provided lists of battles enjoyed some degree of success before 1854. 
Most notably Edward Creasy’s Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World went through six 
editions in the three years immediately following its publication in 1852. 4  Prior to the 
outbreak of the Crimean War, however, popular campaign histories were comparatively rare, 
although G.R. Gleig, Chaplain General of the Forces, was particularly prolific in the 
publication of such work.5 Nevertheless, after 1854 popular Military History underwent a 
significant period of expansion and diversification, so that by 1907 a ‘British Officer’ writing 
in the American Historical Review noted that every war seemed to produce a ‘stream of 
popular ephemeral books [which] are read by many… and become for the majority of the 
public’ the extent of their reading on the conflict.6 
The development of popular Military History prior to 1914 has been entirely 
overlooked by historians. Although John MacKenzie in Popular Imperialism and the Military 
used the term ‘“instant” histories’ to refer to historical accounts written by journalists 
published soon after the end of a campaign, this appeared in relation to a study of the way 
warfare was represented, not how this type of writing developed.7 Similarly, while there have 
been some studies which have looked at how popular Military History was written in relation 
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to individual conflicts during the nineteenth century, these have not sought to place their 
findings in the broader context of the development of this form of writing. Several works 
have examined the historiography of the Indian Mutiny, although apart from Christopher 
Herbert’s War of No Pity all were written under the postcolonial dispensation to assume that 
any writing by a British author on this conflict prior to the end of Britain’s empire in the 
region was necessarily an instrument of colonial power.8 There have also been two studies of 
the historiography of the Second Boer War, the first of which was written by Ian Beckett and 
the second by Frederick van Hartesveldt.9 However, Hartsveldt’s work consisted mainly of an 
annotated bibliography, and Beckett’s study overlooked primary material related to the 
production of the Times History of the War in South Africa.10 As Beckett based his study on 
the official correspondence sent between The Times Managing Director, Charles Moberly 
Bell, and the editor of the work, Leo Amery, he overlooked the unofficial communications 
between these men which were purposely not recorded in the newspaper’s archives. 11 
Likewise, Beckett did not make use of the private discussions regarding the history which 
took place between Amery and William Blackwood, who was involved in the proof reading 
of the work.12 
To contribute an answer to the fourth research sub-question of this study, which asked 
what factors contributed to the expansion and diversification of popular Military History 
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between 1854 and 1914, this chapter intends to examine the development of this form of 
writing. As popular Military History was intended to appeal to a wide section of the reading 
public, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the degree to which commercial 
opportunism played a role in the growing popularity of this genre. Equally, since this type of 
work had the potential to allow an author to address a large audience it is also important to 
consider the extent to which the writing of popular Military History was influenced by the 
desire to change the public’s perception of military affairs. Bearing these considerations in 
mind, this chapter will examine: first, the emergence of a mass market for popular Military 
History between 1854 and 1884; second, the material produced between 1884 and the start of 
the Second Boer War in 1899; third, the impetus provided by the Second Boer War on the 
publication of popular Military History; and, fourth, the popular Military History produced 
between 1902 and the outbreak of the Great War. 
 
I. Emergence of a Mass Market for Popular Military History, 1854-1884 
Thanks to the development of steamships and the telegraph, the Crimean War was the first 
major conflict in which eyewitness accounts from those directly involved in the fighting, as 
well as reports from the new breed of War Correspondent, most notably William Howard 
Russell, could reach London within a matter of days of the event they described.13 The new 
speed with which uncensored first-hand information was available not only allowed 
newspapers to provide daily coverage of the war, but also permitted the rapid publication of 
volumes containing eyewitness accounts and narratives describing the conduct of the 
campaign.14 The best-selling example of this type of work was Russell’s War, published by 
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Routledge, which consisted of his despatches from the Crimea ‘precisely as they appeared 
originally in The Times newspaper’.15 The large sale of this work demonstrated the demand 
for this type of literature; in fact, by late 1856 it had sold 21,000 copies.16  
Not only did these works reflect and foster the reading public’s interest in the conflict, 
but they also enabled the emergence of a new type of accessible Military History. In 1856 the 
first part of George Dodd’s serialised Pictorial History of the Russian War appeared.17 This 
work, ‘called forth’ by the reading public’s ‘intense interest’ in the conflict, was published by 
W.& R. Chambers, and was complete in a total of twelve parts issued monthly, each costing 
1/-.18 Dodd explained that this history was made possible since the conflict ‘differed from all 
preceding wars in… that it admitted, to a very remarkable degree, [to] historical narration 
during the progress of the events themselves’ through the ‘publication of numerous volumes 
by military officers [and journalists], describing rapidly, but faithfully, such portions of the 
scenes and events of warfare as came under their personal observation’. Since it was felt that 
there was insufficient material on which to provide a ‘complete analysis of events, in their 
causes, and their consequences’ this was left ‘to a later generation’, and instead the history 
focused on providing descriptions of battles and life in the allied camp, derived from the first-
hand accounts. Given its source material, the history depicted the dreadful conditions which 
confronted allied soldiers, including the terrible conditions of the Hospital at Scutari.19 
Russell also produced a serialised history of the war entitled British Expedition to the 
Crimea, which was published by Routledge in 1858 and was complete in thirteen 1/- 
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instalments. Like Dodd’s work it was founded on the ‘valuable [and] trustworthy… letters 
written from the very scene’ of the war, although naturally Russell’s own despatches 
predominated. The work reflected the strong criticism which he had directed at the British 
military establishment, particularly the commander of British forces in the Crimea, Lord 
Raglan, to whose ‘ignorance, mismanagement, and apathy’ Russell attributed ‘so much of the 
sufferings and losses… of our troops’.20 
There was a strong financial incentive for publishers to produce serialised Military 
History. The use of first-hand accounts not only allowed the work to be quickly produced so 
that it appeared while public interest in the conflict was as its height, but it also enabled the 
re-use of material that had already been published. Moreover, while the purchase of a 
monthly 1/- issue was affordable for the customer in relation to the price of a book, which 
usually cost at least five times as much, if the complete history was purchased the publisher 
stood to take more money. For example, although Russell’s War cost 5/-, Routledge was able 
to charge a total of 13/- for Russell’s British Expedition to the Crimea which utilised 
essentially the same information.21 The release of single affordable instalments also allowed 
the publisher to undercut the circulating libraries, as they were cheap enough for a consumer 
to purchase outright, thus increasing the publisher’s sales.22 Furthermore, the inside covers of 
each issue also provided advertising space which the publisher could sell, and in Russell’s 
history notices appeared for silver cutlery and christening robes, suggesting that the publisher 
envisaged that the work would have a middle class readership.23  
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Several non-serialised histories also made use of eyewitness impressions sent from 
the Crimea so they could also be published while the public interest in the war was high.24 
For example, Henry Tyrrell’s History of the War with Russia, published by the London 
Printing and Publishing Company in 1855, was written whilst the war was on-going and so 
was subtitled ‘the present expedition against Russian aggression in the East’.25 Therefore, this 
history consisted largely of an uncritical synthesis of soldier’s letters and newspaper reports. 
Russell’s work was particularly prevalent and the account of the charge of the Light Brigade 
at the Battle of Balaclava which appeared was quoted verbatim from his report in The 
Times.26  
The next major military event which resulted in the publication of a significant 
amount of popular Military History was the Indian Mutiny, which began in May 1857. Given 
the suddenness of the outbreak there were few correspondents to relay information back to 
London. The introduction of ‘Gagging Act’ in June, which restricted the content of 
newspapers in India, and the isolated nature of the British garrisons, meant that there was 
little reliable information available on the conflict for the press to publish.27 Thus, publishers 
catered to the public’s demand for information by quickly producing a large quantity of work 
in which an individual narrated the part of the Mutiny they had encountered.28 Consequently, 
soon after the outbreak several historical works appeared which drew on eyewitness accounts 
to cover all of the Mutiny: the first volume of G.B. Malleson’s Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: 
An Historical Narrative was published in July 1857, Charles Ball’s History of the Indian 
                                                          
24 For example: George Brackenbury, Campaign in the Crimea; An Historical Sketch (London, 1855); Captain 
Spencer, Fall of the Crimea (London, 1855); Atwell Lake, Defence of Kars (London, 1857); and, Charles 
Duncan, Campaign with the Turks in Asia, 2 vols. (London, 1855). 
25 H. Tyrrell, History of the War with Russia, 3 vols. (London, 1854-5).  
26 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 318-36, 306, 228-30. 
27 Saul David, Indian Mutiny (London, 2002), p. 261. 
28 C.N. North, Journal of English Officer in India (London, 1858); J.W. Shepherd, A Personal Narrative of the 
Outbreak and Massacre at Cawnpore During the Sepoy Revolt (Lucknow, 1879); W. Russell, A Diary of the 
Sepoy Rebellion (London 1857); A. Case, Day by Day at Lucknow (London, 1858); Henry Knollys (ed.), 
Incident of the Sepoy War: Compiled from the Private Journals of the General Sir Hope Grant (London, 1874); 
and, Mowbray Thompson, Story of Cawnpore (London, 1859).  
208 
 
Mutiny appeared in 1858 and George Dodd’s History of the Indian Revolt in 1859.29 To catch 
the public’s interest in the conflict through quick publication, Ball and Dodd’s histories 
consisted largely of extended quotations from the first-hand accounts linked together by one 
or two sentences.30  
All of these histories overtly supported the idea of Empire and eulogised the 
benevolence of the British rule in India, indicating how it had ‘improved the lot of the 
Indians’.31 They emphasised the plight of the British civilians caught up in the uprising 
through explicit descriptions and illustrations of the mutilation and rape of Western women, 
presenting them as victims of native brutality.32 Some of the most lurid descriptions of Indian 
atrocities were in relation to the massacre at Cawnpore, in which around two hundred British 
women and children had been killed.33 Dodd and Ball repeated stories which related how 
savagely these women had been murdered and they claimed messages had been left exhorting 
British men to ‘avenge us’. They used these vivid descriptions of Indian atrocities not only to 
explain and excuse British counter-massacres, but to justify the commendation of the 
commanders, such as Brigadier-General J.G.S. Neill, who had committed them.34 Malleson’s 
history went even further: he used his work to condemn the government’s mishandling of the 
uprising and called for the ‘merciless’ hunting ‘down of every mutineer’, as ‘India will not be 
secure so long as a single [rebel] remains alive’.35 This attitude also appeared in a series of 
                                                          
29 [Malleson], Mutiny of the Bengal-Army; Charles Ball, History of the Indian Mutiny, 2 vols. (London, 1858); 
and, George Dodd, History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expedition of Persia, China, and Japan, 1856-7-8 
(London, 1859). 
30 Malleson’s first volume consisted of a history of the events leading up to the Mutiny, and so was not based on 
first-hand accounts of the outbreak, his second volume, which appeared in 1858, relied on them, however. 
Charles Ball, History of the Indian Mutiny, 1 Vol. (London, 1858), pp. 60, 64, 77, 86; Dodd, History of the 
Indian Revolt, pp. 52-5; and, [Malleson], Mutiny of the Bengal-Army, Vol. 2, p. 79.    
31 Ball, History of the Indian Mutiny, 1 Vol., p. 31; and, Dodd, History of the Indian Revolt, pp. 10-1.  
32 Hebert, War of No Pity, p. 146; [Malleson], Mutiny of the Bengal-Army, Vol. 1, p. 214; Ball, History of the 
Indian Mutiny, Vol. 1, pp. 60, 75, 106-8, 273; and, Dodd, History of the Indian Revolt, pp. 53, 144. 
33 Saul David, Indian Mutiny (London, 2002), p. 254. 
34 Dodd, History of the Indian Revolt, pp. 142-3, 446; and, Ball, History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. 1, pp. 97-8, 
377, 389, 391.  
35 [Malleson], Mutiny of the Bengal-Army, Vol. 1, p. 46. 
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biographical works, mainly written about Henry Havelock, published in the years following 
the Mutiny, which lionised his devout Christianity.36 
However, not all historical works produced immediately after the Mutiny demonised 
the natives, R.M. Martin’s Indian Empire and Henry Mead’s Sepoy Revolt, both published in 
1858, blamed the British misrule of India as the direct cause of the uprising.37 While these 
works presented the notion of the Empire in a positive light, they explained native grievances 
by highlighting the ‘ineffective administration of Justice’ and ‘exclusion of the natives from 
all share in the government’.38 While Martin acknowledged the viciousness of the massacre at 
Cawnpore, he pointed out that the 1st Native Infantry ‘hardened as it had become in mutiny, 
refused to take part in the savage butchery’, undermining the belief that the killings were a 
result of the native’s inherent cruelty. Similarly, he noted that there was no evidence that 
British women had been raped and that the messages supposedly left by those massacred 
were later forgeries. Martin also denounced British reprisals, illustrating in damning fashion 
that Neill’s policy of ‘unlimited hanging’ had actually spurred the mutineers to conduct the 
Cawnpore massacre.39  
Unlike the Crimean War, the public interest in the Indian Mutiny led to the production 
of numerous historical works long after the fighting ceased. Those which appeared in the 
1860s adopted an attitude toward native Indians that was between the positions held by the 
first histories. J. Cave-Browne’s Punjab and Delhi in 1857, published by Blackwood in 1861, 
did not shy away from referring to the brutality of attacks on British civilians, but like Martin 
he pointed out that there was no evidence that British women had suffered ‘indignities to 
                                                          
36 W.H. Aylen, Soldier and the Saint, or Two Heroes in One (London, 1858); J.C. Marshman, Memoirs of 
Major-General Sir H. Havelock (London, 1858); J.W. Sherer, Havelock’s March on Cawnpore (London, 1858); 
and, W.S.R. Hodson, Hodson of Hodson’s Horse: or Twelve Years of a Soldiers Life (London, 1859).  
37 R.M. Martin, Indian Empire: With a Full Account of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army (London, 1858-61); and, 
Henry Mead, Sepoy Revolt: Its Causes and its Consequences (London, 1858).  
38 Martin, Indian Empire, Vol. 2, pp. 2, 6, 8, 37, Vol. 1, p. 577; and, Mead, Sepoy Revolt, p. 253.   
39 Martin, Indian Empire, Vol. 2, pp. 262, 288, 300, 383. 
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embitter and aggravate their end’.40 While Neill was styled as the ‘bold saviour of Allahabad 
and avenger of Cawnpore’, Browne did not try to justify British reprisals; instead, he ignored 
them and assured the reader that ‘it must not be supposed that… justice was suspended for 
war’.41 Similarly, G.O. Trevelyan in Cawnpore, published by Macmillan in 1865, explained 
that one of the contributing factors which had led to the uprising was the lack of regard the 
British officer had for his native soldiers. He explained, ‘the sepoys were [called] 
“niggers”… that hateful word, which is now constantly on the tongue of all Anglo-Indians… 
in such an atmosphere how could mutual attachment exist, or mutual confidence?’ Still, 
Trevelyan held a low opinion of the ‘spoilt, flattered and idle’ natives in the Indian Army and 
claimed that their ‘insolence’ and ‘lust for power’ had combined with the uninterested British 
leadership to be the ‘effective causes of the outbreak’.42 
Despite the continued public interest in the Indian Mutiny, most British colonial 
conflicts fought between 1858 and the Sudan Campaign of 1884 had little Military History 
written about them. The reason for this was that during this time few officers produced work 
regarding a campaign they had taken part in as this was viewed unfavourably by the army and 
it was uncommon for many correspondents to accompanied British forces, so little 
information was available for the production of a history.43 As a result, the British expedition 
to Abyssinia led to just five accounts of the campaign, and the Red River Expedition of 1870 
to only one volume.44 The Zulu War saw only three histories produced. Major W. Ashe and 
Captain E.V.W. Edgell’s Story of the Zulu Campaign, published by Sampson Low in 1880, 
                                                          
40 J. Cave-Browne, Punjab and Delhi in 1857, Vol. 1 (London, 1861), p. 65.  
41 Ibid., p. xi; Vol. 2, p. 265. 
42 G.O. Trevelyan, Story of Cawnpore (London, 1865), pp. 14, 23, 27, 35-6.  
43 Brackenbury, Memories, p. 57.  
44 G.L. Huyshe, Red River Expedition (London, 1871), p. i. See Chapter 5 for Wolseley’s writing on this war in 
Blackwood’s Magazine. See also: Henry Hozier, British Expedition to Abyssinia (London, 1869); H. St. Clair 
Wilkins, Reconnoitring in Abyssinia (London, 1870); A.F. Shepherd, Campaign in Abyssinia (Bombay, 1868); 
H.M. Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala: The Story of Two British Campaigns in Africa (London, 1874); and, 
G.A. Henty, March to Magdala (London, 1868). Unlike Henty’s later work, March to Magdala was not fiction. 
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was uncritical of the conduct of the war.45 But both the anonymously written History of the 
Zulu War, produced by Chapman and Hall in 1880, and A. Wilmot’s work of the same title, 
published by Richard and Best, were both highly critical of the justification of war and Lord 
Chelmsford’s conduct.46 The First Boer War of 1881 merely occasioned two narratives of the 
conflict, both produced by civilians, as well as four first-hand accounts.47 Although historical 
work on the British invasion of Egypt later appeared alongside those depicting the Sudan 
campaign, prior to 1884 only a small amount of Military History was written about it.48 
More instant histories appeared regarding the Ashanti campaign of 1873 as not only 
did the several journalists who accompanied the expedition produce narratives of it, but on 
the orders of Wolseley, who had led the expedition, two additional accounts were written in 
an attempt to control how the reading public viewed his conduct during the campaign.49 To 
this end, Wolseley requested that Brackenbury, his assistant military secretary, should write 
‘an accurate account of the military operations, with other matter as will make it of general 
interest’.50 Gaining a large readership was central to Brackenbury’s task and so he felt that it 
was essential that his work should appear quickly, ‘before public interest in the war had dried 
out’. Thus he ‘worked with all [his] power’ for ‘twelve to fourteen hours a-day’, enabling 
                                                          
45 W. Ashe and E.V. Wyatt Edgell, Story of the Zulu Campaign (London, 1880), pp. 1, 66, vi, viii. 
46 ‘Colenso’, History of the Zulu War (London, 1880), pp. 7, 9, 18, 242, 490, 283, 301, 319, 314-5; and, A. 
Wilmot, History of the Zulu War (London, 1880), pp. 56, 203. 
47 C.L. Norris-Newman, With the Boers in the Transvaal (London, 1882); T.F. Carter, Narrative of the Boer 
War: Its Causes and Results (London, 1883); Lady Bellairs, Transvaal War, 1880-1 (London, 1885); H.C.W. 
Long, Peace and War in the Transvaal: An account of the Defence of Fort Mary (London, 1882); W.E. 
Montegue, Besieged in the Transvaal: The Defence of Standerton (London, 1881); and, W.H. Tomasson, With 
the Irregulars in the Transvaal and the Zululand (London, 1881). 
48 The few exceptions were related to the controversy surrounding Hamley and Wolseley. See, for example, E.B. 
Hamley, ‘Second Division at El-Tel-Kebir’, Nineteenth Century, 12 (Dec. 1882), pp. 861-70.  
49 Winwood Reade, Story of the Campaign in Ashantee (London, 1874); G.A. Henty, March to Coomassie 
(London, 1874); ‘Daily News Correspondent’ [J.F. Maurice], Ashantee War; H.M. Stanley, Coomassie: The 
Story of the Campaign in Africa, 1873-4 (London, 1874).  
50 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4300, ff. 206, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 23 November 1873. The work was 
not classed as an official history as it was not written with the approval of the Secretary of State for War, nor 
was it produced with public funds.  
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him to produce the two volume, 795-page account in six weeks.51 Despite these exertions, 
Brackenbury’s ‘unrestricted access to all official documents’ proved to be an inhibiting factor 
as he was ‘limited’ to the confines of this material and so could not ‘in any way [attempt] to 
compete in descriptive writing’ with the civilian accounts of the war.52 This made the account 
comparatively ‘dry’ reading, limiting its appeal, and in November 1874 Brackenbury was 
forced to admit that the limited sale of his work, entitled Ashanti War: A Narrative (1874), 
had caused it to be a commercial failure.53  
Given the lack of impact of Brackenbury’s history, Maurice, Wolseley’s private 
secretary during the campaign, wrote an anonymous account in which he hoped ‘to answer a 
number of questions [on the campaign] which everyone is still asking’.54 This work, entitled 
Ashantee War: A Popular Narrative, was much more overt in its attempts to influence the 
reading public’s understanding of the conflict than Brackenbury’s account had been. It 
condemned several newspapers for providing a platform for those who attacked the conduct 
of the war, especially the ‘imaginative friends’ of the Ashanti who presented them as 
‘virtuous’ victims of British aggression. Maurice also pointed out that this misinformation 
had directly influenced the Parliamentary debates on the justification for the war, as the 
information on which they were based did not come from an official document, but ‘an article 
… [from] one of the oldest of our magazines’.55 
                                                          
51 Brackenbury, Memories, pp. ix, 232; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4315, ff. 94, Brackenbury to Blackwood, 
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54 Luvaas, Education of an Army, p. 181; and, [Maurice], Ashantee War, p. iii. For evidence that the work was 
written by Maurice, see BL, Macmillan Papers, MS55075, ff. 33-36, Maurice to Macmillan, 1 October 1882. 
55 [Maurice], Ashantee War, pp. 2, 6-7, 14, 31-2, 25-8, 52-3, 21.  
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Although British campaigns in Asia after 1854, with the exception of the Indian 
Mutiny, received little attention from military historians, the coverage of the Second Anglo-
Afghan War, like that of the Ashanti War, was influenced by the desire of a British 
commander to have his actions portrayed in a positive light.56 When The Times correspondent 
Maurice MacPherson accused Lord Roberts, the leader of the Kabul Field Force, of cruelty 
and incompetence he was removed from his position and Major George White, Roberts’ own 
aid-de-camp, replaced him.57 Roberts closely controlled the press coverage of the campaign, 
feeding information to the only remaining civilian journalist with the force, Howard 
Hensman, special correspondent for the Daily News and Pioneer. 58  Thus, Hensman’s 
narrative of the campaign, Afghan War of 1879-1880, published by W.H. Allen in 1881, 
displayed a very positive view of Roberts.59  The only other accounts of this war which 
appeared before 1884 were written by officers, several of whom had served under Roberts, 
and they too eulogised British conduct during the campaign.60  
Conflicts in which no British forces took part resulted in few historical accounts 
during this time. British publishers were dissuaded from producing work on the American 
Civil War as they would be competing with work published in the United States, so only a 
limited number of first-hand accounts and a single history of this war were written. 61 
                                                          
56 For instance, the Lushai Expedition of 1871-2 to rescue British subjects captured during raids into Assam, and 
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Moreover, at this time the copyright protection for foreign books in the United States was 
notoriously flawed; volumes with a demand in the country were often pirated and produced in 
cheap editions by American printers, further undermining the financial incentive for a British 
publisher to produce work on this war.62 It is telling that the only complete history of the 
conflict produced by a British writer, H.C. Fletcher’s History of the American War, published 
by Richard Bentley in 1865, was written by a man who had travelled in the country during 
the conflict and so embodied a rare perspective which gave the work more of an appeal to a 
British audience than if it had been written by an American.63  
Similarly, despite the scale and the significance of the Seven Weeks War, the Franco-
Prussian War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, and the fact there were few first-hand 
accounts of these conflicts in English, only a limited number of popular histories were 
produced.64 H.M. Hozier, who acted as a correspondent for The Times during these conflicts 
drew on his reports to produce serialised histories of each conflict. 65  Due to a lack of 
information, each account focused on details of military organisation, described battles in a 
dispassionate manner and a large part of his history of the Franco-Prussian War was devoted 
purely to a description of the Rhine Valley.66 Although Edmund Ollier, who wrote serialised 
histories of the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish War for the publisher Cassell, also 
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Edward Hamley, ‘by a former pupil’. Hozier, Franco-Prussian War, Vol. 1, pp. 297, 419, Vol. 2, pp. 297-417. 
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suffered from a lack of information caused by the desire to produce works quickly, his 
writing was considerably more ‘popular’ in style. In both works he dispensed with a long 
explanation of the causes of the war, so that in the case of his history of the Franco-Prussian 
War by page twenty-three he had already moved on to a description of the fighting.67  
Besides the desire to catch the reading public’s interest in a conflict while it was at its 
height, it is likely that the reason why most popular Military History produced during this 
period referred to contemporary events was that a general lack of historical knowledge 
undermined interest in work on older campaigns. Military History was not taught at public 
schools, while in schools for poorer children the teaching of History, let alone Military 
History, occupied a low priority as most time was devoted to the teaching of basic reading, 
writing, and arithmetic. 68  The popular Military History which referred to earlier epochs 
focused on events which could be understood out of historical context or with little 
explanation. Consequently, works which provided lists of major battles continued to be 
produced: Creasy’s Decisive Battles went through a further nineteen editions between 1854 
and 1874, and MacFarlane’s Great Battles of the British Army, first published in 1833, was 
updated to include fighting which had taken place during the Indian Mutiny and Crimean 
War.69 The commercial success of these books led to the publication of W.F. William’s 
serialised England’s Battles by Sea and Land by the London Printing and Publishing 
Company in 1854 and also W. Robson’s Great Sieges of History, which appeared the 
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following year.70 Similarly, as during the 1850s and 1860s, while the number of remaining 
veterans of the Napoleonic wars steadily declined, the production of their memoirs continued 
to be popular during this period and Longman included Gleig’s Veterans of the Chelsea 
Hospital, a compilation of old soldiers’ experiences during this conflict, in their collections of 
cheap books sold at railway stations.71 
The production of Military History underwent a further expansion and diversification 
during this period as it began to appear in the cheap monthly magazines aimed at a middle-
class readership which began to be published following both the abolition of the paper duty 
and the tax on advertisements by 1861.72 Although during this time the subject did not appear 
in the majority of these publications, it appeared prominently in Temple Bar, which was first 
published in 1860 and had a monthly circulation of around 13,000 copies. 73  While the 
periodical had featured some Military History in the early 1860s, more appeared after 1870 
when chapters from Creasy’s Decisive Battles were published in the August and October 
issues.74 Following the apparent success of this venture, between 1870 and 1875 articles on 
Napoleon’s campaigns, written by William O’Connor Morris, appeared regularly.75 The other 
periodical at this time which contained Military History was Cornhill Magazine, which could 
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be purchased for 1/- and commanded a circulation of around 80,000 a month. 76  When 
William Thackeray left the editor’s position in 1864 the publication began to include Military 
History related to a wide range of conflicts, including the Crimean War and the Napoleonic 
Wars.77 
Similarly, in the mid-1850s a new type of periodical aimed at middle-class children 
emerged as publishers decided to combine education with instruction.78 While the majority of 
these publications contained almost no Military History, several contained large numbers of 
pieces on the subject. Such a publication, Boy’s Own Magazine, owned by Samuel Beeton, 
began publication as a monthly periodical which cost 2.d. in 1855 and contained long running 
series on the British conquest of India and biographical pieces on famous generals. 79 
Likewise, Young Englishman’s Journal, which was launched by William Emmett in April 
1867, contained a large quantity of Military History and it featured articles on weapons, 
military biography, famous battles, and fiction set in historical situations.80 In sharp contrast 
to the Military History which would appear in boy’s literature later in the nineteenth century, 
that which appeared in these publications contained anti-war elements and often portrayed 
army life in negative terms. For example, in September 1855 Boy’s Own Magazine, contained 
an eyewitness description of a Napoleonic era field hospital in which the ‘last agonies’ of the 
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wounded soldiers were described and the reader was exhorted to ‘not believe in the glory of 
war… let us have no fighting for fighting’s sake’.81 Equally, in a story set during the Crimean 
War in Young Englishman’s Journal, British soldiers were portrayed as cruel, selfish and 
violent men who were ultimately abandoned by the army to be left begging on the streets.82  
During the period between 1854 and 1884, there were several significant 
developments in the writing of popular Military History. The public interest in the Crimean 
War and the Indian Mutiny, combined with the new speed with which first-hand information 
could be available, not only caused the production of an unprecedented level of this type of 
work, but also led to the publication of serialised histories. Similarly, work which was 
intended to enhance the reputation of military figures appeared; and, Military History also 
began to appear in both children’s periodicals and in new, cheap, literary journals. While the 
limited level of literacy at this time curtailed the further growth of popular Military History, 
by the mid-1880s the numbers of those able to read in Britain had greatly increased. This was 
to have an important effect on how this form of Military History subsequently developed.  
 
II. Consolidation of Popular Military History, 1884-1899  
Between 1876 and 1880 primary school attendance became compulsory as a result of the 
Forster Education Act of 1870. This, combined with the Balfour Act of 1902, which led to a 
rapid increase in the number of secondary schools, drove up the level of literacy in Britain 
from around sixty per cent in 1851 to ninety-six per cent by 1914.83 As the population of 
Britain grew from 17.9 million in 1850 to 45 million in 1901, this created a dramatically 
expanded reading public by the mid-1880s which was further supplemented by the growth of 
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82 Anon., ‘Captain Jack: Or one of the Light Brigade’, Young Englishman’s Journal, 3 (9 May 1868), p. 18; and, 
Anon., ‘Captain Jack: Or one of the Light Brigade’, Young Englishman’s Journal, 3 (4 July 1868), pp. 145-7. 
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the colonial book market during this time.84 These changes allowed the development of the 
cheap popular press in the 1870s and 1880s, which, as it became ever more imperialist and 
jingoistic, increasingly covered Britain’s colonial campaigns, and caused greater public 
awareness of them.85 Although the short campaign to invade Egypt in 1882 received some 
newspaper coverage, it was the attempt to relieve Gordon at Khartoum in 1884-5 which 
became the first British colonial campaign to be extensively covered in the new, cheap, daily 
press.86  
As Gordon was so central to the conduct of the campaign, and was already a popular 
hero following his exploits in China with the so-called ‘Ever Victorious Army’ (1860-2), the 
publication of biographical work about him became financially rewarding as publishers could 
now market work to the new and expanding reading public.87 Thus, the publisher Thomas 
Longman offered £5,000 to Gordon’s brother in an effort to secure the rights to the General’s 
‘Last Journals’ sent from Khartoum. However, when he was outbid by Kegan Paul, who 
offered 5,000 guineas, Longman angrily noted that ‘it was those damned shillings’ that had 
lost him such a lucrative opportunity.88 In an attempt to meet the reading public’s demand for 
such work a large number of biographical books and articles which dealt with Gordon 
appeared.89 These works elevated the general to the status of a ‘Christian Hero’ and the 
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‘Youngest of the Saints’ for his role fighting against a ‘savage’ Islamic uprising that actively 
supported the slave trade.90  
The demand for work on this campaign led to the production of a large number of 
historical accounts including, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, which consisted of 
thirty parts which appeared soon after the end of the war costing 1/- each.91 Like earlier 
serialised histories, it consisted mainly of collated first-hand accounts and official 
despatches.92 The work, written by James Grant, reflected an increasingly nationalistic and 
sensationalist approach. It lauded British ‘pluck’, did not feature any criticism of British 
operations and featured a graphic description of Gordon’s death, including details that were 
impossible for the author to have known.93 Moreover, several articles dealing with the history 
of the campaign appeared in the popular periodical press, particularly in Blackwood’s 
Magazine; which, although it had been an established high-brow journal, was increasingly 
identified as a low-brow colonial and military interest publication as the older generation of 
contributors had ceased to produce work in the 1880s.94  
The re-conquest of the Sudan, which took place between 1896 and 1899, also resulted 
in a large quantity of press coverage which quickly translated into a significant number of 
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historical narratives of the campaign.95 Such an account by a journalist, who was present for 
much of the fighting, was G.W. Steevens’ With Kitchener to Khartum, which was published 
by Blackwood in 1898. Since the speed of production was perceived to be all important, 
Steevens felt that the work ‘should be worth £200, if it is published before… any other,’ so 
he cabled chapters from the Sudan as the campaign came to a conclusion.96 When the account 
was published in September 1898, shortly after the Battle of Omdurman, it was the first on 
the campaign to appear and so, given the public interest in the events of the re-conquest, it 
sold 44,362 copies in the remaining months of 1898 alone.97 So great was the demand for the 
work that it soon outstripped supply and it was ‘impossible’ to obtain copies in London by 7 
October 1898.98 In part, this was due to the development of the colonial book market as many 
copies were sold in India during this time and in April 1899, Steevens reported that his book 
was ‘everywhere’ in the country.99 As Steevens had suspected, however, the value of the 
work was closely related to the public interest in the war, and so sales soon dropped off 
dramatically. In 1899 Blackwoods sold 10,540 copies, mostly in the first months of the year, 
whereas in 1900 and 1901 respectively, only 3,242 and 1,514 copies were sold.100  
This rising demand for Military History, particularly from the Indian book market, led 
to an increase in the production of work related to conflict in that region. Thus, the Chitral 
Campaign of 1895, the campaign to relieve the siege of Malakand in 1897 and the Tirah 
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expedition of 1898, all relatively minor undertakings, resulted in a considerable number of 
books and journal articles.101 A particularly notable example of such work was Winston 
Churchill’s Story of the Malakand Field Force, which met with good sales in India.102 The 
Indian book market also caused the continued production of work related to the Indian 
Mutiny, and Trevelyan’s Cawnpore was printed in a cheap edition and was added to 
Macmillan’s ‘Colonial Library’ in 1894.103  
In contrast, with the exception of the Napoleonic Wars, few campaign narratives were 
written about other British conflicts which had not recently occurred, suggesting that the 
popularity of instant history was closely associated with its ability to give the reader an 
understanding of contemporary events.104 Nevertheless, work which allowed the reader to get 
straight to the action and to understand events on some level without the need to fully grasp 
their historical context also remained popular. Thus, Creasy’s Fifteen Decisive Battles went 
through a further thirteen editions between 1874 and 1894 and it became the ‘inevitable 
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prize-book of the school-boy’ in the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s.105 Given its continued success, 
this work was joined by others which followed a similar formula, including Malleson’s 
Decisive Battles of India, published by W.H. Allen in 1883, and Thomas W. Knox’s Decisive 
Battles since Waterloo, which was published by G.P. Putnam and Sons in 1887.106 Similarly, 
articles which gave an account of a single battle also appeared regularly in the popular 
periodical press during the late 1890s.107 Cornhill Magazine featured a series entitled ‘Fights 
for the Flag’ written by W.H. Fitchett, which related the history of key engagements from 
Britain’s past.108 In response to this, Macmillan’s Magazine produced a series of articles on 
the history of British Army by J.W. Fortescue between 1894 and 1897.109 
However, what set the writing about the campaigns in the Sudan apart from earlier 
historical work was the extent to which an emphasis placed on the notion of British 
superiority, thought to be underpinned by a racial primacy. Such an emphasis focused on the 
supposed superiority of British civilisation in comparison to that of the natives encountered 
and so was used to justify Imperialism. For example, Reginald Wingate, head of the 
Intelligence Branch of the British-controlled Egyptian Army, wrote a historical account of the 
rise of the Dervish, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, in an attempt to use the popularity of 
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Military History to create support for the re-conquest of the region. 110  To this end, he 
contrasted the civilisation and progress which he thought the British had brought to Egypt, 
with the destruction of the Mahdists, who he presented as fanatical, bloodthirsty, debauched 
savages, had brought to the Sudan.111 Also in an effort to create support for the re-conquest of 
the region Wingate co-wrote the memoirs of European escapees from Khartoum, Slatin Pasha 
and Father Ohrwalder, which further demonised the Dervish.112 
Likewise, in the works on the Sudan Campaigns, British officers were presented as on 
‘the pinnacle of civilisation’; thus they were naturally intelligent and brave in action, whereas 
the ‘black [was] a perennial schoolboy, without the schooling’. Equally, as the British had 
undertaken the reformation of the Egyptian Army following the invasion of this country in 
1882, its transformation into an effective fighting force was held as a confirmation of the 
Imperial ideal as close contact with the British was thought to have turned the natives into ‘a 
mirror of soldierly virtue’.113 Consequently, Alfred Milner and Evelyn Baring, writing in 
1893 and 1908 respectively, both used the historical example of the Egyptian Army in their 
writing to further their arguments for Imperialism.114  
An emphasis on the superiority of the personality traits of British martial figures also 
appeared in biographical work, the publication of which became more prevalent after the 
commercial success of work on General Gordon.115 In 1889 Macmillan began a collection of 
cheap biographical volumes, known as the ‘Men of Action Series’, with W. Butler’s General 
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Gordon.116 Each work gave a simple and uncritical account of the life of the subject, which 
reflected the increasing nationalism and militarism of the period, through an emphasis on 
personal characteristics, such as bravery and the ability to remain calm in a crisis, which were 
thought to be particularly British qualities.117 Likewise, the publisher George Newnes began 
the ‘Army and Navy Library: Stories of our National Heroes’ series in 1898 with Arthur 
Griffith’s heavily illustrated Wellington and Waterloo, which also emphasised the general’s 
personal characteristics, which were identified as typically British.118 
While much of the literature aimed at boys, such as the Religious Tract Society’s 
Boy’s Own Paper, contained little Military History, or gave an anti-war slant to their stories 
prior to the mid-1880s, this began to change as works increasingly reflected the increasing 
militarism and Imperialism of the period.119 In 1892 Cassell first published Chums, which 
contained considerably more Military History than its competitors.120 Not only did the paper 
contain a large number of features on the history of wars and British regiments, it also 
featured biographical work, interviews with military figures concerning their past service, 
especially regarding the award of medals. The close association between patriotism and the 
army in the Military History which featured in this publication was made especially apparent 
in the double issue produced for the Queen’s diamond jubilee in June 1897, in which the free 
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‘Commemoration Supplement’ consisted of ‘an interesting pictorial… record of the most 
brilliant battles of the Queen’s reign’.121 
The boys literature market was dramatically shaken up by the appearance of Alfred 
Harmsworth’s Half-Penny Marvel in 1893. As the publisher claimed that this periodical was 
an attempt to subvert the ‘penny-dreadful’ with more wholesome reading, it aimed to 
undercut the standard price of serials for children. While Boy’s Own Paper and Chums 
continued publication, such financial competition eliminated most of Harmsworth’s rivals, so 
he was soon able to diversify with new titles. One such publication was Pluck, which first 
appeared in 1894 and also sold for ½ d. The editor of this periodical hoped to ‘strike a 
decisive blow at penny-dreadful-ism’, with ‘volume after volume’ of stories which celebrated 
‘such men as Lord Wolseley, Colonel [Frederick] Burnaby, Lord Roberts [and other] plucky 
Britons who have helped to make the British Empire’.122 Thus, the serial was filled with 
jingoistic stories, usually set around a campaign that had been fought in the Empire, which 
interwove genuine events from military history with fictional incidents which portrayed 
British men to be inherently superior to the natives they encountered.123 Although he did not 
write for Pluck, by far the most prolific writer of this type of work was G.A. Henty, who, 
beginning in 1868, but with increasing frequency after 1884, produced tales set mainly in 
British military history which were jingoistic and were full of examples of the supposed 
superiority of the British hero over the native peoples he encountered.124 
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The role which Military History could play in creating a more nationalistic 
understanding of British identity and a greater comprehension of the Empire was not lost on 
the fervent nationalist, T.M. Maguire.125 On a visit to a school in a poor London district he 
was dismayed to find that ‘not one boy had… been taught one word of history’, and so ‘they 
never had been taught anything about… Nelson, or Wellington, or our Army in Europe or 
Asia’. So alarmed was Maguire at this that he gave a paper at the RUSI in May 1897, entitled 
‘The National Study of Military History’, in which he argued that not only would the 
compulsory study of the subject ‘fill… young souls with patriotism’, but it would teach these 
‘future voters’ who controlled the ‘dearest interests of 400,000,000 of the human race’ what 
‘the word Empire means’.126  
Despite Maguire’s concern, an increasing quantity of Military History had begun to 
appear in school textbooks from the mid-1880s, mainly in the form of the celebration of 
‘British’ personality traits in those noted for their martial prowess, or who were associated 
with a major conflict. 127  While Cassell’s Stories for Children for Standard III of 1882 
focused on Alfred the Great, the Duke of Marlborough, Nelson and Wellington, other works, 
such as C.M. Yonge’s Westminster Reading Books and J.C. Curtis’ Elements of the History of 
England, championed Gordon and Havelock.128 The Empire in India was not neglected and 
short accounts of Clive’s action at Plassey and Wellington’s battle of Assaye were included 
in J. Franck Bright’s English History for the Use of Public Schools.129 However, besides the 
discussion of some martial figures in these works, their emphasis remained on the 
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development of the British constitution, so military events continued to play a secondary role 
in the explanation of the nation’s history at this time.130 Moreover, the curriculum of most 
public schools remained centred around the study of classics, and Military History was 
neglected during this time.131  
Besides the teaching of Military History to children, Maguire also called for a greater 
knowledge of the subject among politicians and the electorate, which had tripled between 
1867 and 1884.132 As Maguire felt that the ‘most fatal evils of democratic politics are cant 
and hysteria’, as well as the ‘arbitration craze’, he felt that the future of the country depended 
on the widespread ‘national study of Military History’ which would bring the public to the 
realisation that ‘the strong man armed is the determining factor, whether domestic order, 
social decency, or international comity be at issue’.133 Maurice also shared a similar view 
regarding the historical knowledge of politicians, so when he was asked in 1881 by the 
Adjutant General, Charles Ellice, to write a pamphlet to provide historical examples to assist 
the Farrer Committee, formed to consider the construction of a channel tunnel, he was keen 
to oblige. To this end, he wrote Hostilities without Declaration in 1883, which argued that as 
many nations had been attacked in the past without warning, the creation of a channel tunnel 
would seriously undermine Britain’s defences as it could be seized by an enemy force in a 
surprise attack and used to invade the country.134  
The writer who most frequently used the popularity of Military History in an effort to 
influence the reading public’s understanding of military matters was Spenser Wilkinson. 
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From 1892 Wilkinson increased the number of articles he wrote on martial topics which 
included reference to military history in the Spectator, Contemporary Review, Nineteenth 
Century, New Review and National Review.135 In these articles, Wilkinson intended to appeal 
‘to the educated public in general’, especially with regards to the ‘way in which… naval and 
military operations [are] connected with each other’; he also introduced this readership to the 
writing of Clausewitz, who he termed ‘the best of all writers on war’.136 Likewise, Wilkinson 
argued for the use of Military History in the education of politicians, as he felt that the subject 
had clearly demonstrated that war was principally ‘a political act’, and so ‘just as the ultimate 
value of all History is to give us political teaching for our future conduct… the true value of 
Military History is to enable the nation… to bear itself in the future’.137  
In 1890 Wilkinson wrote a short pamphlet entitled Brain of an Army: A Popular 
Account of the German General Staff which was published by Constable. This was intended 
to provide a detailed description of this system ‘at work in war [during] the campaign of 
1866’, and to exemplify ‘some of the relations between strategy and policy’ for both the 
reading public and the Hartingdon Commission, then sitting to investigate the reformation of 
the War Office, since he felt neither understood these topics.138 While Wilkinson later told 
Roberts that almost all of those who read the work ‘assumed that my purpose was to advocate 
the German plan for England’, in fact his intention was to ‘distinguish between its essentials 
and its local temporary and personal peculiarities’, so to provide ‘a warning against overhasty 
imitation’ which he hoped would lead to the creation of a system designed uniquely for the 
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British case.139 However, as the work was published on 11 February, the day on which 
Hartington’s report was signed, it ultimately appeared too late to have any direct bearing on 
proceedings.140 Wilkinson was ‘bitterly disappointed’ by the findings of the Commission ‘for 
it recommended the creation, under the name of a general staff, of a department bearing little 
resemblance to the model which it professed to copy’, seeming ‘to justify the apprehension 
which caused [him] to write’.141 Despite this, the work was well received by both Moltke and 
Roberts. Wilkinson took their praise as ‘the highest reward which amateur students of war 
can look for’.142   
Although no major British war was fought between 1884 and 1899, the quantity of 
Military History produced during this time dramatically increased due to the financial 
incentive for publishers created by the growth of the reading public’s interest in British 
colonial conflicts. As a result, popular Military History emerged a key element in writing on 
military matters. Following the Boer declaration of war in December 1899, Britain found 
itself involved in the largest conflict it had fought since the Crimean War and the Indian 
Mutiny. The unprecedented public interest in this war, combined with developments in 
printing technology, as well as the poor performance of the British Army, had a major effect 
on the popular Military History which appeared on this conflict.   
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III. Popular Military History and the Second Boer War, 1899-1902  
As with previous wars fought since 1854, the Second Boer War quickly generated narrative 
accounts written by eyewitnesses. However, the sheer quantity of this type of work far 
outstripped that which had been produced previously, reflecting not only the scale of the war 
but also the level of interest among the reading public. Some of the first volumes to appear 
were written by correspondents as they were usually based on the despatches sent to their 
respective newspapers. 143  There was an unprecedented number of accounts produced by 
officers which described either their part in the war or provided a largely uncritical account of 
the activities undertaken by their unit.144 A good example of both of these types of work were 
the two volumes produced by the army officer and correspondent for the Morning Post, 
Winston Churchill, entitled London to Ladysmith via Pretoria and Ian Hamilton’s March.145 
Both volumes, which were based on his despatches sent to the newspaper, appeared in 1900 
as he had been ‘shrewdly advised to seize an hour while the attention of the world is fixed on 
South Africa’ to publish them.146 This approach paid off and within a few months London to 
Ladysmith had sold 11,000 copies and earned him £720.147 As Churchill had expected, the 
sale of the work soon rapidly declined as the reading public lost interest in the war; in 
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November 1903 London to Ladysmith and Ian Hamilton’s March only sold eighty-six and 
136 copies respectively.148  
While the majority of the first-hand accounts produced about the Second Boer War 
were little different in style to those which had appeared on earlier conflicts, after 1900 new 
types of work began to appear. In 1901 Blackwood published Words by an Eyewitness: The 
Struggle in Natal, which consisted of a series of articles which had appeared in Blackwood’s 
Magazine written by M.H. Grant under the pseudonym ‘Linesman’.149 Instead of providing a 
simple account of the campaign, the work focused on an attempt to articulate ‘the human side 
of… war’ through an explanation of the emotions felt by the author during the events he 
experienced. 150  The work proved to be highly successful, going through eleven editions 
within a year, and it entered into a cheap ‘people’s edition’ which cost 6.d. instead of the 6/- 
of the original as Grant felt that there would continue to be ‘a large market for [the book]… 
in the colonies… and among the lower-middle class’ in England.151 Similarly, Blackwood 
also published On the Heels of De Wet in November 1902, a first-hand account of British 
attempts to locate Boer guerrilla forces written by The Times correspondent Lionel James 
under the pen-name ‘Intelligence Officer’. 152  To retain his anonymity the author was 
deliberately vague regarding the exact locations featured in the work and instead focused on 
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providing an impression of what it was like to take part in these operations.153 Although it did 
not sell as well as Words from an Eyewitness, a cheap colonial edition, which sold at 6.d., 
was produced in April 1903.154 Both of these works sold well in South Africa, as there was a 
‘considerable demand for war books at the railway bookstalls’ in the country. 155  Grant 
maintained that this demand was largely due to the British forces in the region, commenting 
that when it came to popular works, ‘the British Army is a much more of a reading society 
than most people have any idea of’.156  
This war also saw the production of an unprecedented number of serialised histories, 
the majority of which began publication in 1900. 157  Given the advances in printing 
technology, it was now possible to produce each issue of these works more cheaply and faster 
than previously.158 For example, instalments of Richard Dane’s Cassell’s History of the Boer 
War and W.H. Wilson’s With the Flag to Pretoria: A History of the Boer War appeared 
fortnightly, costing only 6.d.159 With the Flag to Pretoria, which after thirty instalments 
changed its title to After Pretoria: The Guerrilla War and ran for another forty-one issues, 
was published by the Amalgamated Press, the owners of the Daily Mail and Pluck, and 
embodied the increasing commercialisation of serialised Military History.160 To make the 
work stand out from its competitors, the front cover of each issue contained either a large 
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dramatic image depicting the fighting or the portrait of a famous British commander.161 
Moreover, the emphasis on the maximisation of sales also directly influenced the way in 
which the war was narrated. For instance, as the public had shown great interest in the siege 
of Mafeking an entire special issue was devoted to it, which contained ‘a new and excellent 
portrait of Major Baden-Powell’, the commander of the town, even though, by the work’s 
own admissions, this siege was largely unimportant in terms of the course of the war.162 
Just as With the Flag to Pretoria demonstrated the new speed and low cost of 
production which were now possible, the ‘Graphic’ History of the South African War 1899-
1900, written by Wentworth Huyshe, exhibited how easy and cheap the reproduction of 
photographs and other images in print had become.163 The selling point of this History was 
the quantity and quality of the images in the work; it included large photographs and 
drawings of the fighting, as well as pictures of British generals, including a poster of Baden-
Powell. The historical content the work was, though, superficial in the extreme. For instance, 
the causes of the ‘squabble’ were explained in less than half a page and the account of the 
battle of Elandslaagte consisted of only one paragraph. The work was also jingoistic; it 
focused on the bravery of British soldiers, especially those who had won the Victoria Cross, 
and was largely uncritical of British commanders.164 
The ‘Graphic’ History of the South African War was not alone in providing a 
nationalistic account of the conflict. The growing nationalism in the years prior to the 
outbreak of the Second Boer War led to the production of numerous superficial histories 
which attempted to meet the public’s demand for work which explained the cause of the war 
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and provided an overview of the operations.165 For example, Louis Creswick’s South Africa 
and the Tranvaal War, published in 1900-1, consistently portrayed the Boers in the worst 
possible light and did not give a complete account of the fighting as it was published before 
the end of the war.166 Similarly, F.T. Stevens’ Complete History of the South African War, 
which appeared ‘immediately on the termination of hostilities’, focused on ‘showing the daily 
development of events over the whole area of the war’ with the intention of providing a 
‘cheap, single, popular volume’ for the ordinary citizen. Like Creswick’s, this work 
uncritically repeated the British government’s justification for the war, emphasised how 
badly the Boers treated the native population and claimed that they had ‘over and over again’ 
shown a white flag to British soldiers only to open fire as they came to accept the 
surrender.167 
Just as earlier biographical works produced after 1884 celebrated what were seen as 
positive characteristics thought to be typically British, much of the historical literature 
produced on the Second Boer War eulogised Baden-Powell in a similar way for his conduct 
during the defence of the town of Mafeking; and he was the subject of numerous 
biographies.168 While earlier work on Gordon and Havelock had focused on extolling their 
Christianity, this was largely absent from that on Baden-Powell and instead there was an 
emphasis on how he embodied personality traits held in high regard, particularly bravery, 
which made him ‘typical of the British officer at his best’.169 This lionisation of Baden-
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Powell led to the publication of numerous accounts of the siege of Mafeking, which often 
amounted to little more than further biographies of him. Even though the town itself was ‘of 
no substantial [material] importance to either side’, it resulted in as many historical narratives 
as did the siege of Ladysmith, a lengthy, pivotal engagement.170 
Baden-Powell was not the only figure to be quickly idolised in multiple biographies 
for his role in this war. In Lord Roberts, who on 23 December 1899 had assumed overall 
command of British forces in South Africa, writers found another powerful subject.171 While 
all the biographical work on Roberts was superficial and uncritical, works on other figures 
were more complex as they were written in an attempt to exonerate officers who had suffered 
serious and embarrassing defeats by the Boers.172 The other feature of biographical work 
produced regarding this conflict was that for the first time a large number of books which 
consisted of collections of letters sent from the front by officers and soldiers who were later 
killed began to be published by their families as a form of commemoration.173 
Despite the uncritical and jingoistic tone of much of the popular Military History 
written on the Second Boer War, for the first time since the Crimean War a large body of 
work appeared which was directly critical of British military leadership. For example, 
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although Foster Cunliffe’s History of the Boer War only treated the conflict up until the 
capture of Bloemfontein in March 1900, it was on occasion critical of British commanders, 
particularly Kitchener for his handling of the battle of Paardeburg.174 Similarly, Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s Great Boer War, which was first published by Smith and Elder in 1900, was 
particularly critical of the leadership provided by high-ranking British officers. The work, 
which was based on the information he had derived from the wounded British soldiers he met 
as he worked at Langford hospital in South Africa, criticised the lack of ‘care and foresight’ 
of British commanders and noted that ‘there may be a science of war in the lecture room at 
Camberley, but very little of it found its way to the veldt’.175 Although such criticism resulted 
in a response from F.N. Maude, writing in Cornhill Magazine, in which he argued that 
civilians were not competent to engage in analysis of current military operations, the work 
sold well and within a few months of its publication it had sold 12,500 copies so quickly that 
the publisher was unable to ‘print it fast enough’.176 By January 1901 the History had sold 
30,000 copies in England, 9,000 in the colonies and ‘over 50,000 altogether’.177  
Although in many respects With the Flag to Pretoria embodied many elements of the 
superficial histories produced on the war because it celebrated the bravery of British soldiers, 
gave romanticised descriptions of the fighting, excused British military blunders and 
demonised the Boers, it also used Military History as a medium to communicate messages 
regarding national defence matters as Wilkinson and Maurice had done previously.178 Instead 
of downplaying the number of casualties Britain sustained, the book emphasised them, even 
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containing images of women receiving the ‘fatal telegram’ informing them that their relative 
had been killed.179 This focus on the cost of a war fought with modern weapons was intended 
to underscore the result of the Empire’s lack of preparation and readiness for the war. The 
work called for ‘a higher standard of duty in England’ and a greater ‘solidarity’ in the 
Empire, which it hoped would cause politicians to ready the country for future conflict since 
‘mistakes of generals in the field kill hundreds, [whereas] the ignorance of ministers in the 
Cabinet slays thousands’.180 
Similarly, the Times History of the War in South Africa also drew on the popularity of 
Military History in an attempt to create both public pressure for military reform and to make 
a profit. Initially, the work began as a suggestion in January 1900 by Leo Amery, The Times 
colonial editor, that the despatches sent by his correspondents regarding the war should be 
‘strung together in a chronological string connected by a few paragraphs’, so to quickly and 
cheaply create ‘one or two volumes’ which could be put on sale in October 1900 for ‘perhaps 
2/-’ with the hope of making money.181 Both Sampson Low and Macmillan approached Bell 
with ‘anxious’ proposals that they should publish this work, and he entered into an agreement 
with the former in early March in which they were to be awarded a quarter of any profit 
made, with the rest retained by the Times.182 Soon after his appointment as editor of this 
work, Amery changed his conception of it and suggested to Bell in February 1900 that, 
instead, he should take until the end of the year to create a longer ‘solid history of the war’ 
which could ‘illustrate [its] essential lessons’ and could ‘try and help toward the solution of 
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our past mistakes’.183 Bell agreed to this widening of the scope of the project, noting that ‘the 
more volumes, the more the profit’.184  
The decision to produce a longer more critical work ultimately created a conflict 
between Bell, who saw the History as primarily a way to make money for The Times, which 
was currently encountering financial problems, and Amery, who instead intended to create a 
comprehensive analytical account of the war.185 Initially, this disagreement manifested itself 
in the content of the first volume. Amery insisted that it should serve as an introduction to the 
account of the fighting which would begin in the second volume, but Bell, eager to ensure the 
initial instalment was purchased in large numbers, as ‘those who buy [it] will in all 
probability feel bound to buy the others’, pointed out that ‘we can hardly advertise a history 
of the war… which does not deal with the war’.186 Although Bell was unsuccessful in getting 
Amery to amend the first volume, he persisted in suggesting ways in which the work could be 
made more attractive to the reading public, including the suggestion that Baden-Powell 
should write the portion of the work on Mafeking.187  
The most persistent and intractable disagreement created by the conflict over the 
work’s function concerned the length of time it took to produce the work as Bell initially 
envisaged that a large part would be complete ‘by early October [1900]’, with the second 
volume out before July.188 Moreover, Bell placed more pressure on Amery to complete the 
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work as from June 1900 he introduced a scheme in which on the advanced payment of £2.2 a 
subscriber would receive each of the five proposed volumes by May 1901.189  Since the 
subscription price was set for five volumes, if only four were produced the public would ‘feel 
swindled’, but if they were to produce six Bell noted they would have ‘swindled’ 
themselves.190 Even though Amery was assisted in the writing of the work by several Times 
correspondents, including Repington and James, and the third and fourth volumes were edited 
by Erskine Childers and Basil Williams respectively, his desire to produce a comprehensive 
history led to the time in which it took to produce each volume wildly exceeding that 
expected. While volume one appeared in 1900, the second took a further two years to 
produce, the third volume was not published until 1905, and, ultimately, the history ran into 
seven volumes, the last of which appeared in 1909.191 Unsurprising, the subscribers soon 
began to become unhappy with the delays in publication and by August 1901 Bell reported 
that letters from them were ‘now averaging eight per day and they are getting angry and 
asking [for] their money back’.192  
The main reason why the work took so long to produce was Amery’s desire to collect 
as much information as possible from which to draw his conclusions. To this end, he not only 
visited South Africa to ‘go over the battlefields’ in 1902, but would also circulate draft 
chapters which were extremely critical of British operations to the officers who had 
conducted them so he could then rewrite it in view of the ‘angry flood of information’ he 
would receive in reply.193 For example, the original draft which recounted the Battle of 
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Paardeburg was ‘sweeping’ in its critique of Lord Kitchener, but the considerably milder 
version which was published in the History was based on the information received from Ian 
Hamilton, Kitchener’s Chief of Staff in the final stages of the war.194 Even though in May 
1902 Kitchener gave official permission for officers to assist Amery, Lord Roberts and those 
closely associated with him, including Henderson, had been already been supplying Amery 
with a large quantity of official information in a noticeable parallel with Robert’s conduct 
toward Hensman while he wrote an account of the Second Afghan War.195  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, given the source of much of Amery’s information, the 
History was very measured in the few criticisms it directed against Roberts, and for the most 
part it praised him.196 It only alluded to the fact that Roberts had completely miscalculated the 
nature of Boer resistance and, following the capture of the enemy capital, had left for 
England assuming the war was over, even though serious guerrilla fighting was to drag on for 
another eighteen months.197 Instead, as Amery and those close associates of Roberts held a 
negative opinion of Redvers Buller, the History was particularly critical of him, especially his 
operations to relieve Ladysmith.198 Even though in 1902 Amery had yet to learn the actual 
wording of a telegram the general had sent to the besieged commander at Ladysmith, General 
George White, in which he apparently suggested the garrison should surrender, Amery 
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condemned Buller, writing that ‘just as in the crisis of the battle [Buller] had failed the men 
whom he led, so now in the hour of trial he was to fail his country’.199  
Through the invective against Buller, Amery hoped to highlight what he felt was the 
real underlying problem with the army as ‘Buller was but the embodiment of the qualities and 
defects which the British military system tended to produce’.200 Thus, the History argued that 
the army was ‘in no sense organised for serious war’ in 1899 as it had neglected to properly 
train for the conflict, partly through the failure to study ‘Military History and military 
theory’.201 Correspondingly, both the War Office and government were also implicated in the 
failures during the war as the History pointed out that there had been a ‘want of any real co-
ordination between our policy and our military preparations’.202 
The History received largely positive reviews from the civilian press, with the 
Spectator declaring it to be the ‘finest popular history of a war ever offered to the public’, 
while the Athenaeum gave it ‘almost unreserved praise’.203 As positive reviews helped to 
boost sales, James, although he had been heavily involving in the writing of the work, 
anonymously wrote all the reviews of the work which appeared in Blackwood’s Magazine.204 
Roberts and his associates were understandably pleased with the History. James reported that 
he had heard that Kitchener had been ‘sitting up [reading the work] till after 3am’, and 
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Henderson, who agreed with its critique of the army, gave ‘an enthusiastic eulogy of volume 
two’ and declared Amery to be a ‘wonderful man’.205  
However, there were many figures in the army, especially those directly criticised, 
who were incensed by it and James noted that he was regularly ‘visited by many irate 
warriors with objections’.206 The Quarterly Review carried an anonymous review of the work, 
attributed by Amery to E.A. Altham, which unfavourably compared the military criticisms 
made in the History by the ‘committee of Journalists’ who were ‘novices in the art of war’ 
with the sober analysis of the operations contained in the German Official History of the 
war.207 As Amery confidentially told Blackwood, ‘[if the reviewer] had not been so biased, 
he might have observed that the criticisms were in substance identical in both works’. The 
reason why he could be so sure on this point was because, as he continued to Blackwood, the 
German official historians ‘were guided by me in both matters of fact and in matters of 
criticism… I supplied [them with my] early draft proofs and they submitted all their proofs to 
me and [they] modified them in accordance with my suggestions’.208   
Simply in terms of the volume of sales, The Times history was successful. By 30 July 
1902 Bell estimated that 5,112 sets of the first two volumes had been purchased and, 
ultimately, the work went on to sell 29,500 individual volumes, far surpassing the meagre 
sales of the British official history of the war.209 Despite this, the work made a significant 
financial loss as from June 1901 the pay of Amery and James was debited from the profits it 
had made. By August 1905 Amery’s pay of £50 a month had cost the history £2,700, a rate of 
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expenditure Bell labelled ‘positively disastrous to us’.210  This problem was compounded 
since Bell initially had only expected the History to consist of five volumes, setting the 
subscription price accordingly, and so money was lost as two additional volumes were 
published.211 By the end of 1909, at Bell’s angry insistence, Amery was forced to contribute 
£1,500 of his own money toward the cost of printing new volumes as all of the profits made 
by the work had gone.212 
Although the Times History was ultimately a commercial failure it represented 
another attempt to use Military History to inform the reading public of the need for military 
reform, a practice which had begun following the increased popularity of the subject during 
the 1880s. The quantity of Military History produced on the Second Boer War demonstrated 
the continued growth in the popularity of the subject, which reflected the reading public’s 
interest in the conflict. As popular Military History became increasingly established, work 
began to be written on conflicts in which British forces did not take part, including a large 
volume of work on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.  
 
IV. Popular Military History after the Second Boer War, 1902-1914 
Although previously there had been little Military History produced about conflicts in which 
British forces did not play a role, the Russo-Japanese War resulted in a large quantity of 
work. So many serialised Histories appeared regarding the Russo-Japanese War, that their 
production assumed a new urgency as publishers competed to gain an advantage over the 
competition. The first to appear was Cassell’s History of the Russo-Japanese War, the initial 
instalment of which was published on 4 March 1904, barely a month after the outbreak of 
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hostiles.213 This was followed on 11 March by the first issues of both Fight in the Far East: 
An Illustrated History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, published by Black and White, 
and H.W. Wilson’s Japan’s Fight for Freedom, published by the Amalgamated Press.214 
Each new issue of these works, all of which could be purchased for 6.d., appeared 
fortnightly.215 
Central to Black and White’s strategy to secure a large readership for Fight in the Far 
East was the use of sensational illustrations, which readers were told were ‘based, not on 
vague telegraphic reports, but [were] actual photographs and sketches from the front’.216 
While such an origin was at best dubious for some of the images, such as a drawing which 
depicted an oncoming Cossack charge, others, mostly photographs, unflinchingly depicted 
mutilated corpses and the decapitated victims of Japanese executions. 217  This graphic 
approach was also reflected in the descriptions of the fighting contained in the work; and, 
adverts for each new issue declared, in an attempt to entice new readers, the conflict to be 
‘the “bloodiest war in history”’. Such an approach proved to be very popular with the reading 
public, so the work encountered ‘enormous success’ and the first part sold out on the day of 
publication, forcing it to be reprinted immediately.218  
By contrast, Cassell’s work contained far fewer images and while it contained 
elements of sensationalism, it was far less explicit and gruesome in its depiction of the 
fighting. Instead, this publication contained complex three-dimensional diagrams of weapons 
and battles, which often provided a cross-section. 219  Despite these obvious differences 
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between the histories, they contained many similarities. Through the desire to release issues 
as soon after the events they described as possible, the works suffered from a lack of 
information and so contained vague descriptions of battles, lengthy discussions of largely 
irrelevant material and large illustrations, depicting insignificant or non-specific occurrences, 
intended to fill up space and to pad-out each issue.220 This problem became considerably 
worse for Black and White when their correspondent, Edwin Emerson, was shot by the 
Russians as a spy in June 1904. 221  The works were all extremely anti-Russian, which 
reflected the British alliance with Japan as well as the traditional fear regarding Muscovite 
designs on India.222  
Both the Russians and Japanese imposed unusually draconian restrictions and 
censorship on foreign correspondents. Thus, although some journalists, such as W.R. Smith 
of the Associated Press, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett of the Daily Telegraph, Charles â Court 
Repington and David Frazer of The Times, were given privileged access by the Japanese to 
their operations around Port Arthur, which enabled them to produce detailed accounts, many 
correspondents had little information on which to base their reports on the war.223 Those 
journalists caught in this predicament, but unwilling to forgo the chance to make additional 
money from their observations, produced accounts which were either bland, devoid of insight 
or which appeared as ‘travel writing’, as they focused on the correspondent’s journey, rather 
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than events in the war.224 Some writers, faced with this lack of information, simply made up 
or embellished what they had seen.225 Most egregious was William Greener’s Secret Agent in 
Port Arthur which was so fanciful that Lionel James thought the author to be ‘a lying 
waster’.226  
As many of the instant histories concerning this war suffered from a lack of 
information, in the period after the Second Boer War criticism appeared for the first time 
which called into question whether an account written immediately after the campaign or 
incident it described could be considered ‘history’. The reviews of the serial histories and 
eyewitness accounts of the Russo-Japanese War which appeared in the Times Literary 
Supplement and those written by ‘British Officer’ in the American Historical Review, pointed 
out that the information on which these works were based was necessarily far from adequate 
to ascertain what had actually taken place, let alone to allow a proper ‘estimate [of] the 
relative value of each event and its bearing on the course of the war’.227 Furthermore, the 
anonymous ‘British Officer’ pointed out that since ‘the strategy of a campaign is entirely 
based on its political causes… [and so its conduct is] invariably influenced, if not dominated, 
by the political goals toward which the efforts of the respective adversaries are directed’ it 
was impossible to write any account which dealt with these vital concerns until such 
information had come to light.228 So, while it was acknowledged that it would be difficult for 
writers in the Anglophone world to produce ‘a good History of the war’, since Russian and 
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Japanese ‘are known to few people in the West’, the instant histories were thought to be 
‘hardly flattering to the intelligence of the British public’ as they owed more ‘to the 
imagination of the London’ based author than to historical events.229 However, this criticism, 
and the continued opposition of the Times Literary Supplement, did not prevent a large 
quantity of instant historical works appearing on the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-2 and the 
Balkan Wars of 1912-3.230 
Besides instant history, Military History written regarding less recent wars and 
campaigns continued to be produced, much as it had been since the 1880s. Hence, while very 
few campaign narratives were published regarding wars fought after 1815 outside Asia, 
books and articles which listed battles or provided an account of one engagement continued 
to be popular and the sustained growth of the colonial book market ensured that there 
continued to be a large quantity work produced on Indian military history. 231  Given the 
reinvention of Blackwood’s Magazine as a colonial journal in the late 1880s, it published an 
especially large number of articles on the Indian Mutiny. 232  The continued widespread 
interest in this conflict also directly influenced the writing of Wolseley’s memoirs, as he was 
told by Andrew Lang, whom he had contacted for advice, that ‘what… the public want is the 
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Indian Mutiny… West African [campaigns] are very well, but [compared to the] Indian 
article trifling’.233 Similarly, a reviewer of Evelyn Wood’s Revolt in Hindustan in the Times 
Literary Supplement noted that ‘the large number of letters [which the Times had] received 
from survivors, suggesting modifications in, or additions [to the work]’, not only showed the 
continued interest in the conflict, but the scope for further histories of the struggle.234  
The Napoleonic Wars continued to be a very popular subject and a large number of 
articles appeared on many aspects of the struggle, predominantly in Blackwood’s Magazine, 
Cornhill Magazine and Macmillan’s Magazine.235 The books which appeared on this conflict, 
while numerous, were much more limited in scope and the majority consisted of either a 
history of the Waterloo campaign, or of a biography of Napoleon or Wellington.236 The 
majority of the work was largely superficial, such as Lord Roberts’ Rise of Wellington, 
published by Sampson Low, Marston and Company in 1902.237 The only substantial popular 
work to be published at this time which dealt with the Napoleonic Wars was Herbert 
Maxwell’s Life of Wellington, also published by Sampson Low, Marston and Company in 
two volumes, costing 36/-, in 1899.238 Maxwell deliberately avoided any analytical comment 
on the Duke’s ‘military career’ and contented himself to ‘notice and compare the opinion of 
                                                          
233 HCL, Garnet Wolseley Papers, ff. 72, Lang to Wolseley, 26 January 1903; and, HCL, Garnet Wolseley 
Papers, ff. 12, Lang to Wolseley, 1 December 1902. Andrew Lang (1844-1912) was a Scottish literary critic, 
known mainly for his work on folklore, mythology and religion. 
234 Anon., ‘Revolt in the Hindustan’, Times Literary Supplement, No. 337 (25 June 1908), p. 203; and, Evelyn 
Wood, Revolt in the Hindustan (London 1908).  
235 J.A. Temple, ‘With the Expedition to Walcheren in 1809’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 188 (Sept. 1910), pp. 
287-308; Herbert Maxwell, ‘Sir John Moore’, Cornhill Magazine, 16 (Jan. 1904), pp. 787-801; Robert Staveley, 
‘Commanding the Imperial Guard at Waterloo’, Cornhill Magazine, 81 (Jan. 1900), 372-80; J.W. Fortescue, 
‘Close of a Great War’, Macmillan’s Magazine, 85 (Mar. 1902), pp. 321-9; and, David Hannay, ‘Did Napoleon 
mean to Invade England?’, Macmillan’s Magazine, 85 (Feb. 1902), pp. 285-94.  
236 E.B. Low, With Napoleon at Waterloo (London, 1911); G. Hooper, Waterloo (London, 1901); G. Wolseley, 
Decline and Fall of Napoleon (London, 1895); A.I. Shand, Wellington’s Lieutenants (London, 1902); F.S. 
Roberts, Rise of Wellington (London, 1902); and, H. Maxwell, Life of Wellington: Restoration of the Martial 
Power of Great Britain (London, 1907).  
237 Roberts, Rise of Wellington, pp. iii, 7, 72, 73. Wellington’s career was simplistically described as a series of 
lessons which enabled him to overcome Napoleon at Waterloo.  
238 Maxwell, Life of Wellington; and, Anon., Sampson, Marston and Company’s Catalogue (London, 1913), p. 
15. 
250 
 
those writers who seem best qualified to pass judgement on the operations of war’. 239 
Ultimately, however, the work was begun at the publisher’s behest as it was felt that it would 
have a large sale if made accessible to the reading public, and so in 1907 a cheap single 
volume edition was produced which could be purchased for 18/-.240 
Due to the continued popularity of Military History the subject continued to be used 
in an attempt to influence public perception of defence matters, particularly in regard to India. 
Although Lord Robert’s autobiography, Forty-One Years in India was originally published in 
1897, his exploits during the Second Boer War significantly contributed to its popularity and 
by 1911 it had run through thirty-four editions and a total of thirty-seven reprints.241 Roberts 
had partly written the work to convince the reading public that in India Britain held ‘the 
position of a Continental power’, so the region ‘must be protected by continental means of 
defence’, or in other words, conscription.242 In an effort to deliver this message in a way 
which would hold the interest of the reader, Roberts sought Wilkinson’s help to ensure he had 
‘touched on most of the points which you think will be attractive to the public’.243 Thus, 
given the continued widespread interest in the Indian Mutiny, Roberts devoted several 
chapters to this conflict. Wilkinson reported that ‘they form by far the most interest and 
clearest History of the Mutiny that I have read and I am sure that on this point my feeling will 
be shared by the public’.244 Equally, H.L. Nevill’s Campaigns on the North-West Frontier, 
which was published by John Murray in 1912, was also written ‘in the hope of arousing the 
interest of the non-military reader’ in the defence of the region, as ‘the responsibility for 
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national honour and safety does not rest with statesmen and soldiers alone… its guardians 
are… the men… of the British race’. To this end, the reader was told that the study of 
Military History was essential since the ‘nation will emerge triumphant which has looked 
ahead, which has studied the lessons of the past the better, and has applied them to the 
problems of the future with the greater care and intelligence’.245  
However, unlike Nevill and Roberts, H.B. Hanna’s Second Afghan War, 1878-79, 
published by Constable in three volumes between 1899 and 1910, was very critical of British 
policy in India. 246  Not only did it blame the government for manufacturing the Second 
Afghan War, but it contained a polemic against the ‘Forward Policy’ under which the Indian 
Army responded aggressively to any incursion into India by the Afghan tribes.247 As the 
History argued that the ‘Forward Policy’ was simply the ‘crystallisation’ of the approach 
adopted by the British government which had caused the Second Afghan War, it hoped to 
‘lay bare the [initial] error of judgement’ so as to ‘deal a deadly blow to’ the current policy.248 
Thus, Hanna chose to write a history of the war since he felt this would be an ‘enduring… 
indictment’ of the government’s action, and would also provide the reading public with more 
information about the North-West frontier of India on which to base their opinion of future 
conflicts.249 Furthermore, Hanna’s work was directly critical of Lord Roberts’ conduct, and 
so broke with the earlier historical accounts of this war. He attacked Roberts’ ‘exactions and 
barbarities’ during the conflict, in which he stole food from the local tribesmen to feed his 
soldiers; and, he pointed out that Roberts’ account of the reprisals exacted on the local 
population for the murder of the British agent, Sirdar Mahomed Hussein Khan, was 
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inaccurate. While Roberts had claimed he only destroyed the fort of the local tribe as 
punishment, Hanna ascertained that he had not only destroyed their entire village as well, but 
the agent had actually been murdered after this devastation had taken place, so his murder 
was not the cause but rather the result of the so-called ‘reprisal’.250 
The quantity of Military History taught to children continued to be debated during this 
period. The Askers-Douglas commission of 1902 asked several of the witnesses their view on 
the role the subject should play in civilian education. Maguire continued to press for the study 
of the subject as he felt ‘Modern Military History’ would prepare children to make informed 
decisions regarding national policy when they became part of the electorate; and, he argued 
that it was a ‘national scandal’ that the topic continued to be ‘neglected in our public 
schools’.251 Although he was not called by the committee, Roberts argued for the study of 
Military History in schools. He sent a ‘deputation’ to the Secretary of State for War on 4 
December 1906, in which he claimed the study of the subject could ‘exercise’ the students’ 
‘powers of intelligence’.252 
Alongside these calls, the quantity of Military History included in school textbooks 
continued to increase as it had done since the late 1880s.253 The Cambridge University Press 
School Reader, published in 1911 and intended for use in primary schools, included forty 
historical figures selected for study. Out of these, twenty-four were known for their martial 
ability or were connected with major conflicts. 254  Similarly, Chamber’s School Reader, 
published in 1901, largely told British history through the medium of a catalogue of wars, 
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paying particular attention to the upstanding personalities of a cast of military ‘heroes’, 
including Wellington, Havelock and Baden Powell.255  
At this time, publications aimed at boys continued to feature Military History, 
although the Second Boer War caused a greater emphasis on fictional stories set during this 
conflict.256 Two of the boys magazines owned by the Harmsworth Brothers, Pluck and Boy’s 
Friend, featured a large number of stories set during the conflict; but in the years before the 
outbreak of the Great War they became increasingly dominated by ‘invasion fiction’.257 
There were some exceptions to the proliferation of stories on the Second Boer War: Boy’s 
Own Paper carried few features on it as the paper was run by a Liberal General Committee 
which had opposed the conflict.258 Instead, it continued to include articles which focused 
predominantly on brave acts committed by British soldiers and stories featuring fictional 
characters in much earlier wars, such as pieces set during Clive’s defence of Fort St. David 
against the French in 1747-8, entitled ‘A Bold Climber’.259 
The emergence of popular Military History as an established form of writing, 
beginning in 1884, had been confirmed during the Second Boer War through the sheer scale 
of material which appeared on the conflict. This continued to have an impact on how the 
subject was written about in the years before the outbreak of the Great War. From 1904 a 
significant quantity of work began to appear on conflicts which had not involved British 
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forces, the popularity of the subject meant that it continued to be used to communicate 
messages regarding nation defence to the reading public.260 
 
*   *   * 
 
In considering the development of popular Military History, the extent to which commercial 
opportunism drove the expansion of this type of writing is striking. Throughout the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, the potential readership for popular Military History grew as 
Britain’s literacy rate increased and colonial book markets emerged.261 Similarly, declining 
production costs enabled the price of works to fall just as the public gained a greater 
awareness of current events and the empire with the growth of the cheap, popular press.262 
Therefore, since ‘instant’ and serialised histories were able to exploit these conditions, as 
they were able to communicate quickly current events in a cheap, accessible form, which was 
profitable for the publisher and author, they became the most common form of popular 
Military History. As journalists and officers were often in the best position to produce an 
account of a conflict rapidly, the majority of these works were written by them. Nevertheless, 
given the commercial success of material which narrated the course of battles, such as 
Edward Creasy’s Fifteen Decisive Battles, or discussed some aspect of the Napoleonic wars, 
such as Herbert Maxwell’s Life of Wellington, historians did produce some popular Military 
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History during this time, but in terms of volume their work was overshadowed by the 
‘instant’ histories.263      
The desire to ensure that popular Military History remained accessible, and so it could 
sell large numbers of copies, led the majority of this type of writing to reflect, rather than 
challenge, the growing nationalism and imperialism of the period. Thus, most popular 
Military History either uncritically accepted the idea of Empire, or, as in the case of Reginald. 
Wingate, Leo Amery, and G.W. Steevens, positively eulogised it.264 The few exceptions to 
this were in relation to the execution of a specific policy, such as Hanna’s criticism of the 
‘Forward Policy’, rather than any opposition to the notion of the Empire itself. 265  This 
tendency was particularly apparent in the popular Military History which appeared on the 
Indian Mutiny. In contrast to the views held in the post-colonial literature, however, not all 
the military history on this conflict was a tool of colonial power; even George Malleson’s 
work, which was most strident in its calls for reprisals against the rebels, equally condemned 
the government of India for its mishandling of the uprising.266 Similarly, although some of 
the earliest work on the mutiny portrayed it as a treacherous attempt by elements within the 
army to overthrow British rule, others, such as R.M. Martin and Henry Mead, pointed to the 
oppression of the natives as the de facto cause of the uprising.267 So here too, the post-
colonial assumption that British historiography on the Mutiny consistently misread a 
narrative of oppression and resistance for one of loyalty and treachery should be called into 
question.268   
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The emergence of popular Military History as an established form of writing in the 
1890s led to its rapid diversification as it came to be seen as a way to influence public 
opinion on military matters. Initially, it was used in this way by military figures in an attempt 
to control the perception of the campaigns which they had conducted; but after the 1890s it 
became the domain of civilian writers.269 In the two decades before the outbreak of the First 
World War the perception that other nations, particularly Germany, were surpassing Britain 
in terms of economic and military might, a sentiment more broadly expressed at this time in 
the drive for ‘national efficiency’, was a major motivating factor behind the popular Military 
History which argued for army reform.270 A belief in the need to improve British military 
organisation led to the writing of some popular Military History of a higher intellectual 
calibre which, although it was still intended to be accessible to a wider audience, drew on a 
greater level of research and which made more complex arguments. While Spenser 
Wilkinson was particularly prolific in writing this type of work, most notably with the 
publication of his Brain of an Army, the Times History of the War in South Africa, due to its 
scale, is perhaps the most prominent example of this type of popular Military History.271  
However, as the commercial success of popular Military History was often closely 
associated with the speed with which it could be run off the printing presses, this prevented 
the writing of more analytical work that drew on a larger number of sources. This problem 
was demonstrated by the Times History of the War in South Africa as, quite simply, the 
information needed to create the comprehensive account which could be used as evidence of 
the need for army reform was not yet available. As Charles Moberly Bell pointed out, Amery 
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was ‘trying to write in 1901 a [type of] History which can never be written until 1911’.272 The 
second volume of the History, published in 1902, included a version of General Redvers 
Buller’s ‘surrender’ telegram to General George White in Ladysmith, but Amery was forced 
to concede that ‘it is certainly to be regretted, from the historian’s point of view’, that it was 
not ‘possible to treat this question with such full and complete knowledge of the exact 
contents of all the official documents as may someday be furnished to the public’.273 To make 
matters worse, as the volume ‘brought the matter to a head’, and caused the release of a 
transcript of Buller’s actual telegram several months after the production of the work, he 
became worried that ‘people [will now] say the Times history is… out of date’.274  
As such, then, popular Military History generated interest among the reading public, 
which included military officers, and among publishers. Commercial pressure did, though, 
place those with more serious historical, literary, and political ambitions in a series of 
dilemmas over historical quality versus the demands of publishers. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Historians, Men of Letters and the Universities: 
‘High-Brow’ Military History, 1854-1914 
 
 
 
 
As popular Military History sought to attract a wide readership, it was unable to engage in a 
complex examination of the past and, as it often appeared soon after the event, it was only 
able to draw on a limited range of source material. In the period between 1854 and 1914, 
however, more intellectually rigorous, or ‘high-brow’, approaches to Military History started 
to appear in print.1 Although chairs of Modern History had been founded at several British 
universities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, prior to the 1850s no institution 
had a History Faculty or examined the subject.2 Much of the high-brow Modern History 
which appeared before 1854, such as David Hume’s History of England and Thomas 
Babington Macaulay’s History of England from the Accession of James the Second, focused 
on the nation’s political history and the gradual growth of individual liberty.3 These historians 
did not approach military topics as objects for study in their own right, but rather to assist the 
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explanation of political change.4 Despite this, several more intellectually rigorous military 
histories were written between 1854 and 1914, most notably A.W. Kinglake’s Invasion of the 
Crimea, Charles Oman’s Peninsular War and John Fortescue’s History of the British Army.5 
Furthermore, Military History began to be taught at universities, which ushered in new 
approaches to its writing and were crucial in its later transformation into a serious discipline. 
Much of the scholarly literature which examines history published in the second half 
of the nineteenth century bears the influence of Herbert Butterfield’s work which argued that 
most historians writing during this period followed a ‘Whig’ interpretation of British history 
which explained the nation’s past in terms of the gradual development of individual liberty.6 
Much of the recent literature has focused on re-appraising the writing of the historians 
discussed by Butterfield and, as he ignored the writing of Military History, these works have 
followed suit.7 For example, although Michael Bentley’s chapter in the Oxford History of 
Historical Writing, 1800-1945 is one of the few works on Victorian and Edwardian 
historiography to mention Military History, reference to it is limited to a single sentence.8 
How the study of History was conducted at British universities prior to the First World War 
has been considered, while Patrick Slee has provided a study of the teaching of History at 
Oxford, Cambridge and Manchester between 1800 and 1914, but there is no reference to the 
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study of Military History.9 There is only one work on the teaching of Military History at the 
University of Oxford prior to 1914, an essay by John Hattendorf. However, he only examined 
the teaching of Military History after 1905 in any depth, so did not place his analysis within 
the broader context of the writing of Military History, nor mention its study at other 
universities, and he made no use of the surviving papers of those who taught Military History 
there.10 
To offer an answer to the fifth research sub-question, which asked what factors 
contributed to the emergence of Military History as a university and research discipline, this 
chapter intends to address the context in which more research-oriented Military History 
emerged, the precursors of ‘high-brow’ Military History and how and why the subject 
became established at major universities. In order to pursue this task, this chapter will 
examine: first, the writing of high-brow Military History prior to the creation of the first 
schools of History at Oxford and Cambridge in 1872; second, why Military History was 
neglected by university historians during the period between 1863 and 1890; third, the 
influence of a new generation of historians at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and 
Manchester, who placed a greater emphasis on the use of primary source material; and, 
fourth, how Military History was taught at universities, 1899-1914.11  
 
I. Men of Letters, Biography and Literary Periodicals, 1854-72 
Although History was examined at Oxford and Cambridge by 1851, the way in which the 
subject was taught at these institutions prevented both the study of Military History and the 
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creation of a university audience for intellectually rigorous work on this subject. At 
Cambridge, despite a reformation of the ‘Moral Sciences’ Tripos in 1860, the newly created 
History syllabus remained focused exclusively on the development of the British 
constitution.12 Even though Charles Kingsley, appointed Regius Professor of Modern History 
in 1860, chose to lecture on European history from the ‘Invasion of the Teutonic Races’ to 
the ‘Congress of Vienna’, a topic not covered by the Tripos, he did not make any reference to 
military history.13 The Tripos was widely regarded as a failure as on average fewer than five 
students took it each year, so in November 1866, at the suggestion of Knightbridge Professor 
of Moral Philosophy, Frederick Denison Maurice, the subject was removed and between 
March 1868 and December 1872 it was taught as part of the ‘Law and History’ Tripos.14 
At Oxford, the study of History was also focused on the development of the British 
constitution and political events.15 In response to J.A. Froude’s fear that History had become 
a political weapon, manipulated to support the political and religious views of the author, an 
effort was made at Oxford to teach the subject as dispassionately as possible.16 As a result, 
between 1853 and 1862 History students were only set questions which dealt with factual 
matters and the course was heavily reliant on the set text-books. 17  Montagu Burrows, 
appointed to the newly established Chichele Chair of Modern History in 1862, instigated a 
shift away from this ‘mere acquaintance with a multitude of facts’ towards historical research 
using primary source materials. This change helped pave the way for the creation of the 
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Honours School of Modern History in 1872. 18  However, since none of the textbooks 
contained any military history, and following Burrow’s reforms, the focus of historical study 
at Oxford remained on the political history of England.19  
Given the lack of Military History taught at universities, the only real forum for those 
writing high-brow Military History were the periodicals founded in the early nineteenth 
century dedicated to the communication of high-culture and the review of new literary 
publications.20 The first of these was the Edinburgh Review, established in October 1802 by 
Francis Jeffery, a Whig, as an instrument of political and social reform, and published by 
Longmans, Green and Co.21 By way of response the Tory publisher John Murray began the 
Quarterly Review in 1808, while William Blackwood founded Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine in 1817.22 The ‘high Tory’ editorial position of Blackwood’s Magazine attracted 
articles by serving army officers and their accounts of on-going campaigns were a staple of 
the periodical. Not only were British campaigns covered, most notably the Crimean War by 
Edward Hamley, but the American Civil War received wide coverage, as British officers, 
such as Garnet Wolseley, wrote articles describing their experiences travelling in the 
country.23 Although this did not translate into later articles treating the conflict historically, 
Hamley and Blackwood’s ‘military staff’ went on to write articles on the military history of 
the Crimean War, the China War of 1860, the Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian 
                                                          
18 Montagu Burrows, Inaugural Lecture delivered October 30 1862 (privately printed and circulated; copy held 
at the Bodleian Library, Oxford), p. 16; Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education, pp. 49, 51, 52; and, Evans, 
Cosmopolitan Islanders, p. 79.  
19 Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education, p. 47; and, Briggs, ‘History and the Social Sciences’, p. 472 .  
20 Hilary Fraser, ‘Periodicals and Reviewing’, in Flint (ed.), Cambridge History of Victorian Literature, p. 67; 
and, Sullivan (ed.), British Literary Magazines: Victorian and Edwardian Age, p. xvii. 
21 Houghton (ed.), Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900, Vol. 1 (London, 1988), pp. 416-22.  
22 Ibid., pp. 7, 696.  
23 Edward Hamley, ‘Story of the Campaign Written in a Tent in the Crimea’, 11 parts, Blackwood’s Magazine: 
76 (July 1854), pp. 619-37; 77 (Jan. 1855), pp. 112-22; 77 (Feb. 1855), pp. 236-50; 77 (Mar. 1855), pp. 349-58; 
77 (Apr. 1855), pp. 492-8; 77 (May 1855), pp. 614-24; 77 (June 1855), pp. 740-5; 78 (July 1855), pp. 91-7; 78 
(Aug. 1855), pp. 259-68; 78 (Sept. 1855), pp. 513-20; 78 (Nov. 1855), pp. 617-31. See also in Blackwood’s 
Magazine: William Tweedie, ‘Letters from a Staff Officer with the Abyssinian Expedition’, 103 (March 1868), 
pp. 349-82; Anon. [Garnet Wolseley], ‘A Month’s Visit to the Confederate Headquarters’, 93 (Jan. 1863), pp. 1-
29; A.J.L. Fremantle, ‘Battle of the Gettysburg and the Campaign in Pennsylvania’, 94 (Sept. 1863), pp. 365-94. 
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War.24 Military biography written by the ‘military staff’ was also a principal component of 
Blackwood’s Magazine.25 The large quantity of military literature, including Military History, 
which appeared in Blackwood’s Magazine contributed to its financial success during this 
period as the military clubs in London subscribed to it; so in 1860 alone the periodical 
brought in £45,134.19s.7d for the company.26  
Although the Quarterly Review published articles commenting on contemporary 
campaigns, it featured few articles which dealt directly with the history of a war, as much of 
the journal was devoted to reviewing literary work.27 Longman’s Edinburgh Review initially 
responded to the Military History which appeared in the pages of its competitors with a series 
of articles on military biography written by a selection of well-known, predominantly 
civilian, contributors.28 From 1865, Charles Chesney, then Professor of Military History at 
the Staff College, began to publish regular Military History articles in the Edinburgh Review. 
At first, Chesney produced critical reviews of recent campaigns, particularly those fought 
during the American Civil War, the Seven Weeks War and the Franco-Prussian War.29 From 
1868, he also contributed a series of biographical articles on famous military leaders, 
                                                          
24 In Blackwood’s Magazine: Edward Hamley, ‘Lessons of the War’, 79 (Feb. 1856), pp. 232-42; W.W.H. 
Greathed, ‘China War of 1860’, 89 (Mar. 1861), pp. 373-84; Charles Chesney, ‘The Campaign in Western 
Germany’, 101 (Jan. 1867), pp. 68-82; W.G. Hamley, ‘Retrospective of the War’, 109 (Mar. 1871), pp. 375-88; 
and, Frederic Marshall, ‘Secret History of the Loire Campaign’, 110 (Sept. 1871), pp. 378-84.  
25 Also in Blackwood’s: Edward Hamley, ‘Life of Charles Napier’, 82 (July 1857), pp. 94-110; Andrew Wilson, 
‘Colonel Gordon’s Chinese Force’, 101 (Feb. 1867), pp. 165-91; and, Francis Charles Lawley, ‘General Lee’, 
112 (Mar. 1872), pp. 348-63. 
26 Finkelstein, House of Blackwood, p. 97; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4312, ff. 169, Wolseley to 
Blackwood, 18 June 1873.  
27 For examples of the Military History which did appear in the Quarterly Review: Henry W. Tyler, ‘Wellington 
in the Peninsular’, 122 (Apr. 1867), pp. 507-41; G.R. Glieg, ‘Operations of Modern Warfare’, 120 (Oct. 1866), 
pp. 503-35; and, P.H. Stanhope, ‘French retreat from Moscow’, 123 (July 1867), pp. 306-50. For examples of 
work covering campaigns not concluded: P.L. MacDougall, ‘French and German Armies and the Campaign in 
France’, 129 (Oct.1870), pp. 415-54; and, P.L. MacDougall, ‘Invasion of France’, 130 (Jan. 1871), pp. 122-63. 
28 For examples in the Edinburgh Review: John Forster, ‘Civil Wars and Cromwell’, 103 (Jan. 1856), pp. 1-54; 
E.A. Freeman, ‘Alexander the Great’, 105 (Apr. 1857), pp. 305-41; and, G.K. Richards, ‘Life of Sir William 
Napier’, 121 (Jan. 1865), pp. 74-108.  
29 For example: Charles Chesney, ‘Last Campaign in America’, 121 (Jan. 1865), pp. 252-88; idem, ‘Military 
growth of Prussia’, 124 (Oct. 1866), pp. 553-95; idem, ‘Campaign of August 1870’, 132 (Oct. 1870), pp. 480-
518; and, idem, ‘Studies of the Recent War’, 133 (Apr. 1871), pp. 545-86. 
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including U.S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and Gerhard von Scharnhorst. 30  When Longmans 
purchased Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country in 1865, Chesney also contributed 
articles to this periodical as well.31 This coincided with an increasing number of military 
articles appearing in this periodical, including Henry Brackenbury’s analysis of the Union 
operations against Charleston in 1863.32  
In comparison to the large number of articles which appeared in the high-brow 
journals, there were comparatively few volumes which took an intellectually rigorous 
approach to Military History prior to 1899. Just as biographical writing was the most 
common form in which military history appeared in these periodicals, the majority of the few 
books published were also biographical works. Like most of the writers who produced high-
brow Military History at this time, Archibald Alison was not a professional historian teaching 
at a university, but an independent ‘man of letters’.33 Alison originally published a version of 
his Life of John, Duke of Marlborough with Blackwood in 1848 ‘chiefly for military readers’. 
But following a ‘favourable reception’ from the civilian reading public, he chose to ‘extend 
his original design’ and produced two much longer and detailed editions of this work with 
Blackwood in 1852 and 1855, primarily for this readership.34 Although Alison drew on the 
unpublished letters written by Marlborough’s private secretary, Adam de Cardonnel, and his 
Chaplin, Dr Francis Hare, he mainly used Letters and Despatches of John Duke of 
                                                          
30 For example: Charles Chesney, ‘General Ulysses Simpson Grant’, 129 (Jan. 1869), pp. 230-69; idem, 
‘Memoirs of General von Brandt’, 131 (Jan. 1870), pp. 65-97; idem, ‘A Life of Robert E. Lee’, 138 (Apr. 1873), 
pp. 363-98; and, idem, ‘Scharnhorst’, 140 (Oct. 1874), pp. 287-321.  
31 Walter E. Houghton (ed.), Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900, Vol. 2 (London, 1988), p. 
315. 
32 For examples in Fraser’s Magazine: Adam Badeau [U.S. Army], ‘Two Great Wars: An Historical Parallel 
[American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War]’, 82 (Dec. 1870), pp. 793-805; Henry Brackenbury, 
‘Operations against Charleston’, 74 (July 1866), pp. 101-11; and, M.D. Conway, ‘Gravelotte Revisited’, 88 
(Oct. 1873), pp. 418-32. 
33 Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders, p. 79. 
34 Archibald Alison, Life of John Duke of Marlborough, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 3rd edn., 1855), p. viii. 
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Marlborough, edited by Sir George Murray in 1845, which provided him with a ‘complete 
series’ of the Duke’s correspondence from 1702 to 1712.35  
In publishing this work Alison had a dual motive. On the one hand, he intended 
primarily to revive Marlborough’s reputation, as he felt that the majority of ‘his countrymen’ 
were ‘ignorant’ of his achievements, or held a ‘dim’ view of him as their knowledge came 
‘from the histories of [his] enemies’. On the other hand, he sought to demonstrate how ‘the 
rise and fall of nations often depend so much on individual agency that the record of their 
growth and decline runs into the lives of particular men’. The idea that the actions of ‘great 
men’ were the driving forces which shaped history was so central to Alison’s understanding 
of the past that, following the production of his History of Europe, he claimed that ‘he who 
undertakes to write the history of the French Revolution will soon find his narrative turn into 
the biographies of Napoleon and Wellington’. Equally, Alison saw his biography of 
Marlborough as fundamentally ‘a history of the war of the Great Succession, at least in those 
portions of it which Great Britain is immediately concerned’.36  
During this period the Duke of Wellington remained a popular subject for military 
biographers. A good example is provided by Charles Yonge’s two-volume biography 
published in 1860. It was based on the Duke’s published despatches, as well as some 
unpublished primary material from the diary of Lord Colchester, a conservative politician, as 
well as interviews with Wellington’s son and Algernon Greville, his private secretary. In the 
first volume of the work, which dealt with Wellington’s military career, it was his 
personality, particularly his ‘invincible moral intrepidity’ and his ‘military genius’, which 
were presented as the central impetus behind the development of events during a campaign. 
The work also sought to maintain the high reputation of its subject and so betrayed the 
                                                          
35 George Murray (ed.), Letters and Despatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, from 1702 to 
1712 (London, 1845); and, Alison, Life of John Duke of Marlborough, Vol. 1 (3rd edn., 1855), p. v.  
36 Alison, Life of John Duke of Marlborough, Vol. 1 (3rd edn., 1855), pp. iii, viii, 403. 
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influence of William Napier’s Peninsular War. Not only was the author of this work praised 
as ‘the great historian’, but Yonge also adopted Napier’s view that between 1809 and 1810 
Wellington was betrayed by the ‘weak and far from united’ politicians at home who were 
‘hesitating as to the expediency of continuing the contest’ in the Peninsula.37  
In contrast to those biographers who wrote mainly to defend the reputation of their 
subject, Thomas Carlyle in his History of Friedrich II of Prussia, published by between 1858 
and 1865, wrote primarily to provide an example of his theory, first articulated in his essay 
‘Heroes and Hero-Worship’, that certain ‘heroes’ were the agents of divine providence and so 
were the dominant actors in history.38 He held that, ultimately, history was incomprehensible 
as man could never come to understand God’s perfect revelation, and even though it was 
partially revealed through time, historians remained blind to it, constrained as they were with 
their ‘chains’ and ‘chainlets’ of ‘causes’ and ‘effects’. 39  Carlyle believed that a lack of 
authoritarian government had led to an increasing internal fragmentation within nations, 
which themselves had become undeserving, through spiritual decay, of a morally righteous 
‘hero as king’ to reunite them.40 Thus, Carlyle selected Frederick to be an example of his 
‘hero’, as he thought that, without his ‘prudence, moderation, [and] clear discernment’, 
Prussia ‘could never have had the pretention to exist as a nation at all’, and this nation 
through its discipline and spirituality had ‘merited such a King to command it’.41 
When the first volumes of the work were published they encountered hostile reviews 
from the high-brow periodicals, but especially from Hamley writing in Blackwood’s 
                                                          
37 C. Yonge, Life of Field-Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, Vol. 1 (London, 1860), pp. vii, 212-3, 367-8.  
38 Frederick Carlyle, History of Friedrich II. Of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great, 6 vols. (London, 1858-
1865); and Frederick Carlyle, Heroes and Hero-Worship (London, 1840), esp. ‘Lecture VI. The Hero as King: 
Cromwell, Napoleon: Modern Revolutionism’, pp. 251-312. 
39 Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders, p. 71; Frederick Carlyle, ‘Thoughts on History’, Fraser’s Magazine, 2 (Nov. 
1830), p. 415.  
40 Carlyle, Heroes and Hero-Worship, p. 280.  
41 Carlyle, Frederick the Great, Vol. 6, pp. 347, 594, and, Vol. 1, pp. 17-18.  
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Magazine.42 Hamley not only dismissed Carlyle’s theory as a ‘mirage philosophy’ but noted 
how it caused him to misrepresent the past in an attempt to tailor it to his own beliefs.43 
Hamley noted that to maintain an image of Frederick’s fairness and honesty Carlyle had 
downplayed the validity of Austrian claims on Silesia, so that when Frederick seized the 
province in 1740, causing the Silesian wars, Carlyle could portray his hero as ‘rushing out to 
seize [his] own stolen horse’, when in reality Hamley felt this act was little more than ‘Royal 
brigandage’.44 
It was not only British writers like Carlyle who received strong criticism for the 
quality of their Military History from reviewers writing in the high-brow periodicals. The 
work of foreign authors was also assessed, which served to highlight the lack of Military 
History written in English. Following the publication of the twentieth volume of Adolphe 
Thiers’ L’Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire in 1862, which dealt with the Waterloo 
campaign, a series of reviews appeared condemning his account. The criticism centred on 
Thiers’ numerous factual errors, his effort to exonerate Napoleon of any blame for the loss of 
the campaign while implicating his subordinates, particularly Soult and Ney, and his attempt 
to undermine Wellington’s reputation as a general.45  Although Hamley in his review of 
Thiers’ work, which appeared anonymously in Blackwood’s Magazine, identified numerous 
factual errors, he was particularly concerned that this latest controversy regarding the factual 
                                                          
42 For examples: G.H. Lewes, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, Fraser’s Magazine, 58 (Dec. 1858), pp. 631-49; 
‘V’, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, Fraser’s Magazine, 69 (May 1864), pp. 539-50; W. Frederick Pollock, 
‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, Quarterly Review, 105 (Apr. 1859), pp. 275-304; Anon., ‘History of Friedrich 
II.’ Athenaeum (Mar. 1864), pp. 369-71; E.B. Hamley, ‘Carlyle: Mirage Philosophy’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 
85 (Feb. 1859), pp.127-54; and, E.B. Hamley, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 98 (July 
1865), p. 38-56.  
43 Hamley, ‘Carlyle: Mirage Philosophy’, p. 128.  
44 Carlyle, Frederick the Great, Vol. 1, pp. 364-71, Vol. 3, p. 593; and, Hamley, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, 
pp. 43-7. 
45 Anon., ‘L’Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire’, Quarterly Review, 112 (Oct. 1862), pp. 410-44; Anon., 
‘L’Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire’, Edinburgh Review, 117 (Jan. 1863), pp. 147-79; and [E.B. Hamley], 
‘Thiers on Waterloo’, Blackwood’s Magazine, 29 (Nov. 1862), pp. 607-33. For evidence that this article was 
written by Hamley, see the letters in which he discusses his authorship of this review with Blackwood: NLS, 
Blackwood Papers, MS4149, ff. 113, Hamley to Blackwood, 13 February 1860, MS4170, ff. 80, Hamley to 
Blackwood, 18 October 1862, and MS4149, ff. 143, Hamley to Blackwood, 14 October 1860.  
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accuracy of Military History had led ‘thoughtful persons’ to look on the subject as only ‘a 
serious and important branch of fiction’ rather than providing material for military analysis.46 
Thus, Hamley wrote that if Thiers’ ‘calls himself a French military historian he ought to 
behave as such’.47  
This high-profile controversy gave rise to two works written to provide in part a 
rebuttal to Thiers. George Hooper’s Downfall of the First Napoleon, was later followed by 
Chesney’s Waterloo Lectures in 1868.48 Although Hooper’s History was very closely based 
on Charras’ Campagne de 1815, Chesney held it to be ‘one of the best single volumes on this 
campaign existing in any language’. Similarly, Chesney’s Waterloo Lectures also provided a 
comprehensive refutation of Thiers’ view of the campaign, particularly that it was ‘special 
conditions of weather, [and the] blundering good luck on his opponent’s side’ which had led 
to Napoleon’s defeat.49 Despite the detail Chesney used to refute the views of the French 
historian, Hamley pointed out that ‘he is particularly praised for… showing up Thiers… [as] I 
did in the Magazine in 1862 and he has adopted all my views’.50  
One of the most ambitious works of high-brow Military History to be written prior to 
1899 was A.W. Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea, published by Blackwood in eight 
volumes between 1863 and 1887.51 When Kinglake began work on this study in 1856, under 
its initial title, ‘History of the Two Years’ War’, he had a publication agreement with John 
Murray.52 The latter had even begun to advertise the work under its other provisional title, 
‘Two Years’ War in the Crimea’, when the author became increasingly unhappy with the 
                                                          
46 [E.B. Hamley], ‘Thiers on Waterloo’, p. 607. 
47 Ibid.  
48 George Hooper, Downfall of the First Napoleon (London, 1862); and, Chesney, Waterloo Lectures.   
49 Chesney, Waterloo Lectures, pp. 9, 24-5, 30-2, 44, 56, 82-6, 90-4, 110-17, 147-8, 183, 236-8.  
50 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4324, ff. 22, Hamley to Blackwood, 18 December 1868.  
51 Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea. For biographical information on A.W. Kinglake, see Appendix 1. 
52 NLS, John Murray Papers, MS40651, ff. 90, Kinglake to Murray, 28 May 1856, and ff. 106, Kinglake to 
Murray, 9 September 1859.  
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copyright arrangement.53 Murray had offered £1000 to purchase the copyright outright, but 
Kinglake considered this ‘too gloomy’ as he wished to retain complete control of the work.54 
Blackwood heard about Kinglake’s disagreement through a mutual friend, Lawrence 
Oliphant, in August 1862. Blackwood was particularly impressed by Kinglake’s style of 
writing, which he deemed essential since ‘the success of the book will now hinge almost 
entirely on its merits as a historical and literary composition’ as he believed that the public 
had now largely lost interest in the Crimean War.55 Keen to recoup his financial loss after his 
best-selling author George Eliot began to produce work for Smith and Elder that year, 
Blackwood essentially ‘poached’ Kinglake by offering him £5000 for the right to produce 
2500 copies of the first two volumes of the work, as well as also allowing the author to retain 
the copyright.56  
Kinglake’s History was particularly attractive to Blackwood due to the primary source 
material he was able to draw on. In 1856 Lord Raglan’s widow had given Kinglake all of her 
husband’s papers, including the entirety of his ‘sealed [official] dispatches’, and ‘his private 
correspondence with ministers, ambassadors, with generals, [and] reigning sovereigns’.57 As 
it was widely known that Kinglake was planning to produce a history, ‘information of the 
highest value was poured upon [him] from many quarters’, including from ‘the French 
military authorities’ who sent ‘an officer of rank with a “mission”… to impart… what they 
                                                          
53 NLS, John Murray Papers, MS40651, ff. 107, Kinglake to Murray, 9 September 1859, and ff. 109, Kinglake 
to Murray, [n.d.] October 1859.  
54 Finkelstein, House of Blackwood, p. 29; NLS, John Murray Papers, MS40651, ff. 127, Kinglake to Murray, 
18 August 1862, and, ff. 129, Kinglake to Murray, 19 August 1862.  
55 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30013, ff. 53, Blackwood to Kinglake, n.d., and ff. 54, Blackwood to Kinglake, 
3 September 1862. 
56 Finkelstein, House of Blackwood, pp. 26, 28; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30013, ff. 54, Blackwood to 
Kinglake, 3 September 1862. Kinglake used his aunt, Mrs Emma Woodforde, as an intermediary with 
Blackwood. NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30013, ff. 59-60, Woodforde to Kinglake, 15 September 1862. The 
later editions of the work also paid Kinglake well, for volumes 3 and 4 he was paid £5500 for 5000 copies. NLS, 
Blackwood Papers, MS30014, ff. 371-372, Blackwood to Kinglake, n.d. 
57 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4171, ff. 110, Kinglake to Blackwood, 10 September 1862. 
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had to say about the battle of Alma’.58 Although Kinglake was able to draw on his own 
experiences of the war, as he had visited the Crimea for a month as a ‘Travelling Gentleman’, 
there was one obvious gap in his research as he had failed to request the use of the Foreign 
Office’s correspondence in the belief that Raglan’s papers were sufficient.59  
When the first two volumes, which covered the causes and conduct of the war up to 
the Battle of Alma, appeared in 1863, a storm of controversy broke around them following 
the almost universally critical reviews which appeared in the high-brow periodical press.60 
Although Kinglake was criticised for his lack of military analysis, as he ‘never’ gave 
‘attention to the strategical principles which determined the whole course’ of the war, even 
more contentious was Kinglake’s treatment of the French Emperor Napoleon III. 61  As 
Kinglake, like the other high-brow military historians of this period, placed great emphasis on 
the historical agency of ‘great men’, he blamed Napoleon almost exclusively for provoking 
the war. Furthermore he also subjected the Emperor to a sustained personal attack that used 
‘the vocabulary of abuse’ so luridly that the Edinburgh Review refused to quote it. 62 
Unknown to the reviewers, it was likely that Kinglake’s animosity toward Napoleon was 
personal. In 1846 Kinglake had been employed as a History tutor for Miss Harriet Howard, 
                                                          
58 Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea, Vol. 1 (4th edn., 1863), p. xxviii; and, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4171, 
ff. 126, John Murray to Kinglake, 22 September 1862. 
59 William H. Russell, The Crimea: 1854-1855 (London, 1881), pp. 2, 8; and, ‘Old Reviewer’ [A. Hayward], Mr 
Kinglake and the Quarterlies (London, 1863), p. 5. For an example of the letters Kinglake sent to those who 
took part in the campaign, see HCL, Garnet Wolseley Papers, ff. 5i, Kinglake to Wolseley, 9 November 1885. 
60 Anon., ‘Invasion of the Crimea Review’, Quarterly Review, 113 (Apr. 1863), pp. 514-76; and, Anon., 
‘Review’, Edinburgh Review, 117 (Apr. 1863), pp. 307-52. 
61 Anon., ‘Review’, Edinburgh Review, 117 (Apr. 1863), p. 336. It is possible that this was Hamley writing 
anonymously in the Edinburgh Review, so he could be critical of the work, something he would have been 
unable to do in Blackwood’s Magazine.  
62 Anon., ‘Review’, Edinburgh Review, 117 (Apr. 1863), pp. 322, 312. For example, Kinglake claimed 
Napoleon III’s ‘sluggish… intellect was of a poorer quality than men supposed it to be’, his features were 
‘opaque’, and he claimed that when he seized power in 1851 he had 48,000 people killed in Paris. Kinglake, 
Invasion of the Crimea, Vol. 1, (4th edn., 1863), p. 219. In the review in the Quarterly Review, 113 (Apr. 1863), 
p. 528, it was concluded that the death toll during the coup was closer to 191. 
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and ‘was unable to teach [her] without desiring her’.63 When she met Napoleon at a party 
thrown by Lady Blessington they became lovers, after which ‘she followed [him] to France in 
1848, and lived openly with him as his mistress’.64  
Similarly, Kinglake’s emphasis on the historical agency of ‘great men’ meant that 
although he purported to provide a history of the campaign in the Crimea, his work was 
largely centred on Raglan.65 For example, both his account of the charge of the Light Brigade 
and the whole of volume six, which covered the winter of 1854-5, in which the British Army 
suffered significant losses as a result of a supply crisis, consisted largely of an attempt to 
exonerate Raglan from any culpability for these disasters.66 Kinglake blamed Lord Lucan for 
misunderstanding his orders and despatching the Light Brigade to its destruction, which 
absolved Raglan of any blame.67 The ‘winter troubles’, as Kinglake euphemistically called 
them, were blamed on the ‘want of land-transport’ and manpower to unpack the supplies of 
building material and warm clothes which Raglan had prudently amassed.68 However, as 
William Russell pointed out in his pamphlet heavily criticising Kinglake’s history, no 
explanation was provided as to why Raglan did not either ask for French assistance to unpack 
the supplies, or why he continued to maintain ineffectual siege operations against Sebastopol, 
needlessly using up manpower.69 These controversies helped to drive the sales of the work, 
and the first volumes went through four editions in the first year alone, and in total 15,000 
copies of the work were sold in 10 years. This made the book the most lucrative published by 
Blackwood’s in the 1860s, as it had made profits of £6,454 by July 1873. By the end of the 
                                                          
63 Simone Andre Maurois, Miss Howard: La Femme qui fit un Empereur (Paris, 1956), p. 93; Gerald de Gaury, 
Travelling Gent: Life of Alexander Kinglake 1809-1891 (London, 1872), p. 142; and, Rev. W. Tuckwell, A.W. 
Kinglake: Biographical and Literary Study (London, 1902), pp. 81-2. 
64 Tuckwell, Kinglake, pp. 81-2.  
65 Ibid., p. 350. 
66 Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea, Vols. 3-8 (6th edn., 1877-88). The sixth edition contained nine volumes 
rather than the usual eight produced for the earlier editions.  
67 Kinglake, Invasion of the Crimea, Vol. 5 (6th edn., 1877), p. 200. 
68 Ibid., Vol. 7 (6th edn., 1883), p. 124.  
69 Russell, Crimea, pp. 57-60. 
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century, the work was one of the company’s best-sellers and in total it generated more than 
£20,000 in profit.70 
Almost as ambitious as Kinglake’s work was the History of the Sepoy War in India, 
the first three volumes of which were written by John Kaye and published by W. Allen 
between 1864 and 1876.71 Kaye, who had previously served as an artillery officer in the 
Bengal Army and had succeeded John Stuart Mill as Secretary of the Foreign Department in 
the India Office in 1858, wrote the work ‘to command the common interests… of all classes 
of readers’. Like Kinglake, central to this work was Kaye’s ability to procure primary 
sources. His position allowed him access to the ‘official records’ of the department of the 
Secretary of State for India which it ‘was at least improbable that any other writer could 
obtain’.72 Most importantly, ‘the executors of the late Lord Canning’ placed in his ‘hands the 
private and demi-official correspondence of the deceased statesman extending over the whole 
term of his Indian administration’.73  
In keeping with the other high-brow Military History written at this time, Kaye’s 
work also placed a great emphasis on the historical agency of ‘great men’. He wrote that it 
was his ‘endeavour’ to illustrate the extent to which the ‘dangers which threatened British 
dominion in the East’, as well as ‘the success with which they were encountered’ was 
‘assignable to the individual characters of a few eminent men’. Consequently, like the earlier 
work which had appeared on the Mutiny, Kaye waxed lyrical on the characters of British 
military leaders, particularly Sir Hugh Wheeler and the ‘saint’ Henry Havelock. Unlike much 
of the literature which had appeared immediately after the Mutiny, Kaye was especially 
                                                          
70 Finkelstein, House of Blackwood, pp. 31-2. This is the equivalent to approximately £1,141,200 at current 
values.  
71 John Kaye, History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-1858, 3 vols. (London, 1864-76). For biographical 
information on John Kaye, see Appendix 1. 
72 John Kaye, History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-1858, Vol. 3 (1st edn., 1864), pp. vi, ix. 
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reverential toward Lord Canning and dedicated his volumes to his service and memory. To 
Kaye, Canning embodied the ‘great national character’ in his reaction to the uprising, as he 
had ‘[arisen] and with his still, calm face’ to confront ‘the dire calamity’.74  
When Kaye died shortly after the third volume of this work appeared, his publisher 
asked George Malleson, who had earlier written Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An Historical 
Narrative, to take over its composition.75 It was under this arrangement that the work was 
completed with an additional three volumes between 1878 and 1880. Malleson made 
extensive use of primary material and stated that ‘there is not a document relating to the 
events I have recorded… which I have not carefully read and noted’.76 For the new author, 
achieving historical accuracy depended on rendering ‘severe and strict justice’ to historical 
figures and he told Blackwood that his contribution to the history was ‘very forthright and 
calls a spade a spade’.77 Malleson vehemently disagreed with several of Kaye’s judgements, 
especially regarding Canning’s response to the Mutiny. Consequently, Malleson’s first 
volume covered the same ground as Kaye’s final instalment so that he could present his 
alternative view concerning the ‘short-sightedness of the government’ at the outbreak of the 
uprising.78 This meant that the history contained two volumes concerning the same events 
which directly contradicted each other on many important points and, tellingly, Malleson’s 
volumes were not dedicated to Canning but to Sir Vincent Eyre, a British General involved in 
the relief of Lucknow.79 
In spite of this, there were many similarities between the works of the two historians. 
Malleson also saw ‘great men’ as the driving force behind events: thus, it was the role of Sir 
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Henry Lawrence in the defence of Lucknow which was presented as allowing the 
‘maintenance of the hold of England on India’.80 Similarly, in marked contrast to the view 
expressed in Mutiny of the Bengal-Army, Malleson agreed with Kaye that it was the ‘bad faith 
to our sepoys… our policy of annexation… [as well as] our breaches of customs more sacred 
to the natives than laws’ which were largely responsible for causing the Mutiny.81 Far from 
advocating the summary retributory execution of mutineers, as he had in his earlier work, 
Malleson condemned Brevet Major William Hodson for the murder of the King of Delhi and 
the Mogul Princes leading the rebellion as a ‘brutal… unnecessary outrage…a blunder as 
well as a crime’.82 Despite the repetition of material and the contradictory nature of Kaye’s 
third volume and Malleson’s first, the history enjoyed a ‘generous reception’ in Britain, the 
colonies, and in the United States.83 A second edition of Malleson’s work was required five 
weeks after it first appeared, an analytical index by Frederic Pincott was published in 1880, 
and in February 1896 Longmans purchased the rights to the work, re-issuing it in August 
1897, July 1898, January 1906, March 1909 and August 1914.84 
While Invasion of the Crimea and the work by Kaye and Malleson sold well, there 
were few intellectually rigorous military histories produced before the end of the nineteenth 
century.85 This appears to be a strange paradox as the financial success of these books is 
likely to have made the writing of comparable works desirable for publishers. However, the 
majority of the historians producing serious historical work during this time had privileged 
access to primary source material, particularly the private papers of key individuals, without 
which the writing of such work would have been impossible. Moreover, the controversies 
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surrounding the accuracy of Military History, together with its continued biographical focus, 
also did little to contribute to more rigorous approaches to the subject. In fact, these disputes 
contributed to the neglect of the subject by university scholars. 
 
II. University Scholars and the Neglect of Military History, 1863-90 
At Oxford during the three and a half decades following the appointment of Burrows to the 
Chichele Chair of Modern History in 1862, the study of History developed from comment on 
set texts to an independent and rigorous discipline which was increasingly based on original 
research conducted using primary source material.86 After the creation of the Honours School 
of Modern History in 1872, the syllabus was amended so that first year students studied the 
constitutional and political History of England, with second and third years able to select a 
‘special subject’ and concentrate on a particular period of history.87 While the most popular 
‘special subjects’ were those on ‘The French Revolution’ and the English Civil War, leading 
to the appointment of tutors and selection of historical literature for these topics, the focus 
continued to be on political history and so military events only received passing attention.88  
Similarly at Cambridge, steps were also taken to reform the study of history to make it 
a separate discipline in its own right. J.R. Seeley, in his inaugural address in February 1870, 
given when he became the Regius Professor of Modern History, devoted much of his lecture 
to ascribing the function of historical study to the education of aspiring politicians.89 Thus, 
when the Modern History Tripos was formed in 1873, and the subject gained its own separate 
exam, it focused on the development of the British constitution.90 However, it was not until 
May 1885 that Cambridge adopted the idea of the ‘special subject’ or placed an emphasis on 
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the use of primary sources.91 Just as at Oxford, historical study remained focused on the 
development of the British constitution and little emphasis was placed on the study of 
military events.  
These changes to the study of History at Oxford and Cambridge, the only institutions 
prior to 1890 to have Schools of History, together with broader university reforms, 
transformed the subject into a separate discipline largely controlled by professional 
historians. 92  This new scholarly readership for History required technical and analytical 
works that were unlikely to appeal to the general public. In the early 1880’s Seeley wrote a 
series of articles in Macmillan’s Magazine in which he claimed that the public, used to the 
writing of Macaulay and Scott, made ‘no distinction… between History and fiction’ and so 
would not want to read complex analytical work. Thus, he called for historians to ‘break the 
drowsy spell of narrative’ and to produce work primarily for fellow specialists which solved 
historical problems and sought to identify the causes of historical events. Both a symptom 
and factor in this development was the creation of a forum for historians with the formation 
of the Historical Society in 1868, the creation of its yearbook in 1872, Transactions of the 
Historical Society, and the foundation of the English Historical Review in 1886. 93  The 
production of specialist literature led to the devaluation of the amateur status of ‘men of 
letters’ and the History departments at Oxford and Cambridge increasing disregarded such 
writers. 94  However, as military events did not feature in the History syllabus of either 
institution, the new specialist literature focused almost exclusively on political history, so 
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Military History was reduced in value at the two universities, remaining the domain of ‘men 
of letters’.95 
The ‘Whiggish’ study of the development of the British constitution, which sought to 
identify long-term factors to explain political change and the growth of individual liberty, 
continued to dominate historical writing during this time.96 Despite notable exceptions in this 
period, such as Seeley’s Expansion of England and Charles Dilke’s Greater Britain, 
intellectually rigorous historical writing largely ignored the growth of the British Empire and, 
consequently, the role of the military in its formation.97 The political liberalism of British 
historians also created an aversion to the discussion of military affairs. This was particularly 
clear in J.R. Green’s Short History of the English People in which he strove to ‘never sink in 
to “drum and trumpet history”’.98 Furthermore, a tendency toward crediting long-term factors 
with historical agency led to the ‘revolt against biography’ in which the influence of 
individuals was downplayed.99 This also counted against the writing of Military History as it 
undermined the credibility of military biographical work, the mainstay of the discipline at this 
time, calling into question the notion that the personality of a military leader drove historical 
events. For example, Seeley, in his Short History of Napoleon, besides making ‘no attempt… 
to describe or to estimate Napoleon as a military commander’, attributed the Emperor’s 
achievements to factors beyond his control and claimed that if he had not existed ‘a Moreau 
or a Bernadotte might have reigned with success and have won great victories’ instead.100  
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There were some apparent exceptions at this time to the general disregard of military 
events by university historians.101 Samuel Gardiner, while he was a Fellow at All Souls 
College at Oxford, wrote History of the Great Civil War 1642-1649. 102  Gardiner, who 
‘disclaim[ed] any knowledge of the military art’, focused mainly on the political history of 
the period and so did not comment on the raising of armies or provide detailed narratives of 
individual campaigns.103 As was common at this time, Oliver Cromwell was discussed almost 
exclusively as a political figure and his ability as a military leader received little 
examination.104 This lack of military analysis did receive some criticism, particularly from 
A.W. Ward, who reviewed the second volume of the work in the English Historical Review 
in 1887. Ward pointed out that despite Gardiner’s admission that he did not understand 
strategy, he had still felt qualified to claim that ‘the results of a series of campaigns [were] 
not solely or even mainly dependent on military considerations’.105  
E.A. Freeman, in History of the Norman Conquest, which was published by the 
Clarendon press in five volumes between 1867-1876, also largely avoided comment on 
military matters; he wrote with the consideration ‘of one with whom Political History is a 
primary study’.106 Hence, he afforded little space to a discussion of the composition of the 
opposing armies in comparison to the time he spent on the political and social effects on the 
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conquest. 107  Freeman, in keeping with the standard historical approach at the time, 
downplayed the influence of military events on the history of England, arguing that the 
success of the Norman Conquest was the result of a series of long term causes ‘at work at 
least ever since the death of Edgar [in 975]’ rather than being dependent on the agency of 
William the Conqueror. Moreover, Freeman wrote that after the conquest it was only a ‘few 
generations’ before the Normans were culturally assimilated and ‘England was England once 
again.’108  
The one exception to Freeman’s general avoidance of military topics in this work was 
his analysis of the Battle of Hastings. Given his lack of military knowledge, Freeman sought 
the assistance of several officers and Captain Edward R. James ‘had the kindness to put 
[Freeman’s] ideas of the battle, as drawn from the original writers, into scientific military 
shape’. Therefore, the description of the formations and manoeuvres made during the battle 
was particularly detailed. Furthermore, Freeman included James’ technical comments in a 
section entitled ‘the military character of the battle’ in which judgement was passed on the 
martial skill shown by William’s army and that of his English opponent, Harold.109  
In an attempt to overcome a lack of a technical military knowledge, which is likely to 
have deterred historians from writing Military History, Thomas Arnold published an article in 
the English Historical Review in 1887 which called for ‘some competent military man, 
acquainted with the tactics and means of attack and defence… in fashion at the times of the 
Thirty Years’ War [to] take in hand the campaigns of our English Civil War’. Arnold hoped 
that this would give historians working on the period some ‘accurate and rational accounts of 
what was done’, and so he provided a complete reading list for anyone willing to undertake 
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the task.110 This call was answered by Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Ross who had ‘for some 
years, during time that could be spared from professional duties, been engaged on the task of 
collecting materials for a Military History of the period in question’. 111  Although Ross’ 
subsequent analysis of the Battle of Edgehill, and later the Battle of Nasby, demonstrated that 
the English Historical Review was not averse to publishing Military History, even by a ‘man 
of letters’, the subject was notable for its rarity as the pages of this journal and the 
Transactions of the Historical Society were largely given over to Political History.112 From 
the mid-1880s, however, this opposition to the subject among university scholars began to 
fall away as a new generation of historians emerged who placed a greater emphasis on the use 
of primary source material to examine topics other than the political history of Britain.  
 
III. The Increasing Acceptance of Military History, 1885-1914 
The professionalisation of history in the 1880s, which had led to the emergence of specialist 
historical literature that utilised primary sources to solve historical problems, meant that no 
new ground was broken in the 1890s when historians at the Universities of Oxford, 
Cambridge, and Manchester defined the function of their respective chairs of History in terms 
of conducting detailed and rigorous research. Instead, in the 1890s the emphasis placed on the 
use of primary sources by J.B. Bury and J. Acton at Cambridge, T.F. Tout at Manchester, and 
C.H. Firth at Oxford differed only in terms of degree from their predecessors who had 
occupied chairs of History in the 1880s.113  
In 1890 Tout was appointed to the chair of History at Owen’s College in Manchester. 
Following the grant of a charter to the Victoria University of Manchester in 1904 and the 
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creation of a School of History the following year, Tout was able to form a department 
around the principle of research. Tout trained his students to undertake historical inquiry and 
so he introduced a compulsory thesis as part of the degree.114 Similarly at Cambridge, Bury 
declared History was a ‘science, no more and no less’ and altered the Historical Tripos so that 
in their final year students were able to further specialise on a specific topic, undergoing 
historical training to assist them in their research.115 At Oxford as well, Firth also pressed for 
the ‘technical training’ of history students.116 
Due to the growing rigour with which this new generation of historians approached 
their work, any historical subject which could be studied using primary sources, even 
Military History, was seen as legitimate by them. When Firth was appointed to the Ford 
Lecturership in English History at Oxford in 1896 he argued that it was ‘necessary… to study 
every side’ of the English Civil War, ‘the military history as much as the political or religious 
history’. Consequently he presented a series of papers on ‘Cromwell’s Army’.117 This lecture 
series, based on a wide range of ‘pamphlets [and] newspapers’, as well as ‘the memoirs and 
correspondence of the different actors’, was intended to ascertain ‘how it was that Parliament 
succeeded in creating an efficient army, while the King could not do so’. Thus, it not only 
looked at developments in tactics but also the social aspects of the armies, including the 
influence of religion and politics.118 Moreover, after becoming Regius Professor of Modern 
History at Oxford in 1904, he began work on Last Years of the Protectorate 1656-1658, with 
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which he intended to conclude Gardiner’s History of the Great Civil War.119 Although, unlike 
Gardiner, Firth referred to the military aspects, including tactical details and the organisation 
of armies, he was still circumspect about criticising decisions in military matters made by 
historical figures.120 
Firth was also a prolific contributor of articles on Military History to both the English 
Historical Review and the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.121 He was not the 
only historian contributing articles on this topic to the specialist periodicals. In the two and a 
half decades before the outbreak of the Great War there was a dramatic increase in articles on 
military historical topics. These articles were not limited to one particular period, with work 
appearing on modern campaigns, the Napoleonic period, the Thirty Years War, and the 
medieval era.122 
Charles Oman, although he did not contribute to the specialist historical periodicals, 
was also instrumental in the development of Military History, so that it became an important 
adjunct to the study of Political History at Oxford.123 Oman went to Oxford in 1878, where he 
studied under William Stubbs, achieving a double First Class in Literae Humaniores and 
Modern History, before rejecting a place in the Civil Service to take a fellowship at All Souls 
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College in 1881.124 In 1884 he won the University’s ‘Lothian Prize’ with an essay entitled 
‘Art of War in the Middle Ages’.125 Oman defined his topic broadly as the development of 
‘the art which enables any commander to worst the forces opposed to him’. He included a 
‘complete sketch of the social and political history’ of the period, so that he could examine 
the role military considerations played in the ‘origin’ and ‘decline’ of Feudalism. However, 
Oman’s study was almost exclusively devoted to pitched battles, and not sieges, even though 
siege-craft was an important branch of military activity at this time. 126  He originally 
approached Blackwood with the essay, but was turned down and ultimately published the 
work with T. Fisher Unwin in 1885.127  
Subsequently, this work was to form the basis of History of the Art of War: The 
Middle Ages, From the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century, published by Methuen in 1898. 
Oman intended this volume ‘to form the second of a series of four’ in which he hoped ‘to 
give a general sketch of the history of the art of war from Greek and Roman times down to 
the beginning of the 19th Century’. Oman’s extensive research, which included walking ‘over 
the important battlefields’ of Europe, assisted his analysis of the actions taken by military 
leaders and he was often very critical of them. This work, together with his earlier essay, was 
the first attempt by a university scholar in Britain to study the historical development of 
warfare and to provide specific criticism of decisions made by military commanders without 
deferring to the judgement of the professional soldier.128  
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Oman’s next major study, History of the Peninsular War, was published by Clarendon 
in seven volumes, the first four of which appeared between 1902 and the outbreak of the 
Great War, with the remainder produced between 1922 and 1930.129 Oman undertook his 
study as he realised that a large quantity of primary material had come to light since Napier 
had written his History, most notably the papers belonging to the British diplomat Sir Charles 
Vaughan, recently acquired by the Codrington Library at All Souls.130 Furthermore, since 
Oman was able to speak Spanish, he was able to use the Record Office in Madrid.131  
Some of Oman’s most valuable research came through his numerous visits to the 
theatre of war, which were assisted by the loan of a motorcar from the King of Portugal.132 
On such a trip to Oporto, Oman discovered why Wellington had been able to escape French 
observation when he crossed the River Douro in 1809. He discovered that ‘lofty and 
precipitous cliffs’ towered ‘nearly two hundred feet above the water’s edge’, obscuring the 
crossing from the French on the plateau above the river. This led him to conclude that ‘from 
Napier’s narrative and plan [of the battle]… he had either never seen the ground, or had 
forgotten its aspect after the lapse of years’.133  
Just as in his earlier works, Oman engaged in an analysis of the leadership of the 
various commanders on each side; and, he criticised the writing of military figures on the 
conflict without an apology for his lack of practical experience in these matters as a civilian. 
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Although he claimed in the work that he did not ‘dream of superseding the immortal six 
volumes’ of Napier, Oman later admitted that his work had ‘two main purposes’: to correct 
‘Napier’s inordinate worship of Napoleon’, and to defend ‘the British government against 
[his] charge that they deliberately starved Wellington and his army’.134 Therefore, he went 
out of his way to correct Napier on these points, and to redress Napier’s anti-Spanish bias, as 
he had ‘invariably exaggerate[d] Spanish defeats, and minimise[d] Spanish successes’ 
through the deliberate use of only French sources when discussing these matters.135  
While Oman did not specifically refer to any military theorist in his writing, his 
examination of Napoleon’s 1809 campaign in Spain, in which he claimed the ‘ordinary rules’ 
of warfare suggested that the destruction of the enemy’s regular forces and occupation of 
their capital would cause them to submit, implied the influence of Jomini’s writing.136 Oman 
provided a balanced analysis of Wellington’s ability as a commander and concluded that his 
battlefield successes were largely down to his use of musket fire, noting that ‘an English 
charge… was practically an advance in line with frequent volleys’, and that ‘it was the ball, 
not the bayonet, which did the work’.137 However, Oman considered Wellington was over-
reliant on his infantry, while he was critical of his failure to make the ‘greatest possible use of 
his cavalry’. Similarly, he also condemned Wellington’s attitude toward the lower ranks and 
his failure to allow subordinates greater scope to act on their own initiative.138  
Oman was particularly critical of Sir John Moore’s campaign in Portugal in 1808-9. 
He felt that there was ‘no justification’ for Moore’s decision to send General Hope by a 
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‘detour’ to find a suitable route for his cannons as ‘the roads of Northern Portugal were not 
impracticable for artillery’. Oman pointed out that in 1706 and 1762 heavy guns had in fact 
been used on those roads at that time of year with little trouble; and he claimed that Moore 
had later written a letter in ‘the language of an honest man, conscious that he has made a 
mistake’ in which he admitted the roads could have been used. Furthermore, he condemned 
Moore’s ‘headlong’ retreat to Corunna since he ‘drove his men beyond their strength, when 
he might, at the cost of a few rear-guard skirmishes, have given them four of five days more 
in which to accomplish [the march]’.139  
Oman’s analysis of Moore’s campaign was severely criticised by Maurice in his 
Diary of Sir John Moore. Maurice used Oman’s criticism as ‘an exceedingly interesting 
illustration of the difference between antiquarian research and the knowledge required for the 
command of armies’; thus it was an attack on civilian criticism of technical military matters. 
He pointed out that Oman had not used the Clausewitzian method for analysing judgements 
made by historical figures, since ‘the practical question before Moore was whether he could 
safely trust his artillery to mountain roads when a wet season might come on at any moment’. 
In this regard, ‘no evidence of what had been done in 1706, or even in 1762… would have 
been the smallest value’, as this told little of the road’s current condition. If Oman’s work 
was to be of any value to the ‘historical student’, Maurice concluded, he must ‘realise the 
meaning of “the fog of war”’ and ‘that a General may often be absolutely right in 
doing…what afterwards, when full information is obtained, turns out to have been… a 
mistake due to false reports’.140 Moreover, Maurice used the correspondence between Moore 
and Hope to demonstrate that both commanders knew nothing about the condition of the 
roads and that the letter Oman had taken as Moore’s omission of guilt had been taken out of 
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context.141 Maurice was disappointed that Oman’s criticisms had tarnished the reputation of 
‘noble Moore’ and his campaign, which he loftily claimed was ‘the boldest, the most 
successful, [and] the most brilliant stroke of war of all time’.142  
Firth and Oman were not the only university historians to produce Military History at 
this time. In March 1896, Cambridge University Press came up with the idea of creating a 
general history based on German Historian Georg Weber’s Weltgeschichte in übersichtlicher 
Darstellung, the Cambridge Modern History. Lord Acton, who had succeeded Seeley as 
Regius Professor in February 1896, accepted the publisher’s offer to edit the work, which he 
hoped would be a History of the ‘common fortunes of mankind’, and set about inviting ‘every 
English historian who [was] competent’ to produce a chapter.143 Volume eight on the French 
Revolution and volume nine on the Napoleonic period, which appeared in 1904 and 1906 
respectively, contained nine chapters on military history written by university historians, 
reflecting the growing acceptance of the subject. 144  Central to Acton’s vision, a view 
maintained by Adolphus Ward who inherited the History when Acton fell ill in April 1901, 
was that it should be impartial, and so, as Acton put it, ‘our Waterloo must be one which 
satisfies French and English, Germans and Dutch alike’. 145  It fell to Oman to write the 
Waterloo chapter; although he did his ‘best… to arrive at the exact truth’, he felt that ‘in 
sober fact it is impossible to write History that every man, whatever his race, creed or 
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politics, can accept’, and so he ridiculed Acton’s notion, writing, ‘imagine an appreciation of 
Bismarck that equally pleased a patriotic Frenchman and a patriotic German’.146  
In fact, not only civilian scholars contributed to the Cambridge Modern History as 
Acton had written to the War Office asking for the names of ‘good writers’ to produce work 
on military topics.147 Henderson agreed to produce chapters on many campaigns, including 
all of those conducted by Napoleon as well as those fought during the Franco-Prussian War 
and he intended to write in a style which emphasised the ‘honour and glory’ of the 
combatants.148 However, following his death in 1902 these chapters passed to several civilian 
scholars, further underscoring the extent to which the writing of Military History was 
becoming accepted by academics.  
Outside of university scholarship, as the potential markets for Military History grew, 
both the quantity and intellectual rigour of ‘high-brow’ Military History increased. In 1904 
Blackwood published George Forrest’s History of the Indian Mutiny, Reviewed and 
Illustrated from Original Documents. 149  Forrest, who was ‘Director of Records of the 
Government of India’, was able draw on a wide range of official material as well as the 
private correspondence of British political and military figures, much of which he reprinted to 
accompany his work.150 Forrest had also published large amounts of primary material relating 
to the Mutiny in his Selection from the Letters Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved 
in the Military Department of the Government of India, 1857-8, published in 1893.151 This 
encouraged more historical work on the uprising as source material was now more widely 
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available than it had been when Kaye and Malleson produced their History. Forrest rejected 
the early sensational accounts of the massacre of British women and, throughout his work, he 
emphasised that the majority of ‘the brave… [native] population… with a few exceptions, 
treated the fugitives of the ruling race with a marked kindness’.152 It is likely that Forrest 
deliberately stressed this point since he hoped the book would sell well in India, he told 
Blackwood that the sub-continent ‘will be the greatest book market in the world’. To this end, 
he put Blackwood in touch with S.K. Lohani and Co., ‘the leading booksellers at Calcutta’, to 
assist in selling his work in India.153  
Likewise, as American copyright laws had become much more rigorous in 1891 it 
was now viable for a British publisher to produce work which was likely to have a large 
demand in the United States as prior to this time there had been little to stop an American 
printer pirating this type of work.154 Thus, at this time, several volumes on the American War 
of Independence appeared. Henry Belcher, a rector from Sussex, had his work on the 
American War of Independence, entitled First American Civil War, published by Macmillan 
in 1911.155 In 1899 Longman published G.O. Trevelyan’s American Revolution, which was 
based on ‘many scores of books’ and ‘an innumerable multitude of memoirs, pamphlets, 
newspapers, magazines, poems, and collections of printed and unprinted documents’. The 
work was methodologically complex as Trevelyan attempted to determine British public 
opinion regarding the conflict by ascertaining the editorial positions of the major London 
newspapers. The premise of this idea was that these publications chose to actively reflect 
popular attitudes toward the war in an effort to retain a high circulation. He concluded that 
                                                          
152 Forrest, History of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. 1, p. xv. For examples of Forrest demonstrating that atrocities 
were committed by only a small minority of Indians and that many natives remained loyal, see Forrest, History 
of the Indian Mutiny, Vol. 1, pp. x, 478, Vol. 3, p. vi. 
153 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS30103, Forrest to Blackwood, 21 December 1904.  
154 Briggs, History of Longmans, p. 262. In 1886 there was the first ‘International Copyright Convention’ signed 
in Berne. However, the United States was not a signatory. In 1891 Congress passed a statue enabling qualified 
non-resident foreign authors to have their works protected under U.S. copyright law. 
155 H. Belcher, First American Civil War: First Period 1775-1778 (London, 1911).  
290 
 
the majority of the public were opposed to the government policy to fight to retain the 
colonies in America, and stressed the good conduct of both sides during the war, particularly 
that of George Washington.156 Such an emphasis contributed to the positive reception the 
work received in the United States, and by 1905 the work had reached a third edition.157  
The most ambitious Military History to be written outside a university was John 
Fortescue’s History of the British Army, which ultimately ran to twenty volumes, which were 
published by Macmillan between 1899 and 1930, the first eight of which were written prior to 
the Great War.158 Fortescue, who had attended Trinity College, Cambridge in 1878, but left 
before he was awarded his degree, originally undertook to write a four volume history of the 
development of both the army and of its relations with the government, ‘so as to determine 
whether success or failure [in war had been] due to the merit or demerits of the army, which 
is the tool, or of the cabinet, which is the workman, or of both’.159  Fortescue was not the first 
military historian to attempt such a History. Charles M. Clode in Military Forces of the 
Crown (1869), Clifford Walton in History of the British Standing Army (1894), and Sibbald 
Scott in British Army: Its Origin, Progress, and Equipment (1868), had all dealt with the 
‘Constitutional History of the Army’.160 However, Fortescue’s work eclipsed them in terms 
of the scale of his research. For example, in order to examine army recruitment between 1803 
and 1814 alone he went through 300 volumes of unseen material. However, travelling to 
examine battlefields in America or India was beyond the meagre financial means of 
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Fortescue, so he was obliged to hold a series of jobs, including Royal Librarian at Windsor 
Castle, as he wrote his magnum opus. Thus, the publication arrangement he made with 
Macmillan on 7 December 1894, in which he was to receive a royalty of ten per cent of the 
retail price of each volume sold, and a £100 advance, stood to provide him with much needed 
income.161  
Throughout the study Fortescue endeavoured to ‘formulate our military experience of 
the past in all its branches, so as to give warning against repetition of old mistakes in the 
future’.162 Hence, the work was highly critical of politicians who Fortescue felt were ‘entirely 
ignorant of military matters’ and had mismanaged the organisation of the army.163 Fortescue 
condemned the Cabinet’s war planning during the Napoleonic wars and labelled the 
disastrous Walcheren expedition as ‘merely one of a hundred examples of the hopeless 
inadaptability of the British Constitution to war’. However, the work was not polemical 
toward the government and Fortescue rejected Napier’s claim that the cabinet had 
deliberately withheld support from Wellington during his operations in Spain and Portugal in 
1810-1.164 Fortescue hoped that his analysis of the suitability of the British Constitution to 
war would prove useful for both politicians and military figures. Therefore, he asked 
Macmillan to send copies of his work to several high-ranking officials. In fact, he felt he had 
been paid a high ‘compliment’ when in March 1906 Lord Esher ‘begged for an advanced 
copy of Vol. IV… for the use of the Committee of Imperial Defence’.165 
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Fortescue, like Oman, engaged in analysis of military operations, particularly those 
conducted during the Napoleonic wars. He praised Wellington’s generalship, especially his 
capacity for logistical organisation; and, while he was critical of his inability to delegate to 
his subordinates, he still felt that he was ‘a man of genius’.166 When covering the Peninsular 
War in volumes six (1910) and seven (1912), Fortescue regularly deferred to the work of his 
‘very good friend’ Oman, attributing him with the discovery that Wellington’s tactics were 
based on meeting ‘the charge of the [French] bayonets with a volley of bullets’.167 Fortescue 
had nonetheless one major area of disagreement with Oman: his critique of Moore’s retreat to 
Corunna via Madrid. Fortescue sided with Maurice and maintained that ‘beyond all question 
[Moore] was right’, given the information available at the time of his decision. Still, possibly 
because of Maurice’s criticism of civilian historians second-guessing military judgements, he 
was circumspect regarding whether Moore should have engaged his pursuers earlier in his 
retreat, concluding that ‘whether Moore was right or wrong… is a matter which a belated 
critic is not competent to decide’.168  
Despite Fortescue’s attempts to make the discussion of constitutional considerations 
regarding the army relevant to his contemporaries, the work failed to sell to any significant 
degree. He excused the fact that the first two volumes had fallen ‘dead flat’ by explaining 
‘one cannot expect such a book to go off quickly… [Lord Roberts] pronounced himself 
pleased with the book, so far as he had read it; but people are busy with the war in South 
Africa’. The third volume (1903), which was delayed by his brother’s death in action during 
the Second Boer War, ‘fell as flat as the first two’.169 It was not until the fourth volume 
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(1906) appeared that reviewers began to praise the work, helping to boost sales, but even then 
it sold so few copies that both the author and publisher were still out of pocket a year later.170 
Fortescue was particularly exasperated when he was told by Trevelyan that ‘fifty years ago 
such a book would have given [him] £300 to £400 a year’; he considered this a ‘comment on 
the spread of education’, sarcastically noting ‘what an encouragement this is to authors and 
publishers’ to produce high-brow Military History.171   
 The emphasis on the use of primary source material in historical studies legitimised 
Military History in the eyes of historians working in universities during the final two decades 
of the Nineteenth Century. Moreover, as this approach was adopted by the ‘men-of-letters’ 
who wrote on the subject, less emphasis was placed on the historical agency of individual 
figures. The growing interest in Military History as a serious discipline opened up for the first 
time the possibility of the subject becoming established in some of the leading universities.  
 
IV. Military History as a University Subject, 1899-1914 
The influence of Oman and Firth led directly to the inclusion of Military History on the 
Modern History syllabus at the University of Oxford in 1899.172 Oman felt that the study of 
the subject was essential at Universities, not only because of the historical significance of 
many conflicts, but also because he maintained that ‘every Minister of the Crown’, the 
‘editors of newspapers’, as well as the general public, needed an ‘educated… opinion on 
things military’ if Britain, as a democratic nation, was to avoid a foreign policy disaster. 
Thus, he wrote in 1900 that ‘it ought to be as disgraceful for an educated man to have to 
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confess that he knows nothing of the lessons of the Crimean War… or the Franco-German 
War… as to own that he is entirely ignorant of the character of the Reform Bill of 1832’.173 
So, when Oman and Firth sat on a Modern History Board committee formed to examine ways 
to make the study of Political History ‘less soul-destroying’, they advocated the inclusion of 
Military History on the syllabus of the final year of the degree course, a proposal the Board 
accepted on 26 January 1899.174 It was hoped that this would enable the teaching staff to 
lecture on ‘Military History without feeling that [it] would not “pay”’. This enabled Oman to 
subsequently begin a series of lectures on the ‘Military History of England: Early and Middle 
Ages to 1485’.175 
Despite the inclusion of the subject on the History syllabus, it was ultimately the 
pressure to improve officer education created by the Second Boer War which had a major 
impact not only on how the subject was taught at Oxford, but also on its emergence at other 
universities before 1914. The desire to improve the educational attainments of the officer 
corps caused the alteration of the existing system by which a university student could qualify 
for a commission. Previously, a candidate had to pass their first year exams, after which they 
could leave for a place at Sandhurst.176 On 10 March 1903 the Secretary of State for War, St 
John Brodrick, announced to the House of Lords his new scheme intended to allow 
candidates to receive a ‘genuine University education’ as well as ‘some practical and 
theoretical training in military subjects during their University career’.177 Under this new 
system, the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Dublin and London were 
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allotted a set number of commissions which could be awarded to students by a committee 
formed at each establishment. Known as the ‘Delegacy for Military Instruction’, these 
committees included at least one representative of the War Office.178 To be eligible for the 
award of a commission, a student needed to be under 25 years old, unmarried, to have been 
attached to a regular unit for six weeks for two consecutive years, to have qualified for the 
award of their degree, and to have passed a series of exams in military subjects.179 These 
exams included Military History. As university candidates were set the same papers as those 
for officers in the reserve forces seeking to convert their commission into one in the regular 
army, they sat a paper on the ‘principles of strategy’ and second paper on a ‘special 
campaign’ selected each year by the War Office.180 Military History was assigned the second 
highest allocation of marks; and so, out of the 3,750 available, up to 1000 were given for the 
subject.181 Given the prominence of the topic, Brodrick called on the Universities to ‘include 
in their honours examinations two or three military subjects’, including ‘Military History’.182  
The University of Oxford, possibly because it already taught Military History, was the 
first institution to respond to Brodrick’s request. On 24 March 1904, the Hebdomadal 
Council, the institution’s chief executive body, ‘suggested’ to the Modern History Board that 
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they should create a special subject in ‘Military Tactics’. The board formed a committee, 
which included Firth and Oman, to examine the matter, and, on 7 May, following their 
recommendation, the Modern History Board accepted the proposal.183 After consultation with 
the War Office, the committee advocated that the new special subject, initially entitled 
‘Strategy and its History’, but later simply known as the ‘Military Special Subject’, should 
use Hamley’s Operations of War and Jomini’s Art of War as textbooks. 184 This decision 
reflected both the influence of these works on the syllabus of the exam set for university 
candidates by the War Office and the subordination of the ‘Military Special Subject’ to it.185 
Even though the course was open to all History students, and not just those seeking a 
commission, specific allowances were made so that it could be directly tailored to the 
requirements of the War Office syllabus. Thus, the Modern History Board relaxed the rules 
which required a two-year delay before the topic of a ‘special subject’ could be changed, 
making it possible to keep up with the annual rotation of the campaign the War Office 
selected for the exam.186  
Sir William Anson, Warden of All Souls College, who had a personal interest in 
Military History, as he was the grandson of two of Wellington’s brigadiers, was persuaded by 
Leo Amery, a Fellow of the College, to put forward £600 to fund a new Lecturership to assist 
with the teaching of the new ‘Special Subject’.187 Advertised in July 1905, the holder of this 
position was to be elected for three years from 15 October 1905, during which time he would 
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receive an annual stipend of £200, which came out of Anson’s donation. In return, he would 
present at least twenty-six lectures per academic year on ‘Military History, not confined to 
any special period… but in all cases bearing upon the conditions of modern warfare’.188 Prior 
to an appointment to this Lecturership, the necessary Military History was taught to those 
seeking a commission by R.P. Dunn-Pattison in Magdalen College.189  
The Lecturership in Military History was awarded to Sir Foster Cunliffe, a Fellow of 
All Souls, who had recently written an historical account of the Second Boer War.190 Cunliffe 
was a close friend of Amery; not only had he been the best man at Amery’s wedding, but 
Amery had also offered him the opportunity to write the fourth volume of the Times History 
of the War in South Africa. Thus, it is possible that it was Amery’s influence which helped to 
secure Cunliffe the Lecturership.191 Cunliffe’s appointment was not approved by everyone, 
however. Spenser Wilkinson had been asked by Cunliffe’s publisher to assist him with the 
second volume of his History of the Boer War, but upon reading the work Wilkinson 
concluded that Cunliffe was a ‘beginner’ in the study of Military History, since ‘he had read 
none of the classic works on the art of war’ and he suggested that Cunliffe should study ‘the 
theoretical treatises of Jomini and of Clausewitz’. Consequently, when only a few months 
later Cunliffe asked Wilkinson to recommend him for the Lecturership, Wilkinson felt forced 
to decline, fearing that he had ‘probably made an enemy for life’.192  
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Cunliffe envisioned that he would undertake a far reaching and in-depth study of 
warfare as Lecturer of Military History. As he felt ‘the mere study of individual campaigns… 
is no good’, he intended to treat ‘war as a grand political act and [to] study how a nation 
should prepare for it’ since he felt ‘this is the only way to commend it to… the Oxford’ 
student.193  However, when Cunliffe began teaching on the ‘Military Special Subject’ in 
October 1905 he quickly found that he was limited to the exam syllabus set by the War 
Office.194 Consequently, he was forced to adopt an approach which focused narrowly on the 
‘principles of strategy’ which it outlined and on the operations conducted during the ‘special 
campaign’ selected for study that year. In January 1906 he began lecturing on the ‘Franco-
Prussian War up to the Battle of Sedan’, due to appear in the March 1906 exam.195 In an 
attempt to make the course as intellectually rigorous as possible, and to retain some 
semblance of the subject which he had envisaged, Cunliffe increased the number of textbooks 
on the reading list. In June 1907, he added the first four books of ‘Clausewitz’s On War’, 
possibly because of his acquaintance with the work following its recommendation by 
Wilkinson.196 Oman assisted with the teaching of the course, and, in 1906, wrote that when 
he set essays asking for a comparison ‘between the strategy of Napoleon Bonaparte and of 
Frederick the Great’ there was always a ‘stupid undergraduate’ who complained ‘that he can 
find nowhere in print’ a ready answer.197 
Despite efforts to balance the requirements of those seeking a commission with the 
need to create a subject in keeping with the intellectual standard required by the Modern 
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History Board, Cunliffe encountered criticism from the independent examiners which 
reported on his subject in 1907. They found that otherwise ‘weak candidates obtained strong 
marks’ in his subject and they expressed ‘some doubt’ as to whether ‘the knowledge required 
was a fair equivalent [to] any one of… other special subjects’.198 Cunliffe tried to bring the 
matter to a head before the Modern History Board in May 1908 when the issue of renewing 
his Lectureship beyond October 1908 was broached.199 He argued that ‘the study of Military 
History is complicated by the fact that the selected periods are subordinated to the 
requirements of Army Examinations’, entailing ‘a good deal of extra work on the teacher, 
who has to study, often with insufficient time, a fresh campaign when the old one would 
suffice’. But his ‘main objection to this constant changing of campaigns [was] that it 
render[ed] the provision of suitable authorities almost an impossibility’ as while the other 
special subjects had ‘work specifically prepared by competent historians’ to draw on ‘English 
military literature is singly poor in works of constructive [historical] criticism’. Cunliffe 
suggested that the Modern History Board should ‘select its own period of Military History 
irrespective of any changes the War Office make’ to allow the Lecturer to focus on a single 
campaign, thus raising the study of Military History at Oxford ‘in both scope and method to 
an equality with other branches of historical investigation’.200 However, while the Modern 
History Board secured funding to continue Cunliffe’s position for another year, no changes 
were made to the syllabus at this point.201  
The attempt by the University of Manchester to teach Military History in response to 
Brodrick’s appeal was even more problematic than at Oxford. At a special meeting on 11 July 
                                                          
198 OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports, 1899-1912, FA 4.11.2.1, ‘Report of the Examiners on the 
1907 Examination’, n.d. [1907]. 
199 OUA, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892-1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board 
Meeting, 1 May 1908. Cunliffe’s position was due to expire on 15 October 1908. 
200 OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports 1899-1912, FA 4.11.2.1, Report on the ‘Military History 
Special Subject’ by Foster Cunliffe, 11 June [1908], pp. 1-4. 
201 OUA, Modern History Board Minutes, 1892-1910, FA 4.11.1.2, Minutes from Modern History Board 
Meeting, 1 May 1908. 
300 
 
1905, the University Council discussed the possibility of establishing ‘a scheme for providing 
instruction in Military History and Strategy’ to assist the students who sought a 
commission.202 At this meeting John William Graham, Principal of Dalton Hall, the Quaker 
hall of residence in Owen’s College, and Rev. Dr James Hope Moulton, the University’s 
Wesleyan Minister, opposed any military instruction, both insisting that it would be ‘a 
corrupt influence among the students and was to some extent a degradation of the idea of a 
University’.203 Despite this objection, the Vice-Chancellor, Alfred Hopkinson, upheld the 
proposed scheme. In September 1905 F.N. Maude was appointed ‘Lecturer on Military 
Subjects’ for two academic years to instruct both those who wanted a commission, as well as 
‘any student in the Faculty of Arts who wish[ed] to offer Military History’ as a subject in 
their final exam.204    
Maude’s inaugural lecture, entitled ‘The Importance of the Study of Military History 
to National Commerce’, given at Whitworth Hall on 26 October 1905, greatly antagonised 
those who opposed the study of military subjects at the University and did little to establish 
Military History at Manchester.205 In this lecture, Maude argued that ‘the gravest permanent 
menace to the peace of Europe’ arose from the ‘extraordinary ignorance’ among the 
electorate ‘as to the view prevailing in all Continental Cabinets concerning both the ethics 
and the nature of modern war’, the substance of which he claimed was embodied in the 
writing of ‘that leading German thinker and soldier, von Clausewitz’.206 Maude suggested 
that Clausewitz’s writing had persuaded Continental governments that the nature of modern 
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war centred around ‘instant readiness for action… ensured by arrangements thought out in 
every detail in peace,’ so that at a moment’s notice ‘the whole destructive potentiality of the 
nation [could be] thrown out in the required direction’.207 As British defence arrangements 
were in a ‘disorganised state’ it was ‘only a matter of time’ before war caused ‘terrible 
internal trouble’ in the country, as ‘our marine insurance practices would automatically force 
up the price of bread… at least fourfold, and in forty-eight hours… workpeople would feel 
the pinch’ and call for ‘peace at any price’.208 When the Manchester Guardian reproduced a 
summary of the speech, which it labelled ‘anti-English’ and ‘pernicious in its political 
tendencies’, it received letters from readers, including from Graham and the Vicar of Eccles, 
which condemned the university for Maude’s appointment.209 While the newspaper insisted 
that it did not quarrel with the inclusion of ‘lectures on Military History’ at Manchester, it felt 
that the subject would ‘suffer through its being identified in the public mind with [Maude’s] 
cranky and ill-digested theories’.210  
Still more embarrassing for the university was what Tout referred to as the ‘Maude 
failure’.211 Despite Maude’s lectures, as well as Wilkinson’s donation of military books to the 
university library, Manchester did not have any successful candidates in the War Office 
exams and was, therefore, unable to nominate any students for a commission.212  In the 
academic year of 1907-08 Maude ceased to work at Manchester and resumed a position at the 
University of London lecturing on Military Law.213 Following Maude’s departure, Wilkinson 
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was appointed Lecturer in Military History to replace him in March 1908.214  Wilkinson 
delivered his course of lectures on ‘the rise of strategy illustrated mainly from the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’; and, from 4 November 1908, he also taught the Third 
Year Honour Class taking the course on the ‘Napoleonic Period’ which consisted of eight 
students.215  
The University of London also encountered difficulties in organising its course of 
Military History lectures intended for those students seeking a commission. The University 
Senate appointed Col. H.A. Sawyer to lecture on Military History alongside F.N. Maude on 
27 October 1904.216 Under this agreement the instructors were paid salaries amounting to 
£250 per year.217 The Military History course began on 17 January 1905, and the Secretary of 
State for War, Arnold-Forster, chaired the first lecture on the Franco-Prussian War. 218 
However, it soon became apparent that there was little interest in the subject amongst the 
students, and by January 1908, the advertisements for Sawyer’s course began to include a 
notice that it would not run ‘unless at least ten students present themselves’.219 Since only one 
person from the University of London successfully passed the War Office Military History 
exam prior to 1909, the Senate took the decision in March 1909 to ‘dispense with the 
services’ of Sawyer and Maude.220        
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At Oxford, as the funds which had sustained the Lecturership in Military History were 
about to expire, the Statutory Purposes Committee of All Souls College recommended on 24 
February 1909 that an offer to the University should be made to endow a ‘Reader in Military 
History’ at £300 a year for five years.221 Following consideration of the matter, however, the 
College recommended instead the establishment of a Professorship in Military History to 
replace the Lecturership. On 26 February Anson wrote to the University’s Vice Chancellor to 
make the formal proposal.222 The statute of July 1909 which created ‘the Chichele Professor 
of Military History’ outlined that the position was to ‘give instruction in Military History 
with special reference to the conditions of modern warfare’. In return, the incumbent would 
be elected for five years and would be paid by All Souls a stipend of £500 per year, of which 
£200 came from a Fellowship which he was automatically awarded.223 The board of electors 
selected to choose the best candidate consisted of Oman, Firth, H.B. George, Cunliffe, and a 
representative of the Secretary of State for War.224 Firth contacted Wilkinson in the early 
summer of 1909 to tell him he ‘was the sort of person the University would like to elect’ and 
that he would support him ‘against any possible rival’. Once assured that he would not be 
competing against Cunliffe, Wilkinson sent testimonials regarding his suitability for the 
position from Tout, Lord Nicholson and Lord Roberts to the board of electors.225 Cunliffe, 
despite Wilkinson’s earlier refusal to recommend him for the Lecturership, also supported his 
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application. And, even though Charles Callwell was the candidate favoured by the War 
Office, Wilkinson was elected to the Professorship on 6 October 1909.226  
Wilkinson had considerably more freedom than Cunliffe to teach Military History in 
the way he saw fit, as in June 1909 the Modern History Board finally resolved that the 
‘military special subject’ would no longer be subordinated to the War Office exam 
syllabus.227 Wilkinson’s view of the role his Professorship could perform was based on both 
his understanding of the University’s function and his Clausewitzian perception of the nature 
of war. He believed that the study of Modern History at Oxford rendered a ‘twofold service’ 
to the nation: first, it created, maintained, and communicated the standard way of 
understanding the ‘life and growth of states’; and, second, it trained the minds of the 
country’s future governing elite.228 Wilkinson felt his Chair was a ‘chance to communicate’ 
to these men ‘the two truths that war is a chapter of policy and that policy cannot be right 
without strategy’.229 Thus, to create ‘statesmen’ Wilkinson thought that he must demonstrate 
to his students that the ‘control and direction of a war… is the function primarily of the 
statesman rather than the soldier’. Moreover, he believed he needed to make his students 
‘acquainted with war’, so that even though they ‘need not… be able to handle fleets or 
armies… [they would] have a true knowledge of what can and what cannot be done by those 
instruments’.230 
To this end, Wilkinson reformed the ‘Military Special Subject’ so that it focused on 
the developing nature of war, particularly the notion that war in ‘any age is the reflection of 
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the political and social condition of the communities engaged in it’. He focused on warfare 
during and after the French Revolution, as ‘a new type of conflict between nationalised 
states’ had been created which ‘it was the achievement of Clausewitz [to have] first 
recognised’. Thus, to Wilkinson ‘the military history of the nineteenth century [was] the 
history of a persistent endeavour [to] more perfectly to realize’ the conception of the ‘nation 
in arms’.231 To study this phenomenon and how the national armies which it created could be 
utilised, Wilkinson made his students study a Napoleonic campaign as it contained the ‘germ’ 
of the changes under way, and a campaign which illustrated an example of the ‘nation in 
arms’, a phenomenon which he judged to have begun with the American Civil War.232 Thus, 
in 1912 Wilkinson’s students studied the Waterloo Campaign and the Seven Weeks War, 
while in 1914 they examined Napoleon’s Italian Campaign and the Franco-Prussian War.233  
Following the creation of the Chichele Professorship, the University of London began 
to consider the formation of a course of military instruction which would count towards a 
student’s degree. In June 1910 the University’s ‘Military Education Committee’ drew up a 
draft syllabus for a new subject entitled ‘Military Science’ which consisted of optional topics 
to be taken during a student’s penultimate and final year of study. Under this scheme, 
members of the OTC taking a Bachelor’s degree in Arts or Science could undergo courses on 
Tactics and Military Topography, Military Law, and Military Engineering in their 
Intermediate year, followed by a study of ‘Military History and Strategy’ in their final year. 
Since it ‘seem[ed] desirable that the syllabus should be correlated to those in the Regulations 
for University Commissions in the Regular Army’, arrangements were made so that the 
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special campaign selected by the War Office was that which was studied.234 It was hoped that 
the study of Military History, besides allowing a greater opportunity to pass the War Office 
exams, would also ‘enable [the] student to form broad and well-informed opinions on 
questions of national policy’ as well as ‘promoting general interest in the subject, which is 
fundamental to the Art of War’.235 The University accepted these draft proposals, and the 
‘Military Science’ course began in 1913, with the first students taking it during their 
intermediate year.236 Although Captain G.P.A. Phillips was appointed ‘Lecturer in Military 
Science’ for the period 1913-1914, his programme of Military History commenced after the 
outbreak of the Great War. 
Despite the appointment of specialist lecturers to teach Military History at Oxford, 
London and Manchester, Cambridge had not followed suit, so its students who sought a 
nomination for a commission relied on lectures put on by the University’s OTC.237 Ironically, 
just as Oxford abandoned the study of Military History subordinated to the War Office exam, 
on 5 November 1909 Cambridge University’s Board of Military Studies recommended that 
an optional special subject, consisting of military topics, including Military History, should 
be created, as ‘for some years… [at] Oxford’ such a course had ‘undoubtedly proved 
beneficial to the preparation of University Candidates for the Army’. It proposed that two 
papers on Military History, which directly reflected the War Office syllabus, be created, and 
Fortescue’s History of the British Army, along with James’ Modern Strategy, be appointed as 
the textbooks for the course. Once the University Senate confirmed the proposal on 14 
                                                          
234 ULA, ME 1.1, Military Education Committee Papers, ff. 38a, ‘Military Education Committee Minutes, 1909-
1911’, ‘Report on meeting held, 28 June 1910’. 
235 ULA, ME 1.1, Military Education Committee Papers, ff. 38a, ‘Military Education Committee Minutes, 1909-
1911’, ‘Report of Military Education Committee on Syllabuses in Military Science’, 15 March 1911; and, 
Anon., ‘Military Science’, University of London Gazette, 12, No. 146 (1 Jan. 1913), p. 63. 
236 Anon., ‘Syllabuses in Military Science for Examinations in Arts and Science for Internal Students’, 
University of London Gazette, 11, No. 140 (25 May 1912), p. 158.  
237 Anon., ‘CUOTC: Lecture on January 25 1913: The events leading to the Russo-Japanese War’, Cambridge 
Review, 34 (6 January, 1913), p. 189; and, Anon, ‘CUOTC’, Cambridge Review, 34 (6 Mar. 1913), p. 338.  
307 
 
December 1909, the course began with the study of the Waterloo campaign, as the War 
Office had selected this as the ‘special campaign’ for 1910.238 With Cambridge now also 
involved in the teaching of Military History, the discipline had achieved a new level of 
acceptance within the ivory towers of academia. 
 
*  *  * 
 
In summary, it can be seen that the development of ‘high-brow’ Military History was 
dependent on the emergence of Modern History as a discipline located in leading universities 
which emphasised the use of primary source material. While much of the intellectually 
rigorous Military History produced prior to 1899 had continued to focus on the historical 
agency of ‘great men’, after 1885 a new generation of historians began to place a greater 
emphasis on the use of primary sources to solve historical problems beyond those posed by 
the development of the British constitution.239  This new development was driven by the 
professionalisation of the study of History at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and 
Manchester.240 The new emphasis on primary sources meant that Military History could now 
be legitimised whenever historians employed it in their research and writing.241 Just as this 
new generation of historians did not copy or adopt the complex methodologies employed by 
their counterparts in Germany, those who wrote Military History also lacked a scholarly 
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apparatus beyond the archive and pencil.242 Nonetheless, Charles Oman became the first 
university scholar to engage in specific and detailed criticism of the judgements made by 
military figures.243 Previous scholars, such as E.A. Freeman, John Kaye, Samuel Gardiner, 
and C.H. Firth had deferred to the judgement of professional soldiers.244 This increasing 
rigour also influenced those working outside universities, with John Fortescue’s History of 
the British Army not only drawing on a wide range of primary sources but also engaging in an 
analysis of the past which was not simply centred on ‘great men’.  
 There were, in essence, three factors which contributed to an approach to Military 
History which took source material more seriously, establishing it as a serious research 
discipline, and which made it a university subject. First, around the turn of the century 
military historical subjects began to make inroads into the curricula at several universities: for 
instance, in 1899 Military History was included in the Modern History syllabus at Oxford to 
supplement the study of political history. 245  Second, following the army’s poor showing 
during the Second Boer War, the university candidate scheme was reorganised, so that 
between 1904 and 1914 the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester and London 
came to teach the military historical knowledge required for a nomination for a 
commission.246 In fact, the way in which the subject was taught at these universities closely 
mirrored the War Office syllabus, which was based in part on Jomini’s ‘principles of war’.247 
Third, there was a growing conviction that civilians, too, required knowledge of military 
                                                          
242 Bentley, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing’, pp. 215-4.  
243 Oman, ‘Plea for Military History’, p. 815.  
244 Freeman, History of the Norman Conquest of England, Vol. 3, pp. 505-507; Gardiner, History of the Great 
Civil War, Vol. 2, 1894, pp. 197-214; Firth, Cromwell’s Army, p. v; and, Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in 
India, Vol. 3 (1st edn., 1864), p. ix. 
245 OUA, FA 4.11.2.1 Modern History Faculty Board Reports, 1899-1912, Report of the Committee on English 
Political History, 26 January 1899, p. 1. 
246 Anon, ‘University and the Army’, Manchester Guardian, 28 Sept. 1905, p. 12; Anon, ‘University 
Intelligence’, Manchester University Magazine, 2 Nov. 1906, p. 4; Anon, ‘Naval and Military Intelligence’, The 
Times, 6 Sept. 1906, p. 4; and, Anon, ‘University Intelligence’, The Times, 27 Oct. 1904, p. 9. 
247 Anon, Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia for Commissions in the Regular 
Army held in September 1906, p. 26. 
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affairs which could only be gained through knowledge of Military History. When Spenser 
Wilkinson was appointed in 1909 to the first Chichele Professorship in Military History, the 
‘special subject’ was reorganised to provide instruction in ‘the nature of war’ for future 
politicians.248 In fact, Wilkinson largely dismissed the notion of ‘principles of war’ in his 
teaching, contemptuously writing that he would only give them passing mention ‘for what 
they were worth’.249 
This move away from the War Office syllabus meant that for the first time Military 
History was on the road to becoming a university subject in its own right, overseen by 
professional historians. The increasing acceptance of the subject was reflected in chapters on 
Military History published in the Cambridge Modern History, 1902-12.250 The trend was 
confirmed in the years between 1909 and 1914 when several postgraduate students at Oxford 
undertook a B.Litt. in aspects of the subject, supervised by Wilkinson and Oman.251 This 
growing acceptance of Military History as a scholarly discipline was symbolised by the 
inclusion of a ‘Naval and Military Section’ at the International Congress of Historical Studies 
held in London in 1913.252 At this event, although Wilkinson was notable by his absence, 
civilian scholars, including Oman and J. Holland Rose, a Reader in Modern History at 
Cambridge, gave papers on Military History alongside officers, such as F.B. Maurice and A. 
Lonsdale Hale.253 
 The final confirmation of the acceptance of Military History at leading British 
universities could be seen in the establishment by Trinity College, Cambridge, of the ‘Lees 
                                                          
248 Wilkinson, University and the Study of War, p. 10. 
249 OUA, FA 4.11.2.1, Modern History Board Reports, 1899-1912, Wilkinson to Johnson, Report on the 
teaching of Military History, 22 February 1911. 
250 A.W. Ward, et al., Cambridge Modern History, Vols. 8-9.  
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Knowles Lectureship in Military Science’, with Fortescue appointed as the first holder of this 
honour.254 Despite the title, Fortescue did not discuss in any depth ‘military science’ during 
the lectures he gave during the Michaelmas Term of 1913.255 Instead, he examined the scope 
of the field of Military History, providing a broad overview of British military activity, 
particularly in India and the colonies, based on the research he had conducted for his History 
of the British Army. Like Wilkinson, his thinking was based on the understanding that 
warfare was primarily ‘the strife of communities’ and so required statesmen to study it as 
well as soldiers. He argued that through the study of Military History it was possible ‘to learn 
the nature of the supreme test to which a nation may be subjected, so that [the nation] may 
equip [itself] morally and physically to pass through the ordeal with success’. Of secondary 
consideration was the study of strategy because he felt that the subject was of importance to 
‘citizens at large’, since it gave them as voters an insight into ‘how far strategical 
considerations enter into political arrangements’ and so was ‘essential to the right 
understanding… of domestic and foreign politics’.256 
The transformation of attitudes towards Military History at universities was now 
complete. The subject had been for much of nineteenth century the domain of conservative 
‘men of letters’, who had emphasised the role of ‘great men’ in deciding the outcome of 
historical events, and who had lacked scholarly credibility in the eyes of the mostly liberal, 
professional historians whose work focused on the political history on Britain.257 In fact, for 
the most part, prior to the appearance of Oman’s History of the Peninsular War (1902), most 
high-brow Military History was largely uncritical of the British Army and often consisted of 
                                                          
254 Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, The Times, 11 Mar. 1913, p. 5. 
255 Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, Cambridge Review, 34 (6 Mar. 1913), p. 364. 
256 Fortescue, Military History, pp. 4, 14, 29, 32, 19, 42.  
257 For examples of writing casting doubts on the credibility of Military History: Anon., ‘L’Histoire du Consulat 
et de l’Empire’, Edinburgh Review, pp. 147-79; [Hamley], ‘Thiers on Waterloo’, Blackwood’s Magazine, pp. 
607-33; ‘V’, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, Fraser’s Magazine, pp. 539-50; and, E.B. Hamley, ‘Carlyle: 
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biographical work which sought to protect the reputation of its subject.258 It was, however, a 
tribute to Britain’s liberal atmosphere that when civilians began to examine military historical 
subjects in detail, they did not attract the same level of opposition as was, for instance, the 
case in Germany. When Maurice criticised Oman’s analysis of Moore’s retreat to Corunna it 
was to suggest how civilian scholars could improve their approach to the subject; Lord 
Roberts and Lord Nicholson even agreed to write references to support Wilkinson’s 
application for the Chichele Chair of Military History.259 
Of course, it may have been that the lack of resistance was due to the unpopularity of 
reading among army officers. 260  But the problem of anti-intellectualism was only to be 
seriously argued over between the World Wars, a debate which was conditioned by a very 
different set of parameters. But in early 1914, these controversies lay far over the horizon.
                                                          
258 For instance: Alison, Life of John Duke of Marlborough: Yonge, Life of Field-Marshal Arthur, Duke of 
Wellington; and, Bruce, Life of General Sir William Napier. 
259 Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 1, p. 320; and, Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years, p. 313. 
260 Anon., ‘Notes by the Editor, Military Education’, p. 491. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Military History has, to a great extent, been viewed by researchers through the lens of 
twentieth century debates. As a result, the type of Military History which emerged during the 
period between 1854 and 1914 has been dismissed as mostly simplistic, unreliable or 
reactionary, especially the form known as official history.1 However, this negative perception 
was formed as a result of controversies in the twentieth century, not least those instigated by 
the writing of Basil Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller.2 As there has been hitherto no attempt to 
examine the emergence of Military History on its own terms, largely because the existing 
secondary literature does not identify this as a subject worthy of study in its own right, the 
development of the discipline has been fundamentally misunderstood.  
In essence, historians have approached pre-1914 Military History with a series of 
preconceived notions, often assuming that one genre of the discipline somehow represents the 
entire subject matter. As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, however, British Military 
History experienced a dramatic expansion and diversification between 1854 and 1914. There 
were, in fact, five main factors which drove the development of the subject: the requirements 
of military education; the need to compile recent or historical information for intelligence and 
planning purposes; commercial opportunism; the desire to alter the public perception of 
                                                          
1 Howard, ‘Military History and the History of War’, p. 14. 
2 Liddell Hart, Remaking Modern Armies, p. 170; and, Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, pp. 29, 328. 
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military affairs; and, the transformation of Modern History into a university discipline based 
on the use of primary sources. While the emergence of Military History in the second half of 
the nineteenth century has been largely ignored by historians in favour of themes such as 
military reform, tactical development and technological innovation, the changes in the way in 
which it was both written and studied between 1854 and 1914 had a profound effect on its 
future development.  
 
*  *  * 
 
The central aim of this study has been to ascertain how and why British Military History 
emerged, expanded and diversified between 1854 and 1914. In order to provide a response to 
the central research question, it is first necessary to address the five sub-questions outlined in 
the introduction.  
 In regard to the first sub-question – what caused the army to expand the use of 
Military History in its exam syllabuses – the increase in the use of Military History in the 
army’s exam syllabuses in 1856 and 1904 occurred for the same reason on both occasions, 
namely, in an attempt to improve the education of the officer corps out of military necessity 
following infamous and well-publicised battlefield disasters. However, the way in which it 
was thought that the subject could contribute to this end underwent significant change. After 
the Crimean War, Military History was added to the syllabuses of Sandhurst, Woolwich, 
Chatham and the Staff College to provide officers with a theoretical framework through 
which they could gain a greater understanding of the factors which were thought to influence 
the conduct of a campaign. Despite the use of Clausewitz’s writing at the Staff College 
between 1868 and 1872, a factor not explored in the scholarly literature on the influence of 
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the Prussian’s writing in Britain, this framework was derived largely from the ‘principles of 
war’ articulated by Jomini.3  
 This approach to studying Military History had several serious flaws, however. On 
the one hand, it created an odd paradox. Although the army deemed that Military History was 
important enough to insist that officer cadets at Sandhurst, Woolwich and Chatham undergo a 
course in the subject, no effort was made at this time to institutionalise the study of the 
subject by obliging the majority of the officer corps to read it. On the other hand, the 
exclusive reliance on continental theorists, which reflected the poverty of British military 
thought at this time, prevented the study of an approach to warfare which was tailored to 
Britain’s unique situation. Thus, although between 1854 and 1914 the British Army was 
involved in numerous colonial conflicts as well as operations which required close co-
operation with the navy, as Jomini and Clausewitz’s writing did not focus on these types of 
military operations, they were essentially ignored in the army’s Military History syllabuses 
prior to the 1890s.4  
As the teaching of Maurice and Henderson at the Staff College (1885-99) had a major 
influence on the perceived military utility of the study of Military History, when the subject 
was given more emphasis in the army’s exam syllabuses after the Second Boer War it was 
assigned three functions not present prior to the 1890s. It was intended to increase the 
military capacity of officers by developing their decision-making ability, as advocated by the 
Clausewitzian approach to the subject. 5  In fact, despite the view of the existing 
historiography, the study of Military History immediately prior to the outbreak of the Great 
War did not simply consist of compiling factual information, but was considerably more 
                                                          
3 Bassford does not specifically examine the use of Clausewitz’s writing in British military education, and 
instead relies on published works which referenced the theorist. The closest he came to examining the use of On 
War at the Staff College in the 1870s was to speculate that Chesney had read the work. Bassford, Clausewitz in 
English, p. 48; and, Royal Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, pp. 104, 287. 
4 Jomini, The Summary of the Art of War, p. 62; and, Bassford, Clausewitz in English, p. 18.   
5 Clausewitz, On War, ed. Howard & Paret, p. 156. 
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complex. 6  It was thought that the study of the subject could play a role in the 
professionalisation of the officer corps by creating an interest in military literature.7 To this 
end, there was an effort to institutionalise the study of Military History by increasing the 
number of officers required to take exams in the subject and by limiting the use of textbooks 
to encourage wider reading.8 Given the increasing emphasis in British military thought on 
maritime considerations, naval elements now played a role in the study of the subject.9 
 In response to the second sub-question – why was there an increase in the writing of 
Military History intended to serve a didactic purpose for army officers? – the increase in the 
writing of Military History intended for military educational purposes was caused primarily 
by two factors. Commercial opportunism led to an expansion in the publication of material 
intended to assist those taking army exams between 1856, and the early 1870s as well as after 
1904. At the same time, a small number of officers wrote work intended to improve the 
education of their fellows as they felt that army education was not preparing them sufficiently 
for future conflicts. In 1856, when Military History was added to the syllabus designed for 
those seeking a staff appointment, an audience, and so a commercial opportunity, was created 
for material to assist officers taking this exam. 10  However, the initial expansion in the 
publication of Military History for this purpose was short lived because in the 1870s and 
early 1880s Operations of War was made the sole basis of the Military History syllabus at the 
                                                          
6 Liddell Hart, Remaking Modern Armies, p. 170; Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 157; Holden 
Reid, ‘War Studies at the Staff College 1890-1930’, p. 4; and, Luvaas, Education of an Army, pp. 243, 369. 
6 Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, pp. 29, 328; Liddell Hart, Ghost of Napoleon, p. 146; and, idem., 
Remaking Modern Armies, pp. 170, 173. 
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8 An Infantry Subaltern’, ‘Promotion of Regimental Officers’, United Service Magazine (Dec. 1903), p. 288; 
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Staff College and Woolwich.11 As a result, the financial incentive for publishers and authors 
to produce such educational material was reduced, so the publication of such work declined 
during this period.12 
 In the late 1880s and 1890s a handful of officers took it upon themselves to improve 
army education by either translating into English material related to the study of Military 
History, or by writing works which used the subject but were unrelated to the army’s exam 
syllabus.13 Although few in number, these works had a disproportionate influence on how 
Military History was subsequently approached when it was intended to serve an educational 
purpose for officers as several had the effect of establishing new ideas in British military 
thought. A focus on German tactical writing introduced the Clausewitzian approach to 
Military History to Britain and this had a profound effect on Henderson’s writing.14 Likewise, 
Callwell drew on Military History to provide examples for Small Wars as well as his work on 
maritime operations.15  
 As the ideas regarding the study of Military History which came from German writers 
had altered the perceived function of Military History in the 1890s, this influenced the way in 
which it was written for the instruction of officers after the Second Boer War. The expansion 
of the army’s use of the subject, combined with the decision to avoid prescribing textbooks, 
created once again a financial incentive for publishers and authors to produce work which 
officers could use to study in preparation for an exam. As a result, a large amount of this type 
                                                          
11 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1870, p. 7; General Orders by his Royal 
Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-chief (1 October, 1874), p. 1; and, Lonsdale Hale, ‘Professional 
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12 BL, Macmillan Papers, MS55075, ff. 68, Maurice to Macmillan, 31 July 1889.  
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14 Henderson, Battle of Spicheren, pp. 27, 260-1. 
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of material appeared between 1904 and 1914.16 While this material naturally reflected the 
Military History syllabuses used by the army, they have been misrepresented in the existing 
historiography. As Luvaas was convinced that the way in which the army studied Military 
History was based on the recollection of ‘facts’, he saw these works as merely intended to 
furnish officers with basic information which they would be expected to reproduce verbatim 
in the exam. As a result, he thought that this type of work, particularly those on the American 
Civil War, represented a step back in British military thought as they ignored Henderson’s 
contention that military history should be studied to induce men to think critically about 
warfare. 17  However, these works were intended to provide the raw material with which 
candidates could analyse the historical military situations presented to them in the exam, and 
so reflected the adoption of Henderson’s contention rather than its rejection.18 
 In terms of the third sub-question – what caused the emergence and diversification of 
official history? – it is clear that this genre of Military History emerged and diversified due to 
a combination of factors. Initially, official history emerged from the need for precise military 
information, as it was used to compile reports and technical information regarding the siege 
of Sebastopol in order so that officers in the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery could learn 
from this chastening experience. Moreover, military educational requirements contributed to 
the writing of the army’s official account of the Russo-Japanese War as it was intended to 
provide information for those taking the new Military History exams introduced after the 
Second Boer War. 19  Similarly, the compilation of a ‘Combined History’ of the Russo-
Japanese War by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence reflected the 
                                                          
16 An Infantry Subaltern’, ‘Promotion of Regimental Officers’, p. 288; and, Anon, Report on the Competitive 
Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in 
September 1904, p. 8.  
17 Luvaas, Military Legacy of the Civil War, p. 188. 
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increasing emphasis on the role played by maritime considerations in British military 
thought.20 Consequently, the work presented the view for those studying the campaign to see 
the actions of the two branches of service as interdependent.  
 The need to compile information for intelligence and planning purposes, and to 
provide technical information for staff officers, led to the diversification of British official 
history as accounts were produced which largely ignored the fighting and focused almost 
exclusively on logistical considerations and the intricacies of the politics of regions. Although 
these works were dismissed as ‘non-descript’ and largely overlooked by Luvaas, they were in 
fact highly specialised works. 21  They not only reflected what were seen as the biggest 
challenges faced by British forces in various regions around the world, but also the proposed 
solutions. For example, while the authorised accounts which dealt with expeditions 
conducted in Africa consisted largely of logistical information, those regarding campaigns 
fought in India focused on imparting an understanding of the customs and characteristics of 
the native peoples.22 
 From 1879, following a series of military defeats and the growing press coverage of 
colonial campaigns, the production of authorised accounts became increasingly influenced by 
the desire to alter the way in which the public understood the conflict.23 When John Frederick 
Maurice was appointed the official historian of the British invasion of Egypt of 1882, for 
example, he decided to produce an account which was principally aimed at the reading public 
and was intended not only to respond to press criticism of the campaign, but also to influence 
the way the public understood future operations.24 Similarly, the desire to alter the public 
perception of the Second Boer War led Henderson to begin to write an account of this 
                                                          
20 Anon., Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, 5 Parts. 
21 Ibid., pp. xi, xiv-xvii, 1-43, 199-231, 284-6.  
22 Paget and Mason, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised and Brought Up to 
Date by Lt. A.H. Mason; and, Reade, Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6. 
23 Reade, Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6; and, Anon., Operations in Somaliland. 
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conflict which was intended to defend Britain’s justification for going to war by demonising 
the Boers; and, it attempted to place as much blame as possible for the army’s poor 
performance on the neglect by the government.25 The suppression of Henderson’s account 
demonstrated that the debate surrounding the bias of official history pre-dated Liddell Hart’s 
accusations about the Official History of the Great War.26 However, it is noteworthy that in 
Henderson’s case the government acted to limit the partisan nature of the work in order to 
reduce its potential to create controversy and to ensure that official history was, at least in 
their view, once again of use to officers studying the campaign.27  
 Turning to the fourth sub-question – what factors contributed to the expansion and 
diversification of popular Military History? – the primary driving force behind its expansion 
was commercial opportunism. Financial considerations drove the publication of the majority 
of this type of material and, ultimately, caused it to emerge as an established form of writing 
by the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the desire to alter the reading public’s 
perception of military events also played an important role in the diversification of this type 
of Military History. The initial expansion of popular Military History occurred during the late 
1850s as publishers were keen to capitalise on public interest in the Crimean War and the 
Indian Mutiny. To this end they produced a large number of ‘instant’ and serialised histories 
which drew on British eyewitness testimony to describe events soon after they occurred.28
 Popular Military History underwent a second period of dramatic expansion and 
diversification between 1884 and 1914. This was caused by the growth in the potential 
market for such work as the literacy rate in Britain increased significantly, falling production 
                                                          
25 CLW, Henderson Papers, A320f.B1, Draft of Chapter 2, p. 5. 
26 Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn From History?, p. 32; LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/259/84, Liddell 
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28 Figes, Crimea, p. 305; and, Bullard, Famous War Correspondents, p. 5. 
320 
 
costs enabled works to be sold for less, a colonial book market emerged and the development 
of the cheap jingoistic popular press stimulated a greater public interest in colonial 
campaigns, which reached new heights during the Second Boer War.29 Even though ‘instant 
histories’, which made up the majority of such work, only experienced a short life-cycle, the 
large volume of books which were produced during this period caused popular Military 
History to become an established form of writing by the end of the nineteenth century.30   
 This emergence of popular Military History as an established form of writing caused 
the subject to diversify as it was now seen as a medium through which it was possible to 
influence the perception of military affairs held by a sizeable portion of the reading public.31 
Initially, popular Military History was used in this way by senior officers in an effort to 
control the public perception of the campaigns which they had conducted and so enhance 
their reputations.32 However, amid growing concerns about British ‘military inefficiency’, 
particularly acute after the embarrassing setbacks encountered by the army during the Second 
Boer War, several popular military histories, most notably the Times History of the War in 
South Africa, argued for military reform.33 Similarly, the growing nationalism and militarism 
of the period was not only reflected in the Military History which appeared after 1884, it also 
caused a diversification of the way in which the subject appeared. Following the large 
number of works produced that eulogised General Gordon, more biographical volumes were 
                                                          
29 Weedon, Victorian Publishing, pp. 33, 114; and, Altick, English Common Reader, p. 171. 
30 RPL, Longman Papers, MS1393.2.72, ff. 398, Churchill to Longman, 10 March 1900. 
31 Steevens’ With Kitchener to Khartum had sold 54,902 copies by the end of 1899. The Times History of the 
War in South Africa sold 29,500 individual volumes. Arthur Conan Doyle’s Great Boer War sold 50,000 copies 
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32 Brackenbury, Ashanti War: A Narrative; [Maurice], Ashantee War; Hensman, Afghan War of 1879-1880; and, 
Roberts, Forty-One Years in India.  
33 Amery (ed.), Times History of the War in South Africa, Vol. 2, pp. 421-65, Vol. 3, p. 301; Wilson, With the 
Flag to Pretoria, Vol. 1, vi, 4, 207, Vol. 2, pp. 703-4; and, Doyle, Great Boer War, pp. 183-94. 
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published which underscored and championed positive personality traits thought to be 
stereotypically British.34   
 In response to the fifth sub-question – what factors contributed to the emergence of 
Military History as a university and research discipline? – the emergence of Military History 
as a research discipline was dependent on the development of Modern History into a 
university discipline based on the use of primary sources as it led military historians to 
increase the scholarly rigor of their work and legitimised the study of the subject in the eyes 
of professional historians. However, although Military History initially became a university 
subject due to the influence of Oman and Firth at Oxford, it was military educational 
requirements which underpinned how the subject was taught from 1904. The increasing 
emphasis on primary sources in the writing of Military History by university historians 
influenced those writing outside the academy. As a result, from the late 1890s high-brow 
Military History, authored by ‘men of letters’, such as Fortescue and Trevelyan, was written 
using a range of primary source material. The increasing use of primary sources created 
scope for more sophisticated work to be written; so high-brow Military History broke away 
from its earlier emphasis on biography.35  
 While financial considerations played a role in the publication of some high-brow 
Military History, most notably Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea, they cannot be seen as 
contributing to the emergence of the subject as a serious research discipline. To be able to 
compose high-brow Military History which engaged in serious research, as opposed to work 
which, for example, either lionised a ‘great man’ or which was intended to appeal to popular 
sentiments in order to increase circulation, required access to a large amount of primary 
                                                          
34 Fletcher, Baden-Powell of Mafeking, p. 9; Stevens, Complete History of the South African War, p. 148; and, 
Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 34-53. 
35 For example see: Firth, Cromwell’s Army; Oman, History of the Art of War: Middle Ages From the Fourth to 
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source material. This often meant that only a select few people could write this type of work, 
and so limited the scope for commercial factors to drive the composition of the subject. 
Equally, one of the most intellectually rigorous works to appear, Fortescue’s History of the 
British Army, was not financially successful. Indeed, even though both author and publisher 
lost money on the work they continued to produce it.36 
 After the Second Boer War, concerns regarding the standard of officer education and 
the extent to which politicians understood military matters influenced the way in which 
Military History was taught at British universities. Following a change in the War Office 
scheme by which a university candidate could be awarded a commission, between 1904 and 
1913 Military History came to be taught at the Universities of Manchester, London and 
Cambridge as well as fundamentally altered at Oxford.37 Therefore, despite the aspirations of 
the newly appointed Lecturer in Military History at All Souls College, the way in which he 
was expected to teach the subject was dominated by the army’s exam syllabus and so the 
earlier developments in the way in which intellectually rigorous Military History was written 
could have little impact.38 Moreover, even when Wilkinson was appointed to the Chichele 
Chair of Military History in 1909, he adopted an approach to the study of the subject which 
was based on the writing of Clausewitz and was intended to educate future politicians.39 
Thus, his understanding of Military History bore little relation to earlier ‘high-brow’ writing 
which could loosely be described as ‘academic’.  
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1912), p. 158. 
38 OUA, Modern History Faculty Board Reports 1899-1912, FA 4.11.2.1, Report on the ‘Military History 
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*  *  * 
 
The answers to these five individual sub-questions, which closely relate to the five main 
genres of Military History, allow for a more considered response to the main research 
question as to how and why Military History emerged, expanded and diversified in Britain 
between 1854 and 1914. In essence, there were five general factors which can be identified in 
the establishment of Military History as a discipline: first, the desire to improve military 
education; second, the requirements of military intelligence and staff planning; third, 
commercial opportunism; fourth, the desire to influence the public perception of military 
affairs; and, fifth, the professionalisation of the study of History at several universities. Each 
genre was influenced by its own particular dynamics, so that popular Military History, for 
example, was driven by the commercial opportunities which such work offered publishers 
and authors. At the same time, these different factors exerted together a collective influence 
on the overall advance of the discipline over a sixty-year period. 
 There were other contextual factors which played a part in the expanding productivity 
among military historians. One of these was the overlapping nature of the three categories of 
military historian identified in the study – army officers, historians and journalists. For 
example, General John Frederick Maurice, who taught Military History to officers at the Staff 
College, not only acted as a correspondent for the Daily News during the Ashanti campaign 
and used his reports to compile an ‘instant history’, but later also worked as a high-brow 
historian when he composed Diary of Sir John Moore in 1904. Equally, Spenser Wilkinson, 
who began his literary career as a journalist became the first Chichele Professor in Military 
History at Oxford. But it was not simply the boundary-crossing of the historians which 
played a role. Events such as the Indian Mutiny and the Second Boer War generated an 
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appetite for popular histories. This, in turn, created a process whereby the army leadership 
developed an interest in using official history to influence public opinion. 
 Another factor which cannot be underestimated is the role played by foreign military 
authors. Since in the mid-nineteenth century, there was no real indigenous British Military 
History to speak of, the need to consult foreign authors was almost absolute. For this reason, 
German approaches to the study of Tactics and Military History played a key part in the 
emergence of Military History in Britain. Foreign military theorists cannot be ignored either, 
Jomini and Clausewitz in particular, as they offered an intellectual justification for the study 
of historical case studies and examples. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the expansion 
of Military History in Britain without reference to Clausewitz and Jomini. 
Although it is true that Jomini’s work was promoted heavily through Edward 
Hamley’s Operations of War, the influence of Clausewitz has been somewhat 
underestimated. In this regard, an examination of material used to teach Military History at 
the Staff College reveals that the transition from away from the exclusive use of Jomini’s 
ideas first began in the late 1860s when students were encouraged to use an eclectic range of 
theorists, especially Clausewitz.40 Graham’s translation of On War (1873) may have been a 
by-product of the teaching at the College. After all, he had written Progress of the Art of War 
in 1858 to assist the officers studying for a staff appointment. The initial failure of Graham’s 
translation to sell is probably explained by the dominance of Hamley’s Operations of War.41 
It is likely that Operations of War hindered the emergence of a professional reading public as 
it served to reduce the number of works published for military educational purposes; and, as 
                                                          
40 Baring, Staff College Essays, pp. 196, 129, 175, 198, 215-7.  
41 Bassford, Clausewitz in English, p. 57. 
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Hamley artificially inflated the price of the work, it may have dissuaded or even prevented 
officers from buying it and developing an interest in military literature.42  
Soon after Clausewitz’s ideas returned to the Staff College in the mid-1880s, they 
influenced Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’.43 Although they have been overlooked by 
historians, Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’ had a major impact on how Military History 
was studied by the army in the two decades prior to the outbreak of the Great War and so also 
on British military thought during this time. As Military History was used by the army to 
communicate a standard way of understanding the nature of war, when the teaching of the 
subject was expanded after the Second Boer War the approach then in use at the Staff 
Colleges, which was dependent on Henderson’s ‘strategical principles’, dictated how warfare 
was presented on the new exam syllabus. Thus, although there was no direct reference to 
Henderson’s ‘principles’, from 1904 the Military History syllabuses of Sandhurst, Woolwich 
and the promotional and competitive exams presented warfare using the same combination of 
Clausewitzian and Jominian ideas which they embodied. For example, both Henderson’s 
‘principles’ and the new syllabus placed a great emphasis on the influence of psychological 
factors in war, as Clausewitz had done, while at the same time they presented the necessity 
for concentrating a ‘superior force at the decisive point at the decisive time’, as per Jomini’s 
writing. 44  Equally, both underscored the influence of maritime considerations on land 
campaigns.45  
 
                                                          
42 NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4199, ff. 17, Hamley to Blackwood 22 February 1865, and MSS30690, Book 
Publication Agreements, Hamley to Blackwood, 10 April 1865. 
43 LHCMA, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/10, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, Mar. 1912. 
44 JSCSC, Shrivenham, Junior Division 1912, ff. 34-36. ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles, 6th edn., March 
1912. 
45 LHCMA, W. Robertson Papers, 1/2/10, List of ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles’, March 1912; ‘An 
Infantry Subaltern’, ‘Promotion of Regimental Officers’, p. 288; and, Anon, Report on the Competitive 
Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for Commissions in the Regular Army held in 
September 1904, p. 8. 
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*  *  * 
 
Despite Fuller’s assertion that the study of Military History by the army prior to the First 
World War was based on the compilation of factual information for its own sake, a sentiment 
repeated by Liddell Hart in his often quoted allusion to the ‘enumera[tion] of the blades of 
grass in the Shenandoah Valley’, this thesis has sought to challenge this view.46 From the late 
1880s, the way in which the army studied the subject became increasingly influenced by the 
approach devised by Clausewitz and articulated by subsequent German writers.47 By 1904 the 
Military History syllabus of the Staff Colleges, Sandhurst, Woolwich and the promotional 
exams were centred on the development of an officer’s military judgement and his ability to 
identify the ‘lessons’ demonstrated by a campaign.48 Strangely, Fuller must have been aware 
of this, as to gain entry to the Staff College in the summer of 1913 he achieved high marks in 
a Military History exam that, for example, not only asked him to ‘explain how railways have 
influenced strategical operations’, but as the examiner explained, was designed to ascertain 
an officer’s ability to make ‘clear and concise deductions’ from the past.49   
This finding has several wider ramifications regarding both the understanding of 
officer training and military thought in Britain prior to the First World War. As the existing 
historical literature which has commented on the role played by Military History in officer 
education has accepted Fuller and Liddell Hart’s contention, it has misrepresented both the 
                                                          
46 Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, p. 328. 
47 For example, Gizycki, Exercises in Strategy and Tactics: [taken from Strategischtaktische Aufgaben nebst 
Lösungen], trans. Rocca. 
48 Anon., Synopsis of the Course of Instruction at the Royal Military College, 1906, p. 7; and, Anon., Report on 
the Examinations of the Fourth Class at the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College held in 
December 1905, p. 20. 
49 Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1913, pp. 20, 75; and, Fuller, Foundations 
of the Science of War, p. 14.  
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intended function of Military History and how it was studied. 50  More recent historical 
research which has touched on this part of officer education, such as De Groot’s biography of 
Douglas Haig, has incorrectly interpreted material related to the study of Military History at 
the Staff College. De Groot claimed that as Henderson had deducted marks from Haig’s 
answer to a question on the Shenandoah valley due to points of ‘mere trivia’ regarding the 
location of a bridge and the time which night fell in the region it had demonstrated that 
Liddell Hart’s explanation of how the topic was taught was essentially correct.51 However, 
when it is understood that Henderson used Military History to develop the subjective 
judgement of his pupils, by placing them in a historical situation and expecting them to 
explain and justify the course of action that they would have adopted, knowledge of the 
location of a strategically important bridge, and the time from which darkness would have 
made the movement of troops considerably more difficult, was of great importance.52   
Besides concealing the real development of British military thought in the decades 
before the First World War, the emphasis placed by the scholarly literature on Fuller and 
Liddell Hart’s interpretation of the way in which the army studied Military History prior to 
1914 has obscured the larger point which these writers were attempting to articulate 
regarding the role the subject should play in officer education. In fact, both Fuller and Liddell 
Hart condemned the way in which Military History had been studied in order to argue that the 
subject was of greatest utility to the military when it was used to ascertain how warfare had 
changed previously and so could be used to provide an indication as to how it would 
subsequently develop. 53  As the role played by ‘economic factors’, the organisation of 
manpower as well as technical innovation, particularly in terms of weaponry, were seen by 
                                                          
50 Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College, p. 157; Holden Reid, ‘War Studies at the Staff College 1890-
1930’, p. 4; and, Luvaas, Education of an Army, pp. 243, 369. 
51 Gerard J. De Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London, 1988), p. 50.  
52 Henderson, Science of War, pp. 181-2.  
53 Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, p. 328;  Liddell Hart, Ghost of Napoleon, p. 146; and, idem, 
Remaking Modern Armies, p. 173. 
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both men to be central causes of change in warfare, they criticised the British Army for 
failing to place an emphasis on these factors before 1914.54 For example, Fuller alluded to the 
‘Brown Bess mind’ which caused the army to see fighting as ‘the sum and not the product of 
the weapons used’ and which he felt had caused technological changes in weaponry to have 
been largely ignored.55 Similarly, Liddell Hart saw the American Civil War as ‘the signpost 
that was missed’ since he thought that the army had overlooked the influence which ‘rifles’ 
and ‘indirect’ approaches, such as those allowed by northern sea-power, had the potential to 
have in the future.56  
However, Fuller and Liddell Hart were not entirely correct, as some of these factors 
had influenced the study of Military History in Britain before 1914. The revisions which 
Hamley made to Operations of War were related to how technical innovations, principally the 
development of the telegraph, railways and rifled weapons, had influenced strategy and 
tactics, and in the 1878 edition of the work he concluded that the telegraph had modified 
Jomini’s conclusion regarding the strength of the central strategic position.57 Likewise, it was 
the realisation of the potential which the introduction of modern rifled weapons had to 
transform tactics which caused historical present to be seen as no longer a good basis for their 
study.58 This caused the Manchester Tactical Society, and others in Britain who studied 
tactics, to look toward German works on the topic and it led to the removal of Military 
                                                          
54 For example see: Basil Liddell Hart, Sherman (London, 1930), pp. vii-viii, 381, 427-8, 429-30, 431; idem, 
British Way in Warfare (London, 1932), p. 123; J.F.C. Fuller, Armament in History (London, 1946), pp. 15-36; 
J.F.C. Fuller, Machine Warfare: An Enquiry into the Influence on the Art of War (London, 1942); J.F.C. Fuller, 
‘The Place of the American Civil War in the Evolution of War’, Army Quarterly, 26 (July 1933), pp. 319-20; 
J.F.C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization, pp. 95, 99; J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant 
(London, 1929), pp. 27-8, 62-3, 65-6.  
55 Fuller, Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars, p. 20.  
56 Liddell Hart, Sherman, pp. vii-viii, 381, 427-8, 429-30, 431; and, Liddell Hart, British Way in Warfare, p. 
123. It is interesting to note that Fuller and Liddell Hart both incorrectly stated that during the American Civil 
War both sides were used ‘rifles’ when in fact they were using rifled muskets. Henderson also made the same 
error in his writing and so perhaps hints at the extent to which these later writers relied on his work. See also 
Henderson, Science of War, p. 323. 
57 Hamley, Operations of War (4th edn.), pp. vi, 441.  
58 Anon., Report on the Competitive Examination of the Officers of the Militia and Imperial Yeomanry for 
Commissions in the Regular Army held in September 1904, pp. 7, 35. 
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History from the syllabuses of Woolwich and Sandhurst so that the study of Tactics could 
take place using fictional case studies rather than historical precedent.59 
Besides changes caused by purely technical matters, prior to 1914 there was also 
some realisation that changes to the organisation of manpower and economic considerations 
had caused warfare to undergo a period of development during the nineteenth century. 
Although these factors featured only to a limited extent in the study of Military History at the 
Staff College, they were the premise of Wilkinson’s teaching as Chichele Professor of 
Military History at Oxford in the years immediately before the outbreak of the Great War.60 
Wilkinson’s course of study was dictated by the selection of campaigns which he thought 
demonstrated the development of the ‘nation in arms’, as he felt that this knowledge would 
cause his students, who he expected to form the country’s governing elite, to be more 
effective ‘statesmen’.61  
Furthermore, the fact that the army had been studying maritime operations on its 
Military History syllabuses from the 1890s reflected the realisation that Britain’s armed 
forces were particularly well suited to conduct this type of warfare long before the 
appearance of Liddell Hart’s British Way in Warfare in 1932 or even Corbett’s Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911.62 Thus, despite Liddell Hart’s contention that the 
importance of maritime considerations during the American Civil War were overlooked 
before 1914, the campaign on the Richmond Peninsula – which underscored the potential of 
                                                          
59 Anon., Report on the Education of Officers by the Director-General of Military Education, 1876, p. 14; Royal 
Commission, Military Education, 1870, Evidence, p. 438; NLS, Blackwood Papers, MS4294, ff. 262, J. F. 
Maurice to Blackwood, 1872; Buchanan-Dunlop (ed.), Records of the Royal Military Academy, p. 132; Anon., 
Report on the Education of Officers by the Director-General of Military Education, 1889, p. 4, 10; TNA, 
WO147/58, Lord Wolseley’s Papers, Report of the Committee on the Course of Study at the Royal Military 
Academy, Woolwich, 7 May 1886. 
60 OUA, FA 4.11.2.1, Modern History Board Reports, 1899-1912, Wilkinson to Johnson: Report on the teaching 
of Military History, 22 February 1911; and, Wilkinson, University and the Study of War, pp. 14-15.  
61 OUA, FA 4.11.2.1, Modern History Board Reports, 1899-1912, Wilkinson to Johnson: Report on the teaching 
of Military History, 22 February 1911. 
62 JSCSC, Shrivenham, Junior Division 1912, ff. 34-6. ‘Henderson’s Strategical Principles, 6th edn., March 
1912. 
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the Federal armed forces to conduct amphibious operations – was regularly used by the army 
to examine this very factor for at least a decade before the outbreak of the Great War.63 While 
Holden Reid was correct in pointing out that Liddell Hart was wrong in his assumption that 
the use of maritime operations during the American Civil War had gone unnoticed in Britain, 
it cannot be said that this conflict was principally responsible for causing the importance of 
‘command of the sea’ to be recognised.64 After all, it was not until the 1890s that this factor 
entered into the army’s Military History exam syllabuses, and the Peninsular War was just as 
regularly used to pose questions on this topic.65 
Nevertheless, while it may be doubted whether Fuller’s view of the role Military 
History should play in military education was sound, he was correct that the army did not use 
the study of the subject to provide insights into future warfare. Prior to the outbreak of the 
First World War, British military thought was based on the work of Jomini, Clausewitz and 
Mahan, who did not look to the past to understand future warfare. To a large extent, the 
Military History syllabuses used by the army between 1856 and 1914 emphasised continuity 
in strategy, rather than change, through the use of the same ‘principles of war’ to study both 
contemporary campaigns and those fought in the Napoleonic era.66  
 
*  *  * 
 
Looking beyond the focus of this thesis, it is perhaps appropriate to suggest some fruitful 
areas for future research. One such subject would be the other literary activity undertaken by 
                                                          
63 LHCMA, A. Wavell Papers, 1.1, Notes taken on McClellan’s operations in the Richmond Peninsular, Junior 
Division, 1909. 
64 Holden Reid, ‘“A Signpost that was Missed?”’, p. 407.  
65 For example, see: Anon., Report on Examinations for Admission to the Staff College, 1898, p. 30; and, Anon., 
Report on the Examinations of the Fourth Class at the Royal Military Academy and Royal Military College held 
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British officers in addition to the writing of Military History. Besides Operations of War, 
Hamley wrote poetry, fiction and regularly contributed articles to Blackwood’s Magazine 
which reviewed literature and philosophical works. 67  Although Hamley was particularly 
prolific in this regard, he was by no means the only officer to produce this type of material. 
For example, Sir Garnet Wolseley, John Kaye, Lionel James and Sir Ian Hamilton also all 
wrote novels and poetry. 68  The apparent volume of such work raises several interesting 
questions regarding the composition, publication and reception of literary work written by 
officers in the Victorian and Edwardian period. A future project could investigate not only 
why officers chose to write such material, particularly during a period of supposed ‘anti-
intellectualism’ in the army, but also how it was received in the civilian literary ‘scene’, 
especially by reviewers writing in the periodical press. 
As this thesis has taken the outbreak of the First World War as the end point of its 
analysis, this provides scope for an examination of the Military History produced in the 
interwar period. The study of Military History by the army between 1918 and 1939 has 
remained almost as unstudied as the period before the Great War.69 An examination of how 
the army approached the subject, especially in light of this conflict, which posed serious 
questions as to the accuracy of the army’s pre-war understanding of strategy and tactics, 
would be a useful avenue of enquiry. More specifically, it would be important to explore the 
                                                          
67 Edward Hamley, Voltaire (London, 1877); idem, Lady Lee’s Widowhood (London, 1854); idem, 
Shakespeare’s Funeral and Other Papers (London, 1889); and, idem, Leaves of Summer and Autumn: Poems 
(London, 1893).  
68 Ian Hamilton, The Ballad of the Hádji, and Other Poems (London, 1887); idem., Icarus (London, 1886); 
Lionel James, Shadows from the East: Being Thirty-Three Short Indian Stories (London, 1897); ‘Intelligence 
Officer’ [Lionel James], The Boy Galloper (London, 1903); John Kaye, Poems and Fragments (London, 1835); 
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Castle: A Novel (London, 1877).  
69 The only exception is a brief reference in Travers, ‘The Development of British Military Historical Writing 
and Thought from the Eighteenth Century to the Present’, pp. 33-4. 
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influence of the later editions of Field Service Regulations on how the subject was taught by 
the army, especially following the inclusion of ‘Principles of War’ in the 1920 edition.70  
Equally, it would be worthwhile to consider how Military History was written for a 
military audience, as the interwar period appears to have been very different to the late 
Victorian and Edwardian periods. Fuller, Liddell Hart and other authors produced work 
which not only placed a much greater emphasis on the changing nature of war but also 
suggested a radically new use for Military History which was based on using the subject to 
predict the conditions and nature of future warfare.71  Yet, for all the radical new ideas, 
textbooks written before 1914 were still in use for part of the period: Operations of War, 
albeit a revised edition from 1923, along with Bird’s Strategy in a Nutshell, were 
recommended reading in official army publications, such as Major H.G. Eady’s Historical 
Illustrations to Field Service Regulations, 1929 (1930).72 This raises the question as to how 
significant the previous era was in providing intellectual foundations, and specific attitudes 
towards Military History, which historians may well have underestimated. 
Beyond the military uses of Military History at this time, another vital area for such a 
project to examine would be the continued development of Military History as a university 
discipline after the Great War. It would be important to determine, firstly, whether the study 
of the subject spread to other universities, and secondly, how it was approached at Oxford, 
Cambridge, London and Manchester, where it was already established. In relation to this 
latter consideration, as Spenser Wilkinson retained the Chichele Chair of Military History 
until 1923, when he was superseded by Ernest Swinton, this not only raises the question of 
                                                          
70 Brian Holden Reid, J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker (London, 1987), p. 94; and, Alaric Searle, ‘Inter-Service 
Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture: The “Principles of War” in the British Armed Forces, 1919-1939’, 
War in History, 21 (Jan. 2014), p. 5. 
71 For example, see: Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, p. 328; and, Liddell Hart, Ghost of Napoleon, p. 
146. 
72 H.G. Eady, Historical Illustrations to Field Service Regulations, 1929 (London, 1930), p. xi.  
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the extent to which his teaching methods remained the same after the Great War, but also 
whether his successor made any alterations.73  
 
*  *  * 
 
Any examination of the Military History written during the interwar period would need to 
reflect that the foundations of both the growth in the publication of military literature and the 
increasing professionalism of the army had their foundations laid down in the two decades 
prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Despite the findings of a recent study of the 
Edwardian Army, which concluded it was hard to detect a growth in professionalism or an 
improvement in officer training over that of the Victorian Army, the way in which Military 
History was studied and the appearance of increasingly sophisticated works for the education 
of officers before the Great War calls this conclusion into doubt.74 Not only did a professional 
reading public emerge for work unrelated to the army’s exam syllabuses, but most tellingly of 
all, several writers, such as J.F.C. Fuller, Frederick Barton Maurice, Henry Rowan-Robinson 
and George Aston, who went on to publish significant military historical and theoretical 
works during the interwar period, began their writing careers in the years before 1914.75  
As the intellectual origins of the writings of this group of military writers has gone 
largely overlooked, it has led to inadequate explanations as to why Britain was able to 
produce so many original military writers in the twentieth century. As continental 
contributions to military thought have exerted a major influence over how military thought 
has been assessed historically, particularly through the influence of Clausewitz’s writing, this 
                                                          
73 Hattendorf, ‘Study of War History at Oxford: 1862-1990’, pp. 20-22. 
74 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, pp. 39, 217.  
75 J.F.C. Fuller, Hints on Training Territorial Infantry (London, 1913); Maurice, Russo-Turkish War 1877; 
Rowan-Robinson, Campaign of Liao-Yang; and, G. Aston, Letters on Amphibious Wars (London, 1911). 
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has led to a further underestimation of British military thought before 1914. In other 
European countries, a more comprehensive approach to military education has obscured the 
very different way in which the British approach to military thought emerged. In effect, the 
occurrence of two major wars in the first half of the twentieth century, in which Britain 
fielded large armies and committed them in Europe as well as other theatres, has served to 
overshadow these areas of innovation.  
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Appendix 1: Biographies 
 
 
 
Army Officers  
 
Sir Charles Edward Callwell (1859-1928) was educated at both Haileybury College (1871-
6) and at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (1876-7). In January 1878 he gained a 
commission as a Second-Lieutenant in the Royal Field Artillery. His first posting took him to 
India, where he joined his battery at Dinapore. After seeing action in the Second Anglo-
Afghan War, as well as in the First Boer War, Callwell returned to Britain in December 1881. 
Here he attended the Staff College (1884-5). In his final year at the institution he was under 
the instruction of John Frederick Maurice, the Professor of Military History. In 1886 he won 
a prize at the RUSI for an essay on ‘The Lessons Learned from British Colonial Campaigns 
since 1865’. This article ultimately proved to be the foundation on his most famous work, 
Small Wars, which was published by HMSO in 1896. The work, which became a Staff 
College textbook in 1899, was re-printed and revised several times before 1914. 
In October 1887 he was transferred to the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. His 
section was responsible for collecting and collating intelligence material on Austria-Hungary, 
the Balkans, Turkey, Egypt and the independent African states. At the end of 1896 he was 
posted to Malta to take charge of a company of the Royal Garrison Artillery which was 
assigned to the costal defence of the island. The following year he acted as a military 
observer during the Graeco-Turkish War, operating with the Greeks. It is possible that his 
experiences during this war, in which maritime operations played an important role, 
combined with his service in charge of costal anti-invasion defences, as well as his reading of 
the work of the American naval theorist, A.T. Mahan, had an impact on his military thought. 
Consequently, these influences may have led him to write The Effect of Maritime Command 
on Land Campaigns (1897) as well as Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance 
(1902).  
During the Second Boer War, Callwell’s unit was sent to support the operations of 
General Redvers Buller against Ladysmith. He wrote a regular series of anonymous articles 
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for Blackwood’s Magazine in which he described the conduct of the campaign. Later in the 
conflict Callwell was put in charge of a British mobile column formed to chase Boer 
commandos. However, he was unable to prevent a commando under Van Deventer from 
escaping encirclement by British forces at Brand Kraal. This had a negative effect on 
Callwell’s military career as it caused him to fall out of favour with his commander, Sir John 
French, who later became CIGS in 1912. Following his return to England, Callwell was 
overlooked for promotion and so retired from the army in 1909. In 1911 he became the editor 
of the ‘Campaigns and the Lessons’ series, published by Constable and Co., to which he 
contributed a history of the Tirah expedition. 
After the outbreak of the First World War Callwell was recalled to active service and 
was appointed Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office. In this 
capacity Callwell was heavily involved in the planning of the disastrous landings at Gallipoli, 
although from the beginning he was sceptical of their potential for success. He later drafted 
the memorandum which formed the basis of the order to evacuate British and ANZAC forces 
from the Dardanelles. Subsequently, in 1916, Callwell was sent on several special missions to 
Russia in order to organise the supply of munitions and other material connected with 
Britain’s support for Russia.  
After the war Callwell continued to write books and work as a journalist. His post-war 
publications include: The Dardanelles (1919) and The Life of Sir Stanley Maude (1920). 
These works contributed to the award of the Chesney Gold Medal by the RUSI in March 
1921 for his services to Military Literature. He died on 16 May 1928 at Queen Alexandria 
Military Hospital in London.  
 
Sources: C.E. Callwell, Stray Recollections, 2 vols. (London, 1923); Daniel Whittingham, 
‘Warrior-scholarship in the Age of Colonial War: C.E. Callwell and Small Wars’, in Andrew 
Mumford and Bruno C. Reis (eds.), The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-
scholarship in Counter-Insurgency (London, 2014), pp. 19-28; T.R. Moreman, ‘Charles 
Edward Callwell’, The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 9 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 
557-559; and, C.E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their 
Relations and Interdependence, with introduction & notes by Colin Gray (Annapolis, 1996). 
 
 
 
Charles Cornwallis Chesney (1826-1876) was educated at the Royal Military Academy, 
Woolwich, and was gazetted as a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Engineers on 18 June 1845. 
After his promotion to Lieutenant in 1846, he served in Ireland, Bermuda, the West Indies 
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and New Zealand. An interest in Military History led to his appointment to teach this subject 
at Sandhurst in 1858. He later went on to succeed Edward Hamley as Professor of Military 
History at the Staff College in 1866, a position which he held until 1868. During his time at 
the Staff College Chesney wrote his most famous work, Waterloo Lectures (1868) which 
was, in part, based on the teaching material he used. Chesney also contributed several articles 
on military topics to the periodicals owned by Longmans, several of which were later 
collected together in Essays in Military Biography (1874). However, his literary work never 
achieved him the fame afforded to his brother, Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, author of 
‘Battle of Dorking’, a work of invasion fiction which appeared originally in Blackwood’s 
Magazine in 1871. Upon leaving the Staff College, Chesney served on the Royal 
Commission for Military Education which sat under the presidency of Lord Dufferin and then 
later Lord Northbrooke between 1868 and 1870. His next major appointment was to 
command the Home District of the Royal Engineers. However, while serving in this capacity 
at Aldershot he caught a chill and died of pneumonia on 19 March 1876. 
 
Sources: Charles Chesney, Waterloo Lectures (Mechanicsburg, 1997); Stanley Poole Lane 
and James Falkner, ‘Charles Chesney’, The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 
11 (Oxford, 2004), p. 325; and, R.T. Stearn, ‘George T. Chesney’, The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Vol. 11 (Oxford, 2004), p. 329. 
 
 
 
Sir Edward Bruce Hamley (1824-1893), the son of Vice-Admiral William Hamley (1786-
1866), obtained a cadetship at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, on 19 November 
1840. On 11 January 1843 he was commissioned as a Second-Lieutenant in the Royal 
Artillery. In order to pay off debts Hamley produced material for Fraser’s Magazine between 
1849 and 1850, before beginning to write for Blackwood’s Magazine in 1851. He also wrote 
a novel, Lady Lee’s Widowhood which was published by Blackwood in 1853.   
During the Crimean War, Hamley served as adjutant to Colonel Richard Dacres, who 
commanded the British artillery. As a result, he saw a good deal of action during the conflict: 
at the Battle of Alma, Hamley’s horse was struck by a cannon ball; another horse was killed 
under him at the Battle of Inkerman, and this incident almost resulted in his capture by the 
Russians. For his bravery, he was mentioned in despatches and was promoted to Brevet 
Lieutenant-Colonel on 2 November 1855. Throughout the war Hamley defended the army’s 
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performance in the letters which he submitted each month to Blackwood’s Magazine, 
claiming that it had been improperly funded by the government. 
After the Crimean War, Hamley spent four years stationed in Scotland at Leith. 
During this time he became friends with his publisher John Blackwood and continued to 
contribute regular articles to Blackwood’s Magazine. In 1859 Hamley was appointed 
Professor of Military History at the Staff College. During his six-year tenure in this capacity, 
Hamley wrote Operations of War: Illustrated and Explained which, after its publication in 
1866, became his most famous work. On 1 April 1866, he was made a member of the Council 
of Military Education until it was dissolved on 31 March 1870. During this time he was to 
secure agreement that Operations of War should be selected as the textbook used to teach 
Military History at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, against the wishes of the rest of 
the council. When Hamley became Commandant of the Staff College (1870-7) he was able to 
ensure his work was the textbook used to study Military History at this institution. 
Promoted to Lieutenant-General on 10 May 1882, Hamley was offered the command 
of the Second Division by Sir Garnet Wolseley as he planned the invasion of Egypt. Hamley 
submitted an unsolicited plan for an amphibious landing at Abu Qir Bay, which Wolseley, in 
an effort to confuse the enemy, deliberately led him to believe he was going to use. When 
Hamley found out that his plan was not to be employed, he took this as a personal slight, and 
was further dismayed to learn that he was to leave a section of the Second Division at 
Isma’iliyyah in order to further mislead the enemy as to Wolseley’s intended line of advance. 
The final straw came following the battle of Tel-El-Kabir. Hamley felt that his troops had 
played the decisive role in the battle, causing the Egyptian forces to flee before the rest of the 
British force arrived. However, in the despatches he sent after the battle Wolseley largely 
ignored the role played by the Second Division. Again, Hamley took this as a personal insult 
and wrote an article in the Nineteenth Century which presented his version of events in an 
effort to redress the balance. In the storm of controversy which broke, Hamley fell out with 
the group of officers loyal to Wolseley, known as the ‘Wolseley Ring’. Despite this, he was 
retained on the active list until 30 July 1890 as a result of a public outcry when news of his 
early retirement appeared in the press. 
Between 1885 and 1892 Hamley served as Conservative MP for Birkenhead. In this 
capacity he campaigned for both better training for the volunteers and for the construction of 
defensive works around London. Hamley died at Bayswater, London, on 12 August 1893. He 
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never married, but virtually adopted his brother’s daughter, Barbara, following her father’s 
death in 1863.  
 
Sources: A.I. Shand, The Life of General Sir Edward Hamley, 2 vols. (London, 1895); J. 
Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (London, 1965), pp. 
130-168; and, E.M. Lloyd and R.T. Stearn, ‘Edward Hamley’, The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Vol. 24 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 943-54.  
 
 
 
George Francis Robert Henderson (1854-1903) was born on 2 June 1854, the eldest son of 
William George Henderson, the Dean of Carlisle University between 1884 and 1905. In 1873 
Henderson won a History scholarship at St John’s College, Oxford. However, he did not 
graduate and instead entered the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1876. He was 
commissioned on 1 May 1878 in the York and Lancaster Regiment and initially served in 
India. He took part in the British invasion of Egypt in 1882 and fought at the battle of Tel-el-
Kebir.  
In 1883, after a period of service in Bermuda, Henderson was stationed at Halifax in 
Nova Scotia. He used this opportunity to visit several American Civil War battlefields, 
including Fredericksburg. In 1886, following his promotion to Major, Henderson published a 
historical account of this battle. As the Adjutant-General of the Army, Garnet Wolseley, was 
keen to foster professionalism in the officer corps and he was eager to reward the writing of 
military literature, so Henderson was appointed as the instructor of Tactics, Administration 
and Law at Sandhurst in January 1890. While occupying this position between 1890 and 
1892, Henderson became good friends with John Frederick Maurice, then Professor of 
Military History at the Staff College. The pair would spend long evenings at Maurice’s house 
at Camberley discussing military history into the small hours.  
Henderson succeeded Maurice as Professor of Military Art and History at the Staff 
College on 17 December 1892. While serving in this position, Henderson wrote his most 
enduring work, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (1898). Henderson left the 
Staff College in 1899 and, following the outbreak of the Second Boer War, was appointed 
Director of Military Intelligence on Lord Roberts’ Staff in January 1900. Immediately before 
the surrender of the Boer commander, General P.A. Cronje, in late February, malaria and 
exhaustion caused Henderson’s health to break down and he was invalided back to England. 
After an improvement in his health, Henderson was appointed as the official historian of the 
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Second Boer War by Lord Roberts in August 1900. In the autumn of 1901 he returned to 
South Africa to order to collect material for the Official History. But his health failed again 
and he returned to England in February 1902. On doctor’s orders to avoid the cold of an 
English winter, Henderson travelled to Egypt, but died at Aswan on 5 March 1903.  
 
Sources: G.F.R. Henderson, Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1891-
1903, ed. Neill Malcolm, (London, 1905); J. Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British 
Military Thought, 1815-1940 (London, 1965), pp. 216-248; Duncan Roberts, ‘Henderson: 
His Life, His Work and His Legacy’, in G.F.R. Henderson, The Battle of Spicheren: August 
6th 1870 (London, 2015); and, Andŕe Wessels, ‘G.F.R. Henderson’, The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Vol. 26 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 316-7.   
 
 
 
Patrick MacDougall (1819-1894) gained his commission in February 1836, and in 1840, he 
entered the Senior Department of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, to train as a staff 
officer. He graduated in 1842. In 1854 he was appointed as Superintendent of Studies at 
Sandhurst, but temporarily vacated this position to serve in the Crimean War. He reassumed 
the post in 1855 and held it until the following year. In February 1858 MacDougall became 
the first commandant of the newly created Staff College, Camberley, a position he held until 
September 1861. During his time at Sandhurst and Camberley, MacDougall wrote both The 
Theory of War and The Campaigns of Hannibal in order to help men studying the Military 
History then covered in the army’s exam syllabuses.  
After leaving Camberley, MacDougall was appointed Adjutant-General of the 
Canadian Militia (1865-1869). On his return to England in 1873 he was made head of the 
Topographical and Strategical Department of the War Office.  However, he was soon to 
return to Canada; in 1878 he was appointed to the North America Command, a position 
which he held until his retirement in 1885. He died in Surrey in 1894.  
 
Sources: R.H. Vetch and R.T. Stearn, ‘Patrick MacDougall’, The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Vol. 35 (London, 2004), pp. 329-330; and, J. Luvaas, The Education of 
an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (London, 1965), pp. 101-129.  
 
 
 
Sir John Frederick Maurice (1841-1912) was the eldest son of the prominent Victorian 
theologian Frederick Denison Maurice. He was educated at Addiscombe Military College and 
the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. He received his commission in 1861 and attended 
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the Staff College in 1870. In 1869 he married Anne Frances and the couple had eleven 
children, the eldest of which was Frederick Barton Maurice who emerged as a prominent 
military historian after the First World War. 
Maurice’s career received an impetus in 1872 when he won a prize for an essay on 
how the British Army could be best organised and prepared to fight a continental army. This 
competition was marked by E.B. Hamley, who awarded second prize to Garnet Wolseley, 
then Adjutant-General of the Army. As a result, Maurice came to the attention of two 
prominent figures within the army. Through Hamley he became part of John Blackwood’s 
‘Military Staff’, publishing several articles on military topics in Blackwood’s Magazine. 
Maurice’s connection with Wolseley was to have a profound influence on the rest of his life. 
Not only did it lead to him being appointed by Wolseley as Instructor of Tactics at Sandhurst 
in 1872, it also caused him to be appointed as Wolseley’s private secretary during the Ashanti 
campaign of 1873-4. Consequently, Maurice became an established member of the ‘Wolseley 
Ring’, and subsequently accompanied Wolseley during his campaign in Zululand (1879-80) 
as well as during the invasion of Egypt (1882) and in the attempt to relieve General Charles 
Gordon at Khartoum (1884-5).  
On his return to England, he was appointed Professor of Military Art and History at 
the Staff College, a position which retained until 1892, when he was succeeded by G.F.R. 
Henderson. In 1890 Maurice purchased the United Service Magazine and transformed the 
periodical into a vehicle which championed officer education. Maurice also acted as an 
official historian on two occasions: first, during the late 1880s, when he wrote an account of 
the British invasion of Egypt; and 1903-7 when he took over the compilation of the 
authorised account of the Second Boer War from Henderson, following his premature death.  
Following his retirement from the army at the end of 1902, Maurice’s last major 
literary project, besides that of the Official History of the Second Boer War, was his two 
volume Diary of John Moore, which was published in 1904. Although the work utilised 
primary source material hitherto unused by historians, it encountered criticism for its 
extravagant and excessive praise of its subject. Maurice died at Camberley on 11 January 
1912 following the break-down of his health while he was working on the Official History of 
the Second Boer War in 1907.  
 
Sources: J. Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 
(London, 1965), pp. 173-215; Brian Bond, ‘John Frederick Maurice’, The Oxford Dictionary 
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of National Biography, Vol. 37 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 463-465; and, Frederick Barton Maurice, 
John Frederick Maurice: His Work and Opinions (London, 1913).  
 
 
 
Frederick Sleigh Roberts (1832-1914) was born in Cawnpore, India, and was educated at 
Eton College before attending the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, beginning in January 
1847. On his father’s insistence he joined the East India Company’s service, leaving 
Sandhurst for Addiscombe College, which trained men for appointments with this force, in 
February 1850. He was commissioned in the Bengal Artillery on 12 December 1851. He 
fought in the Indian Mutiny, winning the Victoria Cross for capturing a rebel standard and 
saving the life of a loyal sepoy. As a result of the absorption of the Bengal Artillery into the 
British Army in 1861, Roberts became a British officer.   
During the Second Afghan War, Roberts was appointed as the commander of a 
column of troops dispatched to occupy the Kurram valley. In the first phase of the conflict he 
defeated the Afghan forces defending the northern exit to the valley after conducting a daring 
night march. Following the massacre of the British political mission in Kabul under Sir Louis 
Cavagnari, Roberts led a force which captured the city. In November 1881 he assumed the 
Madras Command; in July 1885 he became the Commander-in-Chief of India. He left the 
sub-continent in April 1893 and succeeded Sir Garnet Wolseley in the Irish Command in 
October 1895. While in Britain he compiled his memoirs, Forty-One Years In India (1897), 
which enjoyed a high degree of popular success.  
After the disastrous setbacks encountered by the British Army during ‘Black Week’ 
early in the Second Boer War, Roberts was sent by the government to replace General 
Redvers Buller in overall command of British forces in South Africa. Although he 
encountered a personal tragedy, as his only son was killed at the Battle of Colenso on 15 
December 1899, he was able to trap the Boer forces under General P.A. Cronje at Paardeburg 
which caused them to surrender on 27 February 1900. However, Roberts misjudged the 
nature of Boer opposition, which was to drag on in the form of guerrilla fighting until May 
1902; he had handed over command of British forces in South Africa to Lord Kitchener, his 
Chief of Staff, on 29 November 1900, returning to England. 
He was made the Commander-in-Chief of the Army upon his return from South 
Africa, succeeding Garnet Wolseley. When this position was abolished in February 1904, he 
accepted a seat on the Committee of Imperial Defence. At the outbreak of First World War he 
was appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Empire (Overseas) Troops in France. While visiting 
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Indian troops he caught pneumonia and died on the 14 November 1914. He was buried in St 
Paul’s Cathedral.  
 
Sources: Brian Robson, ‘Frederick Sleigh Roberts’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Vol. 47 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 156-61; and, Rodney Atwood, The Life of Field 
Marshal Lord Roberts (London, 2015). 
 
 
 
Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley (1833-1913) was born in Dublin on 4 June 1833. Wolseley was 
nominated for a commission by the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington, due to his 
father’s service; he gained an ensigncy in the 12th Regiment of Foot in 1852. He saw a great 
deal of service during the 1850s: first, he fought in the Second Burmese War, in which he 
was wounded in March 1853; he also served during the Crimean War and took part in the 
relief of Lucknow in the Indian Mutiny. As a result, Wolseley rose, without the need to 
purchase a commission, from Ensign to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel by the age of twenty-five. 
Following a posting to Canada in early 1860s, Wolseley visited the United States 
during the American Civil War and was able to travel in the Confederacy. During this trip, he 
met both General Robert E. Lee and Colonel ‘Stonewall’ Jackson after the Battle of Antietam 
in 1862. In 1870 Wolseley led the Red River Expedition in Canada and overthrew a 
provisional government established by the rebellious Metis at Fort Garry. In 1873 he was 
chosen by the Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell, to lead a punitive expedition to 
Ashanti in response to Ashante attacks on the Gold Coast. This he achieved by capturing and 
burning the Ashante capital, Kumasi, in early February 1874. Many of the officers who had 
accompanied Wolseley to the Ashanti were subsequently selected by him for his future 
campaigns, and this group of men became known as the ‘Wolseley Ring’.  
Wolseley’s active career continued during the 1870s and 1880s: he was dispatched to 
Zululand following the Battle of Isandlwanha in 1879; he commanded the British invasion of 
Egypt in 1882 and led the unsuccessful attempt to rescue General Charles Gordon at 
Khartoum (1884-5). He was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and made a 
Field-Marshal on 26 March 1894. However, soon after he assumed this role its powers were 
significantly reduced and Wolseley came to feel that he was the ‘fifth wheel of a coach’. 
Wolseley retired from the army in 1903 and died in March 1913. 
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Sources: Ian F.W. Beckett, ‘Sir Garnet Wolseley’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Vol. 60 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 7-14; Ian F.W. Beckett, Wolseley and the Ashanti: 
The Ashanti War Journal and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1873-
1874, Army Records Society, Vol. 28 (Stroud, 2009), pp. 15-21; and, Halik Kochanski, Sir 
Garnet Wolseley: Victorian Hero (London, 1999). 
 
 
 
Historians 
 
Sir John W. Fortescue (1859-1933), the fifth son of the Third Earl of Fortescue, was 
educated at Harrow public school (1873-8) and studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 
1878. Although he wished to follow his elder brothers in the army, Fortescue’s father 
prevented this on grounds of expense. As a result, on leaving Cambridge in 1880, Fortescue 
became private secretary to Sir William Robinson, Governor of the Windward Isles, and 
subsequently to Sir William Jervois, Governor of New Zealand. 
 Following his return from the colonies, Fortescue turned to writing popular Military 
History in order to make money. After writing a history of the 17th Lancers, he was engaged 
by the publisher Macmillan in 1896 to compose a biography for their ‘Men of Action’ series. 
Next, Fortescue turned to writing more complex Military History, and at his proposal 
Macmillan agreed to publish a four volume history of the British Army. Fortescue’s zeal for 
research using primary sources caused this work to grow exponentially and eventually 
resulted in thirteen volumes published over a thirty-one year period. Throughout his time 
writing this work, Fortescue was hindered by his financial limitations, which were 
exacerbated by his history’s poor sales. As a result, he was forced to find other sources of 
income and in 1905 he was appointed as librarian at Windsor Castle. Later his wife’s dress-
making and house decorating business was to prove essential in the completion of the history.  
Despite his financial difficulties, Fortescue’s History of the British Army was well 
regarded as a scholarly work. On its strength he was chosen to deliver the Ford Lectures at 
Oxford University in 1911, for which he selected as his topic ‘British Statesmen of the Great 
War, 1793-1814’. Fortescue was also appointed to give the Lees Knowles Lectures at the 
University of Cambridge in 1914, choosing to lecture broadly on British military history. 
Furthermore, in 1920, he not only attained an honorary fellowship at Trinity College, 
Cambridge, but was also awarded the Chesney Gold Medal by the RUSI.  
In 1916 he reluctantly agreed to become the British Official Historian of the First 
World War. However, it would appear that his heart was not in the work and he was removed 
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from the project after critically reviewing Sir John French’s 1914. He died after an operation 
in October 1933 in France.  
 
Sources: Brian Bond, ‘Sir John W. Fortescue’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Vol. 21 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 465-7; J. W. Fortescue, Author and Curator (London, 1933); 
and, K. Grieves, ‘Early responses to the Great War: Fortescue, Conan Doyle and Buchan’, 
Brian Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History, (London, 1991), pp. 15-
39. 
 
 
 
Sir John Kaye (1814-1876) was born in London and was educated at both Salisbury public 
school and Eton College. After leaving Eton he studied at the East India Company’s training 
facility at Addiscombe College (1831-2). Upon graduation he served in the Bengal Artillery 
as a cadet; he was commissioned on 14 December 1833. He resigned from the army on 1 
April 1841 so he could devote himself to his literary work. He founded the Calcutta Review 
in 1844 and submitted articles on political and military topics. In 1852 he completed a two-
volume study of the First Afghan War. 
In 1856 Kaye entered the Home Civil Service of the East India Company and, after 
the transfer of the governance of India to the Crown in 1858, he succeeded John Stuart Mill 
as the Secretary of the Foreign Department of the India Office. This position allowed him 
access to a vast quantity of material related to the Indian Mutiny and he began a history of 
this conflict, entitled History of the Sepoy War in India in 1864. He completed three volumes 
of this work before he died in 1876. The work was completed by George Bruce Malleson, 
 
Source: E.J. Rapson and R.T. Stearn, ‘Sir John Kaye’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Vol. 30 (Oxford, 2004), p. 939. 
 
 
 
Alexander William Kinglake (1809-1891) was born in Somerset and was educated at Eton 
College (1823-28). He attended Trinity College, Cambridge, securing a BA (1832) and an 
MA (1836). He also studied Law at Lincoln’s Inn (1828-36). In August 1834 Kinglake set 
out on an eighteen-month tour of Europe and the Ottoman Empire; he became a member of 
the Traveller’s Club in 1845. In the following year, he competed for the affections of Miss 
Harriet Howard with the exiled Louis Napoleon, the future Napoleon III of France. However, 
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he was ultimately unsuccessful, and Howard accompanied Napoleon back to France in 1848 
and lived openly with him as his mistress.    
 In 1854 Kinglake travelled to the Crimea to witness the fighting around Sebastopol. 
He was present during the Battle of Alma and dined afterwards with Lord Raglan, 
commander of the British forces. At the Battle of Balaclava he saw the charges of the Heavy 
and Light Cavalry Brigades; but soon after he fell ill and was forced to return to England. 
Between 1863 and 1887 Kinglake wrote an eight-volume history of this conflict, entitled The 
Invasion of the Crimea, which was published by Blackwood’s. When the first volume of the 
work appeared it encountered a storm of controversy regarding the extreme criticisms it 
directed at Napoleon III, which unbeknown to the reviewers was likely to have been caused 
by Kinglake’s earlier conflict with him. The later volumes of this publication further excited 
debate as Kinglake went out of his way to defend Lord Raglan, particularly in relation to the 
ill-fated charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava and the sufferings encountered by the 
British forces during the winter of 1854-5.     
Beside his literary work, Kinglake served as a Liberal MP (1857-69). He lost his seat 
following a bribery scandal involving his literary agent. He died at his home in London on 1 
January 1891 following his contraction of throat cancer several years previously.   
 
Sources: Gerald De Gaury, Travelling Gent: The Life of Alexander Kinglake (London, 1972); 
and, John Sweetman, ‘Alexander W. Kinglake’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Vol. 31 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 695-696.  
 
 
 
George Bruce Malleson (1825-1898) was educated at Winchester public school and 
received a direct commission as an ensign on 11 June 1842 in the East India Company. He 
was attached to the 65th Bengal Native Infantry on 26 September 1843. On 28 March 1856, he 
was appointed an Assistant Auditor-General of the East India Company and was engaged in 
administration duties in Calcutta during the Indian Mutiny. During this conflict he wrote 
Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An Historical Narrative, which was published anonymously in 
1857, and which became generally known as the ‘Red Pamphlet’. This work was highly 
critical of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, and blamed his decision to annex 
the Oudh as principally responsible for causing the revolt. Malleson later became Sanitary 
Commissioner for Bengal in 1866 and Controller of the Military Finance Department in 
1868. He retired from the army in 1877. In 1876 he took over John Kaye’s History of the 
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Sepoy War at the publisher’s request, following the historian’s death. Malleson also produced 
some popular Military History, such as Decisive Battles of India (1883). He died at his home 
in London in March 1898. 
 
Source: E.M Lloyd and James Falkener, ‘George Bruce Malleson’, The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, vol. 36 (Oxford, 2004), p. 326.  
 
 
 
Sir Charles William Chadwick Oman (1860-1946) was born in Mozaffarpur in India, but 
soon returned with his family to England. From an early age Oman encountered Military 
History, initially through his father’s memories of life during the Indian Mutiny, subsequently 
through his reading of Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula. Oman attended 
Winchester public school and won a scholarship to New College, Oxford, in 1878. He 
excelled in his studies and received a First in both literae humaniores and Modern History. 
During his time at Oxford he joined the Kriegspiel Club which had been set up by Spenser 
Wilkinson. Although he failed to secure a fellowship at New College, he secured a more 
prestigious fellowship at All Souls. In 1884 he won the Lothian Prize with an essay on the 
‘History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages’. After being made deputy to the Chichele 
Professor of Modern History in 1900, Oman attained this Chair in 1905.  
 Oman authored many historical works, a large proportion of which was high-brow 
Military History. Oman is best known for his four-volume study, History of the Art of War, 
which was based on his prize-winning essay, and for his History of the Peninsular War, 
which was published in seven volumes (1902-30). This latter work drew on a wide range of 
primary source material previously unused by historians, including material from archives in 
Spain. 
During the First World War, Oman worked for the press bureau and the Foreign 
Office, for which he was knighted in 1920. In 1927 he conducted a comprehensive study on 
the losses sustained by German forces during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Here he was 
able to demonstrate that Sir James Edmonds, the British official historian of the conflict, had 
overestimated German casualties, whereas Winston Churchill in The World Crisis had set 
them too low. Oman died on 23 June 1946. 
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Sources: Paddy Griffith, ‘Charles William Chadwick Oman’, The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Vol. 41 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 800-2; and, Charles Oman, Memories of 
Victorian Oxford (London, 1941).  
 
 
 
George Otto Trevelyan (1838-1928) was born in Leicestershire on 20 July 1838. His 
mother, Hannah More, was the sister of Thomas Babington Macaulay, the famous historian. 
As Macaulay spent a great deal of time with Trevelyan’s family, he proved to be a huge 
influence on him. In 1851, Trevelyan went to Harrow, followed by Trinity College, 
Cambridge, in 1857. As he failed to win a fellowship, he subsequently went to India to act as 
private secretary for his father, the Governor of Madras. In 1865 he wrote a history of the 
siege and massacre at Cawnpore, which had taken place during the Indian Mutiny. This work 
was critical of British attitudes toward the natives and suggested that their poor treatment had 
played an important role in causing the mutiny.  
In 1865 he entered parliament as a Liberal; in 1868 as a civil lord of the Admiralty, he 
became part of William Gladstone’s government. However, in 1870, he resigned over the 
increase of the grant paid to denominational schools in the Forster Education Act. In 1882 he 
became the Chief Secretary of Ireland following the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish in 
Phoenix Park, Dublin. He retired from politics in 1897 and between 1899 and 1914 he 
compiled a six-volume history of the American War of Independence. As this work portrayed 
the colonists in a positive light, and was highly critical of the King George III, it was well 
received in the United States. Trevelyan died on 17 August 1928 at the age of 90.  
 
Source: Patrick Jackson, ‘George Otto Trevelyan’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Vol. 55 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 333-7.  
 
 
 
Journalists  
 
Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery (1873-1955) was born in India in 1873, the 
eldest son of an official in the Indian Forestry Commission. From 1887 he was educated in 
England, attending Harrow, where he met a young Winston Churchill, before going up to 
Balliol College, Oxford, in 1892. He took Classical Moderations in 1894 and studied literae 
humaniores in 1896. In 1897 he was elected to a seven-year fellowship in History at All 
Souls College, a position which he retained until 1912. As a result of this fellowship, Amery 
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was instrumental in the creation of the Lecturership in Military History at All Souls in 1905; 
it is possible that his influence enabled his close friend Foster Cunliffe to assume this post. 
Soon after joining the staff of The Times in 1899, Amery travelled to South Africa to 
cover the beginning of the Second Boer War; for a period he was the only British 
correspondent with Boer War forces. Later in the war he was placed in charge of co-
ordinating the paper’s correspondents as they covered the conflict. As Amery expected the 
hostilities to end following the capture of Pretoria in 1900, he proposed that a collection of 
articles from The Times should be published in order to form an ‘instant history’ of the 
conflict. However, after securing the agreement of the newspaper’s Managing Director, 
Moberly Bell, Amery changed his mind and decided that he would produce a major multi-
volume study of the war which argued for the reform of the army. This new vision for the 
project led to conflict between Amery and Moberly Bell as the work grew in length and 
complexity as the war continued. Eventually, after nine years, the Times History of the War in 
South Africa was completed, totalling seven volumes.    
During the First World War, Amery initially served as an Intelligence Officer in 
Flanders. Due to his ability with languages, he also spent time in the Balkans, Gallipoli and 
Salonika. After the war he became Alfred Milner’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the 
Colonial Office. Following Milner’s resignation in 1921, Amery moved to become the 
Parliamentary and Financial Secretary at the Admiralty. Later in October 1922 Amery was 
made First Lord of the Admiralty; between 1924 and 1929 he acted as Colonial Secretary. 
After a period as a back-bench MP during the 1930s, he was offered the India Office during 
the Second World War by Churchill. However, in the 1945 general election Amery lost his 
seat in Parliament. He died in London on 16 September 1955. 
 
Sources: Doborah Lavin, ‘Leopold Charles Maurice Stennett Amery’, The Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Vol. 1 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 933-6; and, John Barnes and David 
Nicholson, The Leo Amery Diaries, 2 vols. (London, 1980-88). 
 
 
 
George Warrington Steevens (1869-1900) was born in Kent, attended private school and in 
1882 was awarded a scholarship to the City of London School. He was successful in his 
studies and won a Classical Scholarship to Balliol College, Oxford (1888-92). He achieved a 
First Class in both Classical Moderations and literae humaniores. Although earlier in his life 
he identified with the Radical Party, as he aged his political views moved to the right and he 
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became an imperialist. In 1896 he joined Alfred Harmsworth’s Daily Mail and the following 
year he acted as a war correspondent for the first time, covering the Turkish-Greek war. 
Steevens accompanied the Anglo-Egyptian army during the re-conquest of the Sudan in 
1898; as a result he wrote With Kitchener to Khartum (1898) which quickly sold a large 
number of copies. In 1899 he accompanied Sir George White’s army in South Africa during 
the Second Boer War. He reported on the Battle of Elandslaagte and Nicholson’s Nek and 
was subsequently besieged in the town of Ladysmith. He died of typhoid in Ladysmith on 15 
January 1900, aged 30. 
 
Source: Sidney Lee and R.T. Stearn, ‘George Warrington Steevens’, The Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Vol. 52 (London, 2004), pp. 384-5. 
 
 
 
(Henry) Spenser Wilkinson (1853-1937) was born in Hulme and his early education was at 
Owen’s College, Manchester. He studied at Merton College, Oxford (1873-8); following a 
period at Lincoln’s Inn, was called to the bar in 1880. During his time as a student at Oxford, 
Wilkinson read an article on European armies; noticing that the British Army was far smaller 
than its continental counter-parts, he set out to discover the reason for this. In so doing, he 
began to develop an interest in military affairs. This interest led Wilkinson to join the Oxford 
Volunteers; he accepted a commission in 1880. In order to improve the training of the 
Volunteers Wilkinson became one of the founding members of the Manchester Tactical 
Society in 1881. This group set out to translate foreign works on tactical matters and set up 
more realistic tactical exercises for the Volunteers.    
In 1881 Wilkinson’s growing interest in military matters led him to begin a career as a 
journalist writing on this topic. He initially wrote occasional articles for the Manchester 
Guardian, but this arrangement ended in 1892 when the editor, C.P. Scott, refused to print his 
work as he did not think that it reflected the liberal viewpoint of the paper. As a result, 
Wilkinson was employed by the high-tory Morning Post (1895-1914). During this time he 
was also a regular contributor to The National Review and several service journals, including 
John Frederick Maurice’s United Service Magazine.  
During the 1890s, Wilkinson, at the insistence of his friend, Lord Roberts, became 
increasingly interested in national defence and army organisation. Although prior to 1891 he 
had not passed much comment on naval matters, from this time he began to write more 
extensively on the topic. Ultimately, he saw the navy as the key to Britain’s national defence 
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and, besides writing a series of books which argued this point, he became the co-founder of 
the ‘Navy League’ in 1894. Wilkinson also pressed for the reformation of the War Office. In 
order to inform the public about the German General Staff, he wrote Brain of an Army in 
1890.  
In 1909 Wilkinson was appointed as the first Chichele Professor of Military History at 
Oxford University; he was able to transform the teaching of this subject; he intended Military 
History to act as a training tool for future political elites, rather than, as formerly, to teach 
students the required military history needed to pass a War Office exam in the subject. 
Wilkinson retained this Chair until he retired in 1923.   
By the outbreak of the First World War, however, Wilkinson’s influence on the War 
Office and the armed services had dramatically declined. He was no longer the nation’s 
foremost military authority in the press on the war. Wilkinson repeatedly volunteered his 
services to the army and navy during this conflict, only to be frustrated as he was turned 
down. The war brought personal tragedy as one of his sons was killed in action with the 
Royal Flying Corps. Together, these factors caused Wilkinson to lose interest in writing on 
military topics; and, in 1932 he told Basil Liddell Hart in a letter that he was ‘getting rather 
tired of war’. As a result, he turned to writing his memoirs and to translating ancient Greek 
writers. He died in 1937. 
 
Sources: A.J.A. Morris, ‘Henry Spenser Wilkinson’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Vol. 58 (Oxford, 2004), p. 1025; H.S. Wilkinson, Thirty-five Years, 1874–
1909 (Oxford, 1933); and, J. Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 
1815-1940 (London, 1965), pp. 253-290. 
 
 
 
Herbert Wrigley Wilson (1866-1940) was educated at Trinity College, Oxford, where he 
was awarded a first class in Classical Moderations (1887) and a Second Class in literae 
humaniores (1889). He held a particular interest in naval matters; this led him to write a 
number of books on the topic, such as Ironclads in Action (1896), as well as to contribute 
several chapters to the Cambridge Modern History. Wilson’s main career, however, was as a 
journalist. His contribution of articles on military topics to The Times and The Standard in the 
1880s and early 1890s brought him to the attention to Alfred Harmsworth. When 
Harmsworth launched the Daily Mail in 1896 he appointed Wilson as chief lead writer and 
assistant editor, positions which he retained for the rest of his life.  
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After the outbreak of the Second Boer War, Wilson wrote a serialised ‘instant history’ 
of this conflict for the Harmsworth Press, entitled With the Flag to Pretoria. When the war 
did not end after the capture of Pretoria 1900, the work changed its title to After Pretoria: The 
Guerrilla War. Prior to the First World War, Wilson vocally supported the growth of the 
Royal Navy and repeatedly warned the reading public of the threat posed by Germany. He 
died at his home on 12 July 1940.  
 
Source: A.J.A. Morris, ‘Herbert Wrigley Wilson’, The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Vol. 59 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 569-70.  
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Spenser Wilkinson, Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the General Staff (London, 1890). 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, Exercises in Strategy and Tactics: Translated From the German (Manchester, 
1887). 
 
W.B. Wood and J.E. Edmonds, History of the Civil War in the United States (London, 1905). 
 
 
Regimental Histories  
 
H. Ainslie, History of the Royal Regiment of Dragoons (London, 1887). 
 
Anon., Historical Record of the Forty-Fourth or East-Essex Regiment (London, 1887). 
363 
 
Anon., Some Historical Records of the West Kent Yeomanry (London, 1909). 
 
N. Aun, The CIV: Being the Story of CIV and Volunteer Regiment of London, 1300-1900 (London, 
n.d.). 
 
R.P. Berry, History of the Volunteer Infantry (London, 1903). 
 
J. Bonhote, Historical Record of the West Kent Militia (London 1909). 
 
E.C. Broughton, Historical Record of 1st Regiment of Militia (London, 1906). 
 
R.G. Burton, A History of the Hyderabad Contingent (Calcutta, 1905). 
 
F.G. Cardew, 10th Bengal Lancers, Compiled in Office of AG in India (London, 1903). 
 
F.G. Cardew, A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army to the Year 1895 (Calcutta, 1905). 
 
W. Corner, 34th Company (Middlesex) (London, 1902). 
 
P.H. Dalbiac, History of the 45th Battalion. 1st Nottinghamshire Regiment (London, 1902). 
 
John Davis, Historical Record of the 2nd Royal Surrey Regiment of Militia (London, 1877). 
 
R. Dunn-Pattison, The History of the 91st Argyllshire Highlanders (London, 1910). 
 
A. Edmeades, History of the 12th Regiment (Suffolk Regiment) (London, 1913). 
 
G.T. Evans, Records of the 3rd Middlesex Rifle Volunteers (London, 1885). 
 
M.L. Ferrar, Historical Howards of the Green Howards (London, 1911). 
 
G. Gardyne, The Life of a Regiment: The History of the Gordon Highlanders (London, 1901). 
 
J.L.C. Gilson, History of the 1st Battalion, Sherwood Foresters in the Boer War (London, 1908). 
 
Henry Graham, The Annals of the Yeomanry Cavalry of Wiltshire (London, 1886). 
 
J.M. Grierson, Records of the Scottish Volunteer Forces, 1859-1908 (London, 1909). 
 
C. Hart, History of the 1st Volunteer Battalion, The Royal Warwickshire Regiment (London, 1906). 
 
J.R. Harvey, Record of the Norfolk Yeomanry (London, 1909). 
 
David Howie, History of the 1st Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers (London, n.d). 
 
M. Jacson, The Record of the Regiment of the Line, Being a Regimental History of 1st Battalion 
Devonshire Regiment During the Boer War (London, 1906). 
 
H.R. Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs (London, 1905). 
 
A. Lawson-Lowe, Historical Record of the Royal Sherwood Foresters and Nottingham Regiment of 
Militia (London, 1882). 
 
364 
 
W.H. Mackinnon, The Journal of the CIV in South Africa (London, 1901). 
 
E.H. Maxwell, With the Connaught Rangers in Quarters, Camp and on Leave (London, 1883). 
 
James Orr, History of the 7th Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers (London, 1884). 
 
Whitworth Porter, History of the Royal Engineers (London, 1889). 
 
G.A. Raikes, Historical Records the First Regiment of Militia (London, 1876). 
 
G.A. Raikes, History of the Honourable Artillery Company (London, 1879). 
 
J.G. Rawstorne, The Royal Lancashire Militia (London, 1874). 
 
R. Rudolf, Short Histories of the Territorial Regiments (London, n.d.). 
 
B.E. Sargeaunt, The Royal Monmouthshire Militia (London, 1910). 
 
A. Sebag-Monteflore, A History of the Volunteer Forces (London, 1908). 
 
D. Sinclair, History of Aberdeen Volunteers (London, 1907). 
 
William Stephen, The Queens Edinburgh Rifle Volunteers (Edinburgh, 1881). 
 
Robert Bell Turton, North York Militia (London, 1907). 
 
B. William and E. Childers, The H.A.C. in South Africa (London, 1903). 
   
J. Williamson, Historical Records of the 1st Lancashire Militia (London, 1885). 
 
G.J. Younghusband, The Story of the Guides (London, 1908). 
 
 
Official Histories 
 
Anon., (trans., F.C.H. Clarke), Franco-German War of 1870-1, 5 vols. (London, 1873-84). 
 
Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 7 vols. (Simla, 1907-1913). 
 
Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Official Account of the Abor Expedition 1911-
1912 (Simla, 1913). 
 
Anon., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Supplement, Operations against the 
Mohmands (Calcutta, 1908). 
 
Anon., Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, 5 vols. (London, 1906-12). 
 
Anon., Operations in Somaliland, 2 Vols. (London, 1907-1908). 
 
R.G. Burton, First and Second Sikh Wars (Simla, 1911). 
 
R.G. Burton, Wellington’s Campaigns in India: Division of the Chief of the Staff, Intelligence Branch 
(Calcutta, 1908). 
365 
 
H.E. Colville, Official History of the Sudan Campaign, 2 vols. (London, 1889). 
 
W.S. Cooke, French Operations in Madagascar, 1882-1886 (London, 1886). 
 
A.M. Delavoye, British Minor Expedition, 1746 to 1814: Compiled in the Intelligence Branch of the 
Quartermater-General’s Department (London, 1884).  
 
N.W.H. Du Boulay, N.W.H. Epitome of the China-Japan War, 1894-1895 (London, 1896).  
 
H.C. Elphinstone, Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by the Corps of 
Royal Engineers (London, 1856). 
 
E.P.C. Girouard, Detailed History of the Railways during the South African War (Chatham, 1904). 
 
E. Hewlett, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Supplement A, Operations against the 
Zakka Afridis (Simla, 1908). 
 
Trevenen J. Holland, and Henry Hozier, Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia (London, 1870). 
 
H.D. Jones, Siege of Sebastopol 1854-5: Journal of the Operations Conducted by the Corps of Royal 
Engineers, 2 vols. (London, 1856). 
 
Neill Malcolm and Ernest Swinton, Official History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War, 
3 vols. (London, 1910-20). 
 
J.F. Maurice (ed.), History of the War in South Africa, 3 vols. (London, 1906-1908). 
 
J.F. Maurice, Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt (London, 1887). 
 
E.W.M. Norie, Military Operations in China, 1900-1901 (London, 1903). 
 
W.H. Paget, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes (Simla, 1874). 
 
W.H. Paget and A.H. Mason, Record of Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes: Revised 
and Brought Up to Date by Lt. A.H. Mason (Simla, 1884). 
 
G.W.V. Philipe, Narrative of the First Burmese War, 1824-26 (Calcutta, 1905). 
 
R.N.R. Reade, Précis of the Ashanti Expedition, 1895-6 (London, 1897). 
 
Edmund M. Reilly, Siege of Sebastopol: An Account of the Artillery Operations Conducted by the 
Royal Artillery and Royal Naval Brigade before Sebastopol in 1854 and 1855 (London, 1859). 
 
John Sutton Rothwell, Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879 
(London, 1881). 
 
R.J.S. Simpson, Medical History of the War in South Africa: An Epidemiological Essay (London, 
1911). 
 
Colonel von Wright and Henry Hozier, Campaign of 1866 in Germany (London, 1872). 
 
 
 
366 
 
Popular Military History 
 
G.F. Abbott, The Holy War in Tripoli (London, 1912). 
 
W.H.D. Adams, Memorable Battles in English History (London, 1879). 
 
J. Adye, Defence of Cawnpore (London, 1858). 
 
J. Adye, Sitana: A Campaign in Afghanistan (London, 1867). 
 
W.F. Aitken, Baden-Powell: The Hero of Mafeking (London, 1900). 
 
H.S.L. Alford, and Sword, W.D. The Egyptian Soudan (London, 1898). 
 
Victor H. Allemandy, Normal History of Great Britain and Ireland 1763-1815 (London, 1908). 
 
L.S. Amery (ed.), Times History of the War in South Africa, 7 vols. (London, 1900-9). 
 
R.P. Anderson, Personal Journal of the Siege of Lucknow (London, 1858). 
 
Anon., A Description of the Memorable Sieges and Battles in the North of England, that Happened 
During the Civil War (Bolton, 1786). 
 
Anon., A General History of the Sieges and Battles, by Sea and Land Particularly such as Relates to 
Great Britain: An Impartial History of the Late War from 1749 to 1763 (London, 1762-3). 
 
Anon., A Lady’s Diary of the Siege of Lucknow (London, 1858). 
 
Anon., A Soldier’s Experience Crimea and the Mutiny (London, 1901). 
 
Anon., A Year on the Punjab Frontier (London, 1851). 
 
Anon., Cassell’s History of the Russo-Japanese War, 3 vols. (London, 1904-5).  
 
Anon., Cassell’s Readers: Stories for Children from English History for Standard III (London, 1882-
3). 
 
Anon., Catalogue of Principal Books in Circulation at Mudie’s Select Library (London, 1865). 
 
Anon., Fight in the Far East: Illustrated History of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 (London, 1904-
5). 
 
Anon., Historical Narrative of the Turko-Russian War (London, 1886). 
 
Anon., History of the Campaign on the Sutlej (London, 1846).  
 
Anon., Illustrated War Special, 2 Vols. (London, 1899-1900). 
 
Anon., Longman’s Catalogue (London, 1860). 
 
Anon., Memoir of the Early Campaign of the Duke of Wellington in Portugal and Spain (London, 
1820). 
 
367 
 
Anon., The Soldiers’ Letters: or Voices from the Ranks (London, 1855). 
 
E.O. Ashe, Besieged by the Boers (London, 1900). 
 
W. Ashe, and E.V. Edgell Wyatt, Story of the Zulu Campaign (London, 1880). 
 
W. Ashe, Personal Records of the Kandahar Campaign by Officers Engaged Therein (London, 1881). 
 
Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, Port Arthur: Siege and Capitulation (London, 1906). 
 
Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, With the Turks in Thrace (London, 1913). 
 
J.B. Atkins, The Relief of Ladysmith (London, 1900). 
 
A. Hillard Atteridge,. Famous Modern Battles (London, 1914). 
 
A.W.M. Atthill, From Norwich to Lichtenburg via Pretoria (London, 1909). 
 
‘Average Observer’, The Burden of Proof: Some Aspects of Sir Redvers Buller’s Work During His 
Recent Campaign in South Africa Considered from an Ordinary Common-Sense Standpoint (London, 
1902). 
 
W.H. Aylen, The Soldier and the Saint, or Two Heroes in One (London, 1858). 
 
R.S.S. Baden-Powell Sketches in Mafeking and East Africa (London, 1907). 
 
F.D. Baillie, Mafeking: A Diary of the Siege (London, 1900). 
 
H.F. Baldwin, A War Photographer in Thrace (London, 1913). 
 
Charles Ball, History of the Indian Mutiny, 2 vols. (London, 1858). 
 
J.I. Ball, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum (London, 1902). 
 
C.R.B. Barrett, Battles and Battlefields in England (London, 1896). 
 
W. Beevor, With the Central Column in South Africa: From Belmont to Komati-Poort (London, 
1903). 
 
H. Begbie, The Wolf that Never Sleeps (London, 1900). 
 
George Bell, Rough Notes by an Old Soldier, during Fifty Years’ Service, from Ensign to Major-
General, 2 vols. (London, 1867). 
 
Lady Bellairs, The Transvaal War, 1880-1 (London, 1885). 
 
E.N. Bennett, With Methuen’s Column on an Ambulance Train (London, 1900). 
 
E.N. Bennett, With the Turks in Tripoli: Being Some Experience in the Turco-Italian War (London, 
1912). 
 
R.C.A. Billington, A Mule Driver at the Front (London, 1901). 
 
368 
 
J.H. Birch, and H.D. Northrop, History of the War in South Africa (London, 1899). 
 
Robert Blakeney, A Boy in the Peninsular War (London, 1835). 
 
John Blakiston, Twelve Years of Military Adventure (London, 1829). 
 
W. Bosman, Natal Rebellion of 1906 (London, 1907). 
 
D.C. Boulger, Life of Gordon (London, 1887). 
 
G. Bourchier, Eight Months Campaign Against the Bengal Sepoy Army (London, 1858). 
 
C.B. Brackenbury, Frederick the Great (London, 1884). 
 
George Brackenbury, Campaign in the Crimea; An Historical Sketch (London, 1855). 
 
Henry Brackenbury, River Column (London, 1885). 
 
A.G. Bradley, John Smith (London, 1905). 
 
A.G. Bradley, Wolfe (London, 1895) 
 
J.F. Bright, English History for the Use of Public Schools, 3 vols. (London, 1887). 
 
V. Brooke-Hunt, Lord Roberts: A Biography (London, 1901). 
 
H.E. Bunbury, Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France (London, 1854). 
 
T. Bunbury, Reminiscences of a Veteran, Personality and Military Adventures in the Peninsular 
(London, 1861). 
 
Bennett Burleigh, Empire of the East, or Japan and Russia at War (London, 1905). 
 
Bennett Burleigh, Khartoum Campaign, 1898 (London, 1899). 
 
Bennett Burleigh, Sirdar and Khalifa (London, 1898). 
 
Bennett Burleigh,. The Natal Campaign (London, 1900). 
 
J.H. Burn-Murdoch, With Lumsden’s Horse Against the Boers (London, 1901). 
 
H.J. Bushby, A Month in the Camp Before Sebastopol (London, 1855).  
 
L. Butler, Sir Redvers Buller (London, 1909). 
 
W. Butler, Charles Napier (London, 1890).  
 
W. Butler, General Gordon (London 1889). 
 
W.F. Butler, Campaign of the Cataracts (London, 1887). 
 
Noel Buxton, With the Bulgarian Staff (London, 1913).  
 
369 
 
H.J. Byyant, The Autobiography of a Military Scapegoat, 1900-1 (London, 1907). 
 
W.E. Cairnes, Earl Roberts as a Soldier in Peace and War (London, 1901). 
 
S.J.G. Calthorpe, Letters from Head-Quarters: or the Realities of the War in the Crimea (London, 
1855). 
 
Earl of Cardigan, Eight Months on Active Service (London, 1855). 
 
T.F. Carter, Narrative of the Boer War: Its Causes and Results (London, 1883). 
 
A. Case, Day by Day at Lucknow (London, 1858). 
 
J. Cave-Browne, The Punjab and Delhi in 1857 (London, 1861). 
 
G.L. Chambers, Bussaco (London, 1910). 
 
George Laval Chesterton, Peace, War, and Adventure, an Autobiography (London, 1853). 
 
E.L. Chide, Life and Campaigns of General Lee (Atlanta, 1866). 
 
Winston Churchill, Ian Hamilton’s March (London, 1900). 
 
Winston Churchill, London to Ladysmith via Pretoria (London, 1900). 
 
Winston Churchill, Story of the Malakand Field Force (London, 1896). 
 
Winston Churchill, The River War (London, 1899). 
 
A. Fitz Clarence, An Account of the British Campaign of 1809 under Sir A. Wellesley in Portugal and 
Spain (London, 1831). 
 
T.F.G. Coates, Hector MacDonald (London, 1900). 
 
T.F.G. Coates, Sir George White: The Hero of Ladysmith (London, 1900). 
 
J.M. Cobban, The Life and Deeds of Earl Roberts, 4 vols. (London, 1901). 
 
L. Cohen, Reminiscences of Kimberley (London, 1911). 
 
J. Colborne, With Hicks Pasha in the Sudan (London, 1885). 
 
Henry Colburn, Narrative of the Expedition of China (London 1842). 
 
‘Colenso’, History of the Zulu War (London, 1880). 
 
J.A.S. Colquhoun, Kurram Field Force (London, 1881). 
 
H.E. Colville, The Work of the Ninth Division in South Africa in 1901 (London, 1901). 
 
Arthur Conan Doyle, Great Boer War (London, 1900). 
 
370 
 
G.W. Cooke, Inside Sebastopol and Experiences in Camp: Being the narrative of a journey to the 
Ruins of Sebastopol accomplished in Autumn and Winter of 1855 (London, 1856). 
 
John Fife Cookson, With the Armies in the Balkans, 1877-78 (London, 1879). 
 
John Spenser Cooper, Rough Notes of Seven Campaigns in Portugal (Carlisle, 1869). 
 
Julian Corbett, Drake (London, 1902).  
 
Edward Costello, Memoirs of Edward Costello of the Rifle Brigade, comprising narratives of 
Wellington’s Campaigns in the Peninsular (London, 1854). 
 
Edward Cotton, A Voice from Waterloo: A History of the Battle Fought on the 18th June 1815 
(London, 1852). 
 
T. Cowen, Russo-Japanese War (London, 1904). 
 
Edward Shepherd Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo 
(London, 1851). 
 
Louis Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, 7 vols. (London, 1900-1). 
 
Charles Crosthwaite, The Pacification of Burma (London, 1912). 
 
F.M. Crum, With the Mounted Infantry in South Africa Being Side-Lights on the Boer Campaigns 
(London, 1903). 
 
F.H.E. Cunliffe, The History of the Boer War to the Occupation of Bloemfontein, 2 vols. (London, 
1901-1904). 
 
J.C. Curtis, Elements of the History of England (London, 1875). 
 
R.L. Dabney, Life of General ‘Stonewall’ Jackson (New York, 1866). 
 
‘Daily News Correspondent’ [J.F. Maurice], The Ashantee War: A Popular Narrative (London, 1874). 
 
Richard Danes, Cassell’s History of the Boer War, 1899-1901 (London, 1901). 
 
A. David, The Happy Warrior: A Short Account of the Life of David 9th Earl of Airlie (London, 1901). 
 
M. Davitt, The Boer Fight for Freedom: From the Beginning of Hostilities to the Peace of Pretoria 
(London, 1901). 
 
‘Defender’, Sir Charles Warren and Spion Kop: A Vindication (London, 1902). 
 
A.M. Delavoye, Life and Letters of Sir Thomas Graham (London, 1868). 
 
H.W. Dennie, A Narrative of the Afghan War (Dublin, 1842). 
 
W.K.L. Dickson, The Biography in Battle: It Story in the South African War (London, 1901). 
 
George Dodd, History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expedition to Persia, China, and Japan, 1856-
7-8 (London, 1859). 
371 
 
G. Dorman, Letters from South Africa (London, 1901). 
 
Arthur Conan Doyle, The Cause and Conduct of the War, (London, 1900). 
 
Arthur Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War (London, 1900).  
 
A. Duberly, Journal of Events in the Crimean War (London, 1855). 
 
Charles Duncan, Campaign with the Turks in Asia, 2 vols. (London, 1855). 
 
William Edwards, Personal Adventures During the Indian Rebellion in Rohilcund, Futteghur and 
Oude (London, 1858). 
 
A. Fincastle, and Elliot-Lockhart, E. Frontier Campaign (London, 1898). 
 
W. Firth, General Gordon (London, 1884). 
 
W.H. Fitchett, Deeds that Won the Empire (London, 1898). 
 
G.W. Fitz-George, Plan of the Battle of Sedan Accompanied with a Short Memoir (London, 1871). 
 
Maurice Fitzgibbon, Arts Under Arms: An University in Khaki (London, 1901). 
 
J. S. Fletcher, Baden Powell of Mafeking (London, 1901).  
 
H.C. Fletcher, History of the American War, 3 vols. (London, 1865). 
 
J.S. Fletcher, Baden-Powell of Mafeking (London, 1900). 
 
J.S. Fletcher, Roberts of Pretoria: The Story of the His Life (London, 1900). 
 
F.P. Fletcher-Vane, Pax Britannica in South Africa (London, 1905). 
 
A. Forbes, Colin Campbell (London, 1895). 
 
Archibald Forbes, Illustrated Battles of the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. (London, 1895-97). 
 
Archibald Forbes, Havelock (London, 1890). 
 
Archibald Forbes, My Experiences of the War (London, 1871). 
 
William Forbes-Mitchell, Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny (London, 1894). 
 
G.W. Forrest, The Life of Lord Roberts (London, 1914). 
 
G.W. Forrest, Wellington to Roberts: Sepoy Generals (London, 1913). 
 
J.W. Fortescue, Dundonald (London, 1895). 
 
H.B. Franklyn, Great Battles of 1870 and the Blockade of Metz (London, 1887). 
 
Augustus Simon Fraser, Letters of A.S. Fraser, Commanding Royal Horse Artillery under Wellington, 
written during the Peninsular Campaigns (London, 1859). 
372 
 
David Fraser, A Modern Campaign (London, 1905). 
 
A.J.L. Fremantle, Three Months in America (London, 1864). 
 
B. Gatacre, General Gatacre: The Story of the Life and Services of Sir William Forbes Gatacre 
(London, 1910). 
 
H.B. George, Battles of English History (London, 1895). 
 
P. Gibbs, and B. Grant, Adventures of War With Cross and Crescent (London, 1912). 
 
W.H. Gill, On the Transvaal Border (London, 1900). 
 
E. Gleichen, With the Camel Corps up the Nile (London, 1886). 
 
G.R. Gleig, The Life of Arthur Duke of Wellington: Peoples Edition (London, 1864). 
 
G.R. Gleig, Veterans of Chelsea Hospital (London, 1857). 
 
C.S. Goldman, With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa (London, 1902). 
 
H.W. Gordon, Events in the Life of Gordon (London, 1886). 
 
M.A. Gordon, Letters of General Gordon (London, 1887). 
 
J.P. Grant, The Christian Soldier: Memories of Major-General Havelock (London, 1858). 
 
James Hope Grant, Incidents of the Sepoy War (London, 1894). 
 
James Hope Grant, British Battles by Land and Sea, 4 vols. (London, 1873-5, 1897). 
 
James Hope Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan 6 vols. (London, 1885-6). 
 
William Green, A Brief Outline of the Travels and Adventures of William Green, Bugler, Rifle 
Brigade, during a period of ten years, 1802-1812 (Coventry, 1857). 
 
William Greener, A Secret Agent in Port Arthur (London, 1905). 
 
Arthur Griffith, Siege of Delhi (London, 1910). 
 
Arthur Griffith, Wellington and Waterloo (London, 1898). 
 
H.G.G. Groser. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts: A Biographical Sketch (London, 1900). 
 
A.E. Hake, Chinese Gordon (London, 1884). 
 
A.E. Hake, Journals of Major-General C.G. Gordon at Khartoum (London, 1885). 
 
A.G Hales,. Campaign Pictures of the War in South Africa (1899-1902) (London, 1900). 
 
R. Hall, The South African Campaign (London, 1901). 
 
A. Hamilton, In Abor Jungles (London, 1912). 
373 
 
J.A. Hamilton, The Siege of Mafeking (London, 1900). 
 
Edward Bruce Hamley, War in the Crimea (London, 1891). 
 
Edward Bruce Hamley, Story of the Campaign of Sebastopol (London, 1855).  
 
H.B. Hanna, The Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80: Its Causes, Conduct, and its Consequences, 3 
vols. (London, 1899-1910). 
 
G.J. Harcourt, Soldiers of the King: Their Battles, Sieges and Campaigns (London, 1902). 
 
F. Hardnam, Spanish Campaigns in Morocco (London, 1860). 
 
B.M. Hart-Synnot (ed.), Letters of Major-General Fitzroy Hart-Synnot (London, 1912). 
 
Henry Havelock, Narrative of the War in Afghanistan in 1838, 1839 (London, 1840).  
 
A. Hayward, The Battles of the Crimea (London, 1855). 
 
Howard Hensman, The Afghan War of 1879-1880: Being a Complete Narrative (London, 1881). 
 
G.A. Henty, At Aboukir and Acre: A Story of Napoleon Invasion of Egypt (London, 1899). 
 
G.A. Henty, By Sheer Pluck: A Tale of Ashanti War (London, 1884). 
 
G.A. Henty, Jack Archer: A Tale of the Crimea (London, 1883). 
 
G.A. Henty, Maori and Settler: A Tale of the New Zealand War (London, 1891). 
 
G.A. Henty, March to Coomassie (London, 1874). 
 
G.A. Henty, On the Irrawaddy: A Story of the First Burmese War (London, 1896). 
 
G.A. Henty, The March to Magdala (London, 1868). 
 
E.A.P. Hobday, Sketches During the Indian Campaign (London, 1898). 
 
W.S.R. Hodson, Hodson of Hodson’s Horse: or Twelve Years of a Soldiers Life (London, 1859). 
 
T. Rice Holmes, A History of the Indian Mutiny (London, 5th edn., 1904).  
 
T. Rice Holmes, History of the Indian Mutiny (London, 1883). 
 
George Hooper, Waterloo: Downfall of Napoleon (London, 1904). 
 
George Hooper, Sedan: the Downfall of the Second Empire (London, 1870). 
 
George Hooper, Campaign of Sedan (London, 1887). 
 
George Hooper, Waterloo (London, 1901). 
 
George Hooper, Wellington (London, 1890). 
 
374 
 
E.L.S. Horsburgh, Waterloo (London, 1895) 
 
P. Howell, The Campaign in Thrace, 1912 (London, 1913). 
 
H.M. Hozier (ed.), The Franco-Prussian War: Its Causes, Incidents and Consequences, 2 vols. 
(London, 1870-2). 
 
H.M. Hozier, Russo-Turkish War (London, 1879). 
 
H.M. Hozier, The Seven Weeks War: Its Antecedents and its Incidents, 2 vols. (London, 1867). 
 
Henry Hozier, The British Expedition to Abyssinia (London, 1869). 
 
H.D. Hutchinson, Campaign in Tirah (London, 1898). 
 
G.L. Huyshe, The Red River Expedition (London, 1871). 
 
W. Huyshe, The Graphic History of the South African War, 1899-1900 (London, 1900). 
 
Julia Inglis, Siege of Lucknow (London, 1891). 
 
McLeod Innes, Lucknow and the Oude in the Mutiny (London, 1895). 
 
C.T. Irace, With the Italian in Tripoli (London, 1912). 
 
Lionel James, Indian Frontier War: Being an Account of the Mohamud and Tirah expedition 1897 
(London, 1898). 
 
Lionel James [‘The Intelligence Officer’], On the Heels of De Wet (London, 1902). 
 
Lionel James [‘O’], The Yellow War (London, 1905). 
 
Lionel James, With the Conquered Turk (London, 1913). 
 
George Jones, The Battle of Waterloo (London, 1817). 
 
R.D. Kelly, An Officer’s Letters to his Wife During War (London, 1902). 
 
[John] ‘Kincaid’, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade (London, 1847). 
 
H. Kisch and H. St J. Tugman, The Siege of Ladysmith in 120 Pictures (London, 1900). 
 
E.F. Knight, Letters from the Soudan (London, 1896). 
 
Henry Knollys (ed.), Incident of the Sepoy War: Compiled from the Private Journals of the General 
Sir Hope Grant (London, 1874). 
 
Henry Knollys, From Saarbruck to Sedan (London, 1870). 
 
W. Knollys (eds.), Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Lord Combermere (London, 1866). 
 
E.B. Knox, Buller’s Campaign (London, 1902). 
 
375 
 
T.W. Knox, Decisive Battles since Waterloo (London 1887). 
 
Charles W. Kock, The Crimea: From Kertch to Perekop and a visit to Odessa (London, 1955). 
 
‘L.N.’, Letters Home (London, 1900). 
 
George L’Estrange, Recollections of Sir George L’Estrange (London, 1873). 
 
Atwell Lake, Defence of Kars (London, 1857). 
 
George T. Landmann, Recollections of Military Life, 1806-8 (London, 1854). 
 
F.S. Larpent, The Private Journal of Judge-Advocate F.S. Larpent attached to Lord Wellington’s 
Headquarters, 1812-14 (London, 1853). 
 
W.F.B. Laurice, The Second Burmese War (London, 1853).  
 
A. Le Messurier, Kandahar in 1879 (London, 1880). 
 
J. Leach, Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier (London, 1831). 
 
‘Linesman’, Words by an Eyewitness: The Struggle in Natal (London, 1901).  
 
T.J. Livesey, and S.B. Thorp, History of England: BC 55 to 1901 (London, 1908). 
 
T.H.E. Lloyd, Boer War: Diary of Captain Eyre Lloyd (London, 1901). 
 
H.C.W. Long, Peace and War in the Transvaal: An account of the Defence of Fort Mary (London, 
1882).  
 
Petre F. Loraine, Napoleon at Bay (London, 1914). 
 
C.R. Low, Great Battles of the Army (London, 1885). 
 
E.B. Low, With Napoleon at Waterloo (London, 1911). 
 
G. Lynch, Impressions of a War Correspondent (London, 1903). 
 
D. Lysons, Crimean War from First to Last (London, 1895). 
 
Donald MacDonald, How We Kept the Flag Flying: The Siege of Ladysmith through Australian Eyes 
(London, 1900). 
 
Charles MacFarlane, Battles of the British Army; to which are now added the Battles of Alma, 
Balaklava, and Inkerman (London, 1855).  
 
Charles MacFarlane, Great Battles of the British Army (London, 1833). 
 
W.M. Mackenzie, The Battle of Bannockburn: A Study in Mediaeval Warfare (London, 1913). 
 
W.K. Maclure, Italy in North Africa (London, 1913). 
 
K.S. Makenzie, Narrative of the Second Campaign in China (London, 1842).  
376 
 
Niell Malcolm, In Pursuit of the Mad Mullah (London, 1902). 
 
Alexander Malet, Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation (London, 1870). 
 
G.B. Malleson, Battle-fields of Germany (London, 1884). 
 
G.B. Malleson, Decisive Battles of India (London, 1888). 
 
S. Malmesbury, Life of Major-General Sir John Ardagh (London 1909). 
 
John Manners, Life and Campaigns of General Marquis of Granby (London, 1899). 
 
J.C. Marshman, Memoirs of Major-General Sir H. Havelock (London, 1858). 
 
R.M. Martin, The Indian Empire: With A Full Account of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army (London, 
1858-61). 
 
Charles Marvin, The Eye-witness’s Account of the Disastrous Russian Campaign Against the 
Turcomans (London, 1880). 
 
G.H. Matkins, Surgical Experience in South Africa (London, 1901). 
 
F.N. Maude, War and the World’s Life (London, 1907). 
 
H. Maxwell, The Life of Wellington: The Restoration of the Martial Power of Great Britain (London, 
1907). 
 
W. Maxwell and Henri Dupray, British Battles (London, 1902). 
 
W. Maxwell, From the Yalu to Port Arthur (London, 1906). 
 
J.G. Maydon, French’s Cavalry Campaign (London, 1901). 
 
F. McCullagh, Italy’s War for a Desert (London, 1912). 
 
James McGrigor, The Autobiography and Services of Sir James McGrigor (London, 1861). 
 
R.J. McHugh, The Siege of Ladysmith (London, 1900). 
 
Henry Mead, The Sepoy Revolt: Its Causes and its Consequences (London, 1858). 
 
A.H. Miles, Fifty-Two Stories of the British Army (London, 1897). 
 
D.S.A. Miller, Captain of the Gordon’s: Service Experiences, 1900-1909 (London, 1914). 
 
J. Milne, Epistles of Atkins (London, 1902). 
 
W.E. Montegue, Besieged in the Transvaal: The Defence of Standerton (London, 1881). 
 
William O’Connor Morris, Campaign of 1815 (London, 1900). 
 
A. Murray, Alasdair Murray, 1900 (London, 1901). 
 
377 
 
J.E. Neilly, Besieged with B-P: A Full and Complete Record of the Siege of Mafeking (London, 1900). 
 
H.L. Nevill, Campaigns on the North-West Frontier (London, 1912). 
 
H.W. Nevinson, Ladysmith: Diary of a Siege (London, 1900). 
 
C.B. Norman, Battle Honours of the British Army (London, 1911). 
 
S.L. Norris, The South African War, 1899-1900: A Military Retrospect Up to the Relief of Ladysmith 
(London, 1900). 
 
C.L. Norris-Newman, With the Boers in the Transvaal (London, 1882). 
 
C.N. North, Journal of English Officer in India (London, 1858). 
 
W.J. Oatley, With Mounted Infantry in Tibet (London, 1906). 
 
Edmund Ollier, Cassell’s History of the War between France and Germany 1870-1, 2 vols. (1870-2). 
 
Edmund Ollier, Cassell’s Illustrated History of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, 2 vols. (London, 
1877-9). 
 
C.W.C. Oman, Warwick the King Maker (London, 1891). 
 
‘One of the Besieged Party’, Brief Narrative of the Defence of the Arrah Garrison (London, 1858). 
 
‘One who has served under Sir Charles Napier’ [Malleson], The Mutiny of the Bengal-Army: An 
Historical Narrative (London, 1857). 
 
W. Owen, The Good Soldier: A Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Havelock (London, 1858). 
 
F. Palmer, With Kuroki in Manchuria (London, 1904). 
 
Gambier Parry, Suakin 1885 (London, 1885). 
 
H.H.S. Pearse, Four Mouths Besieged: The Story of Ladysmith (London, 1900). 
 
A.E. Pease, A Private Memoir of Sir Thomas Fowler (London, 1911). 
 
Sidney Peel, Trooper 8008IY (London, 1901). 
 
John Groves Percy, Some Notable Generals and their Battles (London, 1892). 
 
L.M. Philipps, With Rimington (London, 1901). 
 
A.W.A. Pollard, Southern History of the War: Third Year of the War (New York, 1865). 
 
A.W.A. Pollock, With Seven Generals in the Boer War: A Personal Narrative (London, 1900). 
 
M. Prior, Campaigns of a War Correspondent (London, 1912). 
 
G. Ramaciotti, A Narrative of the Principle Engagements of the Italian-Turkish War During the 
Period 23 October 1911 to June 1912 (London, 1912). 
378 
 
Reginald Rankin, Inner History of the Balkan War (London, 1914). 
 
R.E. Reade, In Memoriam: R. Ernest Reade (London, 1902). 
 
Winwood Reade, Story of the Campaign in Ashantee (London, 1874). 
 
L.E.R. Rees, Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow (London, 1858). 
 
Charles à Court Repington, The War in the Far East (London, 1905). 
 
Grant Richards, On Active Service With the Chinese Regiment in North China (London, 1902). 
 
W. Richardson, With the Army Service Corps in South Africa (London, 1903). 
 
H.I. Ricketts, Narrative of the Ashantee War (London, 1831).  
 
F.S. Roberts, The Rise of Wellington (London, 1902). 
 
C.G. Robertson, Kuram, Kabul, and Khandahar (Edinburgh, 1881). 
 
G.S. Robertson, Chitral (London, 1898). 
 
H.B. Robinson, Memoirs and Correspondence of General Sir T. Picton, 2 vols. (London, 1836). 
 
W. Robson, Great Sieges of History (London, 1855). 
 
C. Rose-Innes, With Paget’s Horse to the Front (London, 1901). 
 
P.T. Ross, A Yeoman Letters (London, 1901). 
 
J.E. Rotton, The Chaplin’s Narrative of the Siege of Delhi (London, 1858). 
 
Charles Royle, Egyptian Campaigns 1882-1885, 2 vols. (London, 1886). 
 
A.V.F.V. Russell, Letters From South Africa (London, 1909). 
 
William Howard Russell, Civil War in America (London, 1861). 
 
William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South (London, 1865). 
 
William Howard Russell, Dampier (London, 1889). 
 
William Howard Russell, The Last Great War (London, 1874). 
 
William Howard Russell, A Diary of the Sepoy Rebellion (London 1857). 
 
G.A. Sala, From Waterloo to the Peninsular (London, 1867). 
 
G.E.S. Salt, Letters and Diary of Lt. G.E.S. Salt, During the War in South Africa, 1899-1900 (London, 
1902). 
 
Edgar Sanderson, The Fight for the Flag in South Africa: A History of the War From the Boer 
Ultimatum to the Advance of the Lord Roberts (London, 1900). 
379 
 
S.H. Shadbolt, The Afghan Campaigns of 1878-80 (London, 1882). 
 
L.J. Shadwell, Lockhart Advance Though Tirah (London, 1898). 
 
T.P. Shaffner, The War in America (London, 1862). 
 
A.I. Shand, Life of E.B. Hamley, 2 vols. (London, 1895). 
 
A.I. Shand, Wellington’s Lieutenants (London, 1902). 
 
A.F. Shepherd, Campaign in Abyssinia (Bombay, 1868). 
 
J.W. Shepherd, A Personal Narrative of the Outbreak and Massacre at Cawnpore During the Sepoy 
Revolt (Lucknow, 1879). 
 
J.W. Sherer, Havelock’s March on Cawnpore (London, 1858). 
 
E. Sidney, Life and Letters of Lord Hill (London, 1845). 
 
W. Sidney, On Active Service (London, 1902). 
 
Rudolf Slatin, Fire and the Sword in The Sudan (London, 1896). 
 
G.H. Smith, With the Scottish Rifle Volunteers at the Front (London, 1901). 
 
Harry Smith, Autobiography (Bombay, 1844). 
 
R.J.B. Smith, Col. R.S.S. Baden-Powell (London, 1900). 
 
W.R. Smith, Siege and Fall of Port Arthur (London, 1905). 
 
W.R. Smith, The Siege of and Fall of Port Arthur (London, 1905). 
 
J.J. Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War (London, 1827). 
 
‘Special Correspondent’, The Balkan War Drama (London, 1913). 
 
C. Spencer, Fall of the Crimea (London, 1855). 
 
A.R.W. Spicer, Letter from the Transvaal (London, n.d.). 
 
H.M. Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala: The Story of Two British Campaigns in Africa (London, 
1874). 
 
H.M. Stanley, Coomassie: The Story of the Campaign in Africa, 1873-4 (London, 1874). 
 
W. Stebbing, Peterborough (London, 1890). 
 
Charles Steevens, Reminiscences of Col. Charles Steevens (Winchester, 1878). 
 
G.W. Steevens and Vernon Blackburn (eds.), From Capetown to Ladysmith: A Unfinished Record the 
South African War (London, 1900). 
 
380 
 
G.W. Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartum (London, 1898). 
 
S. C. Stepney, Leaves from the Diary of an Officer of the Guard, Sketches of Campaigning Life 
(London, 1854). 
 
F.T. Stevens, Complete History of the South African War in 1899-1902 (London, 1901). 
 
Charles Stewart, Lives and Correspondence of the Second and Third Marquesses of Londonderry, 3 
vols. (London, 1861). 
 
John Stirling, British Regiment in South Africa (London, 1903). 
 
Douglas Story, The Campaign with Kuropatkin (London, 1904). 
 
J. Stuart, Pictures in War (London, 1901). 
 
James Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, in 1906 (London, 1913). 
 
S.A. Swaine, General Gordon (London, 1885). 
 
C. Swinnerton, The Afghan War: Gough’s Action at Futtehabad (Allen, 1880). 
 
D. Taylor, Souvenir of the Siege of Mafeking (London, n.d.). 
 
A. Temple, Our Living Generals (London, 1898). 
 
Joseph Thackwell, Narrative of the Second Sikh War (London, 1851).  
 
‘The Roving Englishman’, Pictures of the Battlefields (Written in the Crimea) with Illustrations made 
on the Spot (London, 1855). 
 
H.C. Thompson, Chitral Campaign (London, 1895). 
 
Mowbray Thompson, Story of Cawnpore (London, 1859). 
 
A. Thomson, Memorials of Charles Dixon Kimber (London, 1902). 
 
W.H. Tomasson, With the Irregulars in the Transvaal and the Zululand (London, 1881). 
 
G.O. Trevelyan, Story of Cawnpore (London, 1865 and 1886). 
 
H. Tyrrell, History of the War with Russia, 3 Vols. (London, 1854-5). 
 
H.B. Vaughan, St. George and the Chinese Dragoon (London, 1902). 
 
C.B. Vere, Marches, Movements, and Operations of the 4th Division, in Spain and Portugal, 1810-
1812 (Ipswich, 1841). 
 
R. Vickers, Lord Roberts: The Story of His Life (London, 1914). 
 
F. Villers, Three Months with the Besiegers (London, 1905). 
 
E. Wallace, Unofficial Despatches on the Boer War (London, n.d.). 
381 
 
J. Walter, Lord Roberts of Kandahar, V.C. (London, 1900). 
 
J. Walter, Sir Redvers H. Buller: The Story of his Life and Campaigns (London, 1900). 
 
William Warner, Memoirs of Field Marshal H.W. Norman (London, 1908). 
 
C. Weir, The Boer War: A Diary of the Siege of Mafeking (Edinburgh, 1900). 
 
Samuel Ford Whittingham, Memoir of Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Ford Whittingham (London, 
1868). 
 
H. St. Clair Wilkins Reconnoitring in Abyssinia (London, 1870). 
 
Spenser Wilkinson (ed.), British Soldier Heroes (London, 1899). 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff (London, 
1890). 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, Lesson of the War: Being Comments from Week to Week to the Relief of 
Ladysmith (London, 1900). 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, War and Policy (London, 1900). 
 
W.F. William, England’s Battles by Sea and Land, 6 vols. (London, 1854-9). 
 
A. Wilmot, History of the Zulu War (London, 1880). 
 
C. Wilson, Clive (London, 1890). 
 
C.W. Wilson, Korti to Khartum (London, 1885). 
 
H.H. Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War in 1824-26 (London, 1852).  
 
H.W. Wilson, After Pretoria, the Guerrilla War, 2 vols. (London, 1901-2). 
 
H.W. Wilson, Japan’s Fight for Freedom: Story of the War between Russia and Japan (London, 
1904-5). 
 
H.W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria: A History of the Boer War, 2 vols. (London, 1900-1). 
 
F.R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan: Being an Account of the Rise and Progress of 
Mahdiism (London, 1891). 
 
F.R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan (London, 1891). 
 
C.M.A. Winn, What I Saw of the War at the Battles of the Spichren, Gorze, and Gravelotte (London, 
1870). 
 
Garnet Wolseley, Life of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, 2 vols. (London, 1894). 
 
Garnet Wolseley, The Decline and Fall of Napoleon (London, 1895). 
 
Evelyn Wood, Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign (London, 1895). 
382 
 
Evelyn Wood, Revolt in the Hindustan (London 1908). 
 
O.E. Wood, From the Yalu to Port Arthur (London, 1905). 
 
W. Wood, The Despatches of Field Marshal Duke of Wellington (London, 1902). 
 
R.G. Woodthorpe, Lushai Expedition, 1871-2 (London, 1873). 
 
M. Wylie, (ed.), The English Captives in Oudh (London, 1858). 
 
H.C. Wylly, From the Black Mountain to Warziristan (London, 1912). 
 
C.M. Yonge, Westminster Reading Books, 6 vols. (London, 1890). 
 
F. Young, The Relief of Mafeking (London, 1900). 
 
Keith Young and H. Norman (eds.), Delhi: Its Siege, Assault and Capture (London, 1902). 
 
G.J. Younghusband, Indian Frontier War (London, 1898). 
 
G.J. Younghusband, Relief of Chitral (London, 1897) 
 
 
‘High-Brow’ Military History  
 
Archibald Alison, History of Europe from the Commencement of the French Revolution to the 
Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815, 20 vols. (London, 1860). 
 
Archibald Alison, Life of John Duke of Marlborough, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 3rd edn., 1855). 
 
Anon., The Cambridge Modern History; An Account of its Origins, Authorship and Production, 12 
vols. (Oxford, 1907). 
 
Henry Belcher, The First American Civil War, First Period 1775-1778, 2 vols. (London, 1911). 
 
H.A. Bruce, Life of General Sir William Napier, 2 vols. (London, 1864). 
 
Montagu Burrows, Inaugural Lecture delivered October 30, 1862 (Oxford, 1862). 
 
Frederick Carlyle, Heroes and Hero-Worship (London, 1840). 
 
Frederick Carlyle, History of Friedrich II. Of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great, 6 vols. (London, 
1858-65). 
 
Charles M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown: Their Administration and Government, 2 vols. 
(Edinburgh, 1869). 
 
William Coxe, Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough (London, 1820). 
 
Edward Creasy, ‘The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution (London, 1853). 
 
Edward Creasy, Invasions and the Projected Invasions of England from the Saxon Times (London, 
1852). 
383 
 
Charles Dilke, Greater Britain, 2 vols. (London, 1868).  
 
Lord Ellesmere, Life and Character of the Duke of Wellington (London, 1853). 
 
C.H. Firth, Cromwell’s Army: A History of the English Soldier During the Civil Wars, the 
Commonwealth and the Protectorate, Being the Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford 
in 1900-1 (Methuen, 1902). 
 
C.H. Firth, Last Years of the Protectorate, 2 vols. (London, 1909). 
 
C.H. Firth, Modern History in Oxford, 1841-1918 (Oxford, 1920). 
 
C.H. Firth, Plea for the Historical Teaching of History, Inaugural Lecture Delivered on 9 November 
1904.  
 
George William Forrest, A History of the Indian Mutiny: Reviewed and Illustrated from Original 
Documents (London, 1904). 
 
John W. Fortescue, History of the British Army, 20 vols. (London, 1899-1930). 
 
John W. Fortescue, Military History (Cambridge, 1914). 
 
E.A. Freeman, History of the Norman Conquest of England, 5 vols (London, 1867-76). 
 
J.A. Froude, Suggestions on the Best Means of Teaching English History (Oxford, 1855). 
 
Samuel R. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War 1642-1649, 4 vols. (Longmans 1886-1891). 
 
Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 6 vols. (London, 1776-
1789). 
 
J.R. Green, Short History of the English People (London, 1886). 
 
Franҫois Guizot, History of Charles I and the English Revolution (London, 1854). 
 
John Gurwood, Despatches of the Duke of Wellington (London, 1852).  
 
Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England (London, 1829). 
 
Edward Hamley, Wellington’s Career (London, 1860). 
 
W. Hazlitt, Life of Napoleon, 4 vols. (London, 1828-1830). 
 
George Hooper, Downfall of the First Napoleon (London, 1862). 
 
David Hume, The History of England, 6 vols. (London, 1754-1762). 
 
John Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-1858, 3 vols. (London, 1864-76). 
 
A.W. Kinglake and G.S. Clarke (ed.), The Invasion of the Crimea: Student’s Edition (London, 1899). 
 
Alexander William Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress 
down to the Death of Lord Raglan, 8 Vols. (1st edn., 1864-1887). 
384 
 
John Lingard, The History of England, from the First Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of 
Henry VIII, 8 vols. (London, 1819). 
 
John Lingard, The History of England, from the First Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of 
Henry VIII, 8 vols. (London, 1819). 
 
J.G. Lockhart, A History of Napoleon Buonaparte (London, 1829). 
 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, History of England from the Accession of James the Second, 5 vols. 
(London, 1848). 
 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, The Life of Frederick the Great (London, 1842). 
 
G.B. Malleson, History of the Indian Mutiny, 1857-1858, 3 vols. (London, 1878-80). 
 
Montgomery Martin, History of the British Colonies (London, 1834). 
 
John Frederick Maurice. Diary of Sir John Moore, 2 vols. (London, 1904-5). 
 
James Mill, The History of the British in India (London, 1817). 
 
George Murray (ed.), Letters and Despatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, from 
1702 to 1712 (London, 1845). 
 
William Napier, Conquest of the Scinde (London, 1845).  
 
Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War: The Middle Ages From the Fourth to the Fourteenth 
Century (London, 1898). 
 
Charles Oman, History of the Peninsular War, 7 vols. (Oxford, 1902-30).  
 
Charles Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, AD. 378-1515: Lothian Prize (Oxford, 1885). 
 
Robert Pearce, Life of Lord Wellesley (London, 1843).  
 
William Howard Russell, The Crimea: 1854-1855 (London, 1881). 
 
David Sibbald Scott, British Army: Its Origin, Progress, and Equipment, 3 vols. (London, 1868). 
 
Walter Scott, Life of Napoleon Buonaparte: with a preliminary view of the French Revolution, 9 vols. 
(London, 1834-5). 
 
J.R. Seeley, Expansion of England (Cambridge, 1883). 
 
J.R. Seeley, Short History of Napoleon the First (London, 1886). 
 
William Siborne, History of the War in the Netherlands (London, 1844). 
 
George Otto Trevelyan, The American Revolution, 2 vols. (London, 1899-1903). 
 
Lady A. Trevelyan, (ed.) The Works of Lord Macaulay (London, 1897). 
 
Georg Weber, Weltgeschichte in übersichtlicher Darstellung (Berlin, 1866). 
385 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years (London, 1935). 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, University and the Study of War (Oxford, 1909). 
 
Charles Yonge, Life of Field-Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, 2 vols. (London, 1860). 
 
 
Non-Military Journals  
 
Academy  
 
Charles W. Boase, ‘The Art of War in the Middle Ages’, 30 May 1885, pp. 377-8. 
 
F.J. Goldsmid, ‘The Afghan War, 1838-1842’, 1 March 1879, pp. 183-4. 
 
H.B. Harington, ‘Memories and Studies of War and Peace’, 22 February 1896, pp. 152-3.  
 
Charles Lewis Hind, ‘The Spanish War, 1585-1587’, 9 July 1898, pp. 27-8. 
 
Charles Lewis Hind, ‘Stonewall Jackson’, 1 October 1898, pp. 317-8.  
 
Charles Lewis Hind, ‘The Cromwell’s Scotch Campaigns, 1650-1’, 6 August 1898, pp. 122-3. 
 
J.G.C. Minchin, ‘The Defence of Plevna’, 6 April 1895, pp. 292-3.  
 
William O’Connor Morris, ‘Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History’, 5 August 1893, pp. 103-5.  
 
William O’Connor Morris, ‘The Private Life of Napoleon’, 19 May 1894, pp. 409-10.  
 
O. St John, ‘Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815’, 13 June 1874, pp. 653-4.  
 
H. Morse Stephens, ‘Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815’, 4 July 1891, 
p. 9.  
 
H. Morse Stephens, ‘Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo’, 17 June 1882, pp. 426-7. 
 
 
American Historical Review 
 
‘British Officer’, ‘Literature of the South African War’, 12/2 (1907), p. 301. 
 
‘British Officer’, ‘Literature of the Russo-Japanese War, Part 1’, American Historical Review, 16 (No. 
3, 1911), pp. 500-530. 
 
‘British Officer’, ‘Literature of the Russo-Japanese War, Part 2’, American Historical Review, 16 (No. 
4, 1911), pp. 730-760. 
 
 
Athenaeum  
 
Anon., ‘Our Indian Army: A Military History of the British Empire in the East’, No. 1438 (19 May 
1855), p. 583. 
 
386 
 
Anon., ‘The Theory of War: Illustrated by Numerous Examples from Military History’, No. 1531 (28 
February 1857), pp. 275-6. 
 
Anon., ‘History of the Campaign of 1815: Waterloo’, No. 1575 (2 January 1858), pp. 12-13. 
 
Anon., ‘The Campaigns of Hannibal Arranged and Critically Considered, Expressly for the Use of 
Students of Military History’, No. 1592 (1 May 1858), p. 555.  
 
 
Bentley’s Miscellany 
 
‘A Cavalry Officer’, ‘A Month of the Crimea after the Fall of Sebastopol’, 40 (September 1856), pp. 
221-38.  
 
Anon., ‘History of the First Battalion of the Royal Marines in China: From 1857’, 51 (April 1862), 
pp. 398-405.  
 
Anon., ‘Oude and the Defence of Lucknow’, 43 (April 1858), pp. 414-24.  
 
Anon., ‘Random Recollection of Campaign under the Duke of Wellington’, 35 (February 1854), pp. 
17-18.  
 
Alan Chambre, ‘The Campaign of the Royal Neapolitan Army in the Autumn of 1860’, 50 (December 
1861), pp. 599-610.  
 
Lascelles Wraxall, ‘MacMahon, Duke of Magenta’, 49 (March 1861), pp. 293-301.  
 
Lascelles Wraxell, ‘An Old Soldier’s Story’, 54 (September 1863), pp. 464-71.  
 
Lascelles Wraxell, ‘Auerstadt and Jena’, 54 (December 1863), pp. 616-25.  
 
Lascelles Wraxell, ‘Austerlitz’, 54 (September 1863), pp. 519-28.  
 
 
Blackwood’s Magazine 
 
Archibald Alison, ‘Wilson’s German Campaign of 1813’, 89 (March 1861), pp. 352-72.  
 
Alexander Allardyce, ‘The Cabul Mutiny’, 126 (October 1879), pp. 494-510. 
 
Anon., ‘The Nile Expedition from Gemai to Korti in a Whaler’, 137 (February 1885), pp. 177-85. 
 
J.A. Ballard, ‘The Persian War of 1856-7’, 90 (September 1861), pp. 343-63.  
 
Heros Von Borcke, ‘Memoirs of the Confederate War for Independence’, 98 (September 1865), pp. 
269-88.  
 
Robert Bourke, ‘A Month with the Rebels’, 90 (December 1861), pp. 755-67.  
 
James Peter Brougham, ‘The First Bengal European Fusilier in the Delhi Campaign’, 83 (January 
1858), pp. 719-33. 
  
John F. Burgoyne, ‘The Courtesies of War’, 88 (July 1860), pp. 608-12. 
387 
 
Charles Callwell, ‘The Defence of the Fort Letemalkum’, 187 (April 1910), pp. 457-71.  
 
Edard Chapman, ‘Two Years under Field Marshal Sir Donald Stewart in Afghanistan, 1878-1880’, 
171 (February 1902), pp. 255-63.  
 
Charles Chesney, ‘The Campaign in Western Germany’, 101 (January 1867), pp. 68-82.  
 
Claude Clerke, ‘Past and Present Troubles in Herat and Afghanistan’, 95 (April 1863), pp. 462-74.  
 
C. Crourie, ‘Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical Parallel’, 171 (January 1902), pp. 102-8. 
 
H. Mortimer Durand, ‘The Indian Mutiny: The Last Phase’, 191 (May 1912), pp. 617-34.  
 
Charles Stuart Forbes, ‘The Struggle at Melazzo’, 88 (July 1860), pp. 337-43.  
 
G.W. Forrest, The German General Staff on Lord Roberts Campaign’, 177 (April 1905), pp. 482-97.  
 
G.W. Forrest, ‘The Siege of Calcutta’, 172 (December 1902), p. 836-53.  
 
A.J.L. Fremantle, ‘The Battle of Gettysburg and the Campaign in Pennsylvania’, 94 (September 
1863), pp. 365-94.  
 
G.R. Gleig, ‘Life of Sir William Napier’, 95 (June 1863), pp. 667-84.  
 
G.R. Gleig, ‘The Life of General Sir Howard Douglas’, 93 (May 1863), pp. 561-76.  
 
G.R. Gleig, ‘The Great Collapse’, 108 (November 1870), pp. 641-56.  
 
Maurice Harold Grant, ‘Sir John Moore’, 175 (April 1904), pp. 586-606. 
 
Maurice Harold Grant, ‘The German War’, 172 (November 1902), pp. 714-28.  
 
W.W.H. Greathed, ‘The China War of 1860’, 89 (March 1861), pp. 373-84.  
 
William Greswell, ‘The Battle of Edington, AD. 878’, 188 (October 1910), pp. 491-501.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, 98 (July 1865), pp. 38-56. 
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Kinglake’s History of the War in the Crimea’, 2 parts: 103 (December 1868), pp. 699-
720; 105 (January 1869), pp. 71-93.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea’, 93 (March 1863), pp. 355-83.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Lessons from the War’, 79 (February 1856), pp. 232-42.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Louis Napoleon as a General’, 95 (March 1863), pp. 326-50.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Wellington’s Career’, 87 (May 1860), pp. 397-414, 591-610.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘De Bazancourt’s Narrative of the War’, 79 (April 1856), pp. 486-500.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Story of the Campaign Written in a Tent in the Crimea’ 11 parts: 76 (December 1854), 
pp. 619-37; 77 (January 1855), pp. 112-22; 77 (February 1855), pp. 236-50; 77 (March 1855), pp. 
388 
 
349-58; 77 (April 1855), pp. 492-8; 77 (May 1855), pp. 614-24; 77 (June 1855), pp. 740-45; 77 (July 
1855), pp. 91-7; 78 (August 1855), pp. 259-68; 78 (September 1855), pp. 513-20; 78 (November 
1855), pp. 617-31. 
 
W.G. Hamley, ‘Brackenbury’s Narrative of the Ashanti War’, 116 (July, 1874), pp. 96-126.  
 
Frederick Hardman, ‘The Battle of Lepanto’, 76 (July 1854), pp. 69-88.  
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘Some Maxims of Napoleon’, 166 (November 1899), pp. 587-603.  
 
Lionel James, ‘A Study of the Russo-Japanese War’, 177 (January 1905), pp. 144-74.  
 
Lionel James, ‘The Times History of the War in South Africa, Vol. 1’, 180 (July 1906), pp. 116-23.  
 
Lionel James, ‘The Times History of the War in South Africa, Vol. 2’, 180 (August 1906), pp. 248-
57. 
 
J.W. Kaye, ‘The Punjab in 1857’, 89 (April 1861), pp. 501-16. 
  
W.W. Knolly, ‘The China War of 1860: Sir Hope Grant’, 117 (May 1875), pp. 638-59.  
 
P.L. MacDougall, ‘The Egyptian Campaign in Abyssinia: From the Notes of the Staff Officer’, 122 
(July 1877), pp. 26-39.  
 
P.L. MacDougall, ‘The Later Battles in the Soudan Modern Tactics’, 135 (May 1884), pp. 605-10.  
 
Frederic Marshall, ‘The Secret History of the Loire Campaign’, 110 (September 1871), pp. 378-84.  
 
Margaret Oliphant, ‘The Indian Mutiny: Sir Hope Grant’, 115 (January 1874), pp. 102-19.  
 
Fitzgerald Ross, ‘A Visit to the Cities and Camps of the Confederate States’, 97 (January 1864), pp. 
26-39.  
 
Fitzgerald Ross, ‘A Visit to the Cities and Camps of the Confederate States’, 96 (December 1863), pp. 
645-70. 
 
A. Innes Shand, ‘Mr. Kinglake’s Battle of Inkerman’, 117 (April 1875), pp. 451-80.  
 
E. John Solano, ‘The Siege of Arrah: An Incident of the Indian Mutiny’, 175 (February 1904), pp. 
228-42. 
 
J.A. Temple, ‘An Incident in the French Invasion of Egypt in 1798’, 189 (April 1911), pp. 512-30.  
 
J.A. Temple, ‘With the Expedition to Walcheren in 1809’, 188 (September 1910), pp. 287-308.  
 
George T. Whalley, ‘With Plumer to the Relief of Makeking’, 168 (December 1900), pp. 804-16. 
 
Andrew Wilson, ‘Colonel Gordon’s Chinese’, 101 (February 1867), pp. 165-91. 
 
Robert Wilson, ‘The Secret History of the Russian Campaign of 1812’, 88 (July 1860), pp. 1-16.  
 
‘An English Officer’ [Garnet Wolseley], ‘A Month’s Visit to the Confederate Headquarters’, 93 
(January 1863), pp. 1-29.  
389 
 
Garnet Wolseley, ‘Narrative of the Red River Expedition’, 2 parts: 108 (December, 1870), pp. 704-
18; 109 (January 1871), pp. 48-73. 
 
P.A. Wright, ‘The Story of Cawnpore’, 175 (May 1904), pp. 628-45. 
 
 
Boy’s Own Magazine 
 
Anon., ‘British Arms in India’, 7 parts: 2 (June 1856), pp. 161-70; 2 (July 1856), pp. 214-22; 2 
(August 1856), pp. 250-5; 2 (September 1856), pp. 263-71; 2 (October 1856), pp. 297-304; 2 
(November 1856), pp. 345-51; and, 2 (December 1856), pp. 363-70. 
 
Anon., ‘Death-Ride: A Story of the Charge of Balaklava’, 5 (October 1859), pp. 294-9. 
 
Anon., ‘Gibraltar: How England Got and Kept it’, 6 (April 1860), pp. 162-6. 
 
Anon., ‘Illustrative Narrative of the Crusades’, 8 parts: 5 (January 1859), pp. 1-9; 5 (February 1859), 
pp. 33-9; 5 (March 1859), pp. 68-78; 5 (April 1859), pp. 97-106; 5 (May 1859), pp. 132-40; 5 (June 
1859), pp. 167-75; 5 (July 1859), pp. 195-203; 5 (August 1859), pp. 242-50. 
 
Anon., ‘Napoleon the Third’, 1 (May 1855), pp. 129-32. 
 
Anon., ‘The Battle of Bannockburn’, 3 (March 1857), pp. 71-5. 
 
Anon., ‘The Battle of Vitoria’, 1 (December 1855), pp. 366-9. 
 
Anon., ‘The Rifle or the Bayonet’, 1 (June 1855), p. 186. 
 
Anon., ‘The Sepoys and Sir Charles James Napier’, 3 (September 1857), pp. 282-7. 
 
Anon., ‘Tools of War’, 1 (January 1855), pp. 12-15.  
 
Anon., ‘War Scene’, 1 (September 1855), pp. 284-7. 
 
W. Hitchcock, ‘Sir Charles Napier’s Indian Victories’, 3 (April 1857), pp. 103-9. 
 
 
Boy’s Own Paper 
 
Anon., ‘A Bold Climber’, 22 (11 November 1899), pp. 58-70. 
 
Anon., ‘Boys Who Have Won the Victoria Cross’, 25 (6 December 1902), pp. 153-4. 
 
A.L. Knight, ‘On the Roll of Fame: Some Heroes of the Nineteenth Century, Rorke’s Drift’, 25 (18 
April 1903), pp. 459-60. 
 
 
Boys of England 
 
Anon., ‘How to Become Great Men: Warren Hastings’, 2 (25 May 1867), pp. 14-15. 
 
Anon., ‘Poor Ray the Drummer Boy: A Story Founded on Facts’, 4 (n.d., 1868), pp. 329-31. 
 
390 
 
R.T. Halliday, ‘With the Red Cross at Kassala: Some Experiences in the Eastern Sudan’, 5 (29 
October 1898), pp. 68-9. 
 
Anon., ‘Boys Who Have Won the Victoria Cross’, 25 (6 December 1902), pp. 153-4. 
 
Arthur Lee Knight, ‘On the Roll of Fame, Some Heroes of the Nineteenth Century: The Heroes of 
Rorke’s Drift’, 25 (18 April 1903), pp. 459-60. 
 
Anon., ‘Orders and Medals Worn by British Soldiers’, 25 (29 August 1903), pp. 758-60. 
 
Anon., ‘A Punitive Expedition’, 25 (14 February 1903), pp. 313-14.  
 
Anon., ‘Scene at the Battle of Eylau’, 2 (17 August 1867), p. 206. 
 
 
Cambridge Review 
 
Anon., ‘A Review of The Russo-Japanese War by Charles Ross’, 34 (31 October 1912), p. 67. 
 
Anon., ‘Lees Knowles Lecturership in Military Science’, 34 (6 March 1913), p. 364. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 34 (6 March 1913), p. 338.  
 
 
Chums 
 
Anon., ‘Blue Coats amid the Red: When Jack Tar Fights Ashore’, 6 (16 March 1898), pp. 476-8. 
 
Anon., ‘Bringing up the Guns’, 6 (18 May 1898), p. 620. 
 
Anon., ‘British Army Collar Badges’, 6 (22 June 1898), p. 695. 
 
Anon., ‘How Lord Robert’s Won the V.C.’, 9 (22 August 1900), p. 15. 
 
Anon., ‘Native Weapons from May Lands’, 5 (28 July 1897), pp. 781-2. 
 
Anon., ‘On and Off the Battlefield: A Famous General Chats with Chums, Archibald Alison’, 6 (25 
August 1897), p. 6. 
 
Anon., ‘Our Diamond Jubilee Double Number. Including Gratis Supplement: British Battles of the 
Queen’s Reign’, 5 (9 June 1897), pp. 1-20. 
 
Anon., ‘Regimental Motto’s and Nicknames’, 7 (26 October 1898), p. 151. 
 
Anon., ‘Regimental Mottos and Nicknames’, 7 (16 November 1898), p. 205. 
 
Anon., ‘Stirring Life in the British Army: An Hour with Sir Harry Prendergast’, 8 (17 January 1900), 
p. 350. 
 
Anon., ‘Stories told by Heroes’ Statues: Against Black Man and Boer’, 9 (13 February 1901), pp. 
412-13. 
 
391 
 
Anon., ‘Stories told by Heroes’ Statues: Gallant Deeds Against Russian and Cossack’, 9 (31 October 
1900), pp. 172-3. 
 
Anon., ‘Stories told by Heroes’ Statues: When Briton fought Afghan’, 9 (10 October 1900), p. 10. 
 
Anon., ‘Stories told by Heroes’ Statues’, 9 (5 December 1900), pp. 251-2. 
 
Anon., ‘Stormed At With Shot and Shell: Described by One of the Six Hundred’, 4 (23 October 
1895), p. 130. 
 
Anon., ‘Under the Kings Colours’, 10 (28 August 1901), pp. 29-30. 
 
Anon., ‘When the Zulus took the Field’, 7 (May 1899), p. 653. 
 
Anon., ‘When War was Declared’, 5 (10 February 1897), p. 397. 
 
Ernest Carr, ‘Stories told by Heroes’ Statues: When the Sepoy Turned Traitor’, 9 (26 December 
1900), pp. 295-6. 
 
Ernest Carr, ‘Stories told by Heroes’ Statues: The Men Who Relieved Lucknow’, 9 (23 January 
1901), pp. 365-6. 
 
D.H. Harry, ‘Winning the Victoria Cross: True Tales of Heroism and Valour’, 4 (5 February 1896), 
pp. 374-5. 
 
 
Contemporary Review 
 
Ernest N. Bennett, ‘After Omdurman’, 75 (January 1899), pp. 18-33. 
 
Stephen Bonsal, ‘The Night after San Juan: An Episode of the Cuban War’, 74 (December 1898), pp. 
836-50. 
 
W.F. Butler, ‘Sir Edward Hamley and the Egyptian Campaign’, 68 (August 1895), pp. 212-27. 
 
Archibald Forbes, ‘The Battle of Balaclava’, 59 (March 1891), pp. 428-40. 
 
A. Foxite, ‘Pitt’s War Policy’, 61 (May 1892), pp. 675-94. 
 
W.F. Gatacre, ‘After the Atabara and Omdurman’, 75 (February 1899), pp. 299-304. 
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘Count von Waldersee in 1870’, 78 (July 1900), pp. 590-605. 
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘The Battle of Wöerth’, 61 (June 1892), pp. 821-41. 
 
William Howard Russell, ‘Mr. Kinglake’s Crimean War’, 53 (February 1888), pp. 198-213. 
 
Goldwin Smith, ‘Naseby and Yorktown’, 40 (November 1881), pp. 683-96.  
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘The War in South Africa and the American Civil War’, 77 (June 1900), pp. 793-
804. 
 
 
392 
 
Cornhill Magazine 
 
Anon., ‘Some Military Memoires of Sir Archibald Alison’, 22 (March 1907), pp. 307-16. 
 
Anon., ‘The Great Boer War’, 11 (September 1901), pp. 292-7. 
 
Richard Barry, ‘Port Arthur: Its Siege and Fall: A Contemporary Epic’, 18 (May 1905), pp. 664-79. 
 
A.J. Butler, ‘The Retreat from Moscow’, 78 (August 1898), pp. 218-29. 
  
W. Laird Clowes, ‘The Battle of Sluis: An Anniversary’, 75 (June 1897), pp. 723-9. 
 
George Cooper, ‘Edward I as a Military Leader’, 15 (March 1867), pp. 281-303. 
 
F.H.E. Cunliffe, ‘The Campaigns of 1807’, 23 (November 1907), pp. 614-28. 
 
A. Conan Doyle, ‘Some Military Lessons of the War’, 82 (October 1900), pp. 433-46.  
 
A. Conan Doyle, ‘The Military Lessons of the War: A Rejoinder’, 10 (January 1901), pp. 43-54. 
 
Edmund F. Du Cane, ‘The Peninsular and Waterloo: Memories of an old Rifleman’, 76 (December 
1897), pp. 750-58. 
 
W.H. Fitchett, ‘Fights for the Flag’, 12 parts: 77 (January 1898), pp. 1-15, 77 (February 1898), pp. 5-
8; 77 (March 1898), pp. 289-302; 77 (April 1898), pp. 433-45; 77 (May 1898), pp. 577-89; 77 (June 
1898), pp. 721-33; 78 (July 1898), pp. 1-16; 78 (August, 1898), pp. 145-55; 78 (September, 1898), pp. 
289-306; 78 (October 1898), pp. 433-48; 78 (November 1898), pp. 577-94; 78 (December 1898), pp. 
721-8. 
 
W.H. Fitchett, ‘The Battle of Minden: An Anniversary Study’, 76 (August 1897), pp. 147-60. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘Agincourt and Anniversary Study’, 76 (October 1897), pp. 435-46. 
 
Stephen Gwynn, ‘Sir Charles Napier: A Study’, 81 (January 1900), pp. 65-79. 
 
M.J. Higgins, ‘The French at Alma: Todleben’, 10 (September 1864), pp. 282-98. 
 
George Hooper, ‘Mediaeval Warfare’, 14 (December 1866), pp. 666-86. 
 
J.W. Kaye, ‘The Peace Conflicts of India’, 14 (October 1866), pp. 431-41 
 
Laughton, J.K. ‘The Battle of the Nile: An Anniversary Study’, 74 (August 1896), pp. 147-158. 
 
Baron Campbell von Laurentz, ‘A Scotchman at Mars-La-Tour’, 20 (September 1906), pp. 321-36. 
 
F.N. Maude, ‘Dr. Conan Doyle and the British Army: A Reply’, 82 (December 1900), pp. 728-39. 
 
T. Maunsell, ‘Some Recollection of Active Service’, 18 (February 1905), pp. 244-55. 
 
T. Maunsell, ‘Reminiscences of the Punjaub’, 12 (March 1902), pp. 358-68. 
 
Frederick Maurice, ‘The Battle of Agincourt’, 25 (December 1907), pp. 789-93. 
 
393 
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘Assaye and Wellington: An Anniversary Study’, 74 (November 1896), pp. 291-304. 
 
Herbert Maxwell, ‘Sir John Moore’, 16 (June 1904), pp. 787-801. 
 
W.F. Mayers, ‘Colonel Gordon’s Exploits in China’, 10 (September 1864), pp. 625-38. 
 
F.B. Norman, ‘The Siege of Ghuznee: An Episode of the First Afghan War’, 41 (February 1880), pp. 
201-21. 
 
W.G. Palgrave, ‘The Abkhasian Insurrection of August 8, 1866’, 16 (October 1867), pp. 501-12. 
 
John Rutherford, ‘The Siege of Florence’, 31 (March 1875), pp. 316-28. 
 
William Starke, ‘The Story of a Campaign’, 14 (November 1866), pp. 586-603. 
 
Robert Staveley, ‘Antoine Drouot, 1774-1847: Commanding the Imperial Guard at Waterloo’, 81 
(March 1900), pp. 372-80. 
 
Robert Staveley, ‘Sir John Moore in 1898: A Forgotten Page in History’, 78 (August 1898), pp. 156-
66. 
 
Peter Toft, ‘The Battle of Copenhagen: A Danish Account of the Action’, 64 (September 1891), pp. 
277-89. 
 
E.D.H. Vibart, ‘The Sepoy Revolt at Delhi’, 76 (October 1897), pp. 447-60.  
 
William Westall, ‘The Battle of Spinges’, 75 (June 1897), pp. 803-13. 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘Gustavous Adolphus’, 74 (August 1896), pp. 193-201.  
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘Surprise in War’, 81 (March 1900), pp. 318-28. 
 
 
Edinburgh Review 
 
Anon., ‘J.F. Maurice’s Diary of Sir John Moore’, 200 (July 1904), pp. 29-58. 
 
Anon., ‘Lord Wolseley’s Life of Marlborough’, 180 (October 1894), pp. 259-88. 
 
Anon., ‘The French Expedition to Egypt in 1798’, 194 (October 1901), pp. 245-75. 
 
Anon., ‘The Siege of Quebec’, 198 (July 1903), pp. 135-55. 
 
Anon., ‘Von Moltke’s Campaign in Bohemia’, 179 (April 1894), pp. 412-46.  
 
Anon., ‘War as a Teacher for War’, 195 (April 1902), pp. 282-310. 
 
Chesney, Charles ‘A Life of General Robert E. Lee’, 138 (April 1873), pp. 363-98. 
 
Charles Chesney, ‘De Fezens Recollections of the Grand Army’, 127 (January 1868), pp. 213-42. 
 
Charles Chesney, ‘General Ulysses Simpson Grant’, 129 (January 1869), pp. 230-69. 
 
394 
 
Charles Chesney, ‘Recent Changes in the Art of War’, 123 (January 1866), pp. 95-130.  
 
Charles Chesney, ‘Scharnhorst’, 140 (October 1874), pp. 287-321. 
 
Charles Chesney, ‘The Grenadier Guards’, 140 (October 1874), pp. 462-85. 
 
G.S. Clarke, ‘The Campaign in the Sudan’, 172 (July 1890), pp. 248-82. 
 
G.S. Clarke, ‘The Egyptian Campaign of 1882’, 167 (April 1888), pp. 285-319.  
 
J.A. Crowe, ‘The Prussian Campaign of 1866’, 125 (April 1867), pp. 363-89.  
 
John Forster, ‘The Civil Wars and Cromwell’, 103 (January 1856), pp. 1-54.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Kinglake’s Battle of Inkerman’, 141 (April 1875), pp. 522-33.  
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea, Vol. 3-4’, 128 (October 1868), pp. 379-413. 
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘The Civil War in America’, 173 (April 1891), pp. 400-38.  
 
J.W. Kaye, ‘The Conquest of the Oude’, 107 (April 1858), pp. 513-40.  
 
J.W. Kaye, ‘Napier’, 106 (October 1857), pp. 322-55. 
 
W.W. Knolly, ‘The Candahar Campaign’, 152 (October 1880), pp. 578-606. 
 
R.D. Mangles, ‘Kaye’s History of the Sepoy War’, 124 (October 1866), pp. 299-340. 
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘The Life of Wellington’, 192 (July 1900), pp. 91-116.  
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘Stonewall Jackson’, 189 (January 1899), pp. 48-75.  
 
A.A. Paton, ‘Russian Campaigns in Asia’, 103 (January 1856), 267-304.  
 
Henry Reeve, ‘Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea’, 117 (April 1863), pp. 307-52.  
 
John Holland Rose, ‘The Life of Napoleon’, 195 (April 1902), pp. 522-50.  
 
George Trevelyan, ‘The American Revolution’, 199 (April 1904), pp. 481-510. 
 
 
English Historical Review  
 
Anon., ‘Campaigns in the Dauphiny Alps, 1588-1747’, 28 (April 1913), pp. 228-42. 
 
Anon., ‘The Campaign of Braddock’, 1 (January 1886), pp. 149-52. 
 
Anon., ‘William the Conqueror’s March to London in 1066’, 27 (April 1912), pp. 209-25.  
 
W.A.J. Archibald, ‘A Letter Describing the Death of General Wolfe’, 12 (October 1897), pp. 762-3.  
 
Thomas Arnold, ‘The Battle of Edgehill’, 2 (January 1887), pp. 137-42.  
 
395 
 
C.T. Atkinson, ‘The Composition and Organisation of the British Forces in the Peninsula, 1808-
1814’, 17 (January 1902), pp. 110-33.  
 
F. Baring, ‘The Battlefield of Hastings’, 20 (January 1905), pp. 65-70.  
 
W. Broadfoot, ‘The Defence of Jalalabad’, 8 (January 1893), pp. 93-108.  
 
Ernest Broxap, ‘The Sieges of Hull during the Great Civil War’, 20 (July 1905), pp. 457-73. 
 
H.L. Cannon, ‘The Battle of Sandwich and Eustace the Monk’, 27 (October 1912), pp. 649-70. 
 
M.O.B. Caspari, ‘The Battle of Lake Trasimene’, 25 (July 1910), pp. 417-29.  
 
H.W.C. Davis, ‘A Contemporary Account of the Battle of Tinchebrai’, 24 (October 1909), pp. 728-
32. 
 
H.E. Egerton, ‘Sir William Howe and General Burgoyne’, 25 (October 1910), p. 747. 
 
C.H. Firth, ‘Cromwell and the Insurrection of 1655’, 4 (July 1889), pp. 525-35.  
 
C.H. Firth, ‘Cromwell’s Instructions to Colonel Lockhart in 1656’, 21 (October 1906), pp. 742-6. 
 
Samuel R. Gardiner, ‘Alleged Fighting in-line in the First Dutch War’, 13 (July 1898), pp. 533-4. 
 
R. Garnett, ‘Sir George Grey and the China Expedition of 1857’, 16 (October 1901), pp. 739-42.  
 
T.R.E. Holmes, ‘The Last Word on Hodson of Hodson’s Horse’, 7 (January 1892), pp. 48-79. 
 
E.M. Lloyd, ‘The Raising the Highland Regiments in 1757’, 17 (July 1902), pp. 466-9. 
 
William O’Connor Morris, ‘The Campaign of Sedan’, 3 (April 1888), pp. 209-32.  
 
William O’Connor Morris, ‘The War of 1870-1: After Sedan’, 4 (July 1889), pp. 417-40.  
 
C. Myngs, ‘The Capture of Santiago in Cuba’, 14 (July 1899), pp. 536-40.  
 
C.W.C. Oman, ‘The French Losses in the Waterloo Campaign’, 19 (October 1904), pp. 681-93. 
 
Charles Oman, ‘The German Peasant War of 1525’, 5 (January 1890), pp. 65-94.  
 
A.F. Pollard, ‘The War of Religion in France, 1559-1576 by J.W. Thompson’, 26 (October 1912), pp. 
783-5. 
 
Robert S. Rait, ‘The Campaign on the Sutlej’, 18 (January 1903), pp. 130-1.  
 
J.H. Ramsey, ‘The Strength of English Armies in the Middle Ages’, 29 (April 1914), pp. 221-7. 
 
Cyril Ransome, ‘The Battle of Towton’, 4 (July 1889), pp. 460-6.  
 
J. Holland Rose, ‘A Report on the Battles of Jena-Auerstadt and the Surrender at Prenzlua’, 19 (July 
1904), pp. 550-3.  
 
J. Holland Rose, ‘Frederick the Great and England, 1756-1763’, 29 (January 1914), pp. 79-93. 
396 
 
J. Holland Rose, ‘Pitt and the Campaign of 1793 in Flanders’, 24 (October 1909), pp. 744-9. 
 
J.Holland Rose, ‘The Ice Incident at the Battle of Austerlitz’, 17 (July 1902), pp. 537-8. 
 
W.G. Ross, ‘The Battle of Edgehill’, 2 (July 1887), pp. 533-43. 
 
W.G. Ross, ‘The Battle of Naseby’, 3 (October 1888), pp. 668-79. 
 
J.H. Round, ‘Mr. Freedman and the Battle of Hastings’, 9 (April 1894), pp. 209-60. 
 
Eva Scott, ‘Tracts Relating to the Civil War in Cheshire by J.A. Atkinson’, 26 (April 1911), pp. 390-
1. 
 
William Henry Simcox, ‘Alfred’s Battles’, 1 (April 1886), pp. 218-34. 
 
T.F. Tout, ‘The Tactics of the Battle of Boroughbridge and Morlaix’, 19 (October 1904), pp. 711-5. 
 
Maurice Wilkinson, ‘Documents Illustrating the Wars of Religion’, 26 (January 1911), pp. 127-38.  
 
W.B. Wood, ‘The Canadian War of 1812 by C.P. Lucas’, 22 (July 1907), pp. 606-9. 
 
 
Fortnightly Review  
 
Anon., ‘The Tirah Campaign’, 69 (March 1898), pp. 390-400.  
 
Henry Brackenbury, ‘Mid-summer in the Soudan’, 44 (August 1885), pp. 257-66. 
 
C.C. Chesney, ‘Sherman and Johnson and the Atlanta Campaign’, 24 (November 1875), pp. 611-24.  
 
Gustave Cluseret, ‘The Military Side of the Commune’, 20 (July 1873), pp. 1-24. 
 
Albert V. Dicey, ‘Louis Napoleon, 1851-1873’, 19 (February 1873), pp. 197-204.  
 
Charles George Gordon, ‘Gordon’s Campaign in China’, 74 (September 1900), pp. 601-17.  
 
Arthur Griffith, ‘Kitchener and Khartoum’, 70 (September 1898), pp. 450-9.  
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘Critics and Campaigns’, 50 (July 1888), pp. 112-35.  
 
John Morely, ‘The Plain Story of the Zulu War’, 31 (March 1879), pp. 329-52. 
 
George Scott Robertson, ‘The Defence of Fort Chitral’, 64 (July 1895), pp. 1-11. 
 
James E. T. Rogers, ‘The Peasants War of 1381’, 4 (15 February 1866), pp. 90-5. 
 
William Stigand, ‘The War of the Comunidades’, 18 (August 1872), pp. 219-38. 
 
John Westlake, ‘The Kaffir Revolt of 1873’, 22 (December 1874), pp. 701-13. 
 
Charles Williams, ‘How we Lost Gordon’, 43 (May 1885), pp. 689-700. 
 
Garnet Wolseley, ‘The French Revolution and War’, 51 (June 1889), pp. 780-91. 
397 
 
Garnet Wolseley, ‘War’, 51 (January 1889), pp. 1-17. 
 
 
Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country  
 
Anon., ‘A Soldier’s View of the Campaign of 1854’, 51 (January 1855), pp. 32-9. 
 
Anon., ‘Mr Kinglake and the Pamphlets’, 68 (July 1863), pp. 63-76. 
 
Anon., ‘Reports on the Military Forces of Prussia and the North German Confederation, 1868-1870’, 
84 (November 1871), pp. 537-62. 
 
Anon., ‘Sketches of Campaigning Life: The Storming of Badajos’, 50 (August 1854), pp. 223-37. 
 
Anon., ‘Staff Officer on the War in the Crimea’, 55 (January 1857), pp. 103-12. 
 
Anon., ‘Sub-aqueous Warfare, Ancient and Modern’, 98 (October 1878), pp. 458-70.  
 
Adam Badeau, ‘The Two Great Wars: An Historical Parallel’, 82 (December 1870), pp. 793-805. 
 
Jean de Bouteiller, ‘The Workmen of Paris during the Siege’, 87 (June 1873), pp. 728-37. 
 
Henry Brackenbury, ‘Operations against Charleston’, 74 (July 1866), pp. 101-11.  
 
Charles Chesney, ‘Chinese Gordon’, 79 (February 1869), pp. 135-57. 
 
M.D. Conway, ‘Gravelotte Revisited’, 88 (October 1873), pp. 418-32.  
 
W.B. Donne, ‘Studies of the Great Rebellion’, 58 (November 1858), pp. 618-30.  
 
W.A. Guy, ‘Military Hospitals a Century Ago’, 51 (April 1855), pp. 399-407.  
 
Arthur Harness, ‘The Zulu Campaign: From a Military Point of View’, 101 (April 1880), pp. 477-88.  
 
Abraham Hayward, ‘Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea, Vol. 3-4’, 78 (July 1868), pp. 119-42. 
 
G.H. Lewes, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great’, 58 (December 1858), pp. 631-49. 
 
Henry A. Murray, ‘The Campaigns of Paskiewith and Omer Pacha in Asia’, 54 (July 1856), pp. 64-
78.  
 
John Ormsby, ‘The Battlefields of 1859’, 61 (February 1860), pp. 168-75.  
 
Joseph Orsi, ‘Prince Louis Napoleon’s Expedition to Boulogne’, 100 (August 1879), pp. 210-29.  
 
‘V’, ‘Carlyle’s Frederick the Great, Vol. IV’, 69 (May 1864), pp. 539-50.  
 
 
History 
 
R.C. Anderson, ‘The Cretan War’, 3 (April 1914), pp. 69-80. 
 
Anon., ‘The History of the Balkan Peninsula at a Glance’, 2 (July 1913), pp. 111-5.  
398 
 
A.M. Broadley, ‘Robert Blake at the Siege of the Lyme and the Battle of Portland’, 1 (October 1912), 
pp. 217-30. 
 
C.W. Dodson, ‘Wellington and Marlborough: A Comparison’, 1 (July 1912), pp. 143-56. 
 
 
Macmillan’s Magazine 
 
Anon., ‘The Surrender of Napoleon’, 76 (September 1897), pp. 321-33.  
 
A. Hilliard Atteridge, ‘Some Lessons of the Japanese War’ 90 (October 1904), pp. 419-23. 
 
A.G. Bradley, ‘Flodden Field’, 2 (October 1907), pp. 951-60.  
 
A.G. Bradley, ‘The Battle of Shrewsbury’, 88 (July 1903), pp. 183-92. 
 
A.G. Bradley, ‘With Burgonyne at Saratoga’, 74 (November 1896), pp. 71-80. 
 
W.E. Cairnes, ‘Some Reflections of the War in South Africa’, 81 (February 1900), pp. 313-20. 
 
C.C. Chesney, ‘The Swiss Sonderbund War’, 33 (March 1876), pp. 447-58. 
 
Edward Dicey, ‘The Campaign in Germany’, 14 (September 1866), pp. 386-94.  
 
Edward Dicey, ‘The Campaign in Italy’, 14 (August 1866), pp. 241-51. 
 
Peter FitzGerald, ‘An Episode in the Waterloo Campaign’, 42 (September 1880), pp. 339-45. 
 
J. W. Fortescue, ‘The Beginnings of the British Army’, 3 parts: 70 (June 1894), pp. 109-14; 70 (July 
1894), pp. 195-203; 70 (August 1894), pp. 265-70. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘Our Army and its Critics’, 83 (November 1900), pp. 70-80. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The Expedition to La Plata’, 71 (April 1895), pp. 471-80. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘Cromwell’s Veterans in Flanders’, 69 (March 1894), pp. 360-7. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘Our Yeomanry’, 74 (October 1896), pp. 401-10. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘Sir John Hawkwood’, 73 (January 1896), pp. 232-40. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘St. Lucia’, 85 (April 1902), pp. 419-27. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘Study in Colonial History’, 75 (December 1896), pp. 148-60. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The Close of a Great War’, 85 (March 1902), pp. 321-9. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The Coldstream Guards’, 75 (February 1897), pp. 312-20. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The First Scots Brigade’, 74 (June 1896), pp. 104-13. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The Rise of the Buffs’, 74 (September 1896), pp. 392-400. 
 
399 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The Scottish Guard of France’, 73 (March 1896), pp. 381-9. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The Soldier of the Sixteenth Century’, 72 (July 1895), pp. 171-9. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The Swiss Infantry’, 73 (December 1895), pp. 106-14.  
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘The West Indian Rebellion’, 70 (October 1894), pp. 456-63. 
 
J.W. Fortescue, ‘Our Cavalry’, 73 (November 1895), pp. 1-9. 
  
William Greswell, ‘The Study of Colonial History at Oxford’, 91 (February 1905), pp. 275-81. 
 
David Hannay, ‘Did Napoleon Mean to Invade England?’, 85 (February 1902), pp. 285-94. 
 
David Hannay, ‘Sir William Napier’, 86 (July 1902), pp. 209-16. 
 
T. Rice Holmes, ‘The Battle of Meanee’, 81 (January 1900), pp. 177-81. 
 
William Hill James, ‘A Forgotten Fight’, 70 (September 1894), pp. 331-8. 
 
William Hill James, ‘Recollection of the Chinese War, 71 (February 1895), pp. 241-51. 
 
William Hill James, ‘The Battles of the Nive’, 73 (December 1895), pp. 149-60. 
 
Frederick Barton Maurice, ‘The Private Soldier in the Tirah’ 78 (May 1898), pp. 70-80. 
 
William Salter Millard, ‘The Battle of Copenhagen’, 72 (June 1895), pp. 81-93.  
 
A.F. Mockler-Ferryman, ‘The Story of the Uganda Mutiny’, 78 (August 1898), pp. 308-20.  
 
Hugh Pearse, ‘The Goorkha Soldier, as an Enemy and as a Friend’, 78 (July 1898), pp. 225-37. 
 
Hugh Pearse, ‘The Lesson of 1881’, 81 (November 1899), pp. 73-80. 
 
J. Ruscombe Poole, ‘Cetywayo’s Story of the Zulu Nation and the War’, 41 (February 1880), pp. 273-
95.  
 
Eugene Schuyler, ‘A Turkish Historian of a War with Russia’, 42 (September 1880), pp. 428-35. 
 
John Timewell, ‘The Diary of a Private Soldier in the Peninsular War’, 77 (November 1897), pp. 1-
10.  
 
G.O. Trevelyan, ‘Memorial Literature of the American Civil War’, 17 (April 1868), pp. 460-3. 
 
Garnet Wolseley, ‘General Lee’, 55 (March 1887), pp. 321-31.  
 
 
Manchester Guardian  
 
‘A University Professor’, ‘A Letter from William Wardle’, 30 October 1905, p. 8. 
 
Anon., ‘Appointment of Colonel F.N. Maude’, 28 September 1905, p. 12. 
 
400 
 
Anon., ‘Col. Maude’s Lectures’, 27 October 1905, p. 8. 
 
Anon., ‘Editorial’, 17 November 1905, p. 6.  
 
Anon., ‘Editorial’, 21 December 1905, p. 4. 
 
Anon., ‘Militarism and Progress’, 11 November 1905, p. 10. 
 
Anon., ‘National Defence: Colonel Maude’s Address at the University’, 16 October 1905, p. 11. 
 
Anon., ‘Notice’, 5 November 1908, p. 10.  
 
Anon., ‘The Study of War’, 29 November 1909, p. 12. 
 
Anon., ‘The University and War: Charles Rowley’, 30 October 1905, p. 8.  
 
Anon., ‘The University and War’, 30 October 1905, p. 8. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence: Professorship of Military History’, 10 March 1909, p. 8.  
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 2 August 1912, p. 3. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 29 July 1905, p. 14. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 29 July 1908, p. 14. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 31 July 1913, p. 4. 
 
Mark Hovell, ‘University Intelligence’, 5 May 1914, p. 9. 
 
 
The Manchester University Magazine 
 
Anon., ‘Editorials’, 2 (December 1905), pp. 33-4. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 2 (January 1906), p. 62. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 2 (February 1906), p. 87. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 2 (May 1906), p. 173. 
 
Anon., ‘University Notes’, 2 (November 1905), p. 4. 
 
 
National Review 
 
Anon., ‘Lord Wolseley’s Marlborough’, 23 (May 1894), pp. 391-402. 
 
Eveline C. Godley, ‘General Wolfe’s Letters’, 36 (October 1900), pp. 231-40.  
 
T.R.E. Holmes, ‘Hodson of Hodson’s Horse’, 3 (August 1884), pp. 789-817. 
 
401 
 
T. Miller Maguire, ‘Surprise in War, from a Military and National Point of View’, 31 (May 1898), pp. 
361-73.  
 
‘Military Critic of the Westminster Gazette’, ‘Some Lessons of the Boer War’, 35 (August 1900), pp. 
1025-38.  
 
Charles Oman, ‘A Plea for Military History’, 35 (July 1900), pp. 812-22. 
 
J.H. Round and Alfred T. Story, ‘Two British Battles: Hastings and Sluys’, 28 (January 1897), pp. 
687-95; 28 (January 1897), pp. 681-7. 
 
John Edward Cornwallis Rous, ‘In Correspondence: An Published Episode of the Peninsular War’, 23 
(July 1894), pp. 719-20. 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘Chitral’, 26 (October 1895), pp. 246-57. 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘Lord Roberts in Afghanistan’, 28 (February 1897), pp. 844-53. 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘Moral Factors in the Boer War’, 34 (November 1899), pp. 353-7. 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘The Command of the Sea: a British Policy’, 26 (February 1896), pp. 758-69. 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘War Government’, 34 (February 1900), pp. 843-51. 
 
H.W. Wilson, ‘First Lessons of the Boer War: A Blow to Germany’, 35 (April 1900), p. 204-15.  
 
 
Nineteenth Century  
 
Anon., ‘Egypt and Soudan: On the Other Side of the Hill’, 17 (March 1885), pp. 424-36. 
 
Joseph Alexander Campbell, ‘A Battle Described From the Ranks’, 27 (June 1890), pp. 937-41.  
 
Archibald Forbes, ‘The Russians, the Turks and Bulgarians at the Theatre of War’, 2 (November 
1877), pp. 561-82. 
 
Archibald Forbes, ‘Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War’, 7 (January 1880), pp. 216-34. 
 
Archibald Forbes, ‘Napoleon the Third at Sedan’, 31 (March 1892), pp. 419-32.  
 
Archibald Forbes, ‘The Inner History of the Waterloo Campaign’, 33 (March 1893), pp. 416-29.  
 
F.R.T.T. Gascoigne, ‘To Within a Mile of Khartoum’, 18 (July 1885), pp. 88-100.  
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘Professional Ignorance in the Army’, 22 (September 1887), pp. 325-34. 
  
E.B. Hamley, ‘The Second Division Tel-el-Kebir’, 12 (December 1882), pp. 861-70.  
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘Omdurman’, 44 (December 1898), pp. 1048-54.  
 
Herbert Maxwell, ‘Our Allies at Waterloo’, 48 (September 1900), pp. 407-22.  
 
R.W. Napier, ‘The Caucasus and Tirah’, 43 (May 1898), pp. 717-23.  
402 
 
Laurie Oppenheim, ‘The Tirah and Khartoum Expedition’, 44 (December 1898), pp. 1041-7.  
 
Arthur V. Palmer, ‘A Battle Described from the Ranks’, 27 (March 1890), pp. 397-407.  
 
Arthur V. Palmer, ‘What I Saw at Tel-el-Kebir: A Rejoinder’, 28 (July 1890), pp. 148-56.  
 
H.C. Rawlinson, ‘The Results of the Afghan War’, 6 (August 1879), pp. 377-400.  
 
Reginald A. J. Talbot, ‘The Battle of Abu-Klea’, 19 (January 1886), pp. 154-9.  
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘Through the Khyber Pass’, 34 (October 1893), pp. 533-42.  
 
Garnet Wolseley, ‘England as a Military Power in 1854 and in 1878’, 3 (March 1878), pp. 433-56.  
 
 
Oxford University Gazette 
 
Anon., ‘Delegacy for Military Instruction: Commission in the Army’, 35 (14 February 1905), p. 349.  
 
Anon., ‘Delegacy of Military Instruction’, 36 (13 October 1905), pp. 34-5.  
 
Anon., ‘Election of Chichele Professor of Military History’, 40 (8 October 1909), p. 37. 
 
Anon., ‘General University Notices: Chichele Profession of Military History’, 39 (10 July 1909), p. 
875.  
 
Anon., ‘Lectureship in Military History’, 35 (4 July 1905), p. 741. 
 
Anon., ‘University Intelligence’, 36 (23 November 1905), p. 192.  
 
 
Stories of Pluck 
 
Anon., ‘A Soldier’s Promise: A Tale of General Gordon and the Siege of Khartoum’, 1 (n.d. 1895), 
pp. 2-13. 
 
Anon., ‘Men of Waterloo’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-13. 
 
Anon., ‘The Ameer’s Fate, or British Steel Against Treachery: With Lord Roberts Through the 
Afghan War’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-12.  
 
Anon., ‘Under Wolseley’s Flag: A True Story of the Soudan’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-14. 
 
Anon., ‘Why this Paper is Published’, 1 (n.d. 1895), p. i. 
 
Anon., ‘With White in Natal’, 2 December 1899, pp. 1-5. 
 
Harry Blyth, ‘Heroes of the Matabele War’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-13. 
 
S. Clarke Hook, ‘In Honour’s Cause: A Story of the Great Duke of Wellington’, 1 (n.d., 1895), pp. 1-
12. 
 
Edgar Hope, ‘The Men of Waterloo: A Stirring Story of 1815’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-13. 
403 
 
Captain Lancaster, ‘The Mystery of the Temple: A Story of the Indian Insurrection’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 
1-16. 
 
Captain Lancaster, ‘For the Glory of England: A Romance of the Crimean War’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-
14. 
 
Herbert Maxwell, ‘Mid-shot and Shell or the Heroes of Alexandria’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-13. 
 
Herbert Maxwell, ‘Under Wolseley’s Flag: A True Story of the Soudan War’, 1 (n.d. 1895), pp. 1-14. 
 
 
The Strand 
 
Anon., ‘Battlefields’, 15 (May 1898), pp. 573-82.  
 
Anon., ‘How the V.C. is Made’, 21 (February 1901), pp. 170-3. 
 
Anon., ‘Kitchener: Career in Pictures’, 42 (July 1911), pp. 90-3. 
 
Anon., ‘Portrait of Celebrities: Evelyn Wood’, 4 (September 1892), p. 267. 
 
Anon., ‘Portrait of Sir John French’, 31 (April 1906), pp. 417-9. 
 
Anon., ‘Portraits of Celebrities: Lord Roberts of Candahar’, 6 (July 1893), p. 56.  
 
Anon., ‘Stories of the Victoria Cross’, 1 (April 1891), pp. 410-4. 
 
Rosine Bernard, ‘The Bombardment of Paris’, 46 (August 1913), pp. 205-7. 
 
Harry How, ‘Lord Wolseley’, 3 (May 1892), pp. 443-61. 
 
James Lamb, ‘The Charge of the Light Brigade’, 2 (October 1891), pp. 348-51. 
 
L.S. Lewis, ‘Heroes of the Albert Medal’, 11 (June 1896), pp. 673-82. 
 
Neville Lyttleton, ‘The Charge of the Dervishes at Khartoum’, 46 (September 1913), pp. 313-4. 
 
Herbert Beerbohn Tree, ‘The Prussian Troops Advancing to the Battle of Langen Sala’, 46 (December 
1913), pp. 753-4. 
 
Evelyn Wood, ‘Michael Hardy’s Dauntless Courage’, 46 (August 1913), pp. 209-11. 
 
 
Temple Bar  
 
Edward Creasy, ‘The Battle of Fontenaye, AD. 841’, 30 (August 1870), pp. 109-20. 
 
Edward Creasy, ‘The Battle of Legnano, AD. 1176’, 30 (October 1870), pp. 356-66. 
 
W. O’Connor Morris, ‘Napoleon’s Campaigns’, 15 parts: 34 (December 1871), pp. 53-68; 34 (April 
1872), pp. 65-81; 35 (May 1872), pp. 155-71; 35 (June 1872), pp. 346-62; 35 (July 1872), pp. 506-23; 
36 (September 1872), pp. 245-62; 40 (March 1874), pp. 528-46; 44 (July 1875), pp. 390-408; 45 
(November 1875), pp. 372-90; 63 (September 1881), pp. 95-113; 63 (October 1881), pp. 237-54; 65 
404 
 
(August 1882), pp. 151-73; 75 (November 1885), pp. 355-74; 79 (March 1887), pp. 405-23; 97 (June 
1893), pp. 257-87. 
 
W. O’Connor Morris, ‘Frederick the Great’, 76 (April 1886), pp. 512-22.  
 
Frederick Dixon, ‘A Soldier of the Mutiny’, 90 (October 1890), pp. 175-96. 
 
Ramsey Phipps, ‘The Last Fight in Armour’, 102 (August 1894), pp. 501-3. 
 
Fredericks Dixon, ‘The Battle of Val, 330-360’, 110 (March 1897), pp. 330-60. 
 
Frederick Dixon, ‘Battle of Landen, in 1693’, 117 (June 1899), pp. 174-201. 
 
Claude R. Conder, ‘Tel-el-Kabir’, 68 (May 1883), pp. 68-86.  
 
Anon., ‘The Siege of Sunda Gunge’, 90 (November 1890), pp. 369-80. 
 
 
Times Literary Supplement  
 
Anon., ‘Review of Life of Napoleon I by J.H. Rose’, 1 (24 January 1902), pp. 11-12.  
 
Anon., ‘Review of Cromwell’s Army by C.H. Firth’, 1 (7 March 1902), p. 63. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of Sepoy General’s: Wellington to Roberts by G.W. Forrest, 1 (25 April 1902), p. 
118.  
 
Anon., ‘Review of Sir Charles Warren and Spion Kop: A Vindication by “Defender”’, 1 (May 1902), 
p. 158. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The Great Boer War by A. Conan Doyle’, 1 (17 October, 1902), p. 311. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of Heels of De Wet by Lionel James’, 2 (17 April 1903), p. 124. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The Elements of Strategy by H. Tovey’, 3 (15 January 1904), p. 15. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of ‘The Diary of Sir John Moore edited by J.F. Maurice’, 3 (26 February 1904), p. 58. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of Cassell’s History of the Russo-Japanese War’, 3 (4 March 1904), p. 71.  
 
Anon., ‘Review of The Fight in the Far East: An Illustrated History of the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904’, 3 (11 March 1904), p. 79. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The Second Afghan War, 1878-80. Its Causes, its Conduct and its Consequences 
by C.B. Hanna’, 3 (20 May 1904), p. 159. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of Saarbruk to Paris: A Strategical Sketch by Sission C. Pratt’, 3 (29 July 1904), p. 
239. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The History of the Boer War by F.H.E. Cunliffe’, 3 (30 September 1904), p. 299. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The Operations of the War, edited by L. Kiggell’, 6 (23 August 1907), p. 240.  
 
405 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The American Revolution by Sir George Otto Trevelyan’, 6 (29 September 1907), 
p. 297. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of England in the Seven Years War: A Study in Combined Strategy by Julian Corbett’, 
6 (5 December 1907), p. 375. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of On War by Carl von Clausewitz and edited by F.N. Maude’, 7 (27 February 1908), 
p. 72. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The Reality of War by Stewart L. Murray’, 9 (27 January 1910), p. 32.  
 
Anon., ‘Review of A Precis of Strategy by W.D. Bird’, 9 (2 June 1910), p. 203.  
 
Anon., ‘Review of Letters of Amphibious War by G.G. Aston’, 10 (26 January 1911), p. 350. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of Campaigns and their Lessons: Tirah by C.E. Callwell’, 10 (9 November 1911), p. 
450. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of Wellington’s Army by C.W.C. Oman’, 11 (19 December 1912), p. 582. 
 
Anon., ‘Review of The Principles of War: Historically Illustrated’ by E.A. Altham’, 13 (12 March 
1914), p. 131. 
 
 
Transactions of the Historical Society  
 
Henry Elliot Malden, ‘Alexander the Great in Affghanistan’, 8 (1880), pp. 223-9. 
 
Sydney Robjohns, ‘The Siege of Quebec’, 5 (1877), pp. 144-72. 
 
 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 
 
Oscar Browning, ‘The Flight of Louis XVI to Varennes’, 3 (1886), pp. 319-41. 
 
C.H. Firth, ‘Marston Moor’, 12 (1898), pp. 17-79. 
 
C.H. Firth, ‘Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1667-1662’, 17 (1903), pp. 67-119.  
 
C.H. Firth, ‘The Battle of Dunbar’, 14 (1900), pp. 19-52. 
 
C.H. Firth, ‘The Later History of the Ironsides’, 15 (1901), pp. 1-45. 
 
C.H. Firth, ‘The Raising of the Ironsides’, 13 (1899), pp. 17-73. 
 
G.W. Forrest, ‘The Siege of Madras in 1746 and the Action of la Bourdonnais’, 2 (1908), pp. 189-
234. 
 
Kate Hotblack, ‘The Peace of Paris’, 2 (1908), pp. 235-67. 
 
Henry Howorth, ‘The Conquest of Norway by the Ynglings’, 1 (1883-4), pp. 309-63. 
 
J.E. Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry in Mediaeval Warfare’, 8 (1914), pp. 77-102.  
406 
 
Edgar Powell, ‘An Account of the Proceedings in Suffolk during the Peasants’ Rising in 1381’, 8 
(1894), pp. 203-49. 
 
Arthur R. Ropes, ‘Frederick the Great’s Invasion of Saxony, and the Prussian “Memoire Raisnne”, 
1756’, 5 (1891), pp. 157-75. 
 
A.E. Stamp, ‘The Meeting of the Duke of Marlborough and Charles XII at Altranstadt’, 12 (1898), pp. 
103-16. 
 
S.A. Swaine, ‘The English Acquisition and Loss of Dunkirk’, 1 (1883-4), pp. 93-118.  
 
Harold W.V. Temperley, ‘The Causes of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1739’, 3 (1909), pp. 197-236. 
 
 
Westminster Review  
 
J.G. Alger, ‘Napoleon in Egypt’, 150 (August 1898), pp. 420-34.  
 
Anon., ‘Napoleon the Man’, 97 (April 1872), pp. 399-417. 
 
Anon., ‘The Indian Mutiny’, 112 (October 1879), pp. 358-86. 
 
Anon., ‘The Paraguayan War’, 93 (April 1870), pp. 380-408. 
 
T.R.E. Holmes, ‘The Marquess Wellesley’, 112 (April 1880), pp. 313-55. 
 
R. Seymour Long, ‘Some Modern Wars Reviewed’, 133 (May 1890), pp. 509-18. 
 
William Miller, ‘Napoleon in the Near East’, 154 (November 1900), pp. 524-42. 
 
Robert R. Noel, ‘The Battle of Sadova and Military Organisation’, 87 (January 1867), p. 124. 
 
S. Dewe White, ‘My First Battle in the Indian Mutiny’, 145 (January 1896), pp. 78-83.  
 
S. Dewe White, ‘Reminiscences of the Great Sepoy Revolt’, 150 (September 1898), pp. 448-62. 
 
Leonard Williams, ‘The Object Lesson of the Cuban War’, 148 (September 1897), pp. 255-62. 
 
 
Young Englishman’s Journal 
 
Anon, ‘Battle of Hastings’, 1 (24 August 1867), pp. 293-4. 
 
Anon., ‘A Military Execution’, 2 (May 1868), p. 759. 
 
Anon., ‘Bolingbroke: Days of Chivalry’, 1 (April 1867), p. 9. 
 
Anon., ‘Captain Jack: or One of the Light Brigade’, 3 (July 1868), p. 146. 
 
Anon., ‘Death of Sir John Moore at Corunna’, 1 (6 July 1867), p. 90. 
 
Anon., ‘Old Castles, Implements of War’, 3 (2 May 1868), p. 8. 
 
407 
 
Anon., ‘Our Historic Page: Richard Coeur de Lion’, 1 (6 June 1867), pp. 167-8. 
 
Anon., ‘Our Historic Page: The Battle of Hastings’, 1 (August 1867), pp. 293-4. 
 
Anon., ‘Robert Bruce’, 1 (26 October 1867), p. 455. 
 
Anon., ‘The Bow, Arrow, and Target: History of Archery in England’, 1 (April 1867), p. 5. 
 
Anon., ‘The Four Conquests of England’, 1 (10 April 1867), p. 14. 
 
Anon., ‘War Scene’, 1 (9 September 1855), p. 284. 
 
Emmett, George. ‘Captain Jack: Or one of the Light Brigade’, 3 (4 July 1868), pp. 145-7. 
 
 
Military Journals 
 
 
Aldershot Military Society Lectures  
 
J. Atkinson, ‘Sidelights on the History of the British Army’, 9 December 1913. 
 
C.E. Callwell, ‘Lessons to be Learnt from Small Wars since 1870’, 26 March 1895. 
 
Viscount Esher, ‘The Study of Modern History’, 15 January 1907.  
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘The Battle of Viller-sur-marne’, 29 November 1870. 
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘The Battlefield of Noisseville, 31 August 1870’, 16 January 1890.  
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘The American Civil War, 1861-5: The Composition, Organisation, System and 
Tactics of the Federal and Confederate Armies’, 9 February 1892.  
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘The American Civil War: A Resume of Some of the Principle Event of the War, 
Illustrative of the Strategy and Tactics of the Belligerents’, 16 February 1892.  
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘The Battle of Gettysburg’, 9 February 1893. 
 
W.G. Knox, ‘Personal Reminiscences of the Turco-Russian War, 1877-8’, 4 October 1888. 
 
T. Miller Maguire, ‘The British in the Iberian Peninsula, 1808-14’, 7 February 1905. 
 
T. Miller Maguire, ‘The Importance of the American War of 1861-1865 as a Strategical Study’, 1 
November 1892. 
 
T. Miller Maguire, ‘The Peninsular War, 1808-14 and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 Compared 
from the Strategical Point of View’, 16 November 1909. 
 
F.N. Maude, ‘Evolution of Modern Infantry Tactics’, 19 January 1904. 
 
J.W. O’Dowda, ‘A Summary of the Campaigns Which led up to the Wilderness Campaign in 1864’, 
12 November 1908.  
 
408 
 
G.W. Steevens, ‘The Downfall of Mahdism’, 22 November, 1898. 
 
Edmond Warre, ‘Lecture upon the History of Tactics’, 23 February 1888. 
 
 
Army and Navy Illustrated Magazine  
 
Anon., ‘Glories and Traditions of the British Army’, 5 (17 March 1898), pp. 322-30. 
 
Anon., ‘History of the 1st Battalion, the Blackwatch’, 5 (17 March 1898), p. 360. 
 
Anon., ‘Old Battlefields: Hastings’, 5 (18 February 1898), p. 270. 
 
Anon., ‘Our Cavalry Regiments’, 5 (7 January 1898), p. 173. 
 
Anon., ‘Our Service Bookshelf’, 5 (17 March 1898), p. 352. 
 
Anon., ‘The Regimental History the Royal Marines’, 5 (24 December 1897), p. 142. 
 
Anon., ‘The Soudan Campaign’, 5 (4 March 1898), p. 319. 
 
John Graham, ‘History of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst’, 5 (12 November 1897), pp. 36-7. 
 
A. Griffith, ‘Wellington and Waterloo’, 5 (21 January 1898), p. 213. 
 
A.C. Lovett, ‘The Glories and Traditions of the British Army: Gloucestershire Regiment’, 5 (19 
November 1897), pp. 49-58. 
 
Godfrey Merry, ‘The Story of Badajos’, 5 (29 October 1897), pp. 10-11. 
 
 
Colburn’s United Service Magazine 
 
Anon., ‘A French Infantry Officers Account of Waterloo’, 148 (September 1878), pp. 453-62. 
 
Anon., ‘A Reminiscence of the Crimean Campaign’, 126 (May 1871), pp. 346-59. 
 
Anon., ‘A Sketch of the Progress of Military Art’, 123 (May 1870), pp. 11-16, 109-15. 
 
Anon., ‘Battle of Tamai’, 161 (January 1884), pp. 164-7.  
 
Anon., ‘Episode of the Siege of Strasburg’, 128 (January 1872), pp. 500-21. 
 
Anon., ‘General Lee and the Fortunes of the Secession’, 132 (May 1873), pp. 205-19. 
 
Anon., ‘General von Clausewitz: On War’, 132 (May 1873), pp. 469-80, 469-82, and 133 (September 
1873), pp. 164-79. 
 
Anon., ‘German Tactics at Wörth and Gravelotte’, 130 (September 1872), pp. 40-51.  
 
Anon., ‘Historical Record of the Services of the Tenth, or Prince of Wales’ own Royal Regiment of 
Hussars’, 134 (January 1874), pp. 217-29, 378-99, 502-20. 
 
409 
 
Anon., ‘Historical Records of the Services of 27th Regiment of Foot’, 125 (January 1871), pp. 36-45.  
 
Anon., ‘History of the American Civil War’, 127 (September 1871), pp. 22-35. 
 
Anon., ‘History of the Highland Regiments’, 141 (May 1876), pp. 373-85. 
 
Anon., ‘Journal of an Officer of the 67th Regiment during the North China Campaign of 1860’, 134 
(January 1874), pp. 31-41, 171-85. 
 
Anon., ‘Marlborough’s Lieutenants: Lord Cutts’, 126 (May 1871), pp. 385-99, 510-20. 
 
Anon., ‘Marshal Bazaine and the Mysteries of Metz’, 129 (May 1872), pp. 24-35, 186-98. 
 
Anon., ‘Memoir of Field Marshal Lord Clyde’, 125 (January 1871), pp. 70-5, 267-76, 482-9. 
 
Anon., ‘Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Marion Durand’, 126 (May 1871), pp. 25-34. 
 
Anon., ‘Memorials of the History and Services of the Old Nineteenth Regiment of Light Dragoons 
(Lancers)’, 133 (September 1873), pp. 143-56, 314-25, 521-39. 
 
Anon., ‘Memorials of the History and Services of the Old Nineteenth Regiment of Light Dragoons 
(Lancers)’, 134 (January 1874), pp. 9-19. 
 
Anon., ‘Narrative of the War in Egypt’, 160 (September 1882), pp. 359-69.  
 
Anon., ‘Notes illustrative of the History and Services of the 85th Regiment of Foot’, 128 (January 
1872), pp. 103-10, 254-61, 427-35, 579-87. 
 
Anon., ‘Notes Illustrative of the History and Services of the Eighty-Fifth Regiment of Foot’, 129 
(May 1872), pp. 48-59, 205-20. 
 
Anon., ‘Notes of the History and Services of the Twenty-First Regiment’, 141 (May 1876), pp. 471-
85. 
 
Anon., ‘Notes on the History and Services of the 86th Regiment of Foot’, 148 (September 1878), pp. 
207-19. 
 
Anon., ‘Notes on the History of the 58th Regiment of Foot’, 145 (September 1877), pp. 187-98. 
 
Anon., ‘On Some Military Uses of Antiquarian Research’, 132 (May 1873), pp. 23-9.  
 
Anon., ‘Progress of Military Art’, 141 (May 1876), pp. 137-49. 
 
Anon., ‘Record of the Service of Rifle Brigade’, 126 (May 1871), pp. 73-9, 208-17, 334-41, 533-41. 
 
Anon., ‘Record of the Service of the Royal Fusiliers’, 131 (January 1873), pp. 74-83, 197-209.  
 
Anon., ‘Record of the Services of the 33rd Regiment of Foot’, 122 (January 1870), pp. 509-15.  
 
Anon., ‘Record of the Services of the Royal Fusiliers’, 130 (September 1872), pp. 57-69, 247-59, 
402-20, 512-29.  
 
Anon., ‘Remarks on the March of the Light Brigade before Talavera’, 132 (May 1873), pp. 54-62. 
410 
 
Anon., ‘Russian Campaigns in the Crimea during the Last Century’, 128 (January 1872), pp. 43-51.  
 
Anon., ‘Teachings of the War of 1870’, 125 (January 1871), pp. 475-99. 
 
Anon., ‘The Art of War as Against Barbaric Nations’, 150 (May 1879), pp. 288-93.  
 
Anon., ‘The Battle of Inkerman’, 137 (January 1875), pp. 351-7. 
 
Anon., ‘The Battle of Leipzig’, 149 (January 1879), pp. 363-7. 
 
Anon., ‘The Campaign of Metz’, 127 (September 1871), pp. 101-10, 208-16. 
 
Anon., ‘The Creator of History’, 127 (September 1871), pp. 5-16. 
 
Anon., ‘The Field of Waterloo in 1870’, 124 (September 1870), pp. 24-35. 
 
Anon., ‘The Niger Expedition of 1869’, 142 (September 1876), pp. 290-310.  
 
Anon., ‘The Norman Invasion and the English Archers’, 131 (January 1873), pp. 212-25.  
 
Anon., ‘The Rank and File at Waterloo’, 150 (May 1879), pp. 233-346.  
 
Anon., ‘The Royal Marines in the China War of 1840-2’, 139 (September 1875), pp. 350-69.  
 
Anon., ‘The Siege of Sebastopol’, 147 (May 1878), pp. 273-87.  
 
Anon., ‘The Staff at Salamanca’, 146 (January 1878), pp. 72-4. 
 
Anon., ‘The Storming of Jhansi: A Passage in the History of the Royal County Downs’, 146 (January 
1878), pp. 350-61.  
 
Anon., ‘True Causes of Prussian Success in 1866 and 1870’, 140 (January 1876), pp. 186-98.  
 
Anon., ‘Turkish Tactics in the War of 1877’, 145 (September 1877), pp. 249-61.  
 
Anon., ‘Wellington and Waterloo’, 123 (May 1870), pp. 24-35. 
 
W.H. Cromie, ‘A Russian Account of Balaclava’, 159 (May 1882), pp. 193-203. 
 
William Galloway, ‘Battle of Tofrek’, 170 (January 1888), pp. 241-59.  
 
C.L. Harvey, ‘The Secocoeni War, 1878-9’, 151 (September 1879), pp. 250-260. 
 
A. Hime, ‘The Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1877-78’, 151 (September 1879), pp. 251-7. 
 
H. Hime, ‘On the Misapplication of a priori Arguments in Tactical Questions’, 128 (January 1872), 
pp. 317-30. 
 
Prime Jones, ‘The Battle of Tours in 733’, 130 (September 1872), pp. 208-19.  
 
Prime Jones, ‘War and Warlike Science in the Fourteenth Century’, 137 (January 1875), pp. 457-69.  
W.W. Knollys, ‘Lessons Taught by the Franco-German War’, 169 (January 1887), pp. 97-108. 
 
411 
 
W.W. Knollys, ‘Early Days of Napoleon’, 162 (May 1884), pp. 581-93. 
 
W.W. Knollys, ‘Present Position of Tactics in England’, 162 (May 1884), pp. 41-59. 
 
A. Knox, ‘An Ex-Zouave’s Recollection of Sedan’, 150 (May 1879), pp. 317-30. 
 
A. Knox, ‘The Battle of Inkerman’, 158 (January 1882), pp. 29-39. 
 
E. O’Callaghan, ‘Siege and Capture of Venloo in 1702’, 162 (May 1884), pp. 60-66.  
 
E. O’Callaghan, ‘Anniversaries of British Victories’, 169 (May 1887), pp. 133-41. 
 
E. O’Callaghan, ‘Battle of Walcourt’, 161 (January 1884), pp. 318-27. 
 
E. O’Callaghan, ‘Repulse at Ticonderoga, in 1758’, 168 (January 1887), pp. 112-31. 
 
John Augustus O’Shea, ‘Lessons of the American War’, 169 (May 1887), pp. 45-58. 
 
Dudley Sampson, ‘Hodson’s Horse: A Historical Sketch of the 9th Bengal Cavalry’, 148 (September 
1878), pp. 301-16. 
 
Marion Smith, ‘The Massacre at Bronker’s Spruit on 20 December 1880, 160 (September 1882), pp. 
1-9. 
 
 
Journal of the Royal Artillery 
 
J.C. Dalton, ‘The Campaign of 1866 in Bohemia, up to, and including the 28 June’, 32 (April 1905), 
pp. 49-64. 
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘Experiences of the Past and their Application to the Present’, 35 (January 1907), pp. 
73-84.  
 
A. Keene, ‘Retreat from Kabul, 6 to 13 January 1842’, 34 (June 1906), pp. 83-9. 
 
E. Nash, ‘A Brief Summary of the Chitral Campaign, 1895’, 34 (May 1906), pp. 76-84. 
 
C.W.C. Oman, ‘The Battle of Busaco’, 34 (July 1906), pp. 508-15.  
 
C.W.C. Oman, ‘An Historical Sketch of the Battle of Maida’, 35 (November 1907), pp. 541-51.  
 
H. Rowan-Robinson, ‘A Short Account of the Tirah Campaign’, 32 (April 1905), pp. 513-20. 
 
 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 
 
R.A.S. Adair, ‘England, Her Wars and Expeditions since 1815’, 5 (January 1862), pp. 521-33. 
 
Anon., ‘Military History Examination, 1912’, 55 (May 1911), pp. 102-34. 
 
A. Hilliard Atteridge, ‘The Drongela Expedition of 1896’, 41 (June 1897), pp. 669-89. 
 
412 
 
Ellis Barker, ‘National and Non-National Armies: A Study in Military History’, 51 (February 1907), 
pp. 653-78.  
 
A. Bond, ‘Battles which have been Lost by Neglect on the Part of the Commanders of Acknowledged 
Rules and Principles of War’, 7 (January 1863), pp. 170-3. 
 
C.B. Brackenbury, ‘The Winter Campaign of Le Man’, 15 (May 1871), pp. 580-600. 
 
Charles Callwell, ‘Military Prize Essay: Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British 
Forces have been Employed since the Year 1865’, 31 (July 1887), pp. 357-412.  
 
Charles Chesney, ‘Sherman Campaign in Georgia’, 9 (January 1865), pp. 204-20. 
 
Charles Chesney, ‘The Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland’, 7 (May 1863), pp. 292-307.  
 
E.E.H. Collen, ‘The Battle of Wörth’, 17 (January 1873), pp. 426-71.  
 
W.H.M. Dixon, ‘An Outline of Studies Recommended to a Young Officer’, 6 (February 1862), pp. 
84-99. 
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘The Professional Study of Military History’, 41 (June 1897), pp. 690-721.  
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘The Study of Military History by the Regimental Officer of the Army’, 20 (July 
1876), pp. 259-90. 
 
E.B. Hamley, ‘The Campaign of Marengo’, 4 (January 1860), pp. 25-44. 
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘Strategy and its Teaching’, 42 (July 1898), pp. 761-86.  
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘Red Indian Warfare’, 35 (February 1891), pp. 181-4. 
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘Lessons from the Past for the Present’, 38 (January 1894), pp. 201-25. 
 
T. Miller Maguire, ‘The National Study of Military History’, 41 (May 1897), pp. 598-622.  
 
 
Journal of the United Service Institution 
 
George Robert Gleig, ‘On the Armies of Ancient Greece’, 1 (January 1858), pp. 30-50. 
 
P. L. MacDougall, ‘On Napoleon’s Campaign in Italy in 1796’, 3 (January 1859), pp. 195-208. 
 
 
Professional Papers of the Royal Engineers  
 
A.O. Green, ‘The Battle of Lovcha’, 3 (December 1877), p. 73. 
 
Helsham Jones, ‘The Campaigns of Lord Lake against the Marathas, 1804-1806’, 8 (1882), p. 33. 
 
Helsham Jones, ‘The History and Geography of Afghanistan’, 3, No. 9 (1877), p. 89. 
 
 
 
413 
 
United Service Magazine  
 
A.F. Becke, ‘The Waterloo Campaign: An Appreciation of the Situation from the Points of View of a 
French Staff Officer on June 1st 1815’, 36 (February, 1908), pp. 508-23.  
 
C.E. de la Poer Bereford, ‘Metz and the Fields Around’, 14 (October 1896), pp. 81-9. 
 
C.E. de la Poer Bereford, ‘The Turko-Grecian War’, United Service Magazine, 16 (October 1898), pp. 
79-85. 
 
L.W.G. Butler, ‘Battle of Flodden, 1513’, 18 (January, 1899), pp. 399-413. 
 
L.W.G. Butler, ‘Minor Expeditions of the British Army from 1803-1815’, 28 (January 1905), pp. 388-
403. 
 
W.P. Drury, ‘The Katmu-Dogbank War’, 17 (September 1898), pp. 665-71. 
 
Lonsdale Hale, ‘The German Staff Failure at Villersexel’, 17 (July 1898), pp. 405-22.  
 
G.F.R. Henderson, ‘Studies in Troop-leading by General von Verdy’, 6 (October-March 1892-93), pp. 
306-20, 433-50. 
 
George Hooper, ‘The Sudan Campaign’, 1 (April-September 1890), pp. 162-72. 
 
J.R. Little, ‘The Moral Element in Strategy: An Example from the Operations in Virginia in 1862’, 36 
(July 1908), pp. 405-13.  
 
E.M. Lloyd, ‘The Last French Charge at Waterloo’, 21 (April 1900), pp. 58-65. 
 
T.M. Maguire, ‘General Clausewitz’s On War’, 36 (February 1908), pp. 524-30.  
 
T.M. Maguire, ‘The Campaign of 1813 in the Iberian Peninsula’, 18 (December 1898), pp. 293-300. 
 
T.M. Maguire, ‘Austerlitz’, 44 (October 1912), pp. 20-29. 
 
T.M. Maguire, ‘Campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula’, 18 (November 1898), pp. 202-14. 
 
T.M. Maguire, ‘The Battle of Spottsylvania’, 36 (October 1908), pp. 63-71. 
 
T.M. Maguire, ‘The Campaign of 1805’, 44 (August 1912), pp. 518-30. 
 
T.M. Maguire, ‘The Campaigns in Bohemia’, 36 (October 1907), pp. 69-77. 
 
Henry Elliot Malden, ‘The Art of War Before and After the Renaissance Period’, 22 (November 
1900), pp. 191-201.  
 
Henry Elliot Malden, ‘The Battle of Tewkesbury’, 21 (May 1900), pp. 163-70. 
 
Henry Elliot Malden, ‘The Campaign of Lewes’, 20 (October 1899), pp. 37-44.  
 
Hugh Martin, ‘Kassala: An Historical Sketch’, 18 (October 1898), pp. 55-70. 
 
F.N. Maude, ‘The Evolution of Modern Strategy’, 28 (November 1903), pp. 136-48. 
414 
 
F.N. Maude, ‘Notes on the Evolution of Cavalry’, 21 (June 1900), pp. 220-36. 
 
F.N. Maude, ‘Thoughts on the Campaign of 1815’, 22 (February 1901), pp. 485-90. 
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘Sir Hamley and Lord Wolseley’, 11 (April-September 1895), pp. 414-24, 439-51. 
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘The Coruna Centenary’, 37 (January 1909), pp. 345-8.  
 
J.F. Maurice, ‘Waterloo’, 1 (April-September 1890), pp. 61-76, 137-49, 257-64, 344-56, 533-41.  
 
William O’Connor Morris, ‘Frederick the Great: War from the Close of the War of the Spanish 
Succession to the Seven Years War’, 21 (September 1900), pp. 602-12. 
 
William O’Connor Morris, ‘The Beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession: Marlborough’s 
First Campaigns’, 20 (October 1899), pp. 24-36. 
 
William O’Connor Morris, ‘Turenne’, 18 (December 1898), pp. 262-72. 
 
‘N’, ‘The Study of Military History’, 44 (February 1912), pp. 496-502. 
 
Hugh Pearse, ‘The Kaffir and Basuto Campaigns of 1852 and 1853’, 17 (August 1898), pp. 520-36.  
 
Antonio G. Perez, ‘Some Episodes of the Ten Years’ War in Cuba’, 18 (October 1898), pp. 89-103. 
 
G.W. Redway, ‘The Shenandoah Campaign’, 40 (February 1910), pp. 522-30.  
 
H.T. Russell, ‘The Balkan War of 1912’, 46 (December 1912), pp. 286-300. 
 
E.W. Sheppard, ‘The Campaign of 1815 as it Appears To-day’, 40 (December 1909), pp. 285-91.  
 
S.T. Sheppard, ‘The Study of Military History’, 28 (November 1903), pp. 149-52.  
 
C. Slack, ‘The Battle of New Orleans’, 21 (May 1900), pp. 190-201. 
 
A.K. Slessor, ‘The Universities and the Army’, 22 (February 1901), pp. 516-27.  
 
C. de Thierry, ‘The Wars of the United States’, 17 (August 1898), pp. 547-55. 
 
A. Turner, ‘The Retreat From Moscow, and the Passage of the Beresine’, 12 (October-March 1896-
97), pp. 335-46, 463-71, 585-91. 
 
Spenser Wilkinson, ‘Military Literature and the British Army’, 2 (April 1891), pp. 507-24.  
 
Charles Williams, ‘The Nile Campaign: A Reply to Mr. Forbes’, 4 (October-March 1892), pp. 418-
29.  
 
F.R. Wingate, ‘The Siege and Fall of Khartoum’, 4 (October-March 1892), pp. 406-19, 537-49. 
 
Garnet Wolseley, ‘The Franco-Prussian War’, 4 (October-March 1892), pp. 89-99, 185-99.  
 
Garnet Wolseley, ‘The Study of War’, 2 (March 1890), pp. 481-92. 
 
 
415 
 
IV. Secondary Sources  
 
 
Books 
 
Richard D Altick, English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public, 1800-1900 
(Chicago, 1957). 
 
Anon., Collected Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout with a Memoir and Bibliography (Manchester, 
1932). 
 
Michael Asher, Khartoum (London, 2005). 
 
G. Aston, The Study of War (London, 1927). 
 
John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds.), Leo Amery Diaries, 2 vols. (London, 1980). 
 
Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English (Oxford, 1994). 
 
Ian Baucom, Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity (London, 1999). 
 
Ian F.W. Beckett, The Victorians at War (London, 2003). 
 
Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History (London, 2008). 
 
Brian Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History (London, 1991). 
 
Brian Bond, Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London, 1972). 
 
Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training and Deploying the 
British Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford, 2012). 
 
Henry Brackenbury, Some Memoires of My Spare Time (Edinburgh, 1909). 
 
C.N.L. Brooke, A History of the University of Cambridge, 1870-1990, Vol. 4. (Cambridge, 1993). 
 
J.W Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge, 1981). 
 
J.W. Burrow, History of Histories (London, 2007). 
 
Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London, 1931). 
 
Charles Callwell, Stray Recollections, 2 vols. (London, 1923). 
 
F.G. Cardew, Second Afghan War, 1878-1880 (London, 1908). 
 
Kevin Carpenter, Penny Dreadfuls and Comics (London, 1983). 
 
Gautum Chakravarty, The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination (Cambridge, 2005). 
 
V. Chancellor, History for their Masters: Opinion in the English Textbook (New York, 1970). 
 
S.B. Chaudhuri, English Historical Writings on the Indian Mutiny, 1857-1859 (Calcutta, 1979). 
416 
 
Winston Churchill, My Early Life (London, 1948). 
 
Sonia Clarke, Zululand at War 1879: The Conduct of the Anglo-Zulu War (Brenthurst, 1984). 
 
B.S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, 1996). 
 
Stefan Collini and Brian Young (eds.), History, Religion and Culture: British Intellectual History, 
1750-1950 (Cambridge, 2000). 
 
Steven J. Corvi and Ian F.W. Beckett (eds.), Victoria’s Generals (London, 2009). 
 
Martin van Creveld, The Culture of War (New York, 2008). 
 
William Cruise, A Chronological Abridgement of the History of England, its Constitution and Laws 
from the Norman Conquest to the Revolution in 1688 (London, 1815). 
 
Saul David, The Indian Mutiny (London, 2002). 
 
Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities 
(London, 1994). 
 
Arthur Conan Doyle, Memoires and Adventures and Western Wanderings (London, 1924). 
 
Peter Doyle and Matthew Bennett, Fields of Battle (London, 2002). 
 
T.N. Dupuy, International Military and Defence Encyclopaedia (Washington, 1993). 
 
Richard J. Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent 
(Cambridge, 2009). 
 
Thomas G. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence 1870-1914: The Development of the Modern 
Intelligence Organisation (London, 1984). 
 
David Finkelstein, The House of Blackwood: Author Publisher Relations in the Victorian Era 
(Pennsylvania, 2002). 
 
Kate Flint (ed.), The Cambridge History of Victorian Literature (Cambridge, 2012). 
 
G.K. Fortescue, Subject Index of the Modern Works Added to the Library of the British Museum in the 
Years 1881-1900 (London, 1902). 
 
John W. Fortescue, Author and Curator (Edinburgh, 1933). 
 
David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, The British Army, and the British People c. 
1870-2000 (Oxford, 2005). 
 
J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure. A Study of the Personal Factor in Command 
(London 1932). 
 
J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London, 1926). 
 
J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S Grant (London, 1929). 
 
417 
 
J.F.C. Fuller, The Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars (London, 1937). 
 
J.F.C. Fuller, The Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (London, 1936). 
 
J.F.C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization 1832 -1932, The Study of War as a Political Instrument 
and the Expression of Mass Democracy (London, 1932). 
 
Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1992). 
 
Gerald de Gaury, Travelling Gent: The Life of Alexander Kinglake 1809-1891 (London 1872). 
 
A. R. Godwin Austen, The Staff and the Staff College (London, 1927). 
 
John Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1920). 
 
John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 
(London, 1974). 
 
Jeffery Gray (ed.), The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British 
Commonwealth (London, 2003). 
 
Andrew Green, Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915-1948 
(London, 2003). 
 
Paddy Griffith, Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future (Swindon, 
1990). 
 
Ian Hamilton, Listening for the Drums (London, 1944). 
 
Basil Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (London, 1933). 
 
Basil Liddell Hart, Remaking Modern Armies (London, 1927). 
 
Basil Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn From History? (London, 1972). 
 
Basil Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London, 1932). 
 
Frederick R. Hartesveldt, The Boer War: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (London, 
2000). 
 
Christopher Herbert, War of No Pity: The Indian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma (Princeton, 2008). 
 
Robin Higham (ed.), Official Histories: Essays and Bibliographies from Around the World 
(Manhattan, 1970). 
 
Robin Higham (ed.), Official History Offices and Sources (London, 2000). 
 
Robin Higham (ed.), The Writing of Official History (London, 1999). 
 
Brian Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought (Lincoln, 1998). 
 
Richard Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London, 2001). 
 
418 
 
Walter E. Houghton (ed.), The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900, 5 Vols. (Toronto, 
1966-89). 
 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard & Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976). 
 
Leslie Howsam, Past into Print: The Publishing of History in Britain, 1850-1950 (London, 2009). 
 
P. Inman, United Kingdom Civil Series: Labour in the Munitions Industries (London, 1957). 
 
Wilson Chacko Jacob, Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial 
Modernity 1870-1940 (Durham, 2011). 
 
Peter Kendall, The Royal Engineers at Chatham 1750-2012 (Swindon, 2012). 
 
Henry Keown-Boyd, Good Dusting: The Sudan Campaigns 1883-1899 (London, 1986). 
 
David Killingray and David Omissi, Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of Colonial Powers 
(Manchester, 2009). 
 
Robert J. Kirkpatrick, From the Penny Dreadful to the Ha’Penny Dreadfuller: A Bibliographic 
History of the Boys’ Periodical in Britain 1762-1950 (London, 2013). 
 
Ian Knight, Zulu Rising (London, 2010). 
 
John Laband, Companion to the Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 
1879 (London, 1989). 
 
Jay Luvaas, The Civil War: A Soldiers View, A Collection of Civil War Writings by G.F.R. Henderson 
(Chicago, 1958). 
 
Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (London, 1965). 
 
Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Chicago, 1959). 
 
A.M. Macdonald (ed.), Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (London, 1878). 
 
S. Maiguashca, Juan Macintyre and Attlia Pók (ed.), The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Vol. 4: 
1800-1945 (London, 2011). 
 
John MacKenzie (ed.), Popular Imperialism and the Military (Manchester, 1992). 
 
John MacKenzie (ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1986) 
 
Franklin D. Margiotta (ed.), Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography 
(Washington, 2000). 
 
Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language (Houndmills, 2001). 
 
Frederick Barton Maurice, Sir Frederick Maurice: A Record of his Work and Opinions (London, 
1913). 
 
Frederick Barton Maurice, The Life of Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London, 1928). 
 
419 
 
Simone Andre Maurois, Miss Howard: La Femme qui fit un Empereur (Paris, 1956). 
 
John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (New York, 1988). 
 
Antoine-Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans by G.H. Mendell & W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia, 
1868). 
 
Charles Messenger (ed.) A Reader’s Guide to Military History (London, 2001). 
 
David Mitch, The Rise of Popular Literacy in Victorian England: The Influence of Private Choice and 
Public Policy (Pennsylvania, 1992). 
 
Stephen Morillo and Michael F Pavkovic, What is Military History? (Cambridge, 2012). 
 
W. Murray and R.H. Sinnreich (eds.), The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the 
Military Profession (Cambridge, 2006). 
 
Fergus Nicoll, Gladstone, Gordon, and the Sudan Wars (London, 2013). 
 
Charles Oman, Memories of Victorian Oxford (Oxford, 1941). 
 
David Omissi, The Sepoy and Raj (London, 1998). 
 
Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London, 1979). 
 
Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (London, 1991). 
 
Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (London, 1986). 
 
Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture 1850-2000 (London, 2000). 
 
Christopher Parker, The English Historical Tradition Since 1850 (Edinburgh, 1990). 
 
B.A.H. Parritt, The Intelligencers: British Military Intelligence from the Middle Ages to 1929 
(Barnsley, 2011). 
 
H.L. Peacock, History of Modern Britain, 1815-1981 (London, 4th edn., 1982). 
 
Roger Perkins, Regiments: Regiments and Corps of the British Empire and Commonwealth 1738-
1993: A Critical Bibliography of their Published Histories (Newton Abbott, 1994). 
 
Markus Pöhlmann, Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: Der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche 
deutsche Geschichtsschreibung 1914-1956 (Paderborn, 2002). 
 
Brian Holden Reid, J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker (London, 1987). 
 
Charles â Court Repington, Vestigia (London, 1919). 
 
Michael Rice, From Dolly Gray to Sarie Marais: The Boer War in Popular Memory (Surry, 2004). 
 
Adam Riches, When the Comic Went to War (London, 2009). 
 
Walter Ruegg (ed.), History of the University in Europe, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 2004). 
420 
 
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London, 1993). 
 
Edward Said, Orientalism (London, 1978). 
 
Alexander Innes Shand, The Life of General Edward Bruce Hamley (Edinburgh, 1895). 
 
Alan Sheppard, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and its Predecessors (London 1980). 
 
Yumna Siddiqi, Anxieties of Empire and the Fiction of Intrigue (Columbia, 2008). 
 
Peter R.H. Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education: The Study of Modern History in the Universities 
of Oxford, Cambridge and Manchester 1800-1914 (Manchester, 1986). 
 
John Smyth, Sandhurst (London, 1961). 
 
Edward Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester, 1992). 
 
Daniel Stashower, Jon Lellenberg, and Charles Foley (eds.), Arthur Conan Doyle: Life in Letters 
(London, 2007). 
 
Jules Steward, On Afghanistan’s Plains (New York, 2011). 
 
Hew Strachan, From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology, and the British Army 1815-1854 
(London, 1985). 
 
Hew Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy: The Reform of the British Army 1830-54 (London, 1984). 
 
Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York, 2011). 
 
Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
2013) 
 
Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture 1857-
1914 (Manchester, 2004). 
 
Alvin Sullivan (ed.), British Literary Magazines: The Victorian and Edwardian Age, 1837-1913 (New 
York, 1984). 
 
T.H.E.Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front & The Emergence of 
Modern War 1900-1918 (London, 2009). 
 
W. Tuckwell, A.W. Kinglake: Biographical and Literary Study (London, 1902). 
 
Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (London, 1959). 
 
P.H. Vickers, ‘A Gift So Graciously Bestowed’: The History of the Prince Consort’s Library 
(Aldershot, 2010). 
 
Alexis Weedon, Victorian Publishing: The Economics of Victorian Book Production for a Mass 
Market, 1836-1916 (London, 2003). 
 
Craig Wilcox, Recording the South African War: Journalism and Official History 1899-1914 
(London, 1999). 
421 
 
Journal Articles 
 
Anon., ‘Four Generations of Staff College Students’, Army Quarterly, 65 (October 1952), p. 44-66. 
 
H. Baile, ‘Patterns of Thought in the Late Victorian Army’, Journals of Strategic Studies, 4 (March, 
1981), pp. 29-45.  
 
Ian F.W. Beckett, ‘Early Historians and the South African War’, Sandhurst Journal of Military 
Studies, 1 (February, 1990), pp. 15-32. 
 
Martin Blumenson, ‘Can Official History Be Honest History?’ Military Affairs (Winter 1962-63), pp. 
153-161. 
 
B. Robert Bruce, ‘The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present’, Journal 
of Military History, 71 (April 2007), pp. 550-551. 
 
John M. Carland, ‘The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British 
Commonwealth’, Journal of Military History, 68 (October 2004), pp. 1316-1317. 
 
John Whiteclay Chambers, ‘The New Military History: Myth and Reality’, Journal of Military 
History, 55 (July, 1991), pp. 395-406. 
 
Stetson Conn, ‘The Pursuit of Military History’, Military Affairs, 30 (Spring, 1966), pp. 1-8. 
 
Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ‘Military History of the Military Professional’, Parameters 1 (Winter 
1972), pp. 28-35. 
 
Gary P. Cox, ‘Aphorisms, Lessons, and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official 
Histories of the Russo-Japanese War’, Journal of Military History, 56 (April 1992), pp. 389-401. 
 
H. Cunningham, ‘Jingoism in 1877-78’, Victorian Studies, 14 (1971), pp. 429-53. 
 
H. Cunningham, ‘The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914’, Victorian Studies, 14 (1971), pp. 8-33. 
 
P.A. Dunae, ‘Boys Literature and the Idea of Empire, 1870-1914’, Victorian Studies, 24 (Autumn 
1980), pp. 105-121. 
 
Maury Feld, ‘The Writing of Military History’, Military Affairs, 22 (Spring 1958), pp. 38-39. 
 
David Finkelstein, ‘“The Secret”: British Publishers and Mudie’s Struggle for Economic Survival 
1861-4’, Publishing History, 34 (1993), pp. 21-50. 
 
David French, ‘“Official but Not History?” Sir James Edmonds and the Official History of the Great 
War’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, 131, (No. 1, 1986), pp. 58-63. 
 
J.F.C Fuller, ‘The Place of the American Civil War in the Evolution of War’, Army Quarterly, 26 
(July 1933), pp. 320-341. 
T.F. Gallagher, ‘British Military Thinking and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War’, Military 
Affairs, 39 (1975), pp. 19-22. 
 
Felix Gilbert, ‘From Clausewitz to Delbrück and Hintze: Achievements and Failures of Military 
History’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 (December 1980), pp. 11-20. 
 
422 
 
John Gooch, ‘Clio and Mars: The Use and Abuse of Military History’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 
(December 1980), pp. 21-36. 
 
Brian Holden Reid, “A Signpost That Was Missed”? Reconsidering British Lessons from the 
American Civil War’, Journal of Military History, 70 (April 2006), pp. 385-414. 
 
Michael Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History’, Parameters, 11 (March 1981), pp. 9-14. 
 
Michael Howard, ‘What is Military History Today?’, History Today, 34 (December 1984), pp. 5-13. 
 
D.H. Johnson, ‘Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 10 (May 1982), pp. 302-331. 
 
J.A. Mangan, ‘Images of Empire in the Late Victorian Public School’, Journal of Educational 
Administration and History, 12 (January 1980), pp. 31-39. 
 
Maurice Matloff, ‘Government and Public History: The Army’, Public Historian, 2 (Spring, 1980), 
pp. 43-51. 
 
Allan, R. Millett, ‘The Study of American Military History in the United States’, Military Affairs, 41 
(April, 1977), pp. 58-61. 
 
C.B. Otley. ‘The Educational Background of British Army Officers’, Sociology, 7 (1973), pp. 213-40. 
 
Douglas Porch, ‘Military History’, The Historical Journal, 29 (April 1986), pp. 497-505. 
 
Stefan T. Possony, and Smith, Dale O. ‘The Utility of Military History’, Military Affairs, 22 (Winter 
1958-59), pp. 216-18. 
 
Brian Robson, ‘The Strange Case of the Missing Official History’, Soldiers of the Queen: Journal of 
the Victorian Military Society, No. 4 (March 1994), pp. 3-6. 
 
Alaric Searle, ‘Inter-Service Debate and the Origins of Strategic Culture: The “Principles of War” in 
the British Armed Forces, 1919-1939, War in History, 21 (Jan. 2014), pp. 4-32. 
 
L. Ronald Spiller, ‘Military History and Its Fictions’, Journal of Military History, 70 (October 2006), 
pp. 1081-1097. 
 
L. Ronald Spiller, ‘What is Military History’, Journal of Military History, 72 (April 2008), pp. 543-
544. 
 
R.T. Stearn, ‘Archibald Forbes and the British Army’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 17 (1989), pp. 6-9. 
 
Heather Streets, ‘Military Influence in Late Victorian and Edwardian Popular Media: The Case of 
Frederick Roberts’, Journal of Victorian Culture, 8 (June 2003), pp. 231-56. 
 
A. Summers, ‘Militarism in Britain before the Great War’, History Workshop, 2 (1976), pp. 104-23. 
 
T.H.E. Travers, ‘The Development of British Military Historical Writing and Thought from the 
Eighteenth Century to the Present’, in David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson (eds.), 
Military History and the Military Profession (London, 1992), pp. 23-44 
 
